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# THE CONSULATE AND EMPIRE OF FRANCE

VOL. VI.

Coutière sc

MARSHAL BESSIERES

# HISTORY OF THE CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE OF FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON

By LOUIS ADOLPHE THIERS

TRANSLATED, WITH THE SANCTION AND APPROVAL
OF THE AUTHOR, BY
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With Thirty-six Steel Plates

*IN TWELVE VOLUMES*
VOL. VI.

London
CHATTO & WINDUS, PICCADILLY
PHILADELPHIA: J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY
1894

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1893
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# HISTORY OF THE CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE OF FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON.

## BOOK XXXII.

### ERFURTH.

THE months of June and July, during which were accomplished the events which we have just narrated, were spent by Napoleon at Bayonne and in the departments situated at the foot of the Pyrenees. He visited in succession Pau, Auch, Toulouse, Montauban, and Bordeaux, and was everywhere received with transport by populations, always delighted to hail the passing appearance of the sovereign who for a moment occupies their leisure, but now more than usually eager to behold that extraordinary sovereign who so justly excited their curiosity and admiration. The Basques performed before him their graceful and picturesque dances, and impetuous Toulouse displayed all its customary vivacity of sentiment. Scarcely anything was known even in those provinces about the events in Spain, for Napoleon permitted nothing to be published that was contrary to his own views. It was known indeed, by means of the communications inevitably subsisting between the two opposite slopes of the Pyrenees, that Aragon was in insurrection, and that the establishment of King Joseph was encountering some rather serious difficulties; but no importance was attached to any resistance which unhappy Spain, enfeebled and disorganised by twenty years of bad government, could offer to the vanquisher of the continent. The people, therefore, shared in their sovereign's delusion respecting the progress of events beyond the Pyrenees. They ceased not to regard him as the emblem of success, power, and genius. At the very most, a few obstinate old royalists, rendered prophetic by their vindictive feelings, predicted at random disasters that should trace their origin to Spain. But the multitude ran with noisy enthusiasm

to greet the restorer of order, of religion, and of the greatness of France. They still believed him fortunate at the moment when he was beginning to be so no longer, and when a ray of sadness had already shot into his daring and intrepid heart.

When he quitted Bayonne, Napoleon was disabused of almost all his illusions regarding the affairs of Spain. He knew the extent and violence of the insurrection; he was informed of the retreat of Marshal Moncey, the obstinate resistance of Saragossa, and the difficulties which General Dupont had encountered in Andalusia. But he knew also of the brilliant victory won by Marshal Bessières at Rio Seco, the entry of Joseph into Madrid, the numerous succours sent to Dupont, and the great preparations for attack made before Saragossa. He flattered himself, therefore, that Marshal Bessières would follow up his advantages, and drive back the northern insurgents into Galicia; that with reinforcements sent him, Dupont would repel the southern insurgents to Seville, perhaps to Cadiz; that one day or other Saragossa would be taken, and that it would be possible, with the old regiments which were coming, to reinforce sufficiently the various divisions of our army, and gradually to consummate the submission of Spain. A victory on the Guadalquivir like that of Rio Seco would have sufficed to substitute these brilliant results for the sad ones we have just depicted; but unhappily it was Baylen, instead of another Rio Seco, that was to be inscribed in the bloody and heroic history of that time! As for Portugal, there had been no news from it, absolutely none, for more than a month.

It was at Bordeaux, where he passed the first three days of August, that Napoleon became aware of that eternally deplorable catastrophe of Baylen. The affliction it caused him, his sense of the humiliation endured by the French arms, the bursts of rage to which he gave way, are not to be described. They have left a deep impression on the memory of all around him, as I have a hundred times gathered from their own lips. His mortification exceeded that which he had experienced at Boulogne on learning that Admiral Villeneuve declined entering the British Channel; for to defeat was added dishonour, the first and only dishonour inflicted on his glorious banners. Charles IV. and Ferdinand VII. were avenged! Pious souls in all ages have believed that beyond this life there is a remuneration for good and for evil, and the wise have regarded this belief as accordant with the general scheme of things. But there is a remark which all profound observers have likewise made, namely, that even in this life events carry with them a certain remuneration for good and for evil. The violation of good sense, reason, and justice soon encounters here below a just and first chastisement. God, no doubt, has appointed another place and time for finally

balancing the account of the master of an empire as well as of the humblest swain.

Napoleon perceived at a glance all the probable consequences of the occurrence of Baylen; the discouragement it would cause in the French army; the enthusiastic energy it would infuse into the insurgents; and he regarded the evacuation of almost the whole Peninsula as certain, before information of that event had reached him. The despatches that hourly arrived soon acquainted him with the extent to which the consequences of the disaster were doomed to be aggravated under the rule of a good but weak and vain prince. Had Murat been King of Spain, he would have rallied all his remaining troops and fallen upon Castaños before the latter had entered Madrid. Joseph, weak Joseph, through ignorance still more than timidity, retreated in all haste to the Ebro, raised the siege of Saragossa, a town half won, stopped Bessières in his victorious march, and scarcely believed himself safe when he had put the Ebro behind him and had his foot already on the Pyrenees.

The least important consequences of this disaster were those which concerned Spain only; its European consequences were far more momentous. The dejected enemies of France took courage again. Austria, always engaged in preparations for war since the Polish campaign, feignedly quiescent since the convention that had given her back Braunau, excited anew by the events of Bayonne, and super-excited by those of Baylen, was now becoming hostile. Her apparent rupture with England, procured by force of threats, was about to be changed into a close and secret alliance with that power. And it was in the face of such a state of things that it was necessary to recall a part of the grand army from the banks of the Vistula and the Elbe to be transferred to the Ebro and the Tagus! From a triumphant position Napoleon was, through his own fault, about to enter upon one of difficulty at least, and one that called for the fullest display of his genius. He was strong enough certainly to meet the crisis, for the grand army was still entire, and capable of crushing Austria even after sending off a strong detachment to Spain. But from being absolute arbiter of events, as he had been in 1807, Napoleon was now reduced to the necessity of struggling to control them. These were weighty cares, and they were aggravated by mortified pride. He had deceived himself, visibly deceived himself: of that fact nobody in Europe could entertain a doubt. His invincible soldiers had been beaten, and by whom? By undisciplined bands of insurgents; and public opinion, that inconstant harlot who delights in forsaking those she has flattered most, would doubtless exaggerate the event by concealing the facts that explained it, such as the youth of the soldiers, the influence of climate, an

unparalleled combination of unfortunate circumstances; in fine, the momentary error of a general of incontestable ability. Doubtless that fickle opinion would depreciate at once the political foresight of Napoleon and the heroic valour of his armies. The great man's self-love and his prudence were both assailed by this disastrous news, and he was punished, punished in every way—punished as offenders are wont to be by infallible Providence. Still the blow might prove to be but a salutary warning, and he might yet triumph over the momentary disaster, and triumph so completely as to remain all-potent in Europe, if he knew how to profit by that first bitter lesson.

What often happens happened in this case: an unfortunate man who had his share, and no more than his share, in a series of blunders, paid the penalty for everybody. Deeply incensed against General Dupont, and descrying with his superior sagacity the military errors which the latter had committed, and which sufficed to explain everything,* but suffering himself also to believe all the dishonouring suppositions which malevolence added thereto, Napoleon exclaimed that Dupont was a traitor, a dastard, a wretch, who had lost his army for the sake of saving a few waggons, and that he would have him shot. "They have sullied our uniform," he said, in speaking of Dupont and the other generals; "it shall be washed in their blood." Accordingly he ordered that General Dupont and his lieutenants should be arrested on their arrival in France, and delivered up to the high imperial court. But real as his anger was in the main, it was also to a certain degree feigned. He wished to account to those about him for the disappointments experienced in Spain by attributing the unexpected turn of events to the errors, the pretended crimes, and the dastardy of one general. Docile to his will, the servile courtiers soon railed implacably against General Dupont. That unfortunate man had erred in judgment, as we have seen, and had been prostrated by a combination of overwhelming circumstances; and now he was at once proclaimed a coward and a robber that deserved capital punishment. After all, these insults were still confined to the circle of the imperial staff; for in order to restrain as much as he could the babbling tongue of rumour, Napoleon had forbidden the publication of anything relating to Spain; and that none might suspect the extent of the difficulties he had

* There exists, as I have said, in the archives of the Secrétaire d'Etat a minute of the questions addressed to General Dupont by order of Napoleon. With the help of that document an exact idea may be formed of the opinion Napoleon had conceived of the catastrophe of Baylen and the conduct of General Dupont. He saw plainly the military faults which sufficed to explain the catastrophe; but he allowed himself to be influenced for a while by the calumnious rumours propagated respecting General Dupont, and he caused the latter to be interrogated on the subject of them, without himself putting much faith in them. Some time afterwards he had ceased to believe them altogether.

brought upon himself, he had applied that prohibition to the victory of Rio Seco no less than to the capitulation of Baylen. Involved in that catastrophe, Marshal Bessières saw the fairest exploit of his military life covered by the same veil that hung over the disaster of General Dupont. But the English press soon conveyed, not to the multitude, but to the enlightened classes, the knowledge of the reverses sustained by our armies in Spain. Moreover, the exasperation against General Dupont, because he had succumbed, became so violent, that Napoleon's dormant generosity was stirred, and he exclaimed frequently, "The unfortunate man! What a fall after Albeck, Halle, Friedland! What a thing war is! One day, one single day is enough to tarnish the lustre of a lifetime." And thus contradicting himself, he fell into the habit of saying that Dupont had only been unlucky; and his genius, discerning the hard conditions of human life, seemed to behold his own destiny written in that of one of his lieutenants.

The discreet and quick-witted people of Bordeaux gave him magnificent entertainments, at which he appeared with a serene aspect, and without betraying any of the feelings that filled his soul. To those who, without venturing to question him, nevertheless touched, in talking to him, upon the grand object that had brought him to the south, he said that some peasants, wrought to fanaticism by priests, and hired by England, were endeavouring to embarrass his brother, but that *he had never seen a more cowardly rabble since he had been in the service;* that Marshal Bessières had put several thousands of them to the sword; that a few French squadrons were enough to put to flight a whole army of those Spanish insurgents; that the Peninsula would ere long be subjected to the sceptre of King Joseph; and that the provinces of the south of France, to which it was of so much interest that good relations should be maintained with Spain, should reap the principal fruit of this new enterprise. Those with whom he conversed believed whatever he pleased whilst their eyes were on him, and they were satisfied; but when his back was turned, their thoughts assumed a very different complexion on learning, through commercial correspondence, the momentous facts that were occurring beyond the Pyrenees.

Napoleon would have wished to proceed without any delay from Bordeaux to Paris, in order to apply himself to his three pressing occupations of the moment—the explanation with Austria, the consolidation of the union with Russia, and the transference of a part of the grand army from the Vistula to the Ebro. But he had promised to pass through La Vendée, and he would have appeared either to regard that province with distrust, or to have such formidable business on hand as

compelled him to break all his engagements. Now he had made one with the Vendéans which he could not and would not break without absolute necessity. He resolved, therefore, to journey by way of Rochefort, La Rochelle, Niort, Napoleon-Vendée, Nantes, Saumur, Tours, and Orleans, dictating his orders on the road, receiving hundreds of despatches at every station, and sending off as many as he received.

He arrived at Rochefort on the 5th, and was hailed with enthusiasm by a wholly maritime population, whose arsenals and dockyards had become doubly active under his reign. He visited the Isle of Aix and the works at Fort Bayard, glad to examine personally those places respecting which he was constantly giving orders of the greatest importance. Curiosity, admiration, and gratitude drew the urban and rural populations around him. Proceeding from Rochefort to La Rochelle, Niort, and Napoleon-Vendée, he was everywhere greeted with every demonstration of respect by immense multitudes. The prodigious man who had rescued those provinces from civil war, and had given them back quiet, safety, prosperity, and the exercise of their religion, was in their eyes more than a man; he was a sort of demigod. But just punished in Spain for the evil he had done, Napoleon was now recompensed for the good he had accomplished in France! If he had suffered for his bad deeds, he enjoyed the fruits of his good ones, and his cares were almost dissipated at the sight of grateful and enthusiastic La Vendée. The province could not have given a better reception to Louis XVI., could he have risen from the grave to which he had been consigned by the crime of '93. At Nantes and at Saumur the welcome was as cordial, and Napoleon could not restrain the pleasure with which it filled him; it overflowed into his correspondence, which at Bordeaux had been full of vexation, anger, and hurried orders.

He arrived in Paris late on the 14th of August, the eve of the grand fête of the 15th, when he was preparing to appear in all the lustre of power, and with a serenity of visage which should disconcert the conjectures of malevolence. It was, above all, before the *corps diplomatique*, eagerly on the watch to observe him, that he wished to display an imposing attitude, and to hold a language that should resound through all Europe.

He had just received highly satisfactory news from Russia, which depicted that power as still acquiescent in his designs, in consideration of the advantages she expected in the east. But the news from Austria was of a very different nature. In that quarter everything was beginning to look threatening. It will be recollected that Austria—always hostile at heart, notwithstanding the promises made by the Emperor Francis at the bivouac of Urschitz; dissatisfied with herself for not having

taken advantage of the battle of Eylau to occupy the banks of the Oder whilst Napoleon was embarrassed on the Vistula; then soothed for awhile by the convention that gave her back Braunau—had affected, after the battle of Copenhagen, to participate in the indignation of the continental powers against England. She had, in fact, dismissed Mr. Adair, the British minister, but had probably given him to understand at the same time that this rupture of intercourse meant nothing, and was not to be regarded as of any importance. It is certain that the English ships of war in the Adriatic had continued to allow free passage to the Austrian flag, and that the colonial trade had not been for a moment interrupted at Trieste. But on being made aware of the snare laid at Bayonne for the royal family of Spain, and of the disasters that had followed, Austria could contain herself no longer, and had almost thrown off the mask. A terror, partly feigned, partly real, had seized the court and its familiars. "This, then, is the fate that awaits all the old royalties of the continent!" was the cry in the salons of Vienna. "It is a horrible trap, an evident danger, which must be a warning to any one who has the least foresight; for every sovereign who shall have neglected to defend himself will be treated like Charles IV. and Ferdinand VII.!" The Archduke Charles himself, usually more reserved than the rest, and less malevolent towards France, exclaimed, "We will die, if it must be so, with arms in our hands; but the crown of Austria shall not be disposed of as easily as that of Spain has been."

The news from Rome had likewise contributed to excite emotion and passionate comment in Vienna. General Miollis having, as we have elsewhere stated, received and executed an order to take military possession of Rome, and having left the Pope only the spiritual authority, the latter had withdrawn into the palace of St. John of the Latran, barricaded the doors and windows as if he had to sustain a siege, shut himself up with his domestics, refused to communicate with any but the foreign ministers, declared himself oppressed, enslaved in his own dominions, and a victim to an abominable usurpation, and protested every day against the violence under which he succumbed. To these events were added the annexation of the provinces of Ancona, Macerata, and Fermo to the kingdom of Italy, under the titles of departments of the Métaure, the Musone, and the Tronto.

These facts had exasperated the public of Vienna almost as much as the events in Spain, and both court and town indulged in the bitterest language, even in presence of the French ambassador, General Andréossy. Some of those who did so really believed what they said, and seriously imagined that Napoleon desired to supersede all the reigning families of the continent.

The rest believed nothing of the kind, and aware that his system, modelled upon that of Louis XIV., might extend to Italy and Spain, but not to Austria, they nevertheless reiterated the current expressions, in order to excite the credulous multitude. All, however, were agreed in saying that, without attacking, it was necessary to make preparations for self-defence; and even after the highly exaggerated disasters of our armies, they suffered themselves to be carried away far beyond the idea of a merely defensive policy. The military preparations were in conformity with this state of public feeling.

The Austrian army had never ceased to be kept up at its full complement, and in perfect training and organisation, by the assiduous care of the Archduke Charles. Not content with this effort, ruinous as it was to the Austrian finances, new measures, some of which were imitated from France herself, had just been adopted for an extraordinary augmentation of the forces of the monarchy. Independently of the army in actual service, a system of reserve had been devised, which consisted in assembling and exercising a certain number of recruits in each locality, and holding them in readiness to march. The avowed number of these recruits was 60,000 and their real number 100,000, making the effective force of the army amount to more than 400,000 men. Then, under the name of a militia, very much resembling our national guards, nearly the whole population had been enrolled, clad, armed, and exercised every day. The people of Austria, usually strangers to their own government, felt in a manner flattered to find that recourse was had to them; and partly moved by the pleasure of being counted for something, partly by the fear of danger from without, they had enrolled themselves with singular alacrity—nobles, burghers, populace and all. Voluntary donations made by the States and by individuals had furnished sufficient means for equipping that mass of men; and it was computed that not fewer than 300,000 persons were prepared to serve locally, or even generally, for the maintenance of the monarchy. Four hundred thousand men enrolled for active service, and 300,000 men in local corps, for a population of 15,000,000 or 16,000,000 then subject to the house of Austria, constituted an enormous force, such as that house had never before displayed. It was probable, in fact, that it could have actually brought 300,000 fighting men under fire; and that was an immense thing which it had never yet accomplished, nor had it yet been done by any of the powers opposed to France. The government had just purchased 14,000 artillery horses, and given orders for 1,000,000 of infantry muskets. Whilst Braunau on the Inn was being dismantled, 20,000 workmen were occupied in Hungary upon the fortifications of Comorn, works which proved the intention of waging a long and obstinate war, and

retiring, if beaten on the frontier, into the interior of the monarchy, and there maintaining a desperate resistance. Already even troops that had somewhat the appearance of divisions of an army were beginning to assemble towards Bohemia and Galicia, no doubt in order to confront the French forces on the Vistula and the Oder.

The emotion of the court spread gradually to all classes of the population, and whilst at the waters of Toeplitz, Carlsbad, and all Germany, there was an affected desire to assume towards the French an attitude of unwonted arrogance, in the streets of Vienna the populace threatened General Andréossy's people, in Trieste the people insulted the French consul, and in Istria our couriers were assassinated on the military roads that had been surrendered to us. Germany, humiliated by our triumphs, and trampled by our armies, was beginning to thrill with wrath and hope. The events in Spain, serving at once to excite her indignation and to encourage her, had evoked the display of her secret feelings.

Though Napoleon, backed by Russia, had nothing to fear from the continent, yet it was so serious a matter to march a part of the grand army from the Vistula to the Ebro; this transfer of his forces from the north to the south might so embolden his enemies, that he wished previously to force Austria to explain, that he might know exactly how he stood with regard to her. If she desired war, he preferred making war upon her immediately (postponing the suppression of the Spanish insurrection), and making it with all his forces, so as to dispense even with the aid of the Russians, have done with Austria for ever, and then fall back from the Danube to the Pyrenees to subdue the Spaniards, and sweep the English into the sea. But this was only an extremity. He would rather not have had that new war to wage, for war was no longer his ruling passion. After Rivoli, the Pyramids, Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland, military glory could no longer be for him a source of very keen delight. Thenceforth war was to be for him but a means of upholding his policy—a policy unfortunately exorbitant, and which would still render necessary many a bloody triumph. Thus, without wishing to provoke Austria, he was bent on exacting from her the clearest explanation.

Receiving the representatives of the powers, as well as the great State corporations, on the 15th of August, he took the opportunity to have an explanation with M. de Metternich; not passionate and provocative, like the explanation he had formerly had with Lord Whitworth, and which had led to the war with England, but mild, calm, and yet peremptory. His demeanour towards the ministers of all the courts was gracious and serene;

he was affable with M. de Tolstoy, though he had reason to complain of his military sallies; with M. de Metternich he was amicable, open, but pressing. Without raising his voice so as to be heard by all present, he yet spoke in a manner to be understood by some of them, especially M. de Tolstoy. "You wish either to make war on us or to frighten us," he said to M. de Metternich.* M. de Metternich having replied that his cabinet did not wish to do either the one or the other, Napoleon instantly replied, mildly but positively, "Wherefore then your armaments, that agitate yourselves and Europe, put peace in jeopardy, and ruin your finances?" On receiving an assurance that these armaments were only defensive, Napoleon applied himself, like one who was profoundly acquainted with the subject, to prove to M. de Metternich that they were of a very different nature. "If your armaments," he said, "were as you assert, purely defensive, they would not be so much hurried. When a new organisation is to be created, one takes one's time, and does nothing abruptly, because things are done best that are done slowly; but one does not erect magazines, order assemblages of troops, and buy horses, particularly artillery horses. Your army amounts to nearly 400,000 men. Your militia will nearly equal that number. Were I to imitate you I should add 400,000 men to my effective force, and that would be an armament out of all reason. I have no need to do so. Less than 200,000 conscripts will be enough to maintain my grand army on a formidable scale, and enable me to send 100,000 veteran troops into Spain. I will not follow your example, therefore, for it would soon be necessary to arm women and children, and we should relapse into a state of barbarity. But meanwhile your finances suffer; your exchange, already so low, will fall still lower, and your trade will be interrupted. And wherefore all this? Have I demanded anything of you? Have I advanced claims to any one of your provinces? The treaty of Presburg has settled all questions between the two empires; your master's word, in the interview we had together, ought to have settled everything between the two sovereigns. There remained yet to be made some arrangements respecting Braunau, which was still on our hands, and on the subject of the Izonzo, the thalweg of which was not sufficiently determined; these have been provided for in the convention of Fontainebleau (convention of October 10, 1808). I demand nothing of you—I want nothing of you—except mutual quiet and security. Is there any difficulty—any one difficulty between us? Let it be known, that we may settle it on the spot." M. de Metternich having again

* This conversation, committed to paper on the instant by M. de Champagny, was sent to Vienna to M. Andréossy, and is preserved in the archives of the Foreign Office. I give only the substance of it in the text.

affirmed that his government had no thought of attacking France, and alleging in proof that it had not ordered any movement of troops, Napoleon immediately replied, with the same quiet decision, that he was mistaken, that assemblements of troops had taken place in Galicia and Bohemia, opposite Silesia, in front of the quarters of the French army; that the fact was incontestable; that the immediate consequence would be the assemblement of no less considerable forces on the French side; that instead of demolishing the fortresses in Silesia, he was about to repair some of them, arm and provision them, convoke the contingents of the confederation of the Rhine, and put everything again on a war footing. "I shall not be taken by surprise, you are well aware," he said to M. de Metternich; "I shall be always prepared. You reckon perhaps on the Emperor of Russia, and you deceive yourself. I am certain of his adhesion, of the disapprobation he has formally manifested respecting your armaments, and the course he will adopt on the occasion. If I had doubts on this subject I would make war at once on you and him alike, for I should not choose to leave the affairs of the continent in doubt. If I confine myself to mere precautions, it is because I am perfectly confident with regard to the continent, because I am so with regard to the Emperor of Russia. Do not imagine, then, that the opportunity is a fair one for attacking France; it would be a grievous mistake on your part. You do not desire war; I believe this of you, M. de Metternich, I believe it of your emperor, and of the enlightened men of your country. But the German nobility, dissatisfied with the changes that have occurred, fill Germany with their rancour. You let yourselves be moved; you communicate your emotion to the masses in urging them to arm; from armament to armament, you come at last to an extraordinary situation which cannot be long maintained; and by-and-by you will be brought perhaps to that point at which one longs for a crisis as a means of escaping out of an insupportable situation, and that crisis will be war. Moral and physical nature alike, when they are come to that troubled state which precedes the storm, have need to explode in order to purify the air and bring back serenity. This is what I fear from your present conduct. I repeat to you," continued Napoleon, "I want nothing of you, I demand nothing but peace—nothing but a peaceable and stable condition of our mutual relations; but if you make preparations, I will make such that the superiority of my arms shall not be more dubious than in the preceding campaigns; and thus, in order to preserve peace, we shall have brought on war."

On concluding this conversation, Napoleon was most gracious in his demeanour towards M. de Metternich, and behaved in all respects like a man who desired peace without fearing war, but

who was resolved not to remain in a state of uncertainty. M. de Metternich and the others who heard the conversation could not entertain any doubt as to his real intentions, for his manner was as decided as it was calm and business-like.

Next day, the 16th, was a day of multifarious orders. M. de Champagny had to transmit to Vienna an account of Napoleon's conversation with M. de Metternich, and to draw precise conclusions from its general tenor. M. de Metternich was told in Paris, and General Andréossy was instructed to repeat in Vienna, that it was absolutely necessary either to stop the armaments that had been begun, and to do so in a satisfactory manner, or to fight forthwith. Then, in order the more surely to sound the disposition of Austria, Napoleon addressed a demand to her for the immediate recognition of Joseph. This was beyond all doubt the most infallible means of knowing what she thought, or at least what she desired at that moment; for were it possible to extort from her, contrary to all her sentiments and to her most emphatic and most recent declarations, the recognition of Joseph's royalty, it would be proof that she was incapable of encountering any risk, and that for some time at least one might be at ease as regarded her.

M. de Metternich, who in Paris displayed great zeal for the maintenance of peace, and was lavish of pacific assurances in all his conversations, whether with the imperial ministers or with the emperor himself, replied with alacrity that full satisfaction should be given relatively to the armaments of Austria. But as to the recognition of King Joseph, assuming a less affirmative tone and a more constrained manner, he declared that as far as he was aware, he foresaw no resistance on the part of his cabinet, but that he could not give a definite answer without referring for instructions to Vienna. It was evident that the point in question was the greatest of the existing difficulties, and that to obtain from Austria such a disavowal of her sentiments and her most recent language, to inflict such a humiliation upon her, would require no less an effort than it would cost to extort fresh provinces from her. It was nevertheless a means of embarrassing her and forcing her to more circumspection, if she was not prepared to fight.

In reality, Napoleon was beginning to believe that he should be obliged to have one more conflict with her, in order to bring her finally into submission; but he wished to know if he should previously have at least six months' leisure to make a rapid campaign in Spain, and move thither a hundred thousand of his veteran soldiers, without hazarding his preponderance beyond the Rhine.

All his demonstrations and demands for explanation had no other object than this.

In order to give them a still more imposing character, he called upon all the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine for a first contingent, a small one indeed, but sufficient to excite much uneasy comment in Germany, and to give Austria matter for reflection. Should war finally break out between her and France, those small contingents would be raised to their legal effective amount; otherwise they were to go as they were to Spain, to aid in the new war Napoleon had brought upon himself; for he chose that the princes of the Rhine should be engaged with him in all his quarrels, and should take their full share of the burden laid on France. This was good policy in one sense, bad in another; for if he thus forced them to identify their cause with his own, on the other hand he exposed them to experience the general hatred which was sure to be provoked, soon or late, by these repeated conscriptions, both right and left of the Rhine, and north and south of the Alps and Pyrenees.

The care Napoleon had taken to make Austria explain was not the only one imposed on him by circumstances. Whatever were the number of troops detached from the grand army for the war in Spain, it would be necessary to effect a new retrograde movement in Poland and Germany, in order to approach the Rhine. Already, when he had finally determined on engaging with Spain, Napoleon had made a first change in the positions of his troops, and transferred them from the space between the Pregel and the Vistula to that between the Vistula and the Oder. Marshal Soult, leaving the Oudinot grenadiers in Dantzig, and the heavy cavalry in the delta of the Vistula, had fallen back with the 4th division into Pomerania, Brandenburg, and Hanover. Marshal Bernadotte had continued to occupy the Hanseatic towns with the Boudet and Molitor divisions, the Spaniards, and the Dutch. Marshal Davout with the 3rd division, the Saxons, the Poles, and the rest of the cavalry, had fallen back into the duchy of Posen, having his base on the Oder. General Victor, raised to the rank of marshal, had established his quarters at Berlin with the 1st division. Marshal Mortier, with the 5th and 6th divisions, was cantoned in Silesia.

Napoleon's intention in prolonging this occupation of Prussia was to force it finally to settle the question of the war contributions; next, to observe from a strong position the development of the consequences of his alliance with Russia and his latent strife with Austria; and lastly, to keep his army always in serviceable condition, living on the enemy's country—at least, in part, for he defrayed a portion of its expenses from the extraordinary treasury.

It was indispensable, however, to put an end to this prolonged occupation. In fact, since the war in Spain, it was becoming impossible to keep so vast an extent of country, and it was neces-

sary to abandon a certain number of provinces. It was necessary, not in order to please Russia, with whom everything depended on a concession in the east; not to please Prussia, who, borne down by her heavy burden, demanded to treat on any conditions, reserving to herself the faculty of not executing those conditions at a future time, should she be unable to do so, or should fortune relieve her from the necessity; nor yet was it to please Austria, with whom there was an end to conciliation; but it was necessary in order to bring the French forces into greater compactness, and move a portion of them towards the Pyrenees. It was expedient, however, to derive from this retrograde movement, which had become necessary, an advantageous settlement with Prussia; it was expedient also to extract from it something agreeable to the Emperor of Russia; for next after the arrangement of the affairs of the east, what the Emperor Alexander most desired, in order to be delivered, as he said, *from the importunities of unfortunate people, who upbraided him with their misfortunes*, was the evacuation of Prussia, and the final arrangement of the war contributions, which were still insisted on at the hands of that power.

For many months had been resident in Paris Prince William, brother of the King of Prussia, and envoy to Napoleon, for the purpose of obtaining, if possible, a reduction of the charges imposed on his country. This prince had won the esteem of everybody, and particularly that of Napoleon, by his dignified deportment and his prudence. Still he had hitherto ineffectually alleged the inability of Prussia to pay the sums demanded of her, and had quite as vainly offered the most complete and absolute submission of the house of Brandenburg, to be guaranteed by a treaty of alliance offensive and defensive. Napoleon had not suffered himself to be moved either by the prince's allegations or his offers, because he believed that whatever resources he restored to Prussia she would employ in reconstituting her forces, in order to turn them against him. Before Jena he might have counted upon her; but since that date he felt she must be implacable, and that to exhaust, if he could not destroy her, was the only sagacious policy. Obliged, however, to recall his troops, he consented at last to hear Prince William's propositions; and after rather long debate, he agreed to evacuate Prussia entirely, with the exception of three fortresses on the Oder—Glogau, Stettin, and Custrin—which he would keep until the payment of the stipulated contributions; and he granted this evacuation on condition of the payment of a sum of 140,000,000, as well for the ordinary contributions as for the extraordinary contributions not defrayed. This sum was to be paid half in money or good bills of exchange, half in mortgages on the territorial domains of Prussia, in such sort

that the whole should be liquidated within a brief term—the bills of exchange in eleven or twelve months, at the rate of 9,000,000 a month; the mortgages in a year and a half at the most. The evacuation was to begin immediately, and the French troops were to retire into Swedish Pomerania, the Hanse towns, Hanover, Westphalia, and the Saxon and Franconian provinces taken from Prussia and retained by France. But with Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau on the Oder, Magdeburg on the Elbe, and his troops in Hanover, Saxony, and Franconia, Napoleon was still present as before in Germany, and in a condition to command it. For the greater security he had a secret article inserted in the convention for the evacuation, an article hitherto unknown, by which Prussia bound herself for ten years to confine her military effective within the following limits: ten regiments of infantry, containing 22,000 men; eight regiments of cavalry, 8000 strong; a corps of artillery and of engineers, amounting to 6000; and the royal guard, 6000—making together a total of 42,000 men. The King of Prussia furthermore bound himself not to create any local militia which might serve to disguise any process of arming whatever. Finally, he engaged to make common cause with the French empire against Austria, and to furnish it against her, in case of war, a division of 16,000 men of all arms. For the year 1809 alone, if war broke out, Prussia, not having yet reconstructed her army, was to limit her contingent to 12,000. Napoleon, whose wish was to hold Prussia in check, not to humiliate her, consented to leave this disagreeable part of the treaty unknown. The worthy and discreet prince who defended the interests of his country in Paris could obtain no better terms, for Napoleon, though he had dealt himself the blow which was one day to destroy his power, was still formidable enough to make Europe tremble, and to dictate the law to all his enemies.

Having signed this convention, he wrote to the King and Queen of Prussia, congratulating himself that an end had been put to all the differences between the two courts, and promising for the future to maintain the most amicable relations with the court of Berlin, if the latter was not again misled by hostile passions. Hard as was this treaty for Prussia, it was better than the state of things it superseded, for she was at last delivered from the French troops; and if she was limited in her armaments, it is doubtful that she could have paid for more than the treaty allowed her.

Besides the advantage for Napoleon of settling his accounts with Prussia, and allowing him to withdraw his troops, this arrangement was further recommended by its being agreeable to Russia, which was exceedingly importuned by the complaints

of the Prussians, and very desirous to be relieved from them. Now, to be agreeable to Russia was become for the moment one of the conventional rules of Napoleon's policy, and he was as eager to be on a good understanding with her as to bring Austria to an explanation, and to end his disputes with Prussia.

The state of things had undergone no change in St. Petersburg. Alexander, who was always engrossed by the passion of the moment, set no bounds to his complaisance since Napoleon had consented to entertain the question of partitioning the Turkish empire. Constantinople, above all, was an object on which his heart was set more than on the fairest provinces of that empire, because Constantinople implied glory and renown as well as utility. But to give away that key of the straits was of all concessions in the world the very one most repugnant to Napoleon. As the reader has already seen, he had never given it his formal assent; and when he permitted his ambassador, M. de Caulaincourt, to listen to the expression of such desires, it was with a simultaneous announcement of an intention to have the Dardanelles if the Bosphorus was given up to the Russians; an arrangement which could not be acceptable to the court of St. Petersburg. Alexander did not despair of carrying his point with Napoleon. He was incessantly repeating that he desired no territory south of the Balkans, no portion whatever of Roumelia, nothing but the precincts of Constantinople, and anybody else might have Adrianople. In the familiar jargon he talked with the French ambassador, he used to give the name of *the cat's tongue* to that tongue of land which is destined as it were to be the lodging of the gatekeeper of the straits. "Well," he would often say to M. de Caulaincourt, "have you heard from your master? Has he mentioned *the cat's tongue?* Is he disposed to understand and admit the wants of my empire, as I understand and admit the want of his?" M. de Caulaincourt gave only evasive answers to these questions, always alleging Napoleon's engrossing occupations, his absence from the capital, and his approaching return, after which he should be able to turn his attention from the affairs of the west to those of the east. Alexander rejoined by saying that another interview was necessary to end these differences, that it was indispensable towards the vigorous revival of the policy of Tilsit, and that it could not take place too soon. He himself, however, had not his hands freer than Napoleon's; for the affairs of Finland had taken almost as bad a turn as those of Spain. His troops, after driving back the Swedish armies to Uleaburg, and thereby concentrating them, had themselves been driven back in turn, and even beaten, thanks to the incapacity of General Buxhoevden, a court favourite, and secured against the indignation of the army by that cir-

cumstance only. At the same time, an English fleet, blockading the Russian fleet in the Gulf of Finland, spread terror along the coast. It was not possible, therefore, for the Emperor Alexander to leave home immediately. But the closing of the navigation in September, and the shutting out of the English for several months, would set Alexander free again, and he asked that the interview in which he hoped to arrange everything with Napoleon should be fixed at the latest for that month. M. de Caulaincourt always replied to these pressing instances in the manner most likely to make him have patience, and promised that the interview should certainly take place at the time he specified.

Alexander certainly spared no pains to induce Napoleon to enter into his views. The introduction of the French armies into Spain, the occupation of Madrid, the forcible removal of the Spanish princes to Bayonne, the spoliation of their rights, and the proclamation of Joseph's royalty—all this he had found natural, legitimate, and necessary by way of completing Napoleon's policy. "Your emperor," he said to M. de Caulaincourt, "cannot suffer any Bourbons so near him. This is on his part a consistent policy which I entirely admit. I am not jealous of his aggrandisements," he was continually saying, "especially when they are prompted by the same motives as the last. Let him not be jealous of those which are in like manner necessary to my empire, and quite as easy to justify."

The higher circles in St. Petersburg, emboldened by the disagreeable, rather than dangerous, checks sustained in Finland, shocked more or less sincerely at the events of Bayonne, and finding a plausible pretext for their complaints in the interdiction of the navigation, were again holding disparaging language as to the policy of an alliance with France; and it is true that the said policy was not distinguished at that time either by morality or by success; for the act of wresting Finland from a relation, whose natural extravagance one had long excited, and over whose weakness it was painful to triumph, was not much better than what was passing in Spain, and was even very like it. "You must *make the best of a bad job*" (*bonne mine à mauvais jeu*), said Alexander to M. de Caulaincourt, "and go through with this difficult affair without flinching." With his usual tact he avoided as much as possible talking to M. de Caulaincourt about our disadvantages in Spain, and only adverted to the subject when he could not be silent respecting it without an affectation that would be disagreeable to the very person whose feelings he wished to spare. And when the English party in St. Petersburg proclaimed General Dupont's disaster with shouts of joy, and so much exaggerated our losses as to announce as destroyed the army which was still entire on the

Ebro, and as prisoner King Joseph, who was holding his court in Vittoria, he spoke on the matter to M. de Caulaincourt as being neither publicly nor secretly pleased at the disaster of an army that had long been opposed to his own; but on the contrary, as being grieved at such an occurrence, and as seeing in what had occurred nothing but what was simple, indifferent, and easy to explain. "Your master," he said, "sent young soldiers thither, and not enough of them; besides, he was not there; blunders have been committed; he will soon have repaired all that. With some thousands of his old soldiers, one of his good generals, or some days' presence in his own person, he will soon have brought back King Joseph to Madrid, and rendered the Tilsit policy triumphant. For my part, I shall be invariable, and I am about to address Austria in language that will induce her to reflect seriously on her imprudent conduct. I will prove to your master that I am faithful in bad and in good fortune. It is a very slight misfortune this; but such as it is, it will afford him an opportunity of putting me to the test. Tell him, however, that we must see each other, and as soon as possible, to arrange together and master Europe." Alexander, moreover, kept his word, imposed silence on the censorious and the alarmists, made the Austrian legation especially hold its peace, and enjoined such a reserve upon his mother's circle, that they spoke of our discomfitures in Spain with as much discretion as of those of the Russian armies in Finland.

Such was the aspect of the court of St. Petersburg after, and as influenced by, the events in Spain. Informed in the most exact manner of what was passing there by the despatches of M. de Caulaincourt, who transmitted to him scrupulously by way of question and reply his daily dialogues with the Emperor Alexander, Napoleon at last resolved to accept an interview. This was the principal one among the determinations taken by him in consequence of his new position. He thought the time was come to realise, not all the wishes of Alexander, which was impossible without jeopardising the safety of Europe, but a part at least of those wishes; and that it was thus expedient to see him, fascinate him again, concede to him something considerable, such as the Danubian provinces, for instance, and for the rest, to disabuse him or make him wait; in one word, to put him in good humour, which was possible, for Wallachia and Moldavia, immediately and really bestowed, were enough to satisfy the vastest ambition. Besides the advantage of conferring directly with the young emperor under circumstances of great moment, ascertaining what was at the bottom of his heart, and securing his goodwill by some important concessions, a public interview in the face of Europe would be a grand spectacle, which would strike men's imaginations, and bear visible

testimony to an alliance which it was necessary to render not only real and solid, but apparent, in order to awe all the enemies of the empire.

Whilst he was pressing Austria with his questions, and according to Prussia the evacuation of her territory, Napoleon despatched a courier to M. de Caulaincourt, authorising him to consent to a solemn interview with the Emperor Alexander. The latter had named the end of September, on account of the closing of the navigation which took place at that season. The time was convenient for Napoleon, and he accepted it. Alexander had seemed to desire for the place of rendezvous either Weimar, for the sake of his sister, or Erfurth, on account of the greater freedom that might be enjoyed there. Napoleon accepted Erfurth, one of the territories that remained in his hands since the parcelling of Germany, and of which he had not yet disposed in favour of any of the sovereigns of the Confederation. Having thus generally determined the time and place for the interview, and leaving it to the Emperor Alexander to specify the days and hours, he gave orders that the interview should have all desirable éclat.

There were still some detachments of the imperial guard on the Rhine. Napoleon ordered a superb battalion of grenadiers of that guard to Erfurth. He gave orders to select a fine regiment of light infantry, a regiment of hussars, and one of cuirassiers, from among those which were returning from Germany, and to march them likewise to Erfurth, to serve as a guard of honour for the sovereigns who were to be present at the interview. He despatched officers of his household with the richest portions of the crown furniture, in order that the largest houses in the town might be elegantly and sumptuously arranged, and adapted to the wants of the persons about to be assembled—emperors, kings, princes, ministers, and generals. He desired that French literature should contribute to the splendour of the assemblage, and commanded the administration of the theatres to send to Erfurth the first French actors, and the first of all, Talma, to perform there *Cinna*, *Andromaque*, *Mahomet*, and *Œdipe*. He excluded comedy, although he held the immortal works of Molière in the esteem they deserve; "but they are not well understood," he said, "in Germany. We must set before the Germans the grandeurs of our tragic stage; they are more capable of seizing them than of penetrating the depth of Molière." Lastly, he gave orders for the display of prodigious sumptuosity, for it was his will that France should command respect by her civilisation as much as by her arms.

These orders being given, he employed the time that remained to him in making his military preparations against two contin-

gencies: that, namely, in which he should have to encounter only Spain aided by the English, and that in which, besides Spain and England, he should have to fight once more and immediately with Austria. The state of things had not mended in Spain since the retreat of the French army on the Ebro. Joseph had, between Catalonia, Aragon, Castille, and the Basque provinces, and including some recent reinforcements, more than a hundred thousand men, partly young soldiers already inured to war, partly old soldiers who had arrived successively, regiment by regiment, from the Elbe to the Rhine, and from the Rhine to the Pyrenees. This was more than would have been enough in the hands of an able general to overwhelm the insurgents, who were audaciously advancing from all points of Spain, from Galicia, from Madrid, from Saragossa; but nothing was done except running to and fro, complaining, and soliciting fresh resources without knowing how to use those at hand. Napoleon tried to inspire the panic-stricken Joseph with courage by the energy of his language. "Be worthy of your brother," he said to him; "try to bear yourself as becomes your position. What care I for a parcel of insurgents whom I shall settle with my dragoons, and who are not likely to defeat armies that neither Austria, Russia, nor Prussia could withstand? *I shall find the Pillars of Hercules in Spain; I shall not find there the limits of my power.*" He promised him immense reinforcements, and added much wise and provident advice, which Joseph and his generals were incapable of understanding, still more of following. Joseph had chosen to have about him his little court of Naples, and in the first place Marshal Jourdan, a very respectable man, as we have said, decent, slow, mediocre, just the sort of man suited to the mediocrity of Joseph, and above all, to his love of domineering; for the emperor's brothers indemnified themselves for his domination over them by that which they endeavoured to exercise over others. Next after Marshal Jourdan, Joseph had asked for M. Rœderer to aid him in the political and financial administration of Spain; a request which Napoleon had not yet granted, because he distrusted, not the heart or understanding of M. Rœderer, but his practical capacity in business of State. With the exception of this latter, Joseph had already round him all his Neapolitan household; and in his half-military, half-political court, it was a favourite practice to speak ill of Napoleon, to inveigh against his oddities, his perverse commands, and his want of justice and reason; and without venturing to deny his genius, these critics were fond of observing that he judged of things from a distance, and therefore ill and superficially; in short, that he was mistaken, and they were not so. They were not very far even from believing that forasmuch as one was his brother, one must

possess a share more or less of his genius, and that with a little of his experience in war one would be no less capable than himself of commanding.

Inspirited by Napoleon's energetic language, and emboldened by the reinforcements which were arriving from all parts, Joseph plucked up courage, was often on horseback attended by his trusty Jourdan, and took some pleasure in playing the warrior king, giving orders, directing movements, showing himself to the troops, and holding reviews. But reassured as he was, he had not ventured to remain in Burgos, or even in Miranda, and he finally established his headquarters at Vittoria. He had there 2000 men of a royal guard, half Spanish, half Neapolitan, 2000 men of the imperial guard, and 3000 of the Rey brigade, which always accompanied him—in all, 7000. On his right he had Marshal Bessières, with 20,000 men distributed between Cubo, Briviesca, and Burgos, holding the latter town by cavalry; on his left, from Miranda to Logroño, Marshal Moncey, with 18,000; and from Logroño to Tudela, General Verdier's division, still 15,000 or 16,000 strong after its losses at Saragossa. In his rear Joseph had the marching depôts and regiments, a disjointed assemblage of soldiers detached from all the corps, but useful for covering the rear, and comprising not fewer than 15,000 or 16,000 men. The last arrived of the old regiments which Napoleon had successively withdrawn from the grand army, namely, the 51st and 43rd of the line, with the 26th regiment of chasseurs, had served to form the Godinot brigade, an excellent body of troops, which, by a sudden attack on Bilbao, had cleared it of the insurgents, and killed 1200 of them. Lastly, the movable columns of gendarmerie and mountaineers guarding the passes of the Pyrenees, to the number of 3000 or 4000 men, the division of General Reille 6000 or 7000 strong, that of General Duhesme, in Catalonia, 10,000 or 11,000, completed a total of 100,000 men, forming the forces that still remained in Spain.

Napoleon wearied himself with sending to Joseph's headquarters instructions which, as we have said, were ill understood and worse executed. In the first place, he converted from provisional into regular regiments those from 113 to 120, and gave orders to incorporate with them all the marching detachments, in order to the consolidation of the several corps, and to concentrate the imperial guard, one part of which was with Marshal Bessières, the other with Joseph, and to form with it and the two old regiments of Godinot's brigade a good reserve, such as was necessary against unforeseen contingencies. His arrangements for the general distribution of the forces were as follows. Considering Aragon and Navarre as a separate theatre of operations, which had its own secured line of retreat on

Pampeluna, he gave orders to form there a distinct mass of from 15,000 to 18,000 men, which should serve to cover the left of the army, to guard Tudela, which was the key of Aragon, and to collect there a vast amount of artillery for the purpose of ultimately resuming the siege of Saragossa. Then placing the centre of the principal operations in Burgos, in Old Castille, on the highroad to Madrid, he ordered the establishment there of a body of from 40,000 to 50,000 men, to be ready to fall upon any insurgent corps that should present itself on the one hand or the other, and to overwhelm it; for there was no Spanish army whatever that could stand against a combined force of 30,000 or 40,000 Frenchmen. Finally, he gave orders to wait in that imposing attitude for the arrival of the reinforcements, and for his presence, which he hoped to give at no distant time. All this, which was as clearly set forth in Napoleon's instructions as it was sagaciously planned, was not understood by any one in Vittoria, and Joseph and those about him passed their time in taking fright at the least movements of the enemy, and descrying insurgents everywhere by hundreds of thousands. Thus, since the retreat of Marshal Bessières, General Blake had reappeared with some 20,000 men in Old Castille, and his force was exaggerated into 40,000 or 50,000. Since the capitulation of Baylen, General Castaños was advancing slowly on Madrid with about 15,000 men, and he was supposed to be on his march to the Ebro with 50,000. Lastly, the Valencians and Aragonese might reckon on 18,000 or 20,000 men, and their force was set down at 40,000. All together, then, the enemy were computed at 130,000 or 140,000 men, potent and skilful enough to reduce French armies to capitulate, as at Baylen; and when more precise information had reduced these exaggerations to their true value, the alarmists excused themselves on the plea that it was so difficult to obtain exact information in Spain. "In war it is at all times and in all places difficult to know the truth," was Napoleon's reply to them; "but it is always possible to collect it if one will be at the pains. You have a numerous cavalry, and the brave Lasalle. Send out your dragoons to sweep the country over a range of ten to fifteen leagues; seize the alcades, the curés, the notable inhabitants, and the post-masters; keep them until they speak, interrogate them judiciously, and you will learn the truth, which you will never learn by going to sleep within your lines."

These grand lessons were thrown away, and Joseph's courtiers continued to people space with imaginary enemies. Towards the end of August, for instance, the Aragonese, Valencians, and Catalonians, under the Conde de Montijo, having presented themselves in the environs of Tudela, Marshal Moncey, who was much intimidated since his campaign in Valencia, imagined

that all the insurgents of Spain were swarming down upon him, and hastened to take up a defensive position, and to cry out loudly for succour. General Lefebvre-Desnoettes, acting in place of General Verdier, who had been wounded at Saragossa, immediately advanced. He crossed the Ebro at Alvaro with his Polish lancers, and put to flight all that came in his way, thus demonstrating what sort of thing was the formidable army of Aragon and Valencia.

This curious adventure covered the alarmists with confusion, and contributed to induce a more correct estimate of the enemy's strength. Emboldened by what he had just seen and by the severe letters he received from Paris, Joseph then took it into his head to imitate his brother's grand manœuvres. Establishing himself in Miranda as a centre, he meditated the plan of rushing from one division of the enemy to another, and beating them in succession, after the manner frequently practised by Napoleon. The Spaniards, it is true, rather facilitated such a system; for General Blake, with the insurgents of Leon, the Asturias, and Galicia, aimed at introducing himself into Biscay on our right; a detachment under General Castaños intended to arrive at the Ebro on our front; and the Aragonese, Valencians, and others purposed to enter Navarre so as to turn our left. Their hope was to outflank and surround us, cut off our communication with France, and thus achieve another Baylen: an absurd chimera, for there was no chance of repeating with 60,000 Frenchmen, all very resolute in spite of the timidity of some of their leaders, what had been effected for once against 8000 disheartened Frenchmen. To counteract this ridiculous plan, imitated from the chance affair at Baylen, Joseph proposed to employ the equally ridiculous imitation of his brother's grand style of operations, and to fall en masse on each of the insurgent bodies in its turn, so as to crush them one after the other. The intention might be good; but opportune precision is everything in war, and imitation succeeds no better in that art than in any other. Thus whilst Blake's insurgents were making demonstrations on Bilbao, and those of Aragon on Tudela, Joseph was sending his divisions thither in all haste, sometimes galloping with them himself in breathless speed, arriving when it was too late, or stopping short midway in his manœuvres; he would then march his wearied and exhausted soldiers back to Vittoria, and write to the emperor that he had followed his advice, and hoped soon, with a little experience, to become worthy of him. Pitiable spectacle often given to the world by commonplace men who seek to copy their more gifted brothers, and succeed in equalling them only in their defects or their vices!

Napoleon could not refrain from smiling at these silly displays of his brother's vanity, but anger soon overcame his disposition

to laugh when he reflected on the time and the forces which were thus utterly wasted. He thought, therefore, of sending to those who imitated him so badly one of his ablest lieutenants, Marshal Ney, that he might put fresh energy into them; and then he ordered them to confine themselves to reorganising the army, repairing their matériel and artillery, keeping good guard on the Ebro, and remaining quiet until his own arrival.

He then made up his mind as to the detachments he should take from Italy and Germany, in order to complete the subjugation of Spain. Not less than from 100,000 to 120,000 men he thought would be required promptly to terminate the Spanish insurrection and drive the English into the sea. He had been made acquainted with the convention of Cintra, and finding it honourable for the army which had fought well and which had remained free, he wrote to Junot, "As a general you might have done better; as a soldier you have done nothing contrary to honour." At the same time he gave orders at Rochefort to receive and re-equip the troops from Portugal, which, being acclimated, inured to war, and rearmed, might again render great services, and increase by 20,000 men the succours destined for the Peninsula.

Italy had for some months received back the Italians, now become good soldiers by serving in the north. Napoleon ordered Prince Eugène to despatch them, to the number of 10,000, under General Pino, towards Dauphiné and Roussillon. With two fine French regiments, the 1st light and the 42nd of the line, taken from Piedmont, where their place was supplied by two regiments of the army of Naples, he formed the nucleus of a division, which was given to General Souham, and completed by several battalions belonging to corps already put under contribution for Catalonia. This division, artillery and cavalry included, amounted to nearly 7000 men. Then there were 16,000 or 17,000 men on the march from the Alps to the Pyrenees, and these, with the division under General Duhesme, Reille's column, and a brigade of Neapolitans already on its way to Perpignan under General Chabot, made up a total of about 36,000 troops destined for Catalonia. That province being separated from the rest of Spain, and forming a distinct theatre of war, Napoleon gave the command-in-chief of the troops there to General St. Cyr, a general of incomparable ability as regarded methodic warfare, and who always operated well when he was alone. He could not have made a better choice.

It was Germany and Poland that were to furnish the most considerable detachments. Napoleon resolved to take thence the 1st division, already transferred to Berlin under the command of Marshal Victor; and the 6th, which had belonged to Marshal Ney, and was then encamped in Silesia under Marshal Mortier.

It was his intention subsequently to take thence the 5th, which had belonged successively to Marshals Lannes and Massena, and which, as well as the 6th, was encamped in Silesia under Marshal Mortier. For the present, Napoleon removed it to Bareuth, one of the Franconian provinces remaining in his possession, where he intended that it should remain in readiness to act against Austria, if she decided for immediate war; or to be marched to Spain, if the court of Vienna desisted from arming. The 1st and 6th divisions, reinforced by the recruits furnished by the depôts, amounted to not less than 50,000 men, including the artillery and the light horse attached to each division. They were all, with the exception of a small contingent of conscripts, tried veterans, combined together in a matchless framework of military organisation. Napoleon thought also of borrowing from Germany a part of the general reserve of cavalry, and made choice of the dragoons, an arm that seemed to him excellently adapted for employment in Spain, because, whereas it could be applied to various services, and was solid enough to be opposed to the Spanish infantry, it was yet less cumbrous than the heavy cavalry. He resolved, on the other hand, to leave in the plains of the north his numerous and valiant cuirassiers, as useless against the undisciplined troops of the south, but necessary against the martial bands of the northern regions. He gave orders for marching three divisions of dragoons to Spain, postponing the departure of the remaining two until he should have cleared up the mystery of the Austrian policy.

He resolved to make the kings, his allies or brothers, cooperate in this war, which belonged to his system of confederated royalties; and he demanded 3000 Dutchmen of the King of Holland, 7000 Germans of the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine, and of the King of Saxony 7000 Poles whom he had long engaged to take into his service. Finally, he sent off about 3500 engineers and artillerymen with an immense matériel.

This was not the whole force which was marching towards the Pyrenees. Already, as we have said, Napoleon had ordered to Spain eight old regiments comprised in the 100,000 men then acting on the Ebro. Four others from the banks of the Elbe and from Paris, the 28th, 32nd, 58th, and 75th of the line, were on the roads of France, and were to form with the 5th regiment of dragoons a fine division of 7000 or 8000 men, whom Napoleon put under the command of General Sebastiani, who had returned from Constantinople. To these twelve old regiments, taken successively from Germany and France, he had added two others on the news of Joseph's disaster: these were the 36th and 55th of the line, at that moment approaching Bayonne, and destined to reinforce Joseph's reserve. Lastly, the guard was to furnish 4000 men more, besides 3000 who

were at Joseph's headquarters. These troops, without the 5th division, the destination of which remained undetermined, and without Junot's troops, which were but just arriving, and required to be reorganised, formed altogether a total of between 100,000 and 115,000 men, worthy of the grand army from which they were drawn. Napoleon was about to take means for further augmenting their numbers by means of a judicious recruitment from the depôts, which were to be kept at their full complement by conscription.

The next consideration was, how to supply the places of the troops withdrawn from the army of Italy, and above all, from the grand army, without too much weakening either. After the regiments successively recalled from Poland and Germany, after the departure of the 1st and 6th divisions and of the dragoons, and the discharge of the auxiliaries, the force of the grand army was very considerably reduced. There remained in Swedish Pomerania and in Prussia, Marshal Soult's 4th division, consisting of 34,000 foot, 3000 light horse, 8000 or 9000 heavy horse, 4000 artillerymen and engineers—in all, about 50,000. Marshal Bernadotte, Prince of Ponte Corvo, was keeping garrison in the Hanse towns and on the Baltic coast with two French divisions of 12,000 men (the Boudet and Gency divisions, Molitor's division having been united to that of Marshal Soult), 14,000 Spaniards, and 7000 Dutchmen —in all, 33,000 men. Marshal Davout, with the 3rd division, the finest and most strongly organised of the whole French army, was occupying the duchy of Posen, from the Vistula to the Oder. It numbered 38,000 foot, 9000 horse, chasseurs, dragoons, and cuirassiers. He occupied, moreover, Dantzig, with the Oudinot division of 10,000 grenadiers and chasseurs d'élite. He had 3000 artillerymen and engineers, which made a total of 60,000 Frenchmen. He had 30,000 Saxons and Poles. The general park for the whole grand army, in Magdeburg and the principal fortresses of Prussia, was served by 7000 or 8000 men of all kinds. This was a total of 180,000 men, of whom 130,000 were French, 50,000 Poles, Saxons, Spaniards, and Dutch. If to this mass was added the 5th division, established in Silesia, and amounting to about 24,000 men, the grand army might be estimated at 200,000 of the very best soldiers, quite sufficient, with the army of Italy, to overwhelm Austria, even should the Emperor Alexander bring us little or no help. It was not enough, however, to withstand the universal antipathy of the continent, for though Austria alone manifested her dislike and her wish to shake off our yoke, all Germany was beginning to feel a deep and ill-concealed aversion for us, both in the countries subject to the Confederation of the Rhine and in all the rest.

Napoleon resolved immediately to raise the effective of the armies of Germany and Italy almost to what it had been before the deductions he had made from them. Unfortunately he could render them equal in quantity only, not in quality, to what they had been, for he sent them recruits only in place of old troops. Yet the nuclei of those armies were so excellent, and the number of experienced soldiers in them was still so considerable, that an addition of conscripts could not sensibly weaken them. He began, in conformity with the convention he had entered into with Prussia, by moving the troops he had in Germany towards the Rhine. The 1st and the 6th divisions, destined for Spain, were, by his orders, on the march for Mayence, with an interval of six halts between them, so that they might not impede each other on the route. Marshal Soult's division was moved to Berlin, to take the place of the 1st, which had just left that capital. Marshal Davout's corps was to take the place left vacant on the Oder and in Silesia by the 6th and 5th divisions, the former of which had gone, as we have seen, to Mayence, and the latter to Bareuth. General Oudinot was to quit Dantzig with his picked battalions, and proceed to Central Germany, his place being supplied at Dantzig by the Poles and Saxons. This movement, which began the execution of the convention with Prussia, rendered recruitment easier by diminishing the distance by one-half.

Napoleon's first step was to put in force the decree passed in the preceding year, which fixed the force of each regiment of infantry at five battalions. Consequently, he resolved to have four complete battalions in all the regiments of the grand army, leaving the fifth, that of the depôt, on the Rhine. For Spain, he determined that every regiment should have three battalions of war with the main body, a fourth at Bayonne as a first depôt, and a fifth in the interior of France as a second depôt. The armies of Italy and of Naples were likewise to have five battalions per regiment, four in Italy, and the fifth in Piedmont or in the southern departments of France.

To this end it was necessary to have recourse again to the conscription. There remained to be enrolled, out of the conscriptions of 1807, 1808, and 1809—the latter already decreed in January of the current year—about 60,000 men. Napoleon resolved to demand in addition that of 1810, thus beginning the practice of anticipating the conscription by more than a year. He took the precaution, however, not to dispose for the present of more than a part of these levies. The 60,000 men for the years 1807, 1808, 1809, and the 80,000 for 1810, were to form a total of 140,000 men, to be thus distributed: 40,000 to the infantry of the grand army, 30,000 to that of the army

of Spain, 26,000 to that of Italy, 10,000 to the five legions in reserve, 10,000 to that of the imperial guard—which made in all 116,000 for the infantry. There remained 14,000 for the cavalry, and 10,000 for the artillery, engineers, and baggage department.

It will be remarked, no doubt, that Napoleon levied 10,000 men for the imperial guard. That choice corps, after its return to France, was reposing in Paris, and was generally less employed than the others. Napoleon resolved to make it a school of war, by sending to it chosen young men to be trained by it into battalions of fusiliers. After having passed a year or two at Paris or Versailles in the imperial guard, these conscripts would naturally have acquired its spirit, its discipline, and its fine soldierly appearance. At the same time he did not neglect to prescribe the ordinary recruitment of the guard, at the rate of twenty picked men from each regiment in the whole army, so as to maintain its excellent composition, and to leave open that career of advancement for the old soldiers who had no other way of rising.

For the present, Napoleon called out only 80,000 men—60,000 upon the conscription already decreed, and 20,000 only upon that of 1810; and desired that the enrolment should begin with the conscripts of the classes in arrear, and that 20,000 of them, chiefly from the southern departments, should be marched to Bayonne. He ordered that skeletons of each fourth battalion should be sent to that town, to begin forthwith the training of those conscripts, who were already of a vigorous age, and thus to provide for the future recruitment of the corps entering Spain. In consequence of this provident measure, the grand army would soon contain nearly 200,000 Frenchmen, not including the 5th division, the army of Italy 100,000, the army of Spain 250,000, of whom 100,000 were already on the Ebro, 110,000 were on the march, and 40,000 were serving their military apprenticeship in the fourth battalions.

Pending the execution of these measures, Napoleon had the depôts cleared immediately of all their disposable inmates, so as to procure more space, and send a first contingent of recruits to all the divisions. Three marching regiments were formed and sent off, one to Berlin, for Marshal Soult (4th division); one to Magdeburg, for Marshal Davout (3rd division); one to Dresden, for Marshal Mortier (5th division). Two others were sent to Mayence and to Orleans, to recruit the 1st and the 6th divisions. This was an immediate reinforcement of 12,000 well-trained men for the various corps which were to remain in Germany or to proceed to Spain.

Napoleon directed, at the same time, with a view to facilitate the formation of the regiments left in Germany into four war

battalions, that those which had companies of grenadiers and chasseurs in the Oudinot division should immediately recall them; and to indemnify that division for the loss, he sent it companies of grenadiers and chasseurs from the regiments stationed in France which had not yet furnished it with any such companies. There was an extraordinary movement of troops in all directions; young and old soldiers, some with their faces set northwards, others towards the south, from the Vistula to the Ebro; all coming and going, with as little confusion as was possible with regard to such vast distances and such considerable masses of men.

Always attentive to the pleasures of the soldier, and aware that, if he sets little store by his life when he has been well fashioned to his trade, he likes to enjoy that life as long as it is left him, Napoleon bespoke brilliant entertainments for the troops which were traversing France from the Rhine to the Pyrenees. The municipalities of Mayence, Metz, Nancy, Rheims, Orleans, Bordeaux, and Perigueux, were by his order to hold military festivities, the cost of which he secretly promised to defray. He devoted to this purpose more than a million out of the treasury of the army, taking care to leave the municipalities all the merit of this gracious hospitality. Martial songs composed at his desire were sung at banquets where nothing was talked of but the heroic exploits of our armies and the greatness of France, the only allusion to politics allowed at those festivities, where old soldiers, on their way from the Niemen to the Tagus, met lads of eighteen or nineteen who were quitting the banks of the Seine or the Loire for those of the Elbe or the Oder, and who, already forgetting the pain of quitting the paternal cot, mingled their adieux with cheerful anticipations of good fortune in the adventurous career of battle and glory. In general those who were bound for the south were the more joyous, simply because they had the prospect of good wine before them; so great was the forgetfulness of self in those men devoted to almost certain destruction, as they were well aware.

Besides men, Napoleon sent also immense masses of matériel towards the Pyrenees. There was no need to send any to the Rhine, because since the beginning of the war on that frontier a considerable matériel had been accumulated there, which the fortress of Magdeburg, becoming almost French on becoming Westphalian, could scarcely contain, and which it had been necessary to transport to Erfurth, Mayence, and Strasburg. But at Perpignan, Toulouse, and Bayonne, almost everything was to be created, the war being new in the south, and now assuming such vast proportions. Accordingly Napoleon gave orders for collecting at Bayonne immense quantities of woollen and linen cloths,

leather, muskets, cannons, tents, kettles, grain, fodder, and cattle. He desired that every soldier should carry three pairs of shoes in his knapsack, and find two other pairs at the Pyrenees, which were for the most part bestowed upon him gratuitously. He commanded an extraordinary manufacture of shoes, greatcoats, and biscuit, persisting in the maxim that the soldier furnished with shoes, raiment, and biscuit has what is indispensable, and that with such appliances he may be made capable of anything. He had a great number of oxen and mules purchased for food and transport. Lastly, he took care to apply large sums to the repair of the roads, for they broke down under the enormous trains of waggons that traversed them. These orders were to be executed in the latter half of October, the interview at Erfurth being fixed to take place in the first half. Napoleon calculated on crossing the Ebro at that period, marching to Madrid at the head of formidable armies, and re-establishing his brother on the throne of Philip V.

These vast expenses demanded resources no less vast. Victory and good administration had provided them beforehand; yet it is not the less true that a notable portion of the funds amassed with so much forethought for the improvement of the soil and the dotation of great families was about to be diverted from those objects and dissipated. Napoleon thus gathered from his errors in Spain two equally deplorable consequences, namely, the dispersion of his old soldiers of the north in the south, and the dissipation of the wealth created by his able economy. The budget he had taken such pains to confine within the amount of 720 millions (exclusive of the cost of collection, which was 120, and the departmental expenditure of 30 millions) was now to rise to 800 millions, and even higher, without counting all that the foreigner would continue to furnish, for the grand army was partly maintained out of the contributions of Prussia. The income which had gone on continually increasing under a reign so peaceful at home, had fallen short in one of its most important items, the customs. It had been expected that they would yield 80 millions, and it was doubtful that they would yield 50. This was a first effect of the formidable Milan decrees, which had prohibited, by new and more rigorous means, the importation of English colonial produce. The income, therefore, was diminishing, whilst the outgoings were increasing. It is true that the army funds were to supply the deficit.

The last arrangement with Prussia promised considerable resources. About 90 millions, received in kind, had been consumed severally on the spot, and 206 millions had been spent in money from the contributions, which made nearly 300 millions drawn from Germany for the maintenance of the French armies. There

remained in the receiving office of the contributions, that is to say, in the army treasury, about 160 millions in value, received or to be received soon, besides 140 due by Prussia—in all, 300 millions. But these 300 millions were not wholly available; for independently of the 140 millions payable in bills of exchange or mortgages, there were in the 160 millions reckoned as cash 24 millions already deposited in the treasury for arrears of pay, and 74 deposited in the *caisse de service* out of the 84 due to it for the loan destined to raise the notes of the receivers-general to par. There remained then 62 millions immediately available, besides 20 millions accruing from the contribution of Austria, but absorbed by loans granted to some towns and to Spain herself. Thus the present resources were very limited, since the 140 millions to be furnished by Prussia in bills of exchange and mortgages were to be paid only by instalments extending over a space of eighteen months. It is true that the income of the treasury was obtained with extreme facility, and that the *caisse de service* abounded with money, thanks to the credit it enjoyed; that according to the arrangement concluded with Prussia, the grand army was paid entirely for the whole year 1808; and that although a failure of resources might be foreseen, there was nothing as yet that indicated embarrassment. Napoleon had, nevertheless, by the war in Spain, dealt as heavy a blow to his finances as to his armies, for both were about to be weakened by division.

There resulted from that fatal war a new burden which Napoleon chose to take upon himself for political reasons of a very controvertible kind, and very much controverted by his minister of the treasury, M. Mollien. Though he took great pains to conceal from the public all knowledge of the events in Spain, even hiding victories the better to suppress all mention of defeats, yet they came to be known either through the English journals, some of which always found their way into France in spite of the most vigilant police, or by the letters of the officers to their families, written as usual according to the exaggerated impressions of the moment. Thus the public became cognisant at last of the principal events, and it was known that a French army had been unfortunate in Andalusia, that a fleet had capitulated at Cadiz, and that Joseph, after having entered Madrid, was then at Vittoria. Now, it is the general results that are important far more than the details, and in substance it was generally known that the attempt made upon the crown of Spain, instead of being, as had at first been supposed, a simple act of entering into possession, was becoming a desperate strife against a whole nation, backed by the entire strength of England. The division of the forces of France being an inevitable consequence of this new war,

it was confusedly felt that the empire was no longer so strong as it had been; that its lately prostrate enemies might raise their heads again, and all that had seemed settled might again become matter of dispute. Self-interest, though often blind, has nevertheless an instinctive perspicacity that often renders it prophetic. Thus, although the mercantile movement of the public funds reveals in general only the unreasonable hopes or fears of the day, yet does it indicate in the long run the prudent and well-grounded opinion of the existing state of things which the commercial classes entertain upon mature reflection. Now, in spite of Napoleon's efforts to disguise the true situation of affairs in Spain, the aroused sagacity of the money market belied the official language of the government, and the public funds fell considerably. After Tilsit they had been quoted at the price, then unprecedented, of 94 for the five per cent. stock, which was maintained, with some slight variations, until the barbarous expedition against Copenhagen had induced the culpable invasion of the Peninsula, and all hope of peace was gone. The funds then fell from 94 to 80, and even so low as 70 after the Spanish insurrection. This was a judgment spontaneously pronounced on the emperor's policy by the interests it alarmed; it was a very hard truth obtruded upon him in spite of all his awe-inspiring power. As always happens, the natural movement of the market was complicated with the factitious movement produced by speculation, and the price of the public funds tended to fall even below the level justified by reasonable considerations; for if Napoleon had committed a serious fault, it was still possible for him to repair it and to save himself, provided he did not add to it others of a still more dangerous nature.

But he was not the man to give way before this new kind of foes, and he resolved to fight against them. "I mean," he said to M. Mollien, "to make a campaign against the *bears*"—for the stockjobber's slang was as well known in those days as now. It is enough, indeed, that a country has passed through a revolution to give general currency to that jargon, since revolutions afford the amplest of all fields for the exercise of stockjobbing. In spite, then, of M. Mollien, who, as a man accustomed to the regular course of business, was averse to expedients, Napoleon resolved to make extraordinary purchases of stock, in order to raise the public funds. For this purpose he had recourse to the army treasury, which he deemed inexhaustible, just as he deemed invariable in its favours the gale of victory that had filled that treasury. Accordingly, he ordered considerable purchases on account of the army treasury, independently of the purchases on account of the sinking fund, which were then infrequent and irregular; and in so doing he thought he

acted for the advantage both of the army and of the creditors of the State. For the army he procured investments yielding six or seven per cent. interest; and for the creditors of the State he maintained their security at a sufficient price. Nor, after all, considering the matter in reference to the habits of the time, was there much to blame in this mode of operating; for in those days men had not yet come to understand that the purchases made by the State ought to be constant and daily, as a regular function, not accidental, as a speculation.

Not having the army funds in his hands, Napoleon ordered the *caisse de service* to make advances, and it did so to the amount of 30 millions for purchases of stock. He did not stop there. There was in the bank, since the issue of its new shares, capital which it knew not how to employ, the discount business not proving proportionate to the capital he had thought fit to assign to the bank. The stocks at the current price yielded a return of seven per cent., which was a better employment for money than that of discounting. Napoleon required the bank to purchase stock to a large amount; which it did without demur, and which was indeed in conformity with its own true interests as well as with those of the State, since no other investment could just then yield it so much profit. By means of these purchases, steadily and resolutely planned and executed for a month or two, the speculators for a fall were beaten, many of them even ruined, and the public funds rose again to 80, a price which Napoleon deemed it a point of honour for his government to maintain. A rise above that point was in his eyes a token of the exuberant prosperity which his victories would soon give back to the empire; a fall below it was a mark of decline which he would not endure. He resolved that whenever the funds fell below 80 the treasury should renew its purchases; and so, in spite of the efforts of the gamblers for a fall—the worst of all gamblers, since they speculate on the impoverishment of the public fortune—the price of stock was upheld by the power of that singular speculator who had at his disposal the combined resources of the treasury and of victory. He exulted at this success as much as at a battle gained over the Russians or the Austrians. "We have beaten the *bears*," said he to M. Mollien. "They will not try the game again; and meanwhile we shall have preserved for the creditors of the State the capital to which they have a right; for 80 per cent. is that on which I will have them enabled to reckon; and besides this, we shall have effected good investments for the army funds." He then bestowed some private revenues on several of the vanquished in this financial warfare. It was, after all, a singular symptom, and worthy of observation, that open conflict waged by speculators against Napoleon's policy,

whilst timorous opinion as yet confined itself to whispered rumours. Why did he not hearken to that lesson, ignoble as was the source whence it flowed? for truth is good and wholesome, come whence it may.

These occupations of all kinds consumed the latter part of August and almost the whole month of September. The interview at Erfurth was approaching. In the interval the manifestations of the imperial diplomacy had attained their end. Austria, intimidated since the return of Napoleon to Paris, had considerably lowered her tone. The declarations he had made, confirmed by the call for the German contingents, had shown her the imminence of war, and prompted her to serious reflection. Moreover, it suited her to postpone her purposes; for supposing her bent on again taking the field, it would be better for her to wait until a hundred thousand Frenchmen should have quitted Germany for the Peninsula, and until she should have further improved her preparations. She did not hesitate, therefore, to offer such explanations as might allay Napoleon's irritation, and postpone the moment of rupture. She attributed her armaments to an alleged reorganisation of the Austrian army, begun, as she stated, by Archduke Charles, and steadily continued by him for more than two years past, a fact which no one had a right to think strange or amiss. As for the indulgence with which England had treated the Austrian flag on the Adriatic, she accounted for it, not as the result of a secret connivance, but as a token of lingering forbearance on the part of England towards an ancient ally. Lastly, as regarded the recognition of King Joseph, she eluded the overtures of French diplomacy by putting off the question from day to day on pretence of not having yet been able to fix the attention of the Emperor Francis on that important subject.

Napoleon was not deluded as to the import and the sincerity of the replies made by Austria; but he saw clearly from her language that she would do nothing that year, and that he should have time to make a prompt and vigorous campaign beyond the Pyrenees. Moreover, it was at Erfurth he was finally to make that point certain. Prussia had eagerly ratified the convention of evacuation, and even the secret articles which so strictly limited her military establishment; but she demanded, as a signal favour, longer periods for the payment of the 140 millions remaining due by her. She hoped to obtain this indulgence through the direct personal interference of the Emperor Alexander at Erfurth; for everybody hoped or feared something from that famous interview which had been announced all over Europe, and was now the theme of every conversation. Some denied, others affirmed, it would take place, each according to his own desires. Others talked of sovereigns

who were to be present at it, such as the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria, who had not been invited; for besides the sovereigns of France and Russia, none had been summoned or received a favourable answer to their request to be admitted, except the princes whose homages were expected, and who would serve to give more éclat to the proceedings.

Whilst rumour was busy with these contradictory surmises, one fact was true, namely, that the interview was about to take place on the 27th of September at Erfurth, some leagues from Weimar. The Emperor Alexander, after having so strongly desired it, could not decline it when it was offered to him. Besides, his affairs allowed and even commanded him to accept it; for things were beginning to wear a better aspect in Finland, the English had quitted the Baltic, and events were hurrying onwards in the east. Gladly, therefore, he accepted the opportunity of seeing Napoleon once more, and at last obtaining from him the realisation in whole or in part of his most cherished wishes. M. de Romanzoff, who was, if possible, still more eagerly bent on the consummation of the same desires, approved quite as much as his master of this important interview, and was to accompany him to it. Besides M. de Romanzoff, Alexander resolved to bring with him his brother, the Grand Duke Constantine, as a military man, and the first officer of his palace, M. de Tolstoy, brother of the Russian ambassador at Paris, and in addition to these two personages a few aides-de-camp. In order to facilitate his intercourse with the imperial court of France, he desired that M. de Caulaincourt, whom he had become habituated to see daily, and to converse with in the most unrestricted manner, should be present at Erfurth. He made but one request before setting out on his journey, namely, that he should be enabled, when he passed through Kœnigsberg, again to speak a few words of comfort to the ruined and most unfortunate sovereigns of Prussia. The convention of evacuation, though most welcome to them as regarded the deliverance of their territory, bore very distressingly upon them in its pecuniary stipulations. Now, it was a good-natured weakness of Alexander's to wish always to say to those he saw what it was agreeable to them to hear. His inclination that way was particularly strong with regard to the King and Queen of Prussia, whose misfortunes were a continual reproach to him. He insisted, therefore, on being authorised, as he passed through Kœnigsberg, to promise some further pecuniary remissions, to which M. de Caulaincourt, who had no instructions on the subject, assented with much hesitation and reserve; and this point being carried, he made his arrangements for being at Erfurth on the 27th of September, stopping only one day with the unfortunate court of Prussia.

In St. Petersburg the party hostile to an alliance with France, exulting in the difficulties she was encountering in Spain, arguing from those which were befalling Russia in Finland, and ostentatiously deploring the distresses of the Russian commerce, bitterly censured the interview at Erfurth. After the indignities committed at Bayonne, said this party, to go so far to visit their author, to enter into direct conference with him, with a view, no doubt, to ratify all he had done and all he should yet do, was not very honourable conduct. The representative of Austria especially allowed himself certain liberties of speech on this head which it was necessary to check. The court of the empress-mother had with difficulty held its peace at the express command of Alexander. At the last moment, however, the empress-mother, exasperated by the dangers to which she seemed to think her son exposed, broke out into violent reproaches against M. de Romanzoff, telling him he was leading Alexander to his destruction, and that, perhaps, there would befall the Emperor of Russia at Erfurth what had befallen the unhappy sovereigns of Spain at Bayonne. Finally, she could not refrain from expressing her apprehensions to the emperor himself, who reassured her, rather in the tone of a grateful son, than as an absolute master offended at seeing his conduct and its possible consequences judged so ill. Such strange suppositions proved two things—the infatuation of the old courts, and the strength Napoleon had infused into their prejudices by his conduct at Bayonne.

Alexander paid no heed to these fears, set out from St. Petersburg with his brother and some aides-de-camp (he had sent M. de Romanzoff and M. de Caulaincourt on before him), and travelled post in the simplest and most rapid fashion. It had been agreed that Napoleon, being on his own ground at Erfurth, should take upon himself the task of providing all the accessories of that grand demonstration, and that Alexander should only have to convey thither his own person and those of his officers. He travelled in a plain calèche more rapidly than the most hurried couriers. He stopped on the 18th of September at Kœnigsberg, seemed greatly to commiserate the misfortunes of his old allies, who were almost reduced to a life of indigence in one of the extremities of their kingdom, and immediately set out again for Weimar.

Wherever there were French troops, a most brilliant reception was prepared for the young czar. The military were under arms in their best uniform, shouting *Vive Alexandre! Vive Napoléon!* Alexander reviewed them, complimented them on their military aspect, which corresponded with their valour, and charmed them by his infinite grace. Napoleon had sent Marshal Lannes, created Duke of Montebello, to receive him at the limits

of the Confederation of the Rhine, which extended to Bromberg. Alexander completely won by his gracious condescension the heart of the old soldier, who, though very obstinate in his revolutionary notions, was not the less sensitive to the well-merited marks of approbation bestowed on him by the occupiers of thrones.

Alexander arrived on the 25th of September at Weimar, and remained with that court, to which he was connected by family ties, until the 27th, the day appointed for the meeting at Erfurth.

Napoleon, on his part, had quitted Paris, preceded, surrounded, and followed by all that was most distinguished in his army and his court. M. de Talleyrand was one of the personages he had despatched before him, in order to impart such a tone as was fitting to the language and demeanour of everybody. Though already displeased at some expressions uttered by M. de Talleyrand respecting the affairs of Spain, from which the latter endeavoured to hold himself aloof since they had taken an unfavourable turn, Napoleon chose to have him, that he might employ him in various delicate communications for which M. de Champagny was not adapted. A great number of generals and diplomatists were of the party; Germany was represented by a crowd of crowned princes. On the 26th the King of Saxony made his prompt appearance in Erfurth. That little town formerly belonged to a prince of the church, and accustomed, like Weimar and several other studious capitals of Germany, to invariable quiet, was become a place the most animated, the most brilliant, the most thronged with soldiers, officers, equipages, and servants in livery. Kings, princes, and high and mighty lords of the old and the new régime were met in the streets in the guise of simple pedestrians. Napoleon despatched thither beforehand all that was necessary to cover the grave aspect of business under a veil of elegant and magnificent pleasures. He arrived there on the 27th of September, at ten in the forenoon. After having received the civil and military authorities assembled from all the environs, then the diplomatists of Europe, the potentates of the Confederation of the Rhine, and the King of Saxony, he rode out of Erfurth on horseback about mid-day, surrounded by an immense staff, to go and meet the Emperor Alexander, who was approaching from Weimar in an open carriage. Weimar is four or five leagues from Erfurth. Napoleon met his ally at the end of two leagues. On perceiving the carriage in which he rode, he galloped towards him as if to manifest his eagerness for the meeting. On coming together the two emperors alighted and embraced each other cordially and with every sign of extreme pleasure; a pleasure which was real, for, besides that they had great need of conferring together on their affairs, they felt

mutually a personal liking. Horses had been provided for Alexander and his suite, and the two emperors rode into Erfurth side by side, talking with friendly animation; asking and hearing news of each other's family, as if those families had sprung from the same spot, and had been old and affectionate acquaintances. In short, the demeanour of the two emperors was such as to delight the crowds that had flocked from all the country round to behold them; for their manifest good understanding was a pledge to the spectators that the latter should not see again those formidable armies which two years before, at the same season and on the same spot, had laid waste their fine fields.

Arrived at Erfurth, Napoleon presented to the Emperor Alexander all the personages admitted to the interview, beginning with the kings and princes; and then he escorted him to the palace prepared for him. They were to dine every day at Napoleon's table, since he was the host, and the sovereign of the north was his guest. In the evening there was a splendid banquet, at which were seated Napoleon, Alexander, the Grand Duke Constantine, the King of Saxony, the Duke of Weimar, Prince William of Prussia—in a word, the whole crowd of reigning princes and titled personages civil and military. The town was illuminated, and the tragedy of *Cinna* was performed before the imperial party by the most accomplished tragic actors France ever possessed. The judicious clemency of the founder of empire, disarming parties and attaching them to his power, was the spectacle chosen by Napoleon to open the series of representations of French tragedy.

It was arranged that in the intervals between these entertainments the two chief personages should find time in the morning and evening, either within doors or in their promenades, to confer freely on the important matters they had to arrange. Napoleon had come to Erfurth with his mind fully made up as to the essential topics about to be discussed, and his plan was all arranged beforehand. With respect to the east, in the first place, he had renounced all idea of partition, having perceived, after some discussions into which he had entered from complaisance, that it was impossible for him to agree with Russia on that subject. If he did not give Constantinople, he gave nothing, though he should grant the whole Turkish empire; for in the eyes of Alexander and M. de Romanzoff the question consisted solely in the possession of the two straits; and if he gave Constantinople, he gave a hundred times too much—he gave away the future welfare of Europe—he gave away, in fine, a conquest the lustre of which would eclipse all his own. But he had perceived that in paying cash down, if the expression may be allowed, in sacrificing at once a portion of the

Turkish territory which Russia passionately coveted, he would afford her a pleasure sufficiently great to attach her completely to him in the present crisis. Now this was enough for Napoleon's purpose.

Thus, instead of a magnificent dream, but one that was dangerous to Europe, to substitute a limited but immediate reality, was for this time his plan for conciliating Russia. All that the Emperor Alexander and M. de Romanzoff had been saying for many months proved that in spite of the loftiness of their expectations they would readily enough forego the notion of partitioning the Turkish empire, on account of the difficulty of coming to a common understanding, provided they were forthwith and definitively put in possession of a portion of territory which was convenient for them, that portion of territory being situated on the Danube. This was, no doubt, a weighty concession to Russian ambition, but the least dangerous of any that could be made; it was one that was particularly disagreeable to Austria, whose inclinations there was no reason to study; and it was become inevitable, in consequence of the great embarrassments Napoleon had brought upon himself in Spain. In the position in which the recent events had placed us, this sacrifice was indispensable, and when reduced to certain proportions, it assuredly did not exceed—it did not even equal —the advantages which France obtained on her side.

In return Napoleon required of Russia a close alliance for peace and war, and an absolute union of efforts against Austria and England. That union was indeed inevitable; for in conceding Wallachia and Moldavia to Russia, Napoleon bestowed a gift which could not fail to set Alexander at variance with Austria and England. Since, therefore, a rupture with them was about to be incurred for that important cause, it was necessary to agree together beforehand for resisting them, and the offensive and defensive alliance followed as a matter of course.

In consenting then to the cession of the Danubian provinces Napoleon possessed an almost infallible means of making the conference at Erfurth end in the result he wished for. His plan being well determined, it was not difficult for one who possessed such profound skill in the art of captivating and swaying men's minds, when he so pleased, to bring Alexander over to his views.

The conference having been opened with the usual protestations, the two sovereigns addressed themselves vigorously to the grand topics they had to consider. Alexander repeated his usual language as to the convenience and necessity of a union between the two empires. He again affirmed that all jealousy was extinct in his heart, but that France had just received vast aggrandisements, and that if he desired some

compensations beneficial to Russia, it was less for himself than for his nation, which must be prevailed on to tolerate the great changes effected in the west. As to the strange events of Bayonne, and the sudden, harsh occupation of Rome, he scarcely uttered a word; merely observing that the princes of Spain and the Roman pontiff were poor creatures who deserved their fate for their incapacity, and had rendered themselves through their infatuated blindness incompatible with the existing state of things in Europe. Nevertheless, said Alexander, it was necessary to have comprehended Napoleon's system as thoroughly as he had done before one could acquiesce so easily in the catastrophes which the world had just witnessed; and it was requisite that notable changes in the east also should attract the attention of the Russians, in order to divert it from those which were taking place in the west. As for the enemies of France, Alexander declared that he took them all for his own; for in compliance with Napoleon's wish he had engaged in war with England; and as regarded Austria, scarcely anything remained for him to do to become her declared adversary, since he was ready to employ the most imposing and decisive manifestations to curb her, and if those manifestations were not sufficient, to proceed from words to deeds—that is to say, to war—supposing the court of Vienna would incur the blame of aggression, which he would not take upon himself.

Napoleon replied to these friendly protestations with all possible fervour, and in terms of exact reciprocity. On his part he expressed his readiness to accede to all reasonable aggrandisements of Russia, but he stood his ground as to the impossibility of agreeing upon certain projects, and as to the embarrassments in which the two empires were involved—embarrassments which forbade them to attempt at that precise moment too vast territorial redistributions; for surely there were enough such of great magnitude before the world without adding others of a prodigious kind, such, for instance, as the partitioning of the Turkish empire, and partitioning it wholly. Examining in detail the projects that had so much busied the minds of Alexander and M. de Romanzoff, Napoleon discussed one after the other the various plans of partition which had been proposed; and the better to bring over the Emperor Alexander to his views, he was peremptory, as he had always been, on the subject of Constantinople, that is to say, the possession of the straits, and he left not the least hope of a concession on that point. Next he pointed out how difficult it would be for Russia herself to venture forthwith upon the execution of such a project. Austria would certainly not accede to it, whatever offers might be made to her, and she would prefer a desperate conflict to a partition of the Turkish empire. England, Austria, Turkey

aroused from her very foundations, Spain, and part of Germany would join in a last effort to resist this unsettlement of the whole world. Was the present moment just such as the two empires ought to choose for so gigantic a work? Russia was encountering obstacles in Finland, which, like Spain, had seemed at first so easy of subjugation. She had an army on the Danube sufficient, no doubt, to make head against the Turks, but not in case of a national rising on their part; and she had very few forces in front of Austria. Napoleon would therefore have to make head alone against Austria, England, Spain, and those portions of Germany which might endeavour to rise. This he could unquestionably do, for he was in a condition to overwhelm all his enemies; but was it wise to undertake so much at once? and wherefore too? For an object rendered chimerical by its vastness, and respecting which the two empires themselves could not agree. Was there no other course more simple, more practical, more certainly satisfactory? Might they not, for instance, agree as to certain acquisitions strongly indicated beforehand, for which it would not be difficult to gain the assent of European diplomacy, even without departing from pacific means, and which would of themselves constitute the most brilliant result for Russia, surpassing even her utmost hopes? If, for instance, in the sequel of current events, she obtained Finland, Moldavia, and Wallachia, would not the reign of Alexander have equalled those of his predecessors which were most productive of territorial aggrandisement? As for France, she coveted nothing thenceforth. With Spain secured to Joseph, and the French masters of the temporal power in Rome, she would have nothing more to desire. She did not wish for a single territorial change more. To prove this, she was about to distribute among the sovereigns of the Confederation of the Rhine the German territories which remained to her from the dismemberment of Prussia. Her natural frontiers were enough for her, and Spain even, which she had lately grasped, was not a territorial acquisition, but a complement of her federative system, since, after all, Spain remained separate and independent under a prince of the house of Bonaparte, instead of being so under a prince of the house of Bourbon. Now, all these advantages for Russia and for France might, it was not impossible, be obtained by diplomacy, and by a final military effort—of the Russians in Finland, of the French in Spain. Was it not probable, indeed, that Europe, weary of so much agitation, and seeing the two empires strongly united together, would finally choose peace rather than war? And peace—after having secured to Russia Finland, Wallachia, and Moldavia, and to France the completion of her federative system by the subjection of Spain to King Joseph —peace was certainly a very noble and acceptable *dénoûment*,

which would fill the exhausted world with delight. But if peace was impossible on these conditions, the two empires might, after having finished, the one with Finland, the other with Spain, commit themselves to the vast unknown future opening to them in the east, and they might do so with the more freedom in their movements and the greater mastery over their means. Besides, Alexander and Napoleon were young; they had time to wait, and postpone their vast projects regarding the east.

The strange situation being once admitted that brought the two sovereigns of the east and west face to face to treat of such subjects, nothing could be more discreet than such a system. To complete what was begun before engaging in fresh enterprises was a lesson of prudence which a first defeat had impressed on Napoleon, and which a little weariness of war contributed also to render agreeable to him. Would to Heaven that he had been more attentive to those first lessons of fortune!

It was not in one conversation, but in several, that Napoleon and Alexander had opportunities of talking of all these things. As for Alexander, once he was refused Constantinople, the partition of the Turkish empire ceased to have any charms for him. To adjourn that vast question, which was pregnant with the fate of the old world—to adjourn it until a time when Russia should be more independent of the west—was all that remained to be done. But instead of those gigantic and far too chimerical projects, to substitute a reality, such as the gift of the Danubian provinces, provided this was not a vain promise, but a sure, immediate gift, was also a thing calculated to yield the czar satisfaction; and on the whole, he himself felt in his discreeter moments that it was the arrangement which best suited him, for in that case nothing would have to be given to France along the shores of the east—neither Albania, the Morea, Thessaly, Macedonia, Syria, nor Egypt. The decrepit old empire of the sultans would remain as a prey always at hand whenever the moment should have come for devouring it; and meanwhile there was the immediate acquisition of a reality, which, in any other than a time of prodigies, would have been deemed magnificent, and one for which no irksome compensation was to be paid, since, after all, whether Spain belonged to the house of Bourbon or to the house of Bonaparte was a question in which England was certainly interested, but Russia not at all.

Alexander could, therefore, with great advantage to himself, accede to Napoleon's new views. . It is true that the prospect presented to him was no longer one of marvellous grandeur; and to a man with an imagination like that of Alexander, that was a circumstance much to be regretted. The most positive result, without a little tinge of the marvellous, would want charms for him, and the French alliance was in danger of

becoming one of those ardent but short-lived friendships which were common with him. There was one thing, however, which could stand in the young emperor's estimation in lieu of the prestige of any plan of partition—this was, the instantaneous realisation of his desires, which had all the ardour of youthful appetites, that will be satisfied on the instant. His old minister, M. de Romanzoff, who had reached the opposite term of existence, equalled his master in the juvenile ardour of his desires. He, too, panted for the immediate accomplishment of his wishes; he could not brook a day's delay, as though fearing that at his age there was not time enough left him to enjoy his glory—the glory that so well became one of Catherine's disciples—of securing the mouths of the Danube for the Russian empire. Promptitude was then the charm which Napoleon had to substitute for that of the marvellous. What he gave he should give quickly, in order that the gift might be prized at its true worth.

This new system of arrangement having been adopted, Alexander and M. de Romanzoff seized with the most intense and passionate ardour on the idea of acquiring Moldavia and Wallachia, and resolved to carry back with them from Erfurth, not a vain promise, but a reality, which they might proclaim on their return to St. Petersburg.*

Hitherto Napoleon had tolerated the temporary occupation of the provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia by the Russians, but not without some remonstrances and hints that the French would be forced, in consequence, to prolong their occupation of Silesia. Nothing of the sort was now to be thought of. France was to consent by a formal treaty to Russia's permanent possession of the Danubian provinces, and was to engage not only herself to ratify that acquisition, but also to cause it to be ratified by Turkey, Austria, and even England, when the time was come for treating with the latter. Russia would, in consequence, break the armistice with the Turks, advance her armies to the foot of the Balkans, and even beyond them, to Adrianople and Constantinople, if necessary, in order to extort that sacrifice from the Porte. Should Austria attempt to interfere, the two allies would jointly overwhelm her. As for England, being already at war with that power, they had no new course to adopt with regard to her. It was for Napoleon to compel her, by some heavy blow dealt her in the Peninsula, to acquiesce in whatever he and his ally might do in the rest of the continent.

* There are in the archives of the Secrétaire d'Etat some very curious letters from M. de Champagny to Napoleon, which narrate the writer's interviews with M. de Romanzoff, and give a most singular idea of the impatience of the Russian minister. Further on the reader will meet with various passages from the letters which vividly depict that impatience.

Napoleon had no objection to these views. To give forthwith was his own inclination, for he felt the necessity of exciting a new passion in Alexander's breast. He only wished to observe some prudence in the promulgation of the resolutions which should be adopted at Erfurth, in order not to throw any obstacle in the way of the overtures for peace he intended to make after the interview. He therefore admitted the principle that Russia should immediately enter on possession of Moldavia and Wallachia. The manner of publishing the thing could only be a question of composition, the care of which would devolve on the ministers of the two sovereigns.

Their desires being thus gratified, Alexander and M. de Romanzoff felt a delight almost as great as that with which they had dreamed three months before of the conquest of Constantinople. Napoleon had therefore attained his purpose of satisfying Alexander by a limited but immediate gift almost as much as by a magnificent but doubtful prospect. It was to the arrangement of these points that the first eight or ten days of the interview were devoted; and extreme as had been the mutual courtesy of the two emperors, their conduct towards each other from that moment was expressive of more goodwill than ever. Alexander especially seemed to blend affection with politics; in the promenade, at table, at the theatre, his demeanour towards his illustrious ally was familiar, friendly, deferential, and enthusiastic. When he spoke of him it was in a tone of admiration, with which no one could fail to be struck.

Erfurth was become the most extraordinary gathering-place of sovereigns of which history makes mention. Besides the Emperors of France and Russia, the Grand Duke Constantine, Prince William of Prussia, and the King of Saxony, there were the Kings of Bavaria and Wurtemberg, the King and Queen of Westphalia, the Prince Primate, Chancellor of the Confederation, the Grand Duke and Grand Duchess of Baden, the Dukes of Hesse-Darmstadt, Weimar, Saxe-Gotha, Oldenburg, Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, and a host of others too long to enumerate, with their chamberlains and their ministers. They dined every day at the emperor's table, seated in the order of their respective ranks. In the evening there was a dramatic performance in a theatre which Napoleon had repaired and decorated for the occasion. The last part of the soirée was passed in the palace of the Emperor Alexander. Napoleon, having perceived that Alexander laboured under some defect of hearing, had a platform constructed in the place usually occupied by the orchestra in modern theatres, and there the two emperors were seated in chairs so placed as to make them very conspicuous. Right and left stood seats for the kings. Behind, that is to say, in the pit, were the princes, ministers,

and generals; hence the saying, so often repeated, that at Erfurth there was a pitful of kings (*parterre de rois*). After the representation of *Cinna*, followed that of *Andromaque*, *Britannicus*, *Mithridate*, and *Œdipe*. At the performance of the latter a singular incident struck the audience with surprise and satisfaction. It was a mark of exquisite affectionate flattery bestowed on Napoleon by Alexander in the fulness of the joy with which the former had just contrived to inspire him. When Œdipe uttered this sentiment, "*The friendship of a great man is a blessing from the gods*," Alexander grasped Napoleon's hand and pressed it warmly, in a manner to be observed by all the spectators, whom that sudden and opportune gesture struck with surprise and unanimous approbation.

There had arrived in Erfurth a personage whom all these doings tormented, perplexed, and filled with intense anxiety; this was M. de Vincent, representative of the court of Austria. His master had sent him ostensibly to compliment the two sovereigns who were come so near to his empire, but in reality to observe what was passing, penetrate if possible the secret of the interview, and complain, but in respectful terms, that Austria was neglected; giving it at the same time to be clearly understood that if the Emperor Francis had been invited to attend, he would have complied with alacrity, that his presence would not have impaired the splendour of the interview, and that his adhesion would not have been prejudicial to the accomplishment of whatever resolutions might then be adopted.

Napoleon had arranged beforehand the line of conduct to be pursued with regard to the Austrian envoy. In the first place, that the secrets of the interview might be well kept, they had been confined to the knowledge of but four persons—the two emperors and their two ministers, M. de Romanzoff and M. de Champagny. Alexander and M. de Romanzoff for the sake of their own ambitious hopes, Napoleon for the sake of his whole policy, and M. de Champagny from his tried discretion and fidelity, were incapable of allowing any part of the secret of the negotiations to escape them. Their purport had even been concealed from M. de Talleyrand, whom Napoleon daily distrusted more and more, particularly in matters in which Austria was concerned. He had been made aware, indeed, that the object of the interview was to unite the two empires of France and Russia more closely, and even to fix by treaty the principles of their union; but the positive object of the resolution was carefully concealed from him. Not a word on the subject was breathed to M. de Vincent; and when he complained that his master was left out of that imperial meeting, he was answered roundly enough that this was the consequence of his master's inexplicable armaments; that in order to be associated in a

policy it is before all things necessary to appear favourable to it, and not to have the air of preparing against it all the forces of one's dominions; and that all that Austria would gain by such conduct would be to be daily held more aloof from the serious affairs of Europe, and that if she desired great intimacies, nothing would remain for her but to go seek them in England.

M. de Vincent was in a false position, the awkwardness and even humiliation of which Napoleon took pains to augment, though all the while observing an extreme politeness towards him in outward forms; and his sly contrivances to that end were seconded by Alexander to the best of his ability. M. de Vincent's only resource was in M. de Talleyrand, who was more and more attached to the policy of Austria, and who strove to set M. de Vincent's mind at ease by assuring him that nothing serious was at hand, and that the great show of intimacy was affected only to maintain peace, of which all parties had need. There was a distinguished lady, the Princess de la Tour et Taxis, sister of the Queen of Prussia, who used to entertain the most eminent persons, and often the Emperor Alexander himself. Her drawing-rooms served as a place for insinuating what it was not convenient to say openly in the diplomatic conferences; and this was a species of communication in which M. de Talleyrand was much employed, as we shall see by-and-by. Wit, refinement, and grace reigned in the princess's circle, where Germany's men of genius, Goethe and Wieland, who had come with their august patrons the princes of Weimar, mingled with kings, ministers, and generals. There it was that inquirers sought to guess what could not be known, to detect in a word incautiously uttered some great political or military conception. The unfortunate M. de Vincent was one of the guessers, and exhausted himself in observations and conjectures of all kinds; and his very visible tortures greatly amused the two emperors, who were glad to punish Austria for her imprudent as well as hostile conduct.

Concord with Russia appearing secured in consideration of the formal and not deferred cession of the Danubian provinces, and the co-operation of that power against Austria following as a necessary consequence, Napoleon decided, even before quitting Erfurth, many questions that had been left open with respect to the distribution of his forces. He ordered the fine Sebastiani division, which was to be composed of some of the old regiments destined for Spain, and which had not yet been put in movement for Bayonne, to march immediately from Paris and from the points where it was assembled. He gave a similar order respecting the Leval division, formed entirely of German auxiliaries, so that these two divisions should arrive at Bayonne

at the close of October. He now decided what he should do with the 5th division, and ordered that its march, at first directed to Bareuth, should finally be to the Rhine and the Pyrenees. Lastly, to the three divisions of dragoons already on the move to Spain he added two others, and left in Germany only the cuirassiers with a notable portion of the light horse. These arrangements were the natural result of the security he derived from his compact with Russia, and of his desire at once to overwhelm the Spaniards and the English by an irresistible mass of forces.

The two monarchs had now been ten days together: the task of embodying the conditions of their compact remained to be executed, and this was no easy matter, considering the new passion for immediate possession which had seized on Alexander and M. de Romanzoff. To avoid troubling by discussions on matter of detail the daily increasing cordiality of their union, the two sovereigns agreed to leave to their ministers, M. de Romanzoff and M. de Champagny, the task of committing to paper the convention which was to contain their recent resolutions, and they set out on the 6th of October to pass two days at the court of Weimar, where magnificent fêtes had long been prepared for them. MM. de Romanzoff and de Champagny remained behind to proceed with the important work assigned to them.*

It was Napoleon's wish, as we have stated, that there should result from the interview at Erfurth an accordance with Russia that should be solid, and above all, conspicuous; one that should awe his enemies and constrain them to peace by depriving them of all hope of success. He conceded to Russia, in consideration of what she allowed him to do in Spain and Italy, that Finland, Wallachia, and Moldavia should belong to her in any case, whether there was peace or war; but with the understanding that if it was possible to procure these advantages for Russia by peace, that course should be tried before plunging into a new general war that would involve the whole world, especially Turkey and Austria. Napoleon was convinced that if the union of the two powers, Russia and France, was very complete, very sincere, and very manifest, Austria would be forced to remain quiescent, for she would be crushed between the two empires if she attempted to stir; and that the submission of Austria would compel England also to yield, and agree to a naval peace. He, moreover,

* I have already said that there were letters from M. de Champagny to the emperor, in which the details of the negotiation were related day by day, even when M. de Champagny and Napoleon were together in Erfurth. These letters were of course continued whilst Napoleon was at Weimar. I am not, therefore, reduced to conjectures, and it is from the most authentic documents that I retrace the details of this interview, the resolutions adopted at which were not less interesting than the spectacle exhibited to Europe.

undertook to urge her to that conclusion by various other means. In the first place, he desired that overtures of peace should be made to England solemnly in the name of the two emperors, and in such a manner that they should be well known to the English public; and pending those overtures he proposed, under the security afforded by the Russian alliance, to leave in Germany only a very small portion of the grand army, move the rest to the camp at Boulogne, and at head of a reinforcement of 150,000 veterans, which would raise the French forces beyond the Pyrenees to a total of 250,000, march in person into the Peninsula, overwhelm the insurgents, and inflict some grand disaster on the English troops in that quarter. By these combined means he expected to constrain England to treat for peace. It is true that he should have to bring her to consent to two considerable matters—the establishment of the house of Bonaparte in Spain, and the possession of the Danubian provinces by Russia. But these were matters already consummated, or on the point of being so, for Spain, in his opinion, would be reduced to subjection in two months, and the Danubian provinces were occupied by Russia in a manner that precluded the Turks and their friends from entertaining any hope of effecting their evacuation. England, moreover, had already testified to Russia a sort of inclination to concede to her Moldavia and Wallachia. Napoleon did not therefore regard the proposed arrangements as quite incompatible with peace, particularly should he succeed in the great blows he expected to deal the Spaniards and the English.

His design, therefore, was to make a proposal to England, in the name, as the manifesto should state, of the two emperors, *united together for peace and war*, and offering to negotiate a general arrangement on the principle of *uti possidetis*. This was a convenient basis for negotiation, since, while it left England her maritime conquests, including Malta, it secured to France Spain and Naples, and to Russia Finland and the Danubian provinces. In order to ensure Russia's possession of the latter, a declaration was to be addressed to the Porte, to the effect that Russia intended to keep those provinces, and that declaration was to be backed by the presence of the Russian armies and by the advice of France. Should the latter be disregarded, France would abandon the Porte to Russia, in which case there could be no doubt as to the result.

The parties being agreed on all these points, the business of recording that agreement could not be difficult, for there never is difficulty in the expression when there is none in the thought. But there was one important point respecting which agreement seemed difficult. While positively and immediately conceding Moldavia and Wallachia to Russia, it was Napoleon's wish that the latter should postpone for some weeks its communications

to the Porte. If that power became aware of what was impending, it would be exasperated, would inform England, and throw itself into her arms;* and England, seeing a new ally arise, would see in the union of Spain, Austria, and Turkey, chances of success in a fresh struggle that would dispose her to reject peace. On the other hand, by waiting a few weeks only, it would be possible to bring England to negotiate. Once engaged in negotiation, it would not be so easy for her to desist from it, since the English public must naturally long for the end of the war; and when at length she should be informed of the last condition—that, namely, of leaving to Russia the two provinces which that power possessed *de facto*—it was to be doubted she would forego the ideas of peace she had been led to entertain, and revert to those of war, for a question in which she had personally no great interest. It was in this additional clause that the difficulty consisted—that is to say, in this delay of some weeks to which it was sought to condemn the impatience of Russia.

The Emperor Alexander had left this matter entirely to the discretion of his old minister, whose impatience was at least equal to his own. On conferring with M. de Romanzoff, M. de Champagny found him ready to assent to everything without the least hesitation, until the question was raised of postponing the communication to the Porte, and then he became intractable. A new delay, after fifteen months of expectation from the date of the meeting at Tilsit, was, in M. de Romanzoff's opinion, not to be endured. For fifteen months France had been making promises to Russia without realising any one of them, and had thus compelled her to remain in a state of armistice with regard to the Turks. But for the urgent requests of France, said M. de Romanzoff, Russia would already have marched her armies across the Balkan, and compelled Turkey to surrender the provinces she was no longer able

* The following is what Napoleon wrote to M. de Champagny on this subject:—

"The whole discussion, therefore, can only turn upon the single phrase added to Article VII. It is, nevertheless, an immediate consequence of the step which has been taken; for if England is disposed to enter into negotiation, it is evident that upon news reaching her that a power of such considerable extent as Turkey is coming over to her interests, that fact will render her more peremptory in the negotiation. Why reopen to her without good reason the ports of Syria, Egypt, Africa, and the Morea? The French factories would be pillaged, several thousand men imprisoned and slaughtered, commerce stopped, and all this for no advantage at all to Russia. And if peace were made between Russia and the Porte whilst the negotiations are pending with England, this would be an incident attended with more disadvantages than otherwise, since England would have a clearer insight into the affairs which have been treated at Erfurth; and the treaty made with the Porte would give her to understand that the idea of a partition is postponed, and would alarm her less. There is every motive, therefore, for scrupulously executing the proposed article."

either to retain or govern. All that had been got by the compact at Tilsit was this clog upon the action of Russia, and she had suffered too much from it to submit to it again. It was, in fact, for the very purpose of putting an end to an intolerable *status quo* that the emperor had come all the way from St. Petersburg to Erfurth, in spite of opposition, sinister warnings, and great sacrifices.

In vain did M. de Champagny urge that the delay in question would be only of a few weeks' duration, that couriers were about to be despatched, and that an answer could not be long wanting; that if England consented to the opening of negotiations it would soon be seen whether the principle of *uti possidetis* was accepted or not; that if it was accepted it would have been worth while to have a little patience in order to obtain the valuable acquisitions in question in that way without having recourse to war; that if, on the contrary, it was not accepted, Russia might forthwith prefer her demand at Constantinople, and follow it up by arms or otherwise, for the acquisition of the coveted banks of the Danube. The Russian minister would listen to none of these reasons. "Always delays!" was his dolorous ejaculation. "You do nothing but impose delays on us, whilst you impose none upon yourselves at Madrid or at Rome. If it were even a delay for a definite term, after which all uncertainty should cease, that might be borne; but you require us to have patience until the moment when the negotiation shall have assumed an aspect of utter impracticability. Now there have been negotiations that lasted for years. Would you have us continue for years in a state of armistice towards the Turks?"

M. de Champagny was struck by the fervid impatience of the old minister, whose whole soul was engrossed by one of those violent passions that sometimes seize upon aged men and take from them all the gravity of their years, without imparting to them the engaging vivacity of youth.* It was plain, too, that

* M. de Champagny writes thus on the subject to the emperor:—

"ERFURTH, *October* 6, 1808.

"Discussing this question with all possible good faith, fully persuaded that the delay required (that, namely, which subordinates to the issue of the negotiation with England every step for obtaining the two provinces) is as much for the interests of Russia as of France, I hoped to dissipate the feeling of distrust indicated by M. de Romanzoff's reply; but I could not move him. One who is ready to seize a prey he has long coveted is deaf to all arguments that would retard his enjoyment. For thirty years M. de Romanzoff has set his mind on this acquisition; it is the triumph of his system, the point on which are centred his reputation and his honour. Compared with that, every other interest will seem to him insignificant. The Emperor Alexander, who is urged by no personal motive, and to whom all the interests of his empire are equally dear, must be much more accessible to the force of the reasons that enjoin him, for his own sake, to postpone, not an enjoyment, but a mere

a certain degree of distrust was mingled with the ardour of his desire, and that M. de Romanzoff feared there was an intention to cajole himself and his master by a fresh postponement. M. de Champagny, seeing that he set the honour of his remaining span of life on that acquisition, and that he would be more peremptory than Alexander himself, thought it best to await the return of the two monarchs, and leave the Emperor of the French to exercise his personal ascendency over the Emperor of Russia, in order to obtain from him the admission into the treaty of a precaution deemed indispensable.

taking possession of a province which cannot escape him. I have, therefore, concluded nothing with M. de Romanzoff; even had I been authorised, I was not more than himself disposed to yield, and I consider it useless to speak to him again on the matter before the arrival of your majesty. As to the rest, we pretty nearly agreed. (Signed) CHAMPAGNY."

"ERFURTH, *October* 8, 1808.

"SIR,—A conference of two hours with M. de Romanzoff has led to no result. His system appears to be irrevocably fixed; he will have the Turkish provinces; he will have them at all costs; he will have them to-day rather than to-morrow. His objections are not so much against Article VI., the form of which your majesty is pleased to preserve, as against the addition your majesty proposes to Article VII. of the counter-project, and which consists in these words:—

"'No hint shall be given to the Porte as to the intentions of Russia until the effect of the proposals made by the two powers to England shall have been known.'

"These words greatly alarm M. de Romanzoff. No delay appears to him admissible, least of all an indefinite delay. 'When and how,' he says, 'shall one know the effect of these proposals? Will not a first result give occasion to wait for a second, and this for a third, and thus our arrangement with Turkey be continually adjourned?' He applied this line of argument to everything. If I talked to him of the precautions requisite for the sake of the French who were established in the Levant, he retorted, 'But do you mean to wait until they are come back to France? When can they return thither?' Peace with England appears to him to be difficult, and that is why he does not wish to subordinate to it peace with Turkey. He talked to me also of the necessity of striking the minds of the Russians by the certainty of this important acquisition, and appeared to me to have some apprehensions should such not be the result of the Emperor Alexander's journey. He rather let me surmise his fears than declared them; but the feeling manifest in every word was distrust, distrust of events, distrust also of our intentions. Hence it was that he attached less importance to Article VI. It matters not to him, in fact, in what manner that article declares the consent of France to the acquisitions of Russia, if the following article allows the latter to act and to go straight to her mark. Hence it is, too, that an indefinite delay alarms him the more: he is afraid of exposing to chances an advantage that seems to him almost secured at this moment. He would rather consent to a delay the limit of which should be specified. He wants to have precision in everything. 'The vagueness of the Tilsit articles,' he says, 'has done us too much harm; a year has been lost, and that is as yet the sole result of our alliance with you.'

"This obstinacy on the part of M. de Romanzoff is not an affair of the moment. It results from long meditations exclusively devoted to one end, from the impatience of hope deferred, and from an opinion that at the present moment nothing can withstand the execution of the views of Russia. I despair of overcoming it. I am, &c. (Signed) CHAMPAGNY."

The two emperors, with their whole train of kings and princes, had gone to Weimar, with the intention of remaining there the 6th and 7th of October, and returning on the 8th to their important affairs. Between Erfurth and Weimar is the forest of Ettersburg, where the Grand Duke of Weimar had caused a line of elegant tents to be pitched for all his crowned visitors. That of the emperors and kings, which was in the centre, was magnificent. Before these tents had to pass an immense mass of game, stags, does, and hares, enclosed within a circle of nets, and compelled, in attempting to fly, to expose themselves to the fire of the archduke's guests. Alexander had never fired a shot, so gentle was the nature of his tastes; nevertheless he brought down a stag, and a multitude of others fell beneath the fire of those illustrious sportsmen. A sumptuous reception awaited the two emperors at Weimar. A splendid banquet was followed by a ball, at which the most brilliant society of Germany was assembled. Goethe and Wieland were there. Napoleon left the whole company to go and hold a long conversation in a corner of the room with the two celebrated writers of Germany. He talked to them of Christianity, and of Tacitus the historian, the terror of tyrants, whose name he uttered without fear, as he said with a smile. He maintained that Tacitus had somewhat overcharged the gloomy picture of his own times, and that as a painter he was not simple enough to be quite true. He then passed on to the subject of modern literature, which he compared with that of antiquity, and showed himself to be in matters of art, just as in matters of policy, a partisan of regularity and orderly beauty. Speaking of the drama imitated from Shakespeare, in which tragedy and comedy, the terrible and the burlesque, are mingled together, he said to Goethe, "I am astonished that a great intellect like yours does not *prefer the more sharply defined forms!*" A profound saying, which very few critics of our day are capable of comprehending.

After this long conversation, in which he displayed infinite grace, and let those two eminent men of letters see that he had given up for them the noblest company, Napoleon left them, flattered, as it was natural they should be, by so high a mark of attention. It was to the interview at Erfurth they were indebted for the decoration of the Legion of Honour, a distinction they merited by all means, and which lost nothing of its lustre when bestowed on such personages.

On the following day another fête was given him on the very field of the battle of Jena, between that town and Erfurth. Such was the desire to please Napoleon, that perhaps his entertainers forgot their own dignity in volunteering to recall the memory of one of the most terrible battles gained by France

over Germany. A tent was pitched on the Landgrafenberg, a hill where Napoleon had bivouacked on the night of the 18th of October, two years before; for the anniversary of the memorable battle of Jena was almost arrived. After a déjeuner, and a thousand commemorations of the day by the crowds of guests who had taken part in it, to which Napoleon replied in terms of due consideration for his German entertainers, the party proceeded to the right, towards the plain of Apoldau, situated between the battlefield of Jena and that of Awerstaedt, and famous for the inaction of Marshal Bernadotte. Another battue was prepared there, and occupied some hours of the morning, after which the company returned to Erfurth. Before quitting the heights that command the town of Jena, Napoleon wished to leave there a token of beneficence, the memory of which might mingle with the terrible reminiscences that already connected his name with that spot. The unfortunate city had been set on fire by the bombs. Napoleon gave a sum of three hundred thousand francs to indemnify those who had suffered by his presence on that occasion.

Having returned to Erfurth, he had next day to apply himself again to the weighty matters that had brought him to Germany, and that had made the sovereign of Russia perform so long a journey. He spoke of them to the Emperor Alexander, but he particularly imposed on M. de Champagny the duty of insisting peremptorily that some prudence should be observed in the communications to be made to Constantinople, and that England should not, upon the very opening of the negotiations, be furnished with alliances that would dispose her to persevere in war. As regarded the acquisition of the Danubian provinces, he authorised M. de Champagny to employ the most positive forms of expression, so as to give the most satisfactory assurance of its certainty, at the same time stipulating such a delay in its accomplishment as should render possible the commencement of the negotiations in London.

After frequent conferences Napoleon prevailed on Alexander to abate somewhat of his impatience, and trusted to M. de Champagny to effect as much with M. de Romanzoff. He was anxious, however, that his young ally should have no cause for discontent, for he reckoned on making his whole present policy rest not only on the reality, but also on the notoriety of the Russian alliance both for peace and war. Accordingly, notwithstanding his immediate want of money, he did not refuse to grant a fresh reduction of the burdens imposed on Prussia. By the convention of the 8th of September the final evacuation of the Prussian territory had been stipulated, with the exception of three places of surety, Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau, and in consideration of 140 millions payable in two years. The King

of Prussia, while gladly signing that convention which secured the deliverance of his territory, had said that he nevertheless did not forego the privilege of imploring of his victor's generosity an alleviation of a burden which his country was wholly unable to support. Himself and the queen had entreated Alexander to take the opportunity of his interview with Napoleon in order to obtain for them a further abatement. Alexander, whose heart was oblivious, but kind, had promised what they required; and it would have pained him to be unsuccessful in his suit on their behalf. The gift of the mouths of the Danube would have lost something of its value in his eyes, if on returning to the north he were again to read reproaches written in the faces of his unfortunate allies. He asked Napoleon to forego 40 of the 140 millions, and to extend the term for the payment of the entire sum from two years to several. He even drew up with his own hand the form of the letter by which Napoleon was to announce to him that concession, and attribute it to his own personal and pressing intervention. Napoleon knew this was one of the modes in which he could most sensibly oblige the Emperor Alexander, and after having resisted enough to make the latter appreciate the sacrifice—and a real sacrifice it was, in the state of his finances—he consented to a reduction of 20 millions on the amount, and to a year's prolongation of the term of payment. Thus, instead of 140 millions in two years, Prussia would have to pay only 120 millions in three years, half in money, and half in mortgage bonds. The letter drawn up by Alexander, after being modified by Napoleon, was written nearly as at first proposed.

The two sovereigns, thus seeking to gratify each other, and every day more and more satisfied with the mutual agreement of their views, some difficulties of detail excepted, had yet a last overture to make each other, wherein Napoleon did not choose to take the initiative. It related to a family alliance, which would have rendered their political alliance, if not more solid, at least more conspicuous—in short, to a marriage between Napoleon and a sister of the Emperor Alexander. Napoleon had often thought of divorcing Josephine in order to marry a princess who could give him an heir, and had always been stopped in that design by the affection that bound him to the wife of his youth, and by the difficulty of fixing his choice. Nevertheless, he was continually recurring to this project, and he had now more than ever reason to do so, since he was in the society of the sovereign on whose alliance he designed to base his policy—a sovereign who had marriageable sisters of excellent endowments, as fame reported. Yet though he had Alexander by his side morning and evening, and though they already stood towards each other on a footing of the most confidential intimacy,

Alexander had never alluded to a subject that interested him so keenly. Thinking in his greatness that he honoured all those with whom he allied himself, Napoleon was too proud to be the first to make overtures without being sure of success. Every day did he and Alexander talk together of their union, which nothing, they said, could disturb, for their might could give umbrage only to England, which they were both pressing upon at sea, or to Austria, which they were pressing upon, the one on the Izonzo, the other on the Danube, and they could find no enemy but one or both of these two. They had, therefore, every political reason for being closely allied. They had personal reasons also, since they had seen, appreciated, and come to like each other; since they suited each other in all points, both in views and in tastes; since they were young, and had still an immense future before them, and would have time one day to resume even the projects they adjourned with regard to the east. "Romanzoff is old," said Napoleon to Alexander; "he is impatient to enjoy; but you are young; you can wait." "Romanzoff is a Russian of the times gone by," replied Alexander; "he has passions which I do not share. I wish to civilise my empire much rather than to enlarge it. I desire the Danubian provinces for my nation much more than for myself. I can wait for the other territorial arrangements necessary for my empire. But you," he said, continuing to address Napoleon; "it is time that you should enjoy the great things you have accomplished—that you shall cease at last to expose your precious head to cannon-balls. Have you not enough of glory, enough of power? Had Alexander or Cæsar more? Enjoy them, be happy, and let us put off the rest of our projects to the future." To these professions of disinterestedness Napoleon responded by protestations of love for peace and quiet. Alexander seemed to care no more for Constantinople, and Napoleon to have conceived a disgust for war, battles, and conquests. Riding and walking about Erfurth, at some distance from their officers, the two monarchs thus held confidential converse, in which Alexander went so far as to talk of his most secret affections. More than once the remark had been made that it was greatly to be regretted that Napoleon had no son; but though Alexander thus closely approached the point to which Napoleon would fain have led him, he never actually touched it. The young czar stopped short of it, though he could not be unaware of the talk there had been after Tilsit, both in Paris and St. Petersburg, about a marriage between Napoleon and the Grand Duchess Catherine, Alexander's eldest sister. If Alexander was so reserved on this point, it was not that, in his present prepossession in favour of the French alliance, he would have refused to give his sister to Napoleon, or regarded as a mésalliance her

union with the vanquisher of Europe; but he foresaw and dreaded a dispute with his mother, and durst not offer what he feared he could not bestow.

Not knowing the secret of Alexander's reserve, Napoleon was near feeling pique, and even manifesting it, notwithstanding the immense interest he had in appearing perfectly agreed with the Emperor Alexander. It was for such a contingency, and for that only, that M. de Talleyrand became useful at Erfurth; for if he was capable of betraying the secrets of the cabinet to M. de Vincent, and if for that reason Napoleon let him know but a part of them,* on the other hand, he alone was capable of adroitly insinuating what it was not wished to say plainly; and when marriage was to be talked of with the dignity becoming the two greatest potentates in the world, a more skilful match-maker could certainly not have been found.

The emperor, therefore, had recourse to him, in order to bring Alexander to an overture which he did not choose himself to make. M. de Talleyrand, who was shy of playing a part in the concerns of the imperial family, for fear of offending the one party or the other, had no inclination to meddle with a divorce which was more or less foreseen by everybody, and was become a frequent subject of conversation among politicians. Napoleon took a curious course in order to bring him to the subject in spite of himself. "You know," said he to him, "that Josephine accuses you of busying yourself about a divorce, and has vowed implacable hatred against you in consequence?" M. de Talleyrand exclaimed vehemently against such a calumny. Napoleon replied that he had no need to defend himself against it, for it must come to that some time or other; that notwithstanding his affection for the empress, he should be obliged to contract a new marriage, which might give him an heir, and connect him with one of the great reigning families of Europe; that nothing would be stable in France so long as there was not an assured prospect for the future, which was not the case at that moment, for everything rested on his own head; and that it was time for him, before he grew old, to take a wife and have a son by her. Such a conversation could not fail to lead directly to some mention of the reigning family of Russia, and of a conjugal alliance with them. M. de Talleyrand complimented Napoleon greatly on his personal success with Alexander, which was at least equal to that which he had obtained at Tilsit. The

* M. de Talleyrand, as we have said, knew in a general way that a convention was under consideration which should determine the fundamental principles of the alliance; but he was not aware that the main point was the cession of Moldavia and Wallachia, and above all, that the point in dispute was the delay of a few weeks, required of Russia, before she took open proceedings with reference to the ceded provinces.

young emperor was a frequent visitor at the house of the Princess de la Tour et Taxis, and was never tired of expressing there his admiration of Napoleon, not only as regarded his genius, but also his grace, esprit, and good-nature. "He is not only the greatest man living," he would often say, "but also the best and most agreeable. People think him ambitious and fond of war. He is no such thing; he makes war only from a political necessity, from the compulsion of circumstances." Such were his frequent remarks, which M. de Talleyrand took care to report to Napoleon. "If he likes me," said the latter, after having listened to M. de Talleyrand, "let him give me proof of the fact by uniting himself with me more closely, and bestowing on me one of his sisters. Why has he never said a word to me of this in our daily confidential intercourse? Why does he affect thus to avoid the subject?" It was easy to see that Napoleon wished M. de Talleyrand to undertake the commission, and employ on it the art with which nature had endowed him of saying things or making others say them. M. de Talleyrand undertook it accordingly, and lost no time in bringing the Emperor Alexander to the subject in one of the frequent opportunities he had of seeing him; for as it was that monarch's vanity to wish to please everybody, men of wit especially, and M. de Talleyrand above all others, he took great pleasure in often conversing with him.

M. de Talleyrand did not wait for a pretext for speaking, but made one, for the days were numbered, and he had the desired conversation with Alexander. After expatiating on the alliance, which formed the leading topic of every conversation in Erfurth, M. de Talleyrand proceeded to talk of the means for rendering it more solid and conspicuous, for it was requisite that it should be both, in order to be really efficacious. The means seemed obvious, namely, to add family ties to the ties of policy; and this was an easy thing, since Napoleon was obliged, for the sake of his empire, to contract a new marriage in order to have a direct heir. Now, if he were to contract a new marriage, to what great family could he more properly unite himself than to that which reigned over Russia, and the head of which was become his intimate ally? Alexander received this overture with the most flattering expressions of regard for Napoleon, and protested how much he would have desired personally to be still more closely allied to him; for since he made him his personal friend, he could not feel reluctant to make him his brother-in-law. But here he touched the limits of his power. Whatever might be said in St. Petersburg of his mother's influence, said he to M. de Talleyrand, he was master and sole master; but he was so in the affairs of the empire, and not in

those of his family. The empress-mother, who was a princess of grave habits, and worthy of all respect, exercised an absolute control over her daughters, and suffered no one to interfere with her in that particular. Now, if she held her peace respecting the present policy from deference for her son, she did not go the length of approbation. To give that policy such a pledge of adhesion as the bestowal of one of her daughters, to send that daughter to fill the throne which had been occupied by Marie Antoinette, a throne, indeed, which had been again raised to a loftiness surpassing that of the throne of Louis XIV., would infer a degree of condescension on his mother's part which he durst not expect. Alexander added, that he should, no doubt, succeed in favourably disposing his sister, the Grand Duchess Catherine, but that he could not flatter himself with the hope of subduing his mother's prejudices, and that he could never bring himself to constrain her by an exertion of his imperial authority; that such had been his sole motive for maintaining so much reserve on this subject; and finally, that if it were Napoleon's wish that he should make such an attempt he would do so, but without answering for its success. Very well satisfied with having brought things to that point, M. de Talleyrand thought it was for the two sovereigns to complete the work he had begun, and he hinted to Alexander that in such a matter it was fitting he should speak first. The latter, having made known the real difficulty, could no longer feel any repugnance to speak, since he ran no risk of incurring an engagement he should be quite unable to fulfil. Accordingly, he promised to talk with Napoleon on the subject at their next meeting.

The two monarchs saw each other daily, and several times a day, at Erfurth, and made haste to say all that was on their minds, for the termination of the interview was at hand. Alexander explained to Napoleon his views of the delicate subject on which M. de Talleyrand had talked to him, and signified how much he should desire to add a new tie to that which already united the two empires, and how happy he should be to have a member of his family in Paris, so that he might embrace a sister when he arrived there to treat of the affairs of the two empires. But he repeated to Napoleon what he had stated to M. de Talleyrand as to the nature of the obstacles he should have to overcome, and his respect and forbearance towards his mother, whom he could never think of constraining. Nevertheless he promised that he would strive to overcome her repugnance, and hinted that everything might be obtained from the court of Russia, if contented, and that it would be contented if the nation were so. This was welcome language, and Napoleon replied to it in the most affectionate terms. The two emperors

anticipated the day when they should be more than friends, when they should be brothers. Their countenances beamed with new satisfaction, and they seemed more than ever delighted with each other.*

It was now the 12th of October, and time to resolve the last difficulties as to the terms of the convention. The two emperors had given their ministers, M. de Romanzoff and M. de Champagny, authority to conclude the matter, and on the 12th they agreed upon the following convention, which was to remain a profound secret.

The Emperors of France and Russia solemnly renewed their alliance, and engaged to make peace or war in common.

Every overture made to the one was instantly to be communicated to the other, and receive only a joint and concerted reply.

The two emperors agreed to make a formal proposal for peace to England, and to do so immediately, publicly, and as conspicuously as possible, so as to render refusal the more difficult on the part of the British cabinet.

The basis of the negotiations was to be *uti possidetis.*

France was to consent only to such a peace as should ensure to Russia Finland, Moldavia, and Wallachia.

Russia was to consent to such a peace only as should secure to France, independently of all she possessed, the crown of Spain on the head of Joseph.

Immediately after the signing of the convention, Russia might begin such steps towards the Porte as were necessary to obtain by peace or war the two provinces of the Danube; but (here was the compromise agreed to respecting the principal point) *the plenipotentiaries and agents of the two powers were to agree between them as to the language to be held, so as not to compromise the friendship existing between France and the Porte.*

Moreover, if, for the acquisition of the Danubian provinces, Russia encountered Austria as an enemy in arms, or if on account of what France was doing in Italy or Spain she was exposed to a rupture with Austria, France and Russia should furnish their respective contingents, and make war in common against that power.

Lastly, if war, and not peace, should result from the conference of Erfurth, the two emperors promised to meet each other again within a year.

Such was the substance of the treaty as agreed on between MM. de Champagny and de Romanzoff on the morning of the 12th of October. The ambiguous phrase respecting the precautions to be observed in order to avoid disturbing the union

* I have often heard this affair related by M. de Talleyrand himself, and I have been able to prove the truth of his account by comparing it with the official documents.

between France and the Porte was a manner of freeing Russia from all delay, and yet preventing too abrupt proceedings at Constantinople, such as might render impracticable from their outset the negotiations about to be undertaken at London.

No sooner had M. de Romanzoff snatched from the hands of the French minister the booty he so coveted, than he would have its possession secured to him by the immediate apposition of the signatures. It was necessary, however, to make two copies of the new secret treaty; he had not patience enough to wait until they were written out in M. de Champagny's office, but had one made under his own eye for the greater speed. Immediately on the completion of the copies he hurried in the afternoon to have them signed by M. de Champagny, and then bore them off to his master in an intoxication of joy.

The interview of Erfurth had attained its end; the two emperors were agreed; and above all, they appeared to be so. Alexander thought he already possessed Wallachia and Moldavia; Napoleon thought he had hold of the young emperor, enough at least to render any coalition impossible, enough to make him have nothing to fear from Austria before the following spring. He hoped even that peace might result from that close and publicly proclaimed alliance between the two greatest powers of the world. Instead of the unhappy story of Baylen, he had made the marvellous story of the assembly of kings at Erfurth the subject of conversation in Europe. The two monarchs were perfectly satisfied with each other, and it seemed likely that a tenderer union would one day be added to the political union in which they were joined thenceforth. It was decided that the 13th should be given to intimacy, and the 14th to separation, and that those last days should be employed in lavishing honours and presents on the servants of either court. Seeing clearly that M. de Tolstoy had too much the attitude of a soldier in Paris, Alexander had agreed to send in his stead the old prince Kourakin, an obsequious courtier, incapable of setting his master at variance with Napoleon, and who was then ambassador at Vienna. But it was agreed also that in order to follow up more closely the negotiations with England, and delay as little as possible the steps to be taken with regard to the Porte, M. de Romanzoff should repair in person to Paris, to receive the replies and make the rejoinders, without more loss of time than was necessary to pass from London to Paris. Napoleon drew up at Erfurth, with his own hand, the joint letter to the King of England, which was to be signed by the two emperors, and the notes in corroboration, so as to prevent all delay.

M. de Tolstoy was at Erfurth. Napoleon desired to receive there his letters of recall, and to give him such marks of favour

as should take away all appearance of disgrace from his removal. He made him a present of the Sèvres porcelain and Gobelins tapestry that had adorned his residence in Erfurth. He lavished presents and decorations on all Alexander's suite. Alexander, not less magnificent in his bounty, conferred the order of St. Andrew on the principal persons of Napoleon's court, and was prodigal of portraits, snuff-boxes, and diamonds.

The only person who had no share in these favours was M. de Vincent, the representative of Austria. In spite of his prodigious efforts to discover the secret of what had been done at Erfurth, he had not been successful. He knew that marks of amity of all kinds had been interchanged, and that the principles of the alliance had been laid down in a formal convention; but the true secret of the acquisitions mutually conceded by the contracting parties, and of the negotiations about to be undertaken, was unknown to him, and he even supposed more than really existed. On granting him his audience of leave, the emperor renewed his remonstrances, and repeated to him that Austria should for ever be excluded from all share in the affairs of Europe, so long as she should seem disposed to have recourse to arms. He gave him the following letter for the emperor, which contained the full expression of his thoughts:—

"ERFURTH, *October* 14, 1808.

"SIR AND BROTHER,—I thank your imperial majesty for the letter you have been pleased to write to me, and which the Baron de Vincent has delivered to me. I have never doubted your majesty's upright intentions; but I have, notwithstanding, had fears for a while of seeing hostilities renewed between us. There is a faction in Vienna which affects alarm, in order to hurry your cabinet into violent measures, which would prove to be the origin of greater calamities than those which have preceded. I have had it in my power to dismember your majesty's monarchy, or at least to leave it less potent; I did not choose to do so. What it is, it is by my consent. This is the most evident proof that our accounts are liquidated, and that I desire nothing of your majesty. I am always ready to guarantee the integrity of your majesty's monarchy; I will never do anything contrary to the main interests of your dominions; but your majesty must not reopen questions which fifteen years of war have settled. Your majesty must prohibit every proclamation or proceeding provocative of war. The last levy en masse would have produced war, could I have feared that that levy and those preparations were made in concert with Russia. I have just broken up the camps of the Confederation. A hundred thousand of my troops are proceeding to Boulogne to renew my projects against England. Let your majesty

abstain from every armament which could give me uneasiness and cause a diversion in favour of England. I had reason to believe, when I had the pleasure to see your majesty, and when I concluded the Treaty of Presburg, that our affairs were terminated for ever, and that I could devote myself to the naval war without being troubled or distracted. Let your majesty mistrust those who talk to you of the dangers of your monarchy, and thus trouble your welfare and that of your family and your peoples. Those men are dangerous; those men alone invite the dangers they pretend to fear. Pursuing a straightforward, frank, and plain line of conduct, your majesty will render your peoples happy, will yourself enjoy the happiness for which you must long after so many troubles, and will be sure of having in me a man resolved never to do anything contrary to your main interests. Let your majesty's proceedings display confidence, and they will inspire it. The best policy in these days is simplicity and truth. Let your majesty make known to me your apprehensions whenever any one succeeds in filling you with them, and I will instantly disperse them. Let your majesty permit me one word more: hearken to your own opinion, your own sentiments; they are very superior to those of your counsellors.

"I entreat your majesty to read my letter in a good sense, and to see in it nothing that is not for the good and the tranquillity of Europe and of your majesty."

To this letter, so lofty and so polished, Napoleon again added a formal demand for the recognition of King Joseph, as the surest means of eliciting the true disposition of Austria, and implicating her in his system, or placing her in a dilemma from which he would compel her to extricate herself by peace or by war, whenever he should please to push things to extremity.

The sovereigns assembled at Erfurth, having taken leave of the two emperors, had departed one after the other. On the morning of the 14th, Alexander and Napoleon rode out of Erfurth on horseback, side by side, as they had entered it, amidst the population that thronged around them from all quarters, and in presence of the troops under arms. They rode a certain distance together, then dismounted; their horses were taken by grooms, and they walked a few minutes, briefly reiterating what they had so often said to each other about the utility, fecundity, and greatness of their alliance, their mutual liking, and their desire and hope to strengthen the ties that united them; and then they embraced with a sort of emotion. Though there was policy, ambition, and interest in their friendship, all was not selfish calculation in that sentiment. Men even the

most constrained to practise dissimulation are never so false, so destitute of sensibility, as is imagined in their cunning by the vulgar, who think themselves profound when they assume the existence of evil in everything. Alexander and Napoleon parted with emotion, and there was good faith in the grasp of the hand they exchanged, the one seated in his carriage, the other in his saddle. Alexander departed for Weimar and St. Petersburg, Napoleon for Erfurth and Paris. They were never to meet more, and of their projects of that hour not one was destined to be accomplished!

On his return to Erfurth, Napoleon dismissed the personages, princes and others, who still remained, and some hours afterwards his carriage bore him away, leaving the little town to the silence and solitude from which he had roused it for a while, to fill it with bustle, pomp, and movement, and then let it relapse into its peaceful obscurity. It will nevertheless remain celebrated as the theatre in which was given that prodigious representation of the grandeurs of this world.

Napoleon left Erfurth on the 14th of October, and arrived, on the morning of the 18th, at St. Cloud. Through the interview he had had with the Emperor Alexander he had attained his object, for Austria was held in check—at least for the moment; he had time to make a short and decisive campaign in the Peninsula; for the impressions caused by the affairs of Spain others of a less painful kind were substituted; the event of Baylen, very well known to Europe, very little known to France, was effaced by the event of Erfurth, which was known to all; and lastly, it was possible that England, intimidated before the united forces of France and Russia, might consent to listen to words of peace.

Immediately on his arrival at St. Cloud, Napoleon set about realising the design of a negotiation with Great Britain. He ordered the commander of the naval forces at Boulogne to embark, in the most public manner, the two messengers sent from Erfurth, and respectively designated as couriers from the Emperor of Russia and from the Emperor of the French. The despatch which they bore to Mr. Canning, and which contained a letter from the two emperors to the King of England, offering him peace in dignified but formal terms, was enclosed in an envelope, the superscription of which signified that it was addressed by their majesties the Emperor of the French and the Emperor of Russia to his majesty the King of Great Britain. The couriers were ordered to say everywhere, and particularly in England, that they were come from Erfurth, where they had left the two emperors together, and that they had passed on their road numerous bodies of troops marching to the camp at Boulogne. In this way Napoleon thought to make the responsi-

bility of rejecting peace lie heavily upon the cabinet of London, and also to strike the imagination of the English by the possibility of a new Boulogne expedition.

He proposed to remain in Paris the number of days requisite for the execution of his last orders, and then to set out for Spain, personally to direct the military operations with the activity and vigour peculiar to himself, and then more than ever necessary in order to take from England the aid afforded her by the Spanish insurrection, and to render his armies sooner available in case of a renewal of hostilities with Austria, which he still regarded as possible, in the ensuing spring. To postpone that new crisis, nevertheless, was his whole desire. To alarm England and tranquillise Austria, so as to prompt the one to peace and take away from the other the thought of war, was the twofold object of his last arrangements.

Accordingly he made an entirely new distribution of the forces he had left in Germany. In the first place, he took from them the title of Grand Army, for which he substituted the less imposing appellation of Army of the Rhine, the command of which was to be given to Marshal Davout, of all his marshals the most capable of keeping and disciplining an army. Marshal Soult's division was broken up, and he himself was ordered to Spain. Of the three corps which formed his division, one, the St. Hilaire, was added to Marshal Davout's division, which became the army of the Rhine; the other two, those of Carra St. Cyr and Legrand, were marched towards France, and ostensibly towards the camp of Boulogne, but very slowly, so that, if need were, they might fall back upon the Upper Danube. The Bondet and Molitor corps were ordered to Strasburg and Lyons, as if destined ultimately for Italy, but so as to retain the possibility of returning into Swabia and Bavaria. Marshal Davout, with his three old corps, Morant, Friant, and Gudin, the St. Hilaire corps newly detached from Marshal Soult's command, the fine Oudinot corps d'élite, all the cuirassiers, a large portion of light cavalry, and a magnificent artillery, was to occupy the left bank of the Elbe, having his cavalry cantoned in Hanover and Westphalia, and his infantry in the old Franconian and Saxon provinces of Prussia. His force would consist of about 60,000 foot, 12,000 cuirassiers, 8000 hussars and chasseurs, 10,000 artillerymen and engineers—in all, 90,000 fighting men, the best in all the French armies. There remained on the shores of the Baltic 6000 French and 6000 Dutchmen, commanded by the Prince de Ponte Corvo. The four corps on their way back to France might by a movement to the left reinforce the troops left in Germany by 40,000 men. In consequence of the plan for adding a fifth battalion to every regiment, and sending the fourth battalion to join the body,

by employing the new conscription, these forces would be further augmented to nearly 180,000 men.

In consequence of the same plan, all the Italian regiments, having four battalions with the main body, would form a total of 100,000 men, being 80,000 foot, 12,000 horse, the rest artillerymen and engineers. Napoleon ordered that the close of October should be profitably employed, so that the conscripts should be on their march before the winter. He desired that everything should be ready in Italy by the month of March. The army of Dalmatia, which had continued to be called the second division of the grand army from the time it had been detached, after the battle of Austerlitz, to occupy that province under Marshal Marmont, took the name of first division of the army of Italy, which was thus raised to 120,000 men.

Thus, whilst allaying the fears of Austria by the distribution and direction of his forces, Napoleon kept himself in readiness with regard to her. At the same time, to alarm England, he made a great parade of the movement of the Carra St. Cyr and Legrand corps towards the camp at Boulogne.

Napoleon gave at the same time his final orders as to the composition of the army of Spain. He formed it into eight divisions, of which he purposed to be himself the commander-in-chief, Prince Berthier being as usual his major-general. The first division of the grand army, marched from Berlin to Bayonne towards the end of October, preserved under Marshal Victor the title of first division of the army of Spain. The Bessières division became the 2nd, and was destined for Marshal Soult. Marshal Moncey's division was styled the 3rd of the army of Spain. The Sebastiani division, combined with the Poles and Germans under Marshal Lefebvre, was designated as the 4th. The 5th division of the grand army, under Marshal Mortier, had been moved, by an order issued at Erfurth, from the Rhine to the Pyrenees. It retained its numerical rank as the 5th division of the army of Spain. The 6th division of the grand army, recently arrived from Germany, and still composed of the Marchand and Bisson corps, and commanded by Marshal Ney, was to be called the 6th division of the army of Spain. Its numerical force was raised higher than it had ever been, by the addition of a third corps, a fine body under General Dessoles, and newly formed out of some old regiments transferred to the Peninsula. General Gouvion St. Cyr, with the troops of General Duhesme shut up in Barcelona, the Reille column remaining before Figueras, and the Pino and Souham corps, arrived in Roussillon from Piedmont, was to form the 7th division of the army of Spain. Junot, with the troops that had returned by sea from Portugal, rearmed, recruited, and provided with artillery and cavalry horses, formed

the 8th. Marshal Bessières was put at the head of the reserve of cavalry, composed of 14,000 dragoons and 2000 chasseurs. General Walther took the command of the imperial guard of 10,000 men. This was a mass of 150,000 old troops, which, added to the 100,000 already beyond the Pyrenees, presented the enormous total of 250,000 fighting men. Such were the efforts to which Napoleon was driven for having in the beginning undertaken to invade Spain with too small and too raw an army.

Of this reinforcement of 150,000 men, at least 100,000 that had left Germany or Italy at the end of August had reached the Pyrenees at the end of October; these were the 1st, 4th, 6th, and 7th divisions, the guards, and the dragoons. The 5th, under Marshal Mortier, having set out later than the others, and the 8th, under General Junot, recently landed by the English at Rochelle, were still on the march.

Joseph, as we have stated, had never ceased devising and executing false movements, sometimes to the right, sometimes to the left, the only result obtained by this imitation of the emperor's manœuvres being to fatigue his troops to no purpose, and deprive them of all confidence in the authority that commanded them. To crown his miserable autumn campaign on the Ebro, he had projected, or some one had projected for him, an offensive movement upon Madrid, abandoning the communications of the army with France to the mercy of chance, and leaving to Napoleon the task of re-establishing them with the help of the 150,000 men he was bringing from Germany and Italy. Napoleon looked with pity on this silly conception, wrote his brother the most admirable and instructive letters on the art of which he was the great master, and enjoined him to stay quiet at Vittoria, attempt no operation, allow the insurgents of the right under General Blake to advance as far as Bilbao, and the insurgents of the left under Generals Palafox and Castaños to advance to Sanguesa, or even farther if they pleased; because he himself, arriving soon at the centre, about Vittoria, with an overwhelming force, would be able to fall upon them in the rear, cut them to pieces, and finish the war at a blow. Major-General Berthier set out before his master for Bayonne, in order to organise headquarters, and put everything in place, so that when Napoleon arrived he should have nothing to do but order the movements to be made. After having opened the Legislative Body with little pomp, having commissioned M. de Talleyrand to receive the members of the two assemblies, keep up a continual intercourse with them, and direct them in the peaceable and laborious way they were then pursuing, and having committed to M. de Romanzoff and M. de Champagny the task of conducting the great negotiation begun with England,

Napoleon quitted Paris on the 29th of October for Bayonne. It was with some apprehension his kindred, and those to whom his precious existence was dear, saw him about to expose himself in that land of fanatics, where General Gobert had died by a ball fired from a bush. As for him, calm and serene, thinking no more of a bullet fired from a bush than of the hundreds of cannon-balls that traversed the battlefield of Eylau, he departed full of confidence, and cherishing the hope of inflicting some humiliating disaster.

Before his departure he had given orders to the fleet. Obliged to renounce the vast maritime projects he had conceived when he thought he could easily control Spain, and make her co-operate in his gigantic expeditions, he was again reduced to mere cruises. He had despatched several frigates with soldiers and supplies for the colonies, whence they were to bring back sugar and coffee on commercial account, and to make what prizes they could by the way. He had, moreover, given orders for fitting out two strong cruising expeditions, the one, consisting of three ships and several frigates, sailing from Rochefort under Rear-Admiral Lhermite; the other, also of three ships and several frigates, from Lorient, under Captain Troude, both under orders to touch at Guadeloupe and Martinique, land troops and supplies there, bring back colonial produce, and make their way back to Toulon. Lastly, he ordered his fleet at Flushing to leave port on the first favourable occasion, and to proceed to the Mediterranean, either through the British Channel or by circumnavigating the British Islands. It was always his intention, previously to the conclusion of peace, to attempt a grand enterprise against Sicily, in order to unite it to the kingdom of Naples. Murat had just seized the island of Capri, and Napoleon did not despair of seeing the kingdom of the Two Sicilies entirely reconstituted under that warlike prince, aided by the French marine.

Whilst he was on his way to Spain, the negotiations were to be continued, as we have said, in his absence, by M. de Champagny and M. de Romanzoff, acting under the advice of M. de Talleyrand. The couriers despatched from Boulogne had some difficulty in reaching England, for the most precise orders had been given to all the British cruisers not to let any vessel pass under a flag of truce. Nevertheless, a very able officer who commanded the brig they were on board of succeeded in passing through the line of English cruisers without being captured, and moored in the Downs. Some objection was at first made to admitting the two couriers; at last the Russian was sent on to London, and the French courier was detained in the Downs, until, by an order from Mr. Canning, he was soon after allowed to repair to London. The two couriers were very well treated,

but placed under the guardianship of an English courier, who never quitted them for a moment; and they were sent back again after a lapse of forty-eight hours, and made bearers to MM. de Champagny and Romanzoff of a mere acknowledgment of the receipt of the despatch, and an intimation that an answer would be subsequently sent to the message of the two emperors.

This cold response, coupled with the many precautions taken with regard to the two couriers, indicated no great desire to establish communications with the continent. The public, in fact, were not disposed for peace on the other side of the channel. Though, in general, the English nation was always inclined to accept proposals for peace when any were made to its government, and though it was much given to blame the obstinacy of the cabinet in continuing the war, on this occasion it manifested quite a different temper. This change of sentiment was the result of various causes. In the first place, if after Tilsit the prospect of war with the whole continent, particularly with Russia, had alarmed England as in 1801, she had soon recovered confidence on seeing that the consequences of that general war were not in reality very serious. It had given her one effective enemy the more; and being still mistress of the seas, she might laugh at the efforts of all her adversaries. She was proud in her conviction of their impotence, and quite free in her movements, for she had none to care for, and she believed herself in a condition to attempt more enterprises by directing them solely to her own profit. If the continent indeed seemed closed against her from one end to the other, it was not closed so effectually as to prevent her from still introducing large quantities of goods, both by the north and by the south, and especially by way of Trieste. And then the late events in Spain promised her immense commercial advantages, by opening to her the ports of the Peninsula, and securing to her an exclusive trade with the Spanish colonies, which were all in insurrection against King Joseph. England suddenly found a vast market in those quarters, and an opportunity for seizing the magnificent Spanish colonies, or urging them to independence—a brilliant revenge for the insurrection of the United States. So that, after all, when, after the war in Spain, Napoleon forced Russia to declare against England, he did not thereby raise up a new enemy against her, and by imperfectly closing the northern ports against her he opened to her those of the south of Europe and all those of South America. Moreover, the Spanish insurrection had just given England a new ally on the continent, the only one that since 1802 had gained advantages over the French troops. There is no people more prone to conceive extravagant predilections than are the sober inhabitants of Great Britain, and they were then possessed with

a violent liking for Spanish insurgents, just as we have seen them in our day seized with a liking for the insurgents of every country. The English nation admired their generous devotedness, their incomparable courage; and beholding in the victory only the naked fact without inquiring into its cause, it was quite ready to declare those men to be the equals at least of the French. Austria, though ostensibly she had broken off her intercourse with the British government, still held out to her furtive signs of intelligence, continued to arm without intermission, and was probably about to recommence war with France. Prognostics of a new and perhaps a successful struggle were, therefore, in the opinion of the English, springing up in all directions, and it was no time to think of a peace, the first condition of which would have been to leave Napoleon master of the second of the maritime powers of the continent—that is to say, of Spain. Lastly, an accident, a pure accident, set all the English heads in a ferment at that moment. The convention of Cintra appeared to them an unworthy act of weakness on the part of the British generals. Comparing it with that of Baylen, jealous of not having obtained such an advantage over the French as that obtained by the Spaniards, alleging that General Junot had been in as bad a position after the battle of Vimeira as General Dupont after that of Baylen, which was false, the English were enraged that there had been granted to General Junot's army conditions a hundred times more advantageous than those obtained by General Dupont, and they intensely regretted the pleasure of which they had been deprived —a pleasure for them beyond compare—that of seeing a French army defile as prisoners through the streets of London.

The exasperation against the ministry on this subject amounted to frenzy, and the public had insisted on the formation of a high court to try the victorious generals. Sir Arthur Wellesley himself was compromised with Sir Hew Dalrymple in this affair, although his military operations were applauded. Certainly, when, instead of blaming as formerly the pertinacity against the French, public opinion inveighed against an excessive complaisance towards them, the moment was ill adapted for overtures of peace. The Canning-Castlereagh ministry, extravagant imitators of Mr. Pitt's policy, would have been afraid of incurring still more violent accusations had it listened to pacific proposals under such circumstances. Thus, from one cause and another, every opportunity of reconciliation with Great Britain was successively frustrated: that of Lord Lauderdale in 1806, because France was bent on pursuing and completing the conquest of the continent; that of 1807 after Tilsit, and that of 1808 after Erfurth, because England was bent on pursuing and completing the conquest of the seas. Nevertheless, though England was at the

moment averse to treat for peace, the British cabinet would not have dared to refuse peremptorily in the face of Europe and of its nation to listen to pacific overtures; accordingly, it replied to MM. de Champagny and de Romanzoff some days afterwards, on the 28th of October, by a message which was conveyed to Paris by an English messenger.

The message stated that England, although she had often received proposals for peace, which she had strong reasons for not believing to be sincere, would never refuse to give ear to proposals of that kind, but that they must be such as were honourable for her. And now, avoiding all discussion on the basis of the negotiations, that of *uti possidetis*, which could hardly be gainsaid, since it was the basis which the British government itself had proposed on all former occasions, the message made it a point of honour and duty for England to insist that all her allies should be included in the negotiation, the Spanish insurgents as well as the others, though England was not bound to them by any formal act. But though such a bond was wanting, a community of interests, a sentiment of generosity, and numerous relations already established, forbade her to abandon them. On this condition Mr. Canning said he was ready to name plenipotentiaries, and to send them wherever their presence might be desired.

The British cabinet well knew that to demand the admission of the Spanish insurgents to the conferences which should be opened to treat of peace was to make all negotiation impossible; for between Kings Joseph and Ferdinand VII. there could be no compromise imaginable. It was all or nothing, Madrid or Valençay, for the one as for the other.

When M. de Romanzoff and M. de Champagny received this reply, which was accompanied with excuses to M. de Romanzoff for not replying to the sovereigns themselves but to their ministers, by reason that one of the two emperors was not recognised by England, they were not a little embarrassed. To take upon themselves to make any explicit declaration, one way or the other, respecting the essential condition, that, namely, of the admission of the insurgents, seemed to them too bold a step, even though it were sanctioned by the advice of M. de Talleyrand. They resolved, therefore, to refer the matter to Napoleon, and meanwhile they acted towards Mr. Canning just as he himself had acted, merely acknowledging the receipt of his communication, and promising him a reply at a future day.

M. de Romanzoff had been from the first very eager to bring the negotiations with London to a conclusion, in order to be able the sooner to appropriate the Danubian provinces; and now that he was in Paris publicly engaged in efforts for peace with England, it was a point of personal vanity with him to

consummate the business, especially as the convention of Erfurth had clearly stipulated that in any case Finland, Moldavia, and Wallachia should be secured to Russia. He was therefore of opinion, with MM. de Talleyrand and de Champagny, that the English message, in requiring the presence at the negotiation of all the allies of England, including the Spanish insurgents, nevertheless presented in its form nothing so absolute as to preclude all possibility of agreement. For this reason they all three wrote to the emperor, praying him to make a reply which should allow of continuing the preliminaries, and arriving at a meeting of plenipotentiaries.

Napoleon was at that moment on the Ebro, wholly engrossed with war and with the hope of overwhelming the Spaniards and the English, and under that new phase of mind no longer attaching so much importance as at first to the preliminaries with England. Mr. Canning's message left scarcely any uncertainty in his mind, and he counted on nothing but a great disaster inflicted on the British army to bend the obstinacy of the cabinet of London. That being the case, he was the more disposed to leave to others the conduct of this affair, and he permitted the three diplomatists in Paris to reply as they thought proper, provided the insurgents were formally excluded from the negotiation. He sent a sketch of the reply, which MM. de Champagny, de Romanzoff, and de Talleyrand were authorised to modify as they pleased, and which they took care, indeed, to modify considerably.

This new message, conveyed to London by the same couriers, noticed some offensive allusions in the English message, and then admitted, without difficulty, all the allies of England to participate in the negotiation, except the Spanish insurgents, who were but rebels, and could not represent Ferdinand VII., since he was at Valençay, where he disavowed them, and confirmed the abdication of the crown of Spain.

On receipt of this note the British cabinet, fearing to discourage its new allies in Spain and Austria by rumours of peace, to chill the fanaticism of the one nation, and to retard the military preparations of the other, resolved to break off at once a negotiation that seemed to it neither useful nor made in earnest. Having documents in their hands which proved that France would make no concession to the Spanish insurgents, who were immensely popular in England, it had nothing to fear from Parliament. Accordingly, it made a peremptory declaration, offensive both to Russia and France, to the effect that no peace was possible with two courts, one of which dethroned and kept as prisoners the most legitimate kings, and the other of which suffered them to be treated unworthily for interested motives; that, moreover, the pacific proposals

addressed to England were illusory, and devised for the purpose of disheartening the generous nations that had shaken off the oppressive yoke of France, and those which were yet preparing to do so; that the negotiations were therefore to be considered as finally broken off, and that war should be continued with all the energy which was called for by the circumstances.

It was evident that calculating on a speedy renewal of the struggle, England had been afraid of chilling the ardour of the Spaniards and the Austrians if she continued the negotiation. M. de Talleyrand felt the natural and honourable regret he always experienced upon the failure of an attempt for peace. M. de Romanzoff was piqued at the offensive allusions to his court, and vexed at his own failure, but comforted by the freedom thenceforth possessed for acting immediately in the east. M. de Champagny, in his thorough devotion to the emperor's person, ideas, and fortune, looked upon this refusal only as an opportunity for new triumphant wars to be waged by a master he deemed invincible. The public knew and cared little about the matter, and looked for a decisive result only to Napoleon's presence in Spain.

Whilst such was the reply of England, that of Austria to the declarations of France and Russia was scarcely better. She protested her intention to preserve peace, and in fact she made less display of her preparations, without, however, discontinuing them; but she received with bitterness the joint proposal that she should recognise King Joseph, and declared that when she should have been made acquainted with what had taken place at Erfurth she would explain her views regarding the new royalty constituted in Spain, adding, that a knowledge of what had been settled between the two emperors was indispensable towards enabling her to see her way to a definite conclusion. The form of this declaration, no less than its substance, revealed the deep irritation with which Austria was filled. It was evident that Napoleon would have time to make a campaign in the Peninsula, but only one. It was expected, from his genius and his troops, that it would be decisive. The public, habituated to war, accustomed under that invincible master to sleep amidst the sound of cannon, whose distant echoes were but presages of victory, remained calm and confident, notwithstanding the melancholy and even ominous character of the war waged beyond the Pyrenees against the fanaticism of a whole nation. The brilliant spectacle exhibited at Erfurth still dazzled their eyes, and blinded them to the too real perils of the moment.

# BOOK XXXIII.

## SOMOSIERRA.

NAPOLEON, setting out in all haste for Bayonne, finding the roads entirely ruined by the weather and the great quantity of military carriages, the post-horses knocked up by the numerous passages, was highly irritated against the administrations charged with these different services, and on reaching Mont de Marsan, mounted a horse to ride post through the Landes. He arrived at Bayonne at two in the morning of the 3rd of November. He sent immediately for Prince Berthier, to learn how things stood, and how his orders had been executed. Nothing had been done as he directed; in particular, not so speedily, though he was the most far-sighted, the most absolute, and the most obeyed of administrators.

He had required that 20,000 conscripts of the classes in arrear, taken from the south, and destined to form the basis of the fourth battalions in the regiments serving in Spain,* should be collected at Bayonne. Five thousand of them at most had arrived. He reckoned upon 50,000 greatcoats, 120,000 pair of shoes, and on a proportionable quantity of clothing, the rest to be furnished as wanted. He found but 7000 greatcoats and 15,000 pair of shoes. Now, on these two articles he laid the greatest stress, as we have elsewhere observed, in winter campaigns; he was therefore excessively displeased. While the supply of clothing was so backward, that of provisions was considerable; and this was absolutely according to the rule of contraries, for the Castilles abounded in articles of subsistence, in grain and cattle. It is superfluous to mention wine, which forms the chief produce of the hills of the Peninsula. The mules, of which Napoleon had ordered a large purchase, chosen, for want of others, at four years and a half old, were too young to do good service; which was as much to be regretted as all the rest, for means of conveyance were precisely what they ran most short of in Spain, on account of the state of the roads and the mode of transport, performed almost exclusively on the backs of mules. Napoleon

* We have seen in the preceding Book that Napoleon had increased all the regiments to five battalions; that of those which were in Germany, he resolved to have four with the army, and the fifth at the depôt on the Rhine; that of those serving in Spain, he purposed that three should be beyond the Pyrenees, the fourth at Bayonne as a first depôt, and the fifth in the interior of France as second depôt.

had, besides, prescribed that the troops coming from Germany should be concentrated between Bayonne and Vittoria; that no operation should be commenced; that the insurgents should even be permitted to turn us on the right and the left; for it consisted with his plan to let the Spanish generals, in their ridiculous pretension to envelop him, advance very far upon his wings. Now, the fine troops drawn from the grand army had been hastily dispersed on all the points where the timidity of Joseph's staff had led it to imagine that danger was to be perceived. Lastly, Marshal Lefebvre, commanding the 1st corps, enticed by the opportunity of fighting the Spaniards at Durango, had defeated them—an advantage of no value to Napoleon, who had a liking, and in his position an actual need, for extraordinary results.

Great as were the disappointments he experienced, Napoleon could not find fault either with himself for want of foresight, or with his agents for want of docility, but solely with the nature of things, which began to be forced in all that he had undertaken for some time past. He had, in fact, devoted two months at most to making on the Pyrenees preparations for an immense war. Now, if two months might have been sufficient perhaps upon the Rhine and upon the Alps, whither all the military resources of the empire had not ceased to flow for several years, those two months were far from sufficient on the Pyrenees, whither, since 1795, that is to say, for thirteen years, no part of our military resources had been directed, France having from that period been always at peace with Spain. The agents of the administration, moreover, being yet unacquainted with the nature and wants of this new theatre of war, sent provisions, for example, when clothing was most needed. Besides, the quantities of all articles changed so suddenly, since the augmentation from 60,000 or 80,000 conscripts to 250,000 men, as to outstrip all anticipations. On the other hand, if the troops, instead of being concentrated at Vittoria, were dispersed in various directions, the reason was that a staff, in which as yet figured none of the energetic lieutenants whom Napoleon had trained in his school, was uneasy at the first appearance of danger, and sent off the corps, at the very moment of their arrival, to any quarter where the enemy showed himself. Lastly, Marshal Lefebvre himself had indulged the unseasonable desire of fighting only because, wherever Napoleon was not, the command was relaxed and became weak and uncertain.*

* On this point I quote a curious letter of Marshal Jourdan's, chief of Joseph's staff, and charged to command when Napoleon and Berthier were not there :—

Marshal JOURDAN to General BELLIARD.

"VITTORIA, *October* 30, 1808.

"MY DEAR GENERAL,—Notwithstanding the want of goodwill manifested by everybody, General Morlot is at Lodoza, Marshal Ney at Logroño. The

Napoleon passed the 3rd in expressing, orally or in writing, his extreme dissatisfaction to those agents who had ill comprehended and ill executed his orders, and what was still better, in repairing the inaccuracies or tardiness, more or less inevitable, of which he had to complain.* He ordered all contracts which

enemy has given us time to go backward and forward, and allowed us to take our positions.

"General Sebastiani had received orders to leave the 5th regiment of dragoons at Murquia; but as every one does just what suits him, he has brought with him, as I am told, half of the regiment with the colonel, so that he is going to shut up half a regiment of dragoons in a country where it is almost impossible to ride on horseback. Ah! my dear general, if you could assist me to get out of this cursed situation, you would do me a great service. How happy should I be to go and plant cabbages, if things are to remain in the same state as at present!

"The king received last night a letter from Marshal Victor, dated from Mondragon. Monsieur le maréchal complains rather warmly that one of his divisions has been detained at Durango. He would, perhaps, have preferred finding the enemy at Mondragon and at Salinas. Every one has his taste and his manner of viewing things.

"The king had a strong desire to have the enemy attacked at Durango, but, I imagine, he was fearful that this attack might be disapproved by the emperor. I know not yet what his majesty will decide upon, but assuredly success is certain. It is true that if he waits a few days, and Monsieur Blake has the kindness to remain where he is, he will have some difficulty to get off. The obstinacy of that general appears to me very extraordinary. Is he expecting reinforcements by sea? If so, it would be well to overturn him immediately. But how can one take any resolution when one is not master?

"I write to you, my dear general, all that I know, all that I think, and all that passes. I have no other desire, no other interest, but to see the emperor's arms triumphant, and the king seated on the throne of Spain. If what I write to you can be of any utility, make whatever use of it you think proper."

* I quote two letters of Napoleon's to Dejean the minister, remarkable for his views respecting matters of administration and contracts:—

To the Minister DEJEAN, Director of the Administration of War.

"BAYONNE, *November* 4, 1808.

"You will find annexed a report of the ordonnateur's. You will there see how unworthily I am served. I have yet but 1400 coats, only 7000 greatcoats instead of 50,000, 15,000 pair of shoes instead of 120,000. I am in want of everything; the clothing proceeds in the worst possible manner: my army, which is about to take the field, is naked; it has nothing. The conscripts are not clothed; your reports are mere paper. It is convoys that I need; they ought to be sent off regularly, and an officer or a clerk put at the head of them, and then one might be sure of their arrival.

"You will find herewith letters from the Prefect of the Gironde, and a report from Dufresne, the inspector of reviews; you will there see that all is robbery and waste. My army is naked, though it is taking the field. I have nevertheless spent a great deal of money; but it is so much thrown into the sea."

To the Minister DEJEAN, Director of the Administration of War.

"TOLOSA, *November* 5, 1808.

"The provisions which are at Bayonne shall not be consumed. There is no want of provisions in Spain, particularly in cattle and wine. I have given orders for the reserve of bullocks to be countermanded—it is useless; this will be a saving of two millions.

"What I want are greatcoats and shoes. I should not be in want of any-

the contractors had not executed to be thrown up, the immediate creation at Bordeaux of workshops in which the cloths of the south should be used for making clothes, countermanded all the commissions for corn and cattle, in order to devote his resources to clothing only, had barracks erected at Bayonne for lodging the fourth battalions, hastened the march of the conscripts to fill the skeletons, reviewed the troops that were arriving, sent to the administrations of the posts, and of bridges and roads, a great number of luminous and imperative intimations; then in the evening crossed the frontier, and went to pass the night at Tolosa, and on the following day, the 5th, he proceeded to Vittoria, where were the headquarters of his brother Joseph. He travelled on horseback, escorted by the cavalry of the imperial guard, and entered Vittoria in the night, wishing not to receive any homage, and to lodge out of the town, in order to gratify his taste, which was to live in the open air, and to be with his brother as little as possible. This was neither from coldness nor estrangement towards the latter, but from calculation. He felt that by his side the position of Joseph would be secondary, as he had already remarked during their joint residence at Bayonne; and he wished, on the contrary, to leave him the first place in the eyes of the Spaniards. In Spain he wished, moreover, to be nothing but general, invested with all the rights of war, and exercising them without mercy, until Spain should submit. He

thing if my orders had been executed. None of my orders have been executed because the ordonnateur is not to be depended upon, and because people deal with none but rogues. An ordonnateur above suspicion must be sent to Bayonne. I want no bargaining. Bargaining, you know, produces nothing but roguery.

"I have cancelled the contract for clothing at Bordeaux. Send a director, to get making done on my account, who shall be assisted by the prefect, who shall make a requisition for a building and workpeople. Set out upon the principle that people make contracts only to rob, that when one pays there is no need of contracts, and that the system of administration is always better.

"How are we to manage, then, for this workshop? As we do in the regiments: put an honest commissary of war at the head of that establishment, add three or four master tailors, under his orders, as employés of the workshop, and charge three superior officers of those who are at Bordeaux with the superintendence of the reception, so as not to receive any but good clothes. There is no need of contract for all this, if money be placed at the disposal of the said commissary.

"By the decree you will see that the only question is about having a good assistant to the commissary of war, who will stake his reputation on making the workshop answer, and of having two good storekeepers, honest and clever, and two master tailors, taken out of the army. By means of these five persons the workshop will go on perfectly well, and I shall have clothes as well made as those of the guard.

"As for activity, if you wish to get 10,000 coats made in a day, they will be made, because you will have nothing to do but to make requisitions of workmen throughout all France. If you had acted upon these principles, all would have gone on smoothly. But better late than never. For your rule, I will have no more contracts; and when I shall not have the making done by the corps, this method must be followed."

consented, therefore, to reserve for himself the part of severity, even of cruelty, in order to leave to Joseph that of majesty and clemency. In this view, it was his wisest course not to lodge with Joseph.

No sooner had he arrived at Vittoria, and released himself from the embraces of his brother, who was much attached to him, than he summoned around him his staff, particularly those French and Spanish officers who were best acquainted with the roads of the country, in order to commence immediately the decisive operations which he had projected.

To comprehend the remarkable operations which he ordered on this occasion, and which were not among the least remarkable of his military life, it is necessary to know what had occurred in Spain during the months of September and October —months spent, as well in Paris as at Erfurth, in negotiations, in preparations for war, in movements of troops.

The Spaniards, doubly excited by the unhoped-for triumph of Baylen and the retreat of King Joseph to the Ebro, were intoxicated with joy and pride. It was not a body of conscripts oppressed by the heat and led by an unfortunate general that they fancied they had conquered, but the grand army of Napoleon himself. They supposed themselves invincible, and thought of nothing less than collecting a mass of 500,000 men, and pushing these 500,000 men beyond the Pyrenees, that is to say, of invading France. In the negotiations with the English, whom they knew to be conquerors also in Portugal, but whose convention of Cintra they disdained in comparison with that of Baylen, they talked of nothing but enterprises directed against the south of France. They accepted and even desired the aid of an English army; but they asked this without attaching to it the salvation of Spain, which they undertook to accomplish without any foreign aid. Let us figure to ourselves Spanish boasting, so great at all times, heightened by an unparalleled triumph, and we shall scarcely have a just idea of the silly exaggerations of the insurgents.

What was most urgent, and at the same time most difficult, was to constitute a government; for since the departure of the royal family for Compiègne and Valençay, since the retreat of Joseph to the Ebro, there was no other authority than that of the insurrectional juntas formed in each province, an extravagant authority, divided among twelve or fifteen centres hostile to each other. In Madrid, formerly the sole centre of the royal administration, there was left only the Council of Castille, equally despised and hated for having opposed no other resistance to foreign usurpation than a little ill-will and abundance of tergiversations. This body was then in the same situation in Spain in which the ancient parliaments had been in France at

the commencement of the Revolution, which had been made use of before 1789, and which after 1789 were held of no account, because they had remained far below the desires of the moment. Endowed, however, like all old bodies, with a patient and tenacious ambition, it despaired not of possessing itself of the supreme power, and conceived that it had found occasion to do so in the murder of an old man, Don Luis Viguri, formerly intendant of the Havannah and a favourite of the Prince of the Peace, long forgotten, but unluckily recalled to the attention of the people by an old servant who turned traitor to his master. The unfortunate Don Luis having been slaughtered and dragged about the streets, the need of a public authority was universally felt, and the council called to Madrid the Spanish generals victorious over the French, to lend a strong hand to the law. It proposed, at the same time, to the insurrectional juntas, to depute one representative each, for the purpose of composing, with the council itself, a central government at Madrid.

The Spanish generals, accordingly, were not backward in going to triumph at Madrid; and Don Gonzalez de Llamas, with the Valencians and the Murcians, the pretended conquerors of Marshal Moncey, and Castaños, with the Andalusians, the too real conquerors of General Dupont, successively arrived. The enthusiasm for the latter was extreme, and it was deserved, if success can be accounted equal to genius. But the juntas were not in a humour to submit to the preponderance of the Council of Castille, and to content themselves with a mere participation in power, under the supreme direction of that body. The only answers returned to it by all of them, with the single exception of that of Valencia, were the most vehement reproaches; that they would not acknowledge any authority which had formerly been a purely administrative and judiciary authority only, and which had recently not conducted itself in a manner to obtain from the confidence of the nation a power which it did not derive from the Spanish institutions. They discussed among themselves by deputies the form of the central government which they should constitute. On this point they were as much divided in views as in pretensions. In the first place, all were jealous of their neighbours. That of Seville was at variance with that of Grenada, each attributing to itself the honour of the triumph of Baylen, and carrying their violence so far as to be ready to make war against one another, and which they would have begun but for the prudent Castaños. Moreover, this same junta of Seville insisted upon being the centre of the government, as well on account of its services as its geographical situation, which placed it at a distance from the French; and it purposed by means of successive adhesions

to draw all the others to itself. The juntas of the north, forming two by no means amicable groups, on the one hand, those of Galicia, Leon, and Castille, on the other, that of the Asturias, tended, however, to coalesce, and once united, to fix the government of Spain in the north. The juntas of Estramadura, Valencia, Grenada, and Saragossa, less ambitious, more discreet, and not less meritorious, advanced none of these exclusive pretensions, and declared in favour of the formation of a single government placed in the centre of Spain, but not at Madrid, to avoid the domination of the Council of Castille.

All these juntas were at length brought to agree through the medium of deputies, and it was settled that they should each send two representatives to some place specified, Ciudad Real, Aranjuez, or Madrid, in order to compose a central junta of government. This plan was adopted, and the two representatives nominated, after much agitation, repaired, some to Madrid, others to Aranjuez. Those of Seville, always the most jealous, because they were the most ambitious, would not go further than Aranjuez, and finally drew to them all the others. It gratified the pride of these substitutes of absent royalty to meet in its ancient residence, and to usurp even its forms.

Constituted at Aranjuez, under the presidency of M. de Florida-Blanca, formerly minister of Charles III., illustrious, enlightened, able, but unfortunately old, and a stranger to the present time, the central junta declared itself invested with the entire royal authority, assumed the title of majesty, decreed that of highness to its president, that of excellence to its members, and to each of them a salary of 120,000 reals. Amounting at first to twenty-four members, it was soon increased to thirty-five; and its first act was to enjoin the Council of Castille, as well as all the other Spanish authorities, to acknowledge its supreme power. The Council of Castille, finding the creation of such a power not at all to its taste, thought at first of resisting. It objected by a formal declaration that according to the laws of the kingdom, the junta, if claiming to be a council of regency, was far too numerous, and as a national assembly it could not in any way supply the place of the Cortes. In consequence, it demanded the convocation of the Cortes themselves. We have already had occasion to remark that in this rising of Spain for royalty there was an explosion of all the democratic sentiments, and that in the name of Ferdinand VII. the people were in reality indulging the passions of 1793. Thus nothing sounded better in Spanish ears than the word Cortes. But from the Council of Castille everything was taken ill. In all that it proposed they perceived a snare for annulling the junta and substituting itself in its stead, and without renouncing the Cortes, the juntas answered its declaration only by a

universal murmur of hatred and contempt. The support of the generals was then the only efficacious force. Now, all of them belonged to that central junta, composed of the provincial juntas, by which they were appointed, with which they had an understanding, and they adhered to the junta, save one only, old Gregorio de la Cuesta, always sour, always unsociable, detesting the insurrectional and tumultuous authorities which had recently sprung up, and far preferring the Council of Castille, of which he had formerly been president. He even thought for a moment of concerting with Castaños to attribute the military government to those two, leaving the civil government to the Council of Castille. Events soon proved that such a combination would have been better; but Castaños was not enterprising enough to accept the offers of his colleague, and besides, raised by the junta of Seville, he was on the side of the juntas. Don Gregorio de la Cuesta was therefore obliged to submit; and the Council of Castille, destitute of all support, was forced to follow his example.

The central junta of Aranjuez, in the full exercise of the supreme power ever since the first days of September, began to govern unfortunate Spain after its fashion.

Its first and its sole care ought to have been the levy of troops, their organisation, and their direction. But in a country in which there had always been but very little administration, where a sudden revolution had just destroyed the little that there was, the central government could do nothing, or next to nothing, in regard to the most essential point, that is to say, the organisation of the forces, and possessed at most some influence over their general direction. The enthusiasm was assuredly very boisterous in Spain, as boisterous as it is possible to imagine; but we have just seen how feeble an effective resource enthusiasm is, how inferior in results to a regular law, which calls men, whether willing or not, to serve the country. Spain, which could and ought to have furnished, under such circumstances, four or five hundred thousand men, highly courageous by nature, gave scarcely one hundred thousand, ill equipped, worse disciplined, incapable of making head even in the proportion of four to one against our most indifferent troops. After a great deal of noise and agitation the only persons who enrolled themselves were the youth of the universities, some peasants urged by the monks, and a very small number of hot-headed individuals in the towns. In some of the provinces these recruits went to swell the ranks of the troops of the line; in others they formed, under the name of *Tercios*, a name borrowed from the ancient Spanish armies, special battalions serving along with troops of the line. Andalusia, so proud of its successes, had its army composed of four

divisions, under Generals Castaños, de la Peña, Coupigny, &c. That of Grenada was under Major de Reding. Valencia and Murcia sent, under Llamas, part of the volunteers who had resisted Marshal Moncey. Estramadura, which had not yet figured in the ranks of the armed insurrection, formed under General Galuzzo and the young Marquis de Belveder a division into which entered, besides the volunteers, many deserters from the Spanish troops in Portugal. With this division were joined the men enrolled in La Mancha and New Castille. Catalonia continued to raise bands of Miquelets, who closely pressed General Duhesme in Barcelona. Aragon, responding to the voice of Palafox, and encouraged by the resistance of Saragossa, organised a tolerably regular army, composed of troops of the line and Aragonese peasants, the finest and boldest men in Spain. The northern provinces, Galicia, Leon, Old Castille, the Asturias, taking advantage of a considerable nucleus of troops of the line, some returned from Portugal, others in garrison at Ferrol, rallied under Generals Blake and Gregorio de la Cuesta, compensated for their defeat at Rio Seco by the success of the insurrection in the rest of the Peninsula. They received also an unexpected reinforcement, that of the troops of the Marquis de la Romana, escaped with his corps from the shores of the Baltic by a sort of miracle, which deserves to be recorded.

It will be recollected that the Spanish troops sent by Napoleon to concur in guarding the shores of the Baltic had been spread over the Danish provinces, where they were destined to make head against the English and the Swedes. These troops, summoned to take the oath to Joseph, began to murmur. Those who were in the island of Seeland, around Copenhagen, rose, and would have murdered General Fririon, who commanded them, but could only get at his aide-de-camp, whom they put to death, and declared that they would not have any usurper-king. The King of Denmark caused them to be disarmed. But the greater part of the Spanish corps was in the island of Fühnen and in Jutland. The troops who were in these two localities, long excited by Spanish agents, brought over in English vessels, had resolved to escape from the ruler of the continent, and for this purpose to proceed suddenly to a point of the shore where English ships would be ready to receive them. The Marquis de la Romana, a man of ardent and singular mind, filled with the reading of ancient authors, more learned than discreet, more boiling than energetic, was at the head of this noble plot. At a given signal all the Spanish detachments hastened to the port of Nyborg, where you embark to cross the Great Belt, where they found about a hundred small craft, which they seized, and proceeded to the isle of Langeland. There, under the protection of English ships of

war, they had nothing to fear. The other detachments scattered in Jutland, on their part, hurried to Fredericia, passed the Little Belt in barks seized by them, crossed the island of Fühnen to get to Nyborg, and from Nyborg gained the isle of Langeland, the general rendezvous of these fugitives. The cavalry, leaving their horses in the fields, followed the infantry on foot, and arrived with it at the general rendezvous. The English, forewarned, having collected the vessels necessary for a short passage, had soon conveyed the fugitives to the coast of Sweden, and placed them out of danger; and sufficient means having been at length collected, they carried them from Sweden to Spain in the first days of October, after three months' marvellous adventures. Of the fourteen thousand Spaniards placed on the shore of the Baltic, from nine to ten thousand returned to Spain, and four to five thousand were left in Denmark, disarmed and prisoners.

At a moment when the Spaniards regarded the slightest success as a triumph, the least sign of courage and intelligence as certain proofs of heroism and genius, the Marquis de la Romana could not fail to appear an accomplished hero, a great man worthy of Plutarch. But if they were so prompt in respect to admiration, they were not less so in respect to jealousy; and Castaños, for example, who, though frequently irresolute, was nevertheless the most intelligent and the most discreet of their generals, and for that reason ought to have been invested with the general direction of the war, did not obtain that command. Every junta had its hero, whom it would not place below the hero of any neighbouring junta; all that could be done, therefore, was to form a council of war, placed beside the junta of Aranjuez, and composed of the principal generals or their representatives. It is impossible to recapitulate all the ridiculous plans proposed in this council; but the one which was preferred as an imitation of Baylen was that which consisted in enveloping the French army, which had retired upon the Ebro and was concentrated around Vittoria, by turning both its wings, by Bilbao on one side, by Pampeluna on the other. It is true that, in consequence of the usually odd configuration of the valleys, which among high mountains are entwined in one another, the French army, holding the road from Bayonne to Vittoria, which passes through Tolosa and Mondragon, had on its right the valley of which Bilbao occupies the centre, and which is called Biscay; on its left the valley, the entrance of which is occupied by the fortress of Pampeluna, and which is called Navarre. From Bilbao, by Durango, one might fall at Mondragon upon the rear of Vittoria, and cut off the highroad which formed the principal communication of the French army. From Pampeluna one might also fall upon Tolosa and cut off

the road to France, or even debouch upon Bayonne by St. Jean Pied de Port. Granting that they had met with French troops cowardly enough to flinch from undisciplined bands, led by incapable generals, it is certain that they might entertain well-founded hopes of enveloping the French army, of taking Joseph, his court, and the fifty or sixty thousand men who were left him on the Ebro, and carrying the brother of Napoleon prisoner to Madrid. This would assuredly have been a signal vengeance, and a very legitimate one, since Ferdinand VII. was at Valençay. But chances are not to be reckoned upon, and Baylen was a chance not destined to recur; for all the Spanish armies united would not have been a match for the soldiers and generals who had retired upon the Ebro, much less for the soldiers whom Napoleon was bringing with him. To force the passes of Bilbao at Mondragon, of Pampeluna at Tolosa, the Spaniards must have cleared their way, on the one hand, through the corps of Marshals Victor and Lefebvre; on the other, through those of Marshals Ney and Lannes, of Generals Mouton, Lasalle, and Lefebvre-Desnoettes, marching at the head of old soldiers of the grand army, and no troops in Europe would have found out how to do that. Thus without any chance of turning the French they were left the faculty of debouching from Vittoria as from a centre, to throw themselves in mass, either to right or left, upon one or other of the Spanish armies, which were separated by great distances, which could not succour one another, and thus inflict on them the disaster which they purposed to make the French army undergo. But it was not given to the inexperienced generals of Spain to form these rational conclusions. To envelop a French army, to take it, was ever since Baylen a military process surrounded with an irresistible spell. The plan in question, then, prevailed in this council, in which it was a prodigy that anything should prevail, so numerous and so vehement were the contradictions there. In consequence, it was agreed that they should advance at once by the mountains of Biscay and Navarre upon Bilbao on the one hand, upon Pampeluna on the other, to cut off Joseph from Vittoria, and treat him in the same manner as they had treated General Dupont. They then made the distribution of the forces at their disposal, and which, in the hopes of the Spaniards, were to have amounted to at least 400,000 men.

There were formed four corps, one, of the left, at first under General Blake, comprehending a considerable mass of troops of the line, those of Taranco's division, of the maritime arrondissement of Ferrol, of the Marquis de la Romana, and with these troops of the line the volunteers of Galicia, Leon, Castille, and the Asturias, among whom were to be seen in particular students of Salamanca and mountaineers of the Asturias. This army of

the left might be computed at 36,000 men exclusively of de la Romana's division, at 45,000 with that division, the cavalry of which, returned from the north, was dismounted and incapable of serving. The army of General Blake was to advance along the southern slope of the Asturias and of Leon to Villarcayo, then to endeavour to cross those mountains to Espinosa, in order to penetrate into the valley of Biscay, and descend upon Bilbao. In communication with this army of the left was to be formed an army of the centre, under General Castaños, which was to comprehend the troops of Castille, organised by La Cuesta, and led by Pignatelli; the troops of Estramadura, commanded by Galuzzo and the young Marquis de Belveder; the two divisions of Andalusia, placed under the orders of de la Peña; and lastly, the troops of Valencia and Murcia, which Llamas had led to Madrid. These troops, deducting those of Estramadura still behindhand, might amount to about 30,000 men. They were to line the Ebro from Logroño to Calahorra. Those of Estramadura were to come and occupy Burgos with the remnant of the Walloon and Spanish guards, the best troops of Spain, to the number of 12,000 men. The army of the right, formed in Aragon under Palafox, composed of Valencians, of some troops of Grenada, and of Aragonese, nearly 18,000 strong, was to cross the Ebro at Tudela, and following the bank of the river of Aragon, to march by Sanguesa upon Pampeluna. The army of the centre, under Castaños, was to join the army of the right, in order to act in mass by Sanguesa, when the plan for enveloping the French army was to be definitively put into execution. Behind these three armies it was resolved to form a fourth, destined to play the part of reserve, and composed of Aragonese, Valencians, and Andalusians, who never appeared in line, and of an effective wholly unknown. Lastly, on the extreme right, that is to say, in Catalonia, there were, unconnected with the general plan, without any possible estimate of number, and secluded like that province itself, bands of Miquelets, who with regiments brought from the Balearic Islands, and Spanish soldiers from Lisbon, undertook to dispute that part of Spain with General Duhesme, and blockaded him in Barcelona. But if we confine ourselves to the enumeration of the forces acting upon the real theatre of the war, those of the left under Blake, those of the centre under Castaños (including the division of Estramadura), lastly, those of Aragon under Palafox, we find their total number to be scarcely 100,000 men, comprising all the disciplined soldiers and ardent volunteers that Spain possessed, exhibiting a confused medley of troops of the line, sufficiently instructed to be aware of the defectiveness of their organisation and to be discouraged by it, peasants and students, wholly untrained, without any idea of war, ready

to run away on the first serious rencounter, ill-equipped, ill-fed, commanded by generals incapable, or suspected because they were prudent, jealous of each other, and thoroughly divided. The great courage of the Spanish nation could not make amends for so many insufficiencies; and if the climate, a foreign army, the general circumstances of Europe, and the political faults of Napoleon did not come in aid of the old dynasty, it was not from the defenders armed for it that it had to expect its re-establishment.

However, the principal of the means of salvation was preparing for Spain—that was the assistance of England. That power, after delivering Portugal from the presence of the French, had no intention of stopping at this first effort. Beset by Spanish agents sent by the juntas, perceiving in the rising of the Peninsula a powerful diversion which would absorb part of the French forces, not despairing of raising up a new coalition on the continent, and of throwing it upon Napoleon thus weakened, she was determined to afford the Spaniards all possible succour. She had despatched to Santander, Coruña, and other ports of the Peninsula, arms, stores, provisions for war, and was even preparing an aid in money. No more neglecting her commercial interests than her political interests, she had besides inundated the Peninsula with her merchandise. A last reason, if all those which we have just enumerated had not been decisive enough to determine her to act energetically, was the sensation produced by the convention of Cintra, the object at this moment of the profound anger of the British public. Thus though the expedition to Portugal, such as it was, was one of the best conducted and most successful expeditions that England had yet executed on terra firma, it was nevertheless requisite to repair the effect of it, as it would have been requisite to repair that of a disaster. Whether from this necessity or the enthusiasm of the English for the Spanish cause, the British cabinet was therefore obliged to make the greatest efforts. In consequence, it resolved to send a considerable army to Spain. The south of the Peninsula, as safer, further from the French, nearer to Portugal, would have been preferred for the theatre of its military enterprises; but when the general rendezvous was on the Ebro, when it flattered itself with the prospect of crushing definitively, at the very gates of France, King Joseph's dispirited armies—destroyed, it was said—it would have been a new disgrace, worse than that of Cintra, to land timidly at Cadiz, or to advance from Lisbon by Elvas upon Seville. The assemblage of an English army in Old Castille was, from these motives, decided upon; and its formation was set about in the following manner.

There were left about Lisbon nearly 18,000 men of the

expedition to Portugal, terminated at Vimeira. Sir John Moore, who had come from the north with 10,000 men, after a fruitless attempt to employ them in Sweden, had landed at Lisbon a few days after the convention of Cintra, and increased the British forces in Portugal to about 28,000. He was a prudent, clear-sighted officer, irresolute in council, though extremely brave in the field of battle, full of integrity and honour, and well worthy to command an English army. Participating neither in the glory of the late expedition nor in the prejudices which it had excited, since he had arrived after all was over, he was invested with the chief command, which assuredly he deserved more than any other, if the English had not had Sir Arthur Wellesley at their disposal. But the latter had a sort of account to settle with the public opinion, and his part in Spain was deferred. Sir John Moore, therefore, had the command. Twenty thousand men, of the twenty-eight already assembled in Portugal, were to concur in the new expedition to the north of Spain. Twelve or fifteen thousand, partly cavalry, were to be landed at Coruña, under Sir David Baird, an old officer of the Indian army. This addition would form a total of 35,000 or 36,000 excellent troops, worth of themselves all the troops that Spain had on foot. An immense fleet of transports was placed under the orders of Sir John Moore, to follow the movement of his troops, to convey them to the place of rendezvous if he preferred going by sea, and to supply him, whichever route he adopted, with provisions, stores, and artillery and cavalry horses. It was left to his own judgment to conduct himself as he pleased, provided that he acted in the north of the Peninsula, and concerted with the Spanish generals for the greater success of the campaign.

Sir Charles Stuart and Lord William Bentinck had been sent to Madrid, to give some good advice to the junta of Aranjuez, and to bring about somewhat of unity in the military operations of the two nations.

Sir John Moore, left free in his action, could transport by sea from Lisbon to Coruña the 20,000 men whom he was to draw from the army in Portugal, and join them in that port to Sir David Baird's 15,000 men; or he could cross all Portugal by the roads which the French had followed on entering that country. After mature reflection, he decided on the latter course. On the one hand, almost all the transports were engaged at this moment in carrying Junot's army back to France; on the other, a new embarkation could not fail to prove very detrimental to the organisation of the English army. The route from Coruña to Leon was, moreover, exhausted by Blake's army; and it would at most supply Sir David Baird's division. By setting out before the rainy season, and by advancing slowly in small

detachments, Sir John Moore hoped to arrive in Old Castille in good condition, and to give his troops by this trip what English troops are deficient in, patience and strength for marching. In consequence, he resolved to direct his infantry by the two mountainous routes which debouch upon Salamanca, that of Coimbra to Almeida, and that of Abrantes to Alcantara ; and his artillery, with the cavalry, through the level country from Lisbon to Elvas, from Elvas to Badajoz, from Badajoz to Talavera, from Talavera to Valladolid. He flattered himself that he should thus have reunited, in the course of October, his infantry and his cavalry in the centre of Old Castille. Sir David Baird's corps, which had a larger proportion of cavalry, was to land at Coruña, to proceed from Coruña by Lugo to Astorga, and to join the principal army by the Duero. This plan being decided on, Sir John Moore commenced his march about the end of September, and Sir David Baird, leaving the shores of England, sailed for Coruña.

We must do this justice to the Spaniards, that whether from presumption or patriotism, probably from both these sentiments together, they treated proudly with the English, not accepting their succour without certain reservations, and on condition of not delivering up to them their great naval establishments. They would never consent to admit into Cadiz the 5000 men offered them by Sir Hew Dalrymple ; and when Sir David Baird appeared off Coruña, they refused to allow him to enter the great harbour. He was obliged to write to Madrid to obtain an order for permission to land, which order was at length granted on the urgent application of Sir Charles Stuart and Lord William Bentinck.

But while the English had difficulty to procure a reception for the land troops that had been solicited from them, and the Spanish generals, engaged in intrigue with the junta or against it, in rivalry with one another, were opposing further difficulties of execution to a plan which had been most cordially adopted, and were wasting time in an incredible confusion, a letter from the French staff, intercepted by the numerous scouts who infested the roads, acquainted them that in the course of October and November reinforcements to the amount of 100,000 men would enter Spain, in addition to those which had already arrived ; and that while they were busy in doing nothing, they were letting slip the occasion for surprising the French army, such as they figured it to themselves, exhausted, decimated, and dispirited by Baylen. In this government, which, like all tumultuous and feeble governments, acted only by fits and starts, such a revelation could not fail to give an impulsion for a moment. Its members ceased disputing ; they ordered the generals to set off, whether agreeing among themselves or not ;

they sent Castaños to the Ebro; they urged the arrival of the men of Estramadura at Madrid, and their departure from Madrid for Burgos; lastly, they set in motion all they could and how they could.

It was important not to lose any more time, and yet they did lose a great deal more; so that they were not in a condition to act seriously before the end of October. General Blake, though he had not collected all his forces, had been the first in line; having marched along the foot of the mountains of the Asturias, without penetrating into them, he had crossed them at Espinosa, and had made several demonstrations upon Bilbao. The Castilians, under Pignatelli, kept along the banks of the Ebro to the environs of Logroño. The Murcians and the Valencians under Llamas, and the two divisions of Andalusia under La Pena, extended themselves along the river from Tolosa to Calahorra and Alfaro. Palafox's Aragonese and Valencians, crossing the Ebro and lining the little river of Aragon, had their headquarters at Caparrosa.

According to the plan agreed upon, Castaños and Palafox were to concert for the purpose of uniting on the extreme left of the French towards Pampeluna, and it was urgently necessary that they should; for General Blake, already far advanced upon their right, was liable to be compromised, unless some one hastened to occupy part of the enemy's forces; but it was not easy for Castaños and Palafox to agree, each wishing to draw the other to himself. Castaños was fearful of disgarnishing the Ebro too much; Palafox was desirous to be enabled to overrun Navarre with superior forces. At length, making a movement in advance, they had crossed the Ebro and the river of Aragon, and established themselves at Logroño on the one hand, and Lerin on the other.

But it was too late: the French, before they were reinforced, would not have put up any longer with the inconsiderate audacity of their adversaries, still less since the finest troops in the world were joining them every day. It will be recollected that, even before setting in motion four corps of the grand army, Napoleon had successively detached a number of old regiments from France and Germany, and that with those last arrived there had been composed in the first place Godinot's division, and next Dessoles' division, which was to be the third of Marshal Ney's corps. The intrepid marshal himself was with the latter on the Ebro, awaiting the arrival of his *corps d'armée*.

Though Napoleon had interdicted any operation before he was present, from a desire to allow the Spaniards to gain ground upon his wings, and to induce them to advance so far that they could not retreat, Joseph's staff, unable to endure the sight

of their movements, resolved to repulse them. It therefore ordered Marshals Ney and Moncey to retake the line of the Ebro and of the Aragon. In consequence, on the 25th of October, Ney had marched to Logroño, and entered it at the point of the bayonet, driving Pignatelli's Castilians before him. He had even crossed the Ebro and forced the insurgents to fall back to Nalda, at the foot of the mountains which separate the district of Logroño from that of Soria. Marshal Moncey, on his part, had sent Generals Wathier and Maurice Mathieu, with a regiment of the Vistula and the 44th of the line, upon Lerin. These generals had driven back the Spaniards at first into the town and castle of Lerin, then by cutting them off from all relief had taken them prisoners, to the number of about a thousand men. The Spaniards had everywhere been overthrown with a vigour and a promptness which proved that, before the French army, conducted as it was accustomed to be, the insurrectional levies of Spain could not oppose any serious resistance.

At this very moment arrived the 1st corps under Marshal Victor, the 4th under Marshal Lefebvre, and the 6th destined for Marshal Ney, comprehending his two divisions of Bisson and Marchand, with which he had so eminently signalised himself in every country.

Joseph had scarcely reviewed Sebastiani's fine division, belonging to Lefebvre's corps, in the plains of Vittoria, when, forgetting his brother's instructions, he had directed it upon his right, by the Durango road, into the valley of Biscay, in order to repress General Blake, who gave him uneasiness about Bilbao. He did not stop there. Believing the report of the Spanish peasants, who, when there were 20,000 men, gave out, either from braggadocio or from credulity, that there were 80,000, he had judged that Lefebvre's corps would not be sufficient, and in order the better to protect his rear, had sent one of Marshal Victor's divisions, that of General Villatte, by Mondragon, upon Durango. Lastly, the head of the 6th corps having appeared at Bayonne, he had lost no time in directing Bisson's division, by St. Jean Pied de Port, upon Pampeluna, to secure his left, as he had just secured his right by the position which he had caused Marshal Lefebvre to take. At the same instant the guard, having arrived to the number of 10,000 men, placed itself *en échelon* between Bayonne and Vittoria.

These unseasonable dispositions brought on a new and unforeseen engagement on the right between General Blake and Marshal Lefebvre, as there had been one on the left between Pignatelli and Marshals Ney and Moncey. General Blake, as we have said, after crossing the mountains of the Asturias at Espinosa, and occupying Bilbao, had posted himself in advance

of Zornoza, upon the heights that face Durango. Having not yet been joined by La Romana's division, he was there with about 20,000 or 22,000 men, half troops of the line, half peasants and students. He had left in rear, on his right, about 15,000 men in the adjacent valleys, between Villaro, Orozco, Amurrio, and Balmaseda, to guard the débouches communicating with the plains of Vittoria, by which other French columns might have made their appearance.

Having arrived in presence of Marshal Lefebvre, not far from Durango, on the Mondragon road, and thus finding himself near the goal which he had been ordered to reach for the purpose of turning the French army, he hesitated, as a man hesitates at the decisive moment when he has undertaken a task beyond his strength.

His soldiers, more daring than he, because they were more ignorant, displayed an assurance which he himself had not, and on their lofty position raised loud shouts, insulted our troops, and threatened them by gestures. The impatience of our soldiers, unaccustomed to take insult from the enemy, had excited that of old Lefebvre, who was not sorry, in his coarse wiliness, to make a bold dash upon the Spanish army before the arrival of the emperor. The marshal had with him Sebastiani's division, composed of four old regiments of infantry (the 32nd, 58th, 28th, and 75th of the line) and one regiment of dragoons, forming an effective of about 6000 men; Leval's division, composed of 7000 Hessians, Badeners, Dutch; and lastly, but as merely auxiliary, Villatte's division, consisting of four old regiments, with an effective of nearly 8000 men, some of the best in the French army. These were more than he needed to beat the Spanish army, though part of the men, after a long march, had not yet rejoined.

The Spaniards were in advance of Durango, on a line of heights, the right of which, less strongly appuyed, might be turned. Marshal Lefebvre placed Sebastiani's division in the centre of his line, and on his two wings the Germans, intermixed with Villatte's division, to set them an example. He commenced the attack on his left, in order to turn the right of the Spaniards, which, as we have observed, was less solidly established. On the morning of the 31st of October, in a thick fog, General Villatte, with two of his regiments, the 94th and 95th of the line, and part of the Germans, advanced so vigorously upon the position, that the Spaniards, surprised, could scarcely hold out. Though they had many obstacles of ground to oppose to the French, they suffered themselves to be precipitated from post to post into the bottom of the valley. A fire kindled by General Villatte was to serve as a signal to the centre and the right, which marched with not less vigour than the left. A

shower of howitzer shot, fired through the fog, had already much shaken the Spaniards. They were then briskly attacked, and driven so speedily down the back of the heights which they occupied, that the French had scarcely time to overtake them. Their way of fighting consisted in firing upon our columns in march, and then throwing themselves in confusion into the bottom of the valleys. In the plain our cavalry would have cut them down by thousands. All that our infantry could do in these steep mountains was to fire at them in their flight, taking much better aim than they were capable of doing. In this manner we killed or wounded from fifteen to eighteen hundred men, while they put two hundred of ours hors de combat. But several thousand of them, seized with terror, dispersed on this first rencounter, beginning to comprehend and to have less relish for war with the French. It was assuredly not that they were deficient in natural courage, but without discipline men never retain in danger the requisite firmness without which in war every operation is impossible.

Marshal Lefebvre, following up his victory, on the next day entered Bilbao, which the Spaniards made no effort to defend, and where some soldiers of the enemy's, some wounded, and a great quantity of stores brought by the English, were taken. The trembling inhabitants had fled, some into the mountains, others to the shipping of all sorts lying in the waters of Bilbao. Marshal Lefebvre, then pushing on to Balmaseda, durst not go much further, for beyond it was the pass leading by Espinosa into the plains of Castille; and having already fought without order, it would have been too bad to extend his operations still more. He established Villatte's division, which was not his but Marshal Victor's, at Balmaseda, and fell back with his corps upon Bilbao, to seek there for provisions, which were not abundant in these mountains, where people live upon maize, milk, and preparations from it.

Such was the state of things at the moment of Napoleon's arrival. His intentions had been entirely misconceived, since he meant that his officers should allow themselves to be nearly turned both on the right and on the left, in order to be more sure, when debouching from Vittoria, of taking the two principal Spanish armies in rear. The movement executed by Marshals Ney and Moncey on the Ebro had, in fact, produced no other result than to place Castaños and Palafox rather further apart, and to do these latter the service of disengaging them. The movement which Marshal Lefebvre had taken the liberty of making, in driving Blake back from Bilbao upon Balmaseda, had extricated the Spanish general from a situation from which he never could have escaped if he had been allowed time to entangle himself in it completely. Moreover, the French troops were scattered

in various directions, which were not the best chosen. The 1st and 6th corps, which Napoleon would fain have had at hand in the plains of Vittoria, were dispersed in various places very distant from one another. The 1st corps had one of its three divisions, that of General Villatte, in Biscay; the 6th had Bisson's division at Pampeluna, and another, Marchand's division, on the Vittoria road, with all its artillery.

Napoleon, arriving at Vittoria on the 5th of November, after expressing there, as at Bayonne, his displeasure at being so ill obeyed, gave on the 6th all the orders necessary for repairing the faults committed in his absence. Had he not been disappointed in the execution of his plans by unseasonable operations, he would have opposed to General Blake, merely as a check upon him, the corps of Marshal Lefebvre (4th corps); he would have opposed to Palafox and Castaños, still solely for a check, the corps of Marshal Moncey (3rd corps); then collecting under his hand the corps of Marshal Soult, formerly Bessières' corps (2nd corps), the imperial guard, and the 14,000 dragoons, and debouching with 80,000 men upon Burgos, he would have cut the Spanish armies in two at the centre; he would then have fallen upon them, have taken them alternately in rear, enveloped and destroyed them. Unluckily this plan, without being absolutely thwarted, could not be executed in so certain and complete a manner: in the first place, because the action, commenced too soon, had somewhat kept back the Spanish generals, and prevented them from thoroughly entangling themselves, some in Biscay, others in Navarre; secondly, because the various corps of the French army, employed at the very moment of their arrival, were widely dispersed. Still, neither Blake, who had fallen back to Balmaseda, nor Castaños and Palafox, obliged to retire again to the Ebro, were yet aware of the danger of their position, and they did nothing to extricate themselves from it. Napoleon's plan could therefore be still put into execution. Accordingly, he made his dispositions upon the same principle, that of cutting the Spanish line into two parts, in order to fall first upon one and then upon the other. He ordered Marshal Victor (1st corps), one of whose divisions, that of General Villatte, had already been diverted from its course, to reinforce Marshal Lefebvre, to support the latter, if he needed it, by the road from Vittoria to Orduna, and then to return by Orduna to Vittoria, and join the centre of the French army. Such reports of the strength of the Spaniards were circulated in the country, that Napoleon thought it would not be too much to oppose two corps (the 1st and 4th) to Blake's army, amounting by the lowest estimate to 50,000 men, and by the highest to 70,000. These two marshals, however, agreeably to the plan of Napoleon, were rather to check Blake than to repulse him, till the moment

when the signal to fall upon him should be given from the centre of the army.

Having thus regulated the operations of his right, Napoleon, turning his attention to his left, directed Marshal Moncey to hold himself in readiness to act when he should receive orders to that effect; but till then to confine himself to covering the Ebro from Logroño to Calahorra. He returned him Morlot's division, detached for a moment from his corps; he added to it a reinforcement of dragoons; and lastly, one of the two divisions of the 6th corps (Marshal Ney's). Bisson's division having by a false movement taken the Pampeluna road, he ordered him to allow it to rest in that place, then to direct it upon Logroño, to support there the right of Marshal Moncey, and to remain there provisionally. This division changed commander, and was called Lagrange's division, after its new chief. It was destined subsequently to rejoin Marshal Ney, and to contribute meanwhile to keep the Spaniards in check on the Ebro.

His right and left being thus secured, but without being moved forward, Napoleon resolved to debouch by the centre with the corps of Marshals Soult and Ney (2nd and 6th), with the imperial guard, and the greater part of the dragoons. The corps of Marshal Soult, formerly Bessières', though it numbered many young soldiers, comprehended likewise Mouton's division, composed of four old regiments, which nothing in Spain could withstand, as they had proved at Rio Seco. Ney's corps, though deprived of Bisson's division, directed by mistake upon Pampeluna, and placed temporarily on the Ebro, included Marchand's division, which had always belonged to it, and Dessoles' division, which had recently been formed of old regiments called successively into Spain. These troops had not their match in the world. With these two corps, the guard, and the reserve of cavalry, Napoleon had about 50,000 men to push upon Burgos. These were more than he needed to crush the centre of the Spanish army.

His dispositions, adopted on the 6th and 7th of November, were suspended by a new incident. The Spanish generals, though much disconcerted by the vigour of the attacks which they had sustained, some at Zornoza, others at Logroño and Lerin, did not renounce their plan, but differed more than ever about the execution of this plan, and applied to one another for reinforcements. Blake in particular, the most roughly treated, seeing on his flanks the corps of Lefebvre and Victor, had solicited succour of the centre and the right. But there was a circuit of fifty or sixty leagues to traverse in order to communicate from one end to the other of the Spanish line; and after holding a council of war at Tudela, Castaños and Palafox had replied that it was impossible for them to go to the aid

of the army of the Asturias, and had merely enjoined the corps of Estramadura to hasten its arrival in line, that it might go and cover Blake's right by taking position at Frias. They had also promised to enter into action as soon as they could, in order to draw upon them part of the forces of the French.

Meanwhile Blake, driven from Bilbao and Balmaseda towards the gorges which form the entrance of Biscay, had stopped there, and been rejoined by the 12,000 or 15,000 men placed at Villaro and Orozco while he was fighting at Zornoza, and by the corps of La Romana. With what he had lost in dead and wounded, and particularly by dispersion, which loss amounted to 6000 or 7000 men, he had about 36,000 left to place in line. He moved forward, therefore, on the 5th of November upon Balmaseda, where Marshal Lefebvre had left Villatte's division, that it might itself fall back on Bilbao, in order to live there more at its ease.

After the fault of having moved forward too soon, Marshal Lefebvre could not commit a greater than to fall back all at once on Bilbao, leaving Villatte's division at Balmaseda. There needed soldiers as firm as ours, and a foe as far from formidable as the Spanish insurgents, to cause no calamity to result from such false dispositions.

Marshal Victor, on his part, had acted no better. Sent by Orduna to Amurrio in order to flank Marshal Lefebvre, he had despatched General Labruyère with a brigade to Oquendo, and had kept him in that position without ever conceiving the idea of repairing thither himself to direct him. General Labruyère, among those steep mountains, where it is difficult to find out where you are, where the winter fogs add to the dreariness of the places, left without any directions, not knowing what enemies he might have in presence, had abstained from engaging, and had suffered the corps which flanked Blake during the battle of Zornoza to pass before him, not daring to do anything to stop their retreat. On the following days he had remained in position, seeing Balmaseda in the distance, perceiving Villatte's division without thinking of rejoining it, perceiving also Sebastiani's division, which was making reconnaissances from Bilbao on the Orduna road; so that our troops, instead of uniting to overwhelm Blake, the only operation that was reasonable after committing the fault of fighting before orders arrived from headquarters, were dispersed between Bilbao, Balmaseda, and Oquendo, exposed in their solitary situation to serious checks.

The faults of Marshal Victor had not stopped there. Impatient to return to headquarters in order to serve before the eyes of the emperor himself, and finding in his instructions that he might take the road to Vittoria as soon as his presence

should be no longer necessary in Biscay, he had recalled General Labruyère in order to recross the mountains and again descend into the plain of Vittoria, abandoning Villatte's division, which was left quite alone at Balmaseda. Thus commenced that series of faults owing to the egotism and the rivalry of our generals, and which, by ruining the cause of France in Spain, ruined it in all Europe.

While Marshal Victor was executing this retrograde movement, General Blake, reinforced, as we have said, by the troops of his left and by those of La Romana, had resolved to move forward, and to dispute Balmaseda with Villatte's division, which he knew to be there quite alone. The stay of Marshal Lefebvre at Bilbao, and the retreat of Marshal Victor upon Vittoria, offered every facility for an attempt of this nature. Accordingly, on the 5th of November, he advanced at the head of thirty and some thousand men, and crowned the heights around Balmaseda to surround the town before he attacked it, and to make prisoners of the French by whom it was guarded. But General Villatte, at the head of a superb division of four old regiments, had beheld other foes and other dangers than those which threatened him in Biscay. He possessed equal presence of mind and intelligence. Desirous of securing the heights of Guenes, which are in rear of Balmaseda, and which command the communication with Bilbao, he placed three of his regiments there *en échelon*, and then left the 27th light in Balmaseda itself, to hold the town as long as possible. Having taken these dispositions, he allowed the Spaniards to approach, and received them with a fire to which they were not accustomed. Those who attempted to enter Balmaseda were most horribly maltreated by the 27th, and strewed the environs of the town with dead and wounded. Meanwhile the neighbouring heights were crowned with enemies, and Marshal Lefebvre not arriving from Bilbao, General Villatte deemed it his duty to retire. He brought the 27th from Balmaseda over the heights of Guenes, and fell back in mass, with his four entire regiments, on the Bilbao road. The Spaniards who attempted to approach him were vigorously attacked, and paid dearly for their imprudent boldness. Villatte's division had nevertheless 200 men hors de combat, after bringing down seven or eight hundred of the enemy. If Marshal Lefebvre had been at hand, and if Marshal Victor, instead of withdrawing Labruyère's brigade from the position which it occupied, and from which it should have dashed upon Balmaseda, had acted with his whole corps upon that point, Blake's army might have been enveloped and taken that same day.

Accounts of the affair of Balmaseda, which had no other importance than that of a danger uselessly incurred, being

transmitted one after another to the headquarters, with the usual exaggerations of reports so communicated, produced an aggravation of Napoleon's ill-humour with generals who so wrongly comprehended and executed his conceptions.* He

* I quote despatches which clearly explain the situation, and prove what was thought of the conduct of these two marshals by an infallible judge, Napoleon himself, who generally showed rather weakness than severity towards the two lieutenants in question.

The Major-General to Marshal LEFEBVRE.

"VITTORIA, *November* 6, 1808, noon.

"The emperor is extremely angry at the false movement of retreat from Bilbao. His majesty did not expect this capital fault on the part of a marshal so zealous for his service. His majesty has no doubt that, if you had placed your headquarters at Balmaseda, and encamped with your three divisions to act according to circumstances, you would already have taken more than eight or ten thousand prisoners from the enemy, but the conduct lately held is the more extraordinary, since in speaking of the inconveniences of retrograde movements you have begun with one of five leagues.

"The emperor orders you to unite yourself with Villatte's division, in order to push the enemy briskly. If on the 31st, Monsieur le maréchal, you had not attacked, and had left time for making the necessary dispositions, the campaign in Spain would at this moment be far advanced. The emperor finds in your conduct that too much zeal has caused you to infringe the military regulations in attacking without orders; but his majesty does not conceive that the enemy can remain entire when a success has been gained over him. The emperor may have need of his troops, and when they are engaged, one cannot leave a single division by itself before the enemy, or when, on the other hand, one makes a retrograde movement. His majesty finds that it is with such dispositions that one loses the advantage of one's successes. The emperor thinks that the time when the troops of Generals Villatte, Labruyère, and Ruffin were before the enemy, and manœuvring to cut him off, was not the moment for you to retire, and under such circumstances his majesty thinks it improper that the troops of the 4th corps should remain inactive at Bilbao.

"Marshal Soult marches to-morrow upon Burgos, whence he will proceed to Reinosa and Santander. March briskly, then, Monsieur le maréchal. The intention of the emperor is, that there should not be a moment's rest till Blake's corps is destroyed, and till he is driven back into the Asturias.

"The enemy having retreated upon Balmaseda, Villarcayo, and Santander, you must kick him upon the corps that are coming to stop him at Reinosa.

"ALEXANDRE."

The Major-General to Marshal VICTOR.

"VITTORIA, *November* 6, 1808, midnight.

"I have laid before the emperor your letter of the 6th, which your aide-de-camp says was written at noon. His majesty has been extremely displeased that instead of having supported General Villatte, you have left him engaged with the enemy—a fault the more serious, since you know that Marshal Lefebvre has committed that of leaving one division of your *corps d'armée* exposed by making his two other divisions fall back upon Bilbao. You knew that this division was exposed at Balmaseda, as General Labruyère had communicated with it on the morning of the 5th. How, instead of proceeding in person at the head of your troops to succour one of your divisions, could you leave that important operation to a general of brigade, who had not your confidence, and who had with him only one-third of your force? How, after receiving intelligence that, on the 5th, Villatte's division was in action with the Spaniards, could you, instead of marching to its assistance, suppose

directed General Berthier to address to them a severe reprimand, ordered Marshal Lefebvre to return to Balmaseda, Marshal Victor to march back to Biscay, and to push Blake with the greatest vigour, to crush him even, if he found an occasion to do so. Notwithstanding his plan for cutting the centre of the enemy's line before acting against his extremities, he would not put himself in motion till he had ascertained that a fault upon his wings would not come to compromise the base of his operations.

On receiving these remonstrances of the emperor's, Marshal Lefebvre lost no time in marching upon Balmaseda. He passed the 6th in collecting the detachments sent to the environs of Bilbao, to drive the English from the coast, and on the morning of the 7th he directed his course towards Balmaseda by Sodupe and Guenes, with Sebastiani's, Villatte's, and Leval's divisions, the first two French, the third German, the three forming a mass of about 18,000 men, almost without artillery and cavalry, which could not be brought into those narrow valleys, where means of transport for the ammunition of the infantry were scarcely to be found.

The road followed the bottom of the valley. Marshal Lefebvre advanced, having Villatte's division on the left of that road, Leval's division on the road itself, Sebastiani's division on the right, a little in advance of the two others. Sebastiani's division first stormed the village of Sodupe, then proceeding beyond it, encountered Blake on the heights of Guenes, with twenty odd thousand men and three pieces of cannon. The troops of Sebastiani's division immediately climbed the heights, in spite of the not very annoying fire of the Spaniards, who discharged their pieces at a distance, that they might run away the sooner. On reaching the summit, they could not take

gratuitously that this general was victorious? His majesty asks how long the fire of musketry and attack have been signs of the retreat of an enemy. Nevertheless the instructions of Marshal Jourdan were precise that you should not proceed for Miranda till you had ascertained that the enemy was retreating; and instead of this, Monsieur le maréchal, you set off when you had positive proof that the enemy was fighting. You know that the first principle of war dictates that in the doubt of success we must go to the aid of one of our corps that is attacked, since upon this may depend its salvation. In the other supposition your movement could not have any inconvenience, as your instruction to proceed for Miranda was but hypothetical, and consequently its non-execution could not have an influence over any of the plans of the general-in-chief.

"What has happened, Monsieur le maréchal, is this: the column before which General Labruyère fell back met with General Villatte, who, attacked in front and rear, owed his safety to his intrepidity alone, after making a great carnage among the enemy: his loss has been but small; and he retired upon Bilbao, two leagues in advance of that town, on the evening of the 5th.

"The pleasure of the emperor is that you set out without delay to proceed for Orduna, that you march at the head of your troops, that you keep your corps together, and that you manœuvre so as to put yourself in communication with Marshal Lefebvre, who will be at Bilbao.

"ALEXANDRE."

any prisoners; for the Spaniards, much nimbler than our soldiers, though they were extremely nimble, ran at full speed down the back slopes of their mountains. While our troops were thus taking those positions on the right, the obstacles upon the road itself were all removed, and 10,000 Spaniards, turned by this rapid movement, were left in rear upon the heights on the left, cut off from their main body. The marshal ordered one of the regiments of Sebastiani's division, the 28th of the line, to cross the river which forms the bottom of the valley; thus it found itself on the rear of the Spanish corps, while General Villatte went to attack it in front. But our troops, always finding the insurgents ready to fire before they came within musket-shot, could not overtake them, and of course sustained little injury from them. The enemy, however, had some hundred men killed or wounded. A much greater number were dispersed, and filled with a distaste for the profession of arms.

Having returned with about 36,000 men to Balmaseda, Blake did not carry away so many when he again retired towards the gorges; but if he had met with the corps of Marshal Victor on his rear, all the agility of his soldiers would not have prevented his being enveloped and the greater part of his troops being taken. The next day, the 8th, Marshal Victor, on his part, started for the goal which he ought never to have lost sight of, while Marshal Lefebvre entered Balmaseda. They were henceforward united, and capable of undertaking anything against the Spanish army. The only difficulty was how to subsist. Amidst these steep mountains, where cultivation is rare, our soldiers were in want of everything. The Spaniards were equally destitute. Under these reciprocal privations, the country was plundered and ravaged. Balmaseda and all the villages had been laid waste, and sometimes burned, to supply the two armies with fuel.

On the morning of the 9th, Napoleon knew that his troops, having resumed the offensive, had only to show themselves to make the enemy vanish before them. Though he had a very mean idea of the insurgents, still, before he had acquired complete experience of what they were, he had introduced into his movements greater caution than was needed. But on the morning of the 9th he no longer hesitated to order Marshal Soult to break up for Burgos with the second corps and a strong body of cavalry. The brilliant Lasalle commanded the light cavalry of that corps, composed of chasseurs and Poles of the guard. To these was added Milhaud's division, consisting of four fine regiments of dragoons. There were a total of about 17,000 or 18,000 infantry, and 4000 horse. Napoleon had just learned that the troops of Estramadura had arrived at Burgos.

He enjoined Marshal Soult to push forward without waiting for either Marshal Ney or the guard, to break through these Spanish troops if they were bold enough to place themselves so near him, and to take Burgos from them.

Marshal Soult, who had returned on the preceding day to Briviesca, had immediately given orders to the three divisions of Mouton, Merle, and Bonnet, to unite on the road from Briviesca to Burgos, in the environs of Monasterio. He had Lasalle's cavalry in advance, and that of Milhaud with his main body. It is beyond Burgos that the plains of Castille commence, and it was to gallop over them in pursuit of the fugitive Spaniards that Napoleon had brought with him so large a mass of dragoons.

On the 10th, at four in the morning, Marshal Soult moved off his *corps d'armée* on the road from Monasterio to Burgos, Lasalle's light cavalry and Mouton's gallant division at the head, Bonnet's division and Milhaud's dragoons in second line, Merle's division, the most distant of the three, as rearguard. About 12,000 men of the corps of Estramadura had left Burgos for the Upper Ebro, to proceed to Frias and cover the right of General Blake conformably to the decisions of the council of war held at Tudela. Six thousand men of this corps remained in mass at Aranda, on the Madrid road. The twelve thousand carried in advance of Burgos were composed, like all the Spanish troops, of old troops of the line, and volunteers, peasants, students, and others. This corps, it is true, included in its ranks some battalions of the Walloon and Spanish guards, who were the best soldiers of Spain. It possessed a numerous artillery, well horsed and well served, but it was commanded, in the absence of the captain-general, Galuzzo, by the Marquis de Belveder, a young man without experience, who had advanced against the French with the most silly presumption.

At daybreak, Lasalle's cavalry, marching at the head of the *corps d'armée*, fell in with the Spanish advanced posts, exchanged some carbine-shots with them, and fell back on Mouton's division, for they were in presence of obstacles which infantry alone could overcome. In following the highroad, and in approaching Burgos itself, they had on the left the little stream called the Arlanzon, which waters the foot of the wooded heights of the Carthusian convent; in the centre, the wood of Gamonal, with the highroad running through it; and on the right, the heights of the park of Villimar, on the summit of which is seated the fortified castle of Burgos, and at the foot the city of Burgos itself. The Spaniards had tirailleurs on the heights on right and left of this position, their principal infantry in the wood of Gamonal, barring the highroad, their cavalry on the skirt of

that wood, their artillery in advance. No sooner had Marshal Soult arrived on the ground than he set in motion Mouton's division, to attack the most serious obstacle, that of the wood of Gamonal. He ranged his cavalry in rear, to dash upon the Spaniards when the obstacle of the wood should be overcome, and a little further in rear Bonnet's division, to storm the heights crowned by the enemy, if they offered any resistance. The illustrious General Mouton advanced without hesitation, with his four veteran regiments, the 2nd and 4th light, and the 13th and 36th of the line, upon the wood of Gamonal. The Spanish artillery, firing briskly, at first swept away a few files; but our soldiers, marching, with bayonet fixed, upon the wood of Gamonal, broke into it, in spite of the Walloon and Spanish guards, and cleared it in the twinkling of an eye. At this sight the whole Spanish army disbanded with unparalleled alacrity. Colours, cannon, and all were abandoned. The troops which followed picked up in the wood more than twenty pieces of cannon. All the surrounding heights were in like manner deserted by the Spaniards, and the mass of their fugitives threw themselves either into Burgos or across the Arlanzon, to escape more speedily. Lasalle and Milhaud then passed the Arlanzon, partly by fording, partly by bridges that cross the stream, rushed at a gallop upon the dispersed soldiers of Estramadura, and cut down a considerable number. General Mouton's infantry entered Burgos at the heels of the Spaniards, received a few musket-shots from several convents which it sacked, and made itself master both of the city and of the castle itself, which the enemy had not taken the precaution to put into a state of defence. This feat, accomplished by a single charge of Mouton's division, put into our hands not only Burgos and its castle, but also 12 colours, 30 pieces of cannon, about 900 prisoners, exclusively of all the fugitives who were killed or taken in the plain. Those who fell or were wounded by the swords of our cavalry beyond Burgos were computed at 2000. With soldiers so nimble in flight, there was no other way of diminishing the force of the enemy than to cut down the fugitives, for it was impossible to make prisoners in a different manner. Marshal Soult exerted himself to re-establish order in Burgos, where, in the first moment, very great confusion prevailed, from the concourse of the vanquished and the victors, and the disappearance of nearly all the inhabitants. In a few days, however, that important city had assumed its usual aspect.

Napoleon, impatient to make the central point of Burgos the pivot of his operations, had hastened on the 10th to move forward his headquarters. He had passed the night of the 10th at Cubo, and on the 11th he entered Burgos. During his

stay at Vittoria he had taken care to order the construction at Miranda, Pancorvo, and Briviesca, of posts, which were demi-fortresses, capable of containing an hospital, a magazine, a storehouse, and in which columns on march might rest and revictual themselves, and leave their fatigued or sick men out of the reach of the guerillas. He had perceived, in fact, with his habitual promptness, that in a country where the regular force was so far from formidable, and where the irregular force did so much mischief, there would be much to apprehend for his communications. He took, therefore, not a single step in advance without labouring to secure them.

Napoleon entered Burgos in the night, and incognito, persisting in leaving the royal honours to Joseph, and in reserving for himself the odium of the rigours of war.* He gave orders for burning the standard used at the proclamation of the royalty of Ferdinand, received the clergy and the authorities with extreme sternness, assumed the attitude of an irritated conqueror who has acquired all the rights of war, is determined to exercise them all, and not disposed to forego any but what the clemency of King Joseph might be able to obtain from him.

In the warehouses of Burgos, or in the environs, there were considerable quantities of wool belonging to the great land proprietors of Spain—such as the Dukes of Medina-Cœli, Ossuna, Infantado, Castel-Franco, and others, on whom Napoleon purposed to inflict a heavy stroke by favouring all who were below them. He ordered the confiscation of those wools, which amounted in value to 12,000,000 or 15,000,000 francs. His plan was to sell them to the merchants of Bayonne at

* On this subject, here is another letter of Napoleon's, which seems worthy of being transcribed :—

The Emperor to the King of Spain.

"CUBO, 10*th November* 1808.

"I shall set out at one in the morning, to be before daylight to-morrow incognito at Burgos, where I shall make my dispositions for the fight; for 'tis of no use to conquer if one does not profit by success.

"I think you ought to go to Briviesca to-morrow.

"As much as I think it behoves me to make little ceremony for myself, so much I think that it ought to be made for you. As for myself, that does not harmonise with the profession of war; besides, I will not have it.

"I should think that deputations ought to be sent to meet you, and to give you the best reception. On my arrival I shall order everything for the disarming, and for burning the standard which was used at the proclamation of Ferdinand. Seek to produce an impression that this is no laughing matter.

"Word is sent me that the army of Estramadura is destroyed. It is, however, only an infamous, swaggering rabble, which did not stand the charge of one brigade of General Mouton's. If you know of anything towards Orduna, or of Marshals Lefebvre or Victor, inform me of it. The hope of having some news from that quarter has made me stop here.

"General Dejean, who commands a thousand horse at Miranda, has orders to protect the passage of the Spaniards who are with you, of the parks proceeding to Burgos, of the treasure, &c. NAPOLEON."

very low prices, with a view to favour the woollen manufactures of France, and afterwards to devote the produce, either to the compensation of the French who had suffered in Valencia, Cadiz, and the different cities of Spain, or to the augmentation of the funds of the army. Hitherto he had given to the Senate all the colours taken from hostile armies. He resolved that the Legislative Body should also have a share of these trophies, and made it a present of the twelve colours taken from the Spanish and Walloon guards, wishing to remove as much as possible the dislike attached in France to the war in Spain.

But these were mere accessory concerns for him. The conduct of the military operations was at this moment the principal and the most urgent. Having arrived on the 11th at Burgos, he despatched on the very same day General Lasalle, with his light cavalry, upon Lerma and Aranda, to push the Spaniards to the foot of the Guadarrama, to clear the country, and to prepare the ways for the columns which were to take the Spanish armies in rear. While he sent off Lasalle straight before him, he directed Milhaud's 2000 dragoons to the right upon Valladolid, with injunctions to cut down the fugitives, to make prisoners, to displace everywhere the authorities instituted in the name of Ferdinand VII., and to create others in the name of Joseph. But what was most urgent for him, and what he executed immediately, allowing but a single day's rest to the troops, was to send Marshal Soult from Burgos towards Reinosa with the 2nd corps, in order to throw it upon the rear of Blake. Once arrived at Burgos, in fact, the moment was come for him to fall to the right and left upon the rear of the Spanish armies, and to begin with that commanded by General Blake, because it was that which was engaged at the moment with the French generals, and against which it was of importance to march, if one wished to be in time to take it in rear. Napoleon, therefore, ordered Marshal Soult to set out from Burgos on the morning of the 12th, by forced marches, and by a backward movement to the right to proceed by Huermèce and Canduela upon Reinosa. It was probable that if Blake's Spanish army had been beaten, and if, instead of retreating in order, like regular armies, it was broken up into bands of fugitives, he might at least pick up some of the wrecks. From Reinosa, Marshal Soult was to march upon Santander, to reduce the Asturias. In this march of Marshal Soult's, Napoleon found a twofold advantage—in the first place, that of turning Blake; secondly, that of restoring the 2nd corps, which was the former corps of Bessières, to its first destination, namely, to occupy Old Castille and Leon, countries with

which it was acquainted, and in which it had been accustomed to act. His design was, at the same time, as soon as Marshals Lefebvre and Victor should have finished their operation in Biscay, to recall them to him by Vittoria, where their artillery, which they could not take with them into the mountains, would be waiting for them, and to draw them by Miranda and Burgos upon the Madrid road. Marshal Soult, setting out with all his artillery, which he had not been obliged to leave behind, because he had followed the highroad, had all that was necessary for the operations with which he was charged.

Napoleon bethought him on the same day of the means of preparing a considerable reinforcement for himself. Vague reports of the English were current at Burgos, and several prisoners, closely questioned, had announced their presence on the roads leading from Portugal into Spain. Others had spoken of English landed at Coruña, and proceeding by Astorga upon Leon. Letters intercepted at the post contained the same indications. It was evident that without knowing the period at which they might be expected, we should have to do with them in the plains of Old Castille, whether, established in Portugal, they came from Lisbon upon Salamanca, or, disembarking in Galicia, they came from Coruña to Astorga. Napoleon did not imagine them to be so near him as they really were, for the English plan was punctually executed. The detachments of Sir John Moore had already passed Badajoz and Almeida; and the corps of Sir David Baird, admitted at length into Coruña, was advancing upon Lugo and Astorga. But whether the English were more or less near was of little consequence to Napoleon, who wished, on the contrary, to see them venture so far into the interior of the Peninsula that they would not be able to get back again, and in anticipation of such a case, made all dispositions for crushing them. He had resolved to join with Marshal Soult General Junot's corps, brought from Portugal by sea, conformably to the convention of Cintra, which, though censured by the English, they had punctually executed. He had already given orders that this corps should be reformed, reorganised, and put without delay into such a state as to be fit to appear again in line. He despatched fresh orders from Burgos, that the first division, that of General Delaborde, should pass the Bidassoa on the 1st of December; that the second, General Loison's, should march immediately afterwards; and that the third, to which he had just appointed General Heudelet, but which was not in so forward a state of preparation as the other two, should follow them with the least possible delay. Napoleon had no doubt that this corps, already well seasoned, would show an anxiety to revenge the disaster of Vimeira, and that it was

very capable of doing so. The corps of Marshal Soult and General Junot resisting the English in front, he might, from Madrid, where he purposed to be soon, make some manœuvre on their flanks or their rear, the more decisive the further they should be suffered to advance. At this moment, therefore, he did not concern himself about the English, whose appearance it was easy to foresee, unless to prepare the means of stopping them subsequently on their march.

After the departure of Marshal Soult, Napoleon, left alone at Burgos with the imperial guard and part of the dragoons, hastened the movement of Marshal Ney's two divisions upon that city, having destined them to operate by-and-by on the rear of Castaños when he should have done with General Blake, and could weaken his centre for the benefit of his left. He had traced the route of Marshal Ney upon Burgos, by Haro, Pancorbo, and Briviesca.

While he was sending Marshal Soult into the Asturias upon the rear of General Blake, Marshals Lefebvre and Victor continued to pursue the Spanish general through Biscay. Marshal Lefebvre had met with no serious resistance at Guenes on the 7th, had entered Balmaseda on the 8th, and had pushed forward Villatte's division, which had been lent him for a few days, to the environs of Barcena. On his part, Marshal Victor, reprimanded for having thought of leaving Biscay, had returned by Orduna, Amurrio, and Oquendo to Balmaseda, and on the 9th had made his junction near that town with the corps of Marshal Lefebvre, indemnified for the new direction which was given him by the advantage of recovering Villatte's division, and of being enabled to meet and beat an enemy already demoralised. He saw Marshal Lefebvre on the 9th, and promised to concert his own march with his. But on the next day, the 10th, fearful of a proximity which might further deprive him of Villatte's division, he hastened to push Blake's army with the greatest vigour to the entrance of the gorges of Biscay, passed them at its heels without losing a moment, and about the second half of the day arrived on the other side of the mountains, near Espinosa, a little town which was important for its position, for it was situated at the point of intersection of all the roads of the plain and of the mountains. From Espinosa, in fact, you may proceed by a highroad either to Bilbao or to Santander, if you choose to go from the plain to the mountains; and if, on the contrary, you choose to descend from the mountains into the plain, you may again go by a high road either to Villarcayo or to Reinosa, and thus reach either Burgos or Leon. It was therefore worth while for General Blake to halt at this point, and to contest it obstinately. It was also worth while for Marshal Victor to fight, in order to gain possession of

it; he depended, moreover, on being rejoined, in case of emergency, by Marshal Lefebvre, though he had left him without seeing or speaking to him on the subject. Marshal Lefebvre had followed him into the same valley, pursuing a parallel route, but a little to the left and in rear, and much hurt at his colleague leaving him unawares, and having neither spoken to him nor sent him word concerning the operations to be jointly executed by them. Fortunately, one only of the two French corps despatched against Blake proved sufficient to crush him, so wretchedly organised were the Spanish troops, and so irresistible those which Napoleon had just brought into Spain.

Marshal Victor, having arrived before Espinosa de los Monteros on the 10th about noon, found there General Blake in position on heights of difficult access, and which he had occupied with considerable intelligence. There were left about 30,000 or 32,000 men of the 36,000 which he had when he marched back to Balmaseda, and six pieces of cannon, which he had not brought with him, but received from Reinosa, for it was impossible to drag them along in these mountains. Neither of the two armies had any with it, but fought without artillery and without cavalry—with musket and bayonet. Scarcely could they bring with them a few mules to carry the biscuit and the cartridges.

General Blake had on his left steep and wooded heights, towards his centre an accessible ground, but covered with fences, towards his right a tolerably elevated plateau, but not so much so as the heights on the left, likewise wooded, and backed upon a small river, that of La Trueba, which, issuing from the mountains, ran all along the rear of that position. The town of Espinosa, traversed by the Trueba, was placed precisely behind the centre of the Spanish army. The object to be attained, therefore, was to force one or other of the wings of the Spanish army, to push it upon its centre, and to throw the whole into Espinosa, where a single bridge would not be sufficient for the passage of an army in flight. The advanced hour and the short days of November afforded little hope of performing all this in one day.

General Villatte, who was at the head of Marshal Victor's corps, debouching by the Edesa road, perceived the Spanish army in this formidable position with its six pieces of cannon in the centre of its line. That army appeared to be not destitute of assurance, though always vanquished since the commencement of the operations. The general sent forward Pacthod's brigade, composed of the 27th light and the 63rd of the line, ordered the 27th light to make the Spaniards fall back upon the heights on which they appuyed their left, and enjoined the 63rd of the line to place itself in order of battle before

their centre, to keep it in check. With the second brigade, composed of the 94th and 95th of the line, commanded by General Puthod, he attacked the wooded plateau upon which the right of the Spaniards was appuyed. The assailants were obliged to advance without artillery against an army provided with it, though it had but little, and to carry all the positions by the fire of musketry or by the bayonet. Luckily the wooded ground which they had before them scarcely admitted of the use of any other arms than what the French had at the moment at their disposal. The soldiers of La Romana, placed on this plateau, defended themselves very valiantly, and under favour of the wood kept up a destructive fire on our troops; but General Puthod, with the 94th and 95th, surmounted all obstacles, carried the plateau, penetrated into the wood, dislodged the Spaniards from it, and precipitated some of them into the Trueba. The others fell back, in not very great disorder, upon their centre, backed upon the town of Espinosa. While our left brigade was maintaining this very sharp combat with the enemy's right, the 27th light of the right brigade had kept up all day a tirailleur fire with the Spaniards at the foot of the heights on their left, and the 63rd had been obliged to charge several times with the bayonet to curb their centre. The combat began to be difficult, and might have proved hazardous with other troops, for 6000 or 7000 men were engaged with more than 30,000. But Marshal Victor, having arrived with Ruffin's and Lapisse's divisions, lost no time in supporting the right and left of Villatte's division, and would have entered completely into action, had not a fog, coming on about five o'clock, prevented the two armies from seeing, and obliged them to defer the conclusion of the contest till the following day. The Spaniards, according to custom, concluding that they were victorious because they were not entirely conquered, kindled fires, shouting for joy and proclaiming their victory; but their triumph was destined to be of short duration.

Next morning, the 11th, at dawn of day, Marshal Victor renewed the action, determined to render it this time decisive. He numbered in his three divisions 17,000 or 18,000 infantry present under arms, and it was more than he needed against the thirty odd thousand Spaniards opposed to him. Already, on the preceding evening, he had changed the 94th and 95th of the line, which had been fighting all day, for the 9th light and the 24th of the line of Ruffin's division, supported in rear by the 96th of the line. These three regiments of General Ruffin's, substituted for Puthod's brigade, were destined to complete the victory on our left, upon the plateau backed on the Trueba. The general-in-chief had charged the first brigade of Lapisse's division, commanded by General Maison, one of the most intrepid and intelli-

gent officers of the French army, to support the 27th on our right, to dislodge the Spaniards from the steep and wooded heights on which their left was established, and to throw them upon Espinosa, where there was nothing to favour their flight but the bridge of that town. At the centre he had placed the 8th of the line, of Lapisse's division, to support General Villatte's 63rd. He had kept in reserve the 54th, the last regiment of Lapisse's division, to direct it to any point where it might be needed.

At dawn of day, General Maison, marching at the head of the 16th light, which rivalled in ardour General Villatte's 27th light, climbed under a plunging fire the heights which were on our right, carried them with the bayonet, killed several Spanish generals, a great number of officers and soldiers, and seconded by the 45th, had soon thrust them upon their centre, that is to say, upon Espinosa. At the same instant, the 63rd, commanded by the brave general Mouton-Duvernet, and the 8th, pushed the Spaniards from enclosure to enclosure on the spacious and somewhat lower ground which formed the centre of the position. Our soldiers, carrying one garden-wall after another, at length drove back the Spaniards upon Espinosa, at the moment when General Maison had already pushed them to the same point and taken their six pieces of cannon. The left brigade, led by General Labruyère, had likewise accomplished its task, and crowded the right of the Spaniards into an elbow of the Trueba, where they had accumulated into a dense mass, which exhibited the form of a full square, apparently for the better resisting the shock of our troops. The enemy, repelled from all points at once upon Espinosa, at length fell into frightful confusion, and fled in disorder in all directions, here thronging to the bridge of Espinosa for the purpose of crossing it, there throwing themselves into the bed of the Trueba to ford the river. Then was to be seen, instead of a retreat, the unparalleled rout of 30,000 affrighted men running away in the delirium of terror. In a plain, and with cavalry, almost all of them would have been cut in pieces. Our soldiers firing from above down upon these dense masses, or thrusting them forward with the point of the bayonet, killed or wounded nearly 3000 men, but took only a few hundred prisoners, for they could not come up to such nimble mountaineers in running. We lost in killed and wounded about 1100 men, a much larger proportion than usual in fighting the Spaniards, and which was owing to the nature of the ground which we were obliged to take from them. But we had done better than take prisoners; we had completely disorganised Blake's army. Its commander, plunged into despair, deprived of his best generals, who were wounded or slain, had no longer an army around him. The Asturians had dispersed confusedly on the road to Santander.

The wrecks of La Romana's troops of the line and those of Galicia escaped by Reinosa to the road to Leon. Another detachment fled by the Villarcayo road, in the hope of not finding the French there. Most of them, having thrown away their muskets, ran across the country, with the resolution of not resuming arms. It is true that courage might return as speedily as it forsook them; but we had done, if not for ever, at least for a long time, with that army of Leon and Galicia, which was to have come by Mondragon to cut the line of operation of the French army.

Meanwhile, Marshal Lefebvre, having debouched, on his part, from the mountains into the plain by a different route from that which Marshal Victor had followed, had approached at the noise of the musketry, to assist his colleague, from whom he received no communication. He had come in time to cover his left; but seeing that his support was not necessary, he had taken the road to Villarcayo, which was recommended to him as the easiest for reaching Reinosa. By the way, he came up with a detachment of Blake's which was retreating in that direction, ordered Sebastiani's division to charge and disperse it, took a great quantity of arms and wounded, besides a certain number of unhurt prisoners, and arrived in the evening of the 11th at Villarcayo.

Marshal Victor passed the remainder of the 11th and the whole of the 12th at Espinosa, as he could not lead any further soldiers who were exhausted by the marches which they had made in the mountains, whose shoes were worn out, almost all their cartridges spent, and the biscuit carried on their backs entirely consumed. Besides, there was little hope of overtaking the 5000 or 6000 men left with General Blake, on account of their celerity in marching, and their promptness in dispersing and dissolving. It was for the French cavalry, already despatched to the plains of Castille, it was for Marshal Soult, if he did not arrive too late, to stop and to take them. General Blake, arriving on the 12th at Reinosa, where all the depôts of the Spanish army were established, made no stay there, and endeavoured by a mountain track to reach the road to Leon.

Marshal Soult, having left Burgos on the 13th, and marched by Huermèce for Canduela, fell in with a fugitive band of 2000 men escorting forty-two carriages laden with muskets, a great quantity of baggage and wounded, left the business of destroying them to the dragoons, who made a very great carnage among that band, and went to pass the night midway to Reinosa. He entered the town the next day, and there found all the matériel of Blake's army, thirty-five pieces of cannon, 15,000 muskets, and a great quantity of provisions for war supplied by the English. He was there joined by Marshal

Lefebvre, and after concerting with him, took the road to Santander, with a view to go, agreeably to his orders, and effect the submission of the Asturias.

Napoleon, so difficult were the communications, was not informed till the night between the 13th and 14th of the decisive battle fought on the 11th at Espinosa with Blake's army. He had not doubted for a moment of success, but he began to perceive, and with great regret, that victory, always certain with the Spaniards, did not produce, owing to the difficulty of overtaking them, the results which were obtained with others. He was persuaded that Marshal Soult, if he arrived in time at Reinosa, would have nothing to do but to finish a dispersion nearly complete already, and to pick up a few prisoners. Nothing more was to be expected but from the swords of the cavalry. Napoleon, therefore, sent orders to General Milhaud to sweep with his dragoons all the roads of Old Castille, and enjoined all the other divisions of that arm to join General Milhaud, and to pursue in all directions, and to cut down without mercy, all the fugitives of Blake's army that they could come up with.

The left of the Spaniards being thus destroyed, it was necessary to think of falling upon their right, and treating this as that had been treated. Napoleon ordered Marshal Victor, after allowing the 1st corps to rest at Espinosa, and ascertaining that Marshal Soult would afterwards have nothing to do but with fugitives, to take the road to Burgos, and in fulfilment of his first destination, to join the headquarters. He directed Marshal Lefebvre, who was incessantly complaining that he was deficient in number, since he had left 2000 Germans at Bilbao, since he had no longer Villatte's division, and since the Poles had not yet arrived, to establish himself at Carrion with the 9000 or 10,000 infantry that he had left there, to rest himself, to collect his artillery and his stragglers, and thus form a link between Marshal Soult, who was going to scour the Asturias, the cavalry of General Milhaud, which was to sweep the plain of Castille, and headquarters, where preparations were making for operating from Burgos upon Aranda. At Carrion, in fact, Marshal Lefebvre would be at nearly an equal distance from Reinosa, Leon, Valladolid, and Burgos. When Junot's corps should arrive to take his place on Marshal Soult's flanks, Napoleon purposed to bring him nearer to the Madrid road, either by Miranda or Segovia.

As he was to be soon joined by Marshal Victor, and should retain Marshal Lefebvre, to connect him with the corps of Marshal Soult, Napoleon had no further hesitation to part with Marshal Ney, that he might manœuvre on the rear of Castaños. Remaining at Burgos with the guard only and part of the

cavalry, he sent off the gallant marshal on the morning of the 14th, at the head of Marchand's and Dessoles' divisions, for Lerma and Aranda. His plan was, as soon as Marshal Ney had reached Aranda, to move him to the left upon Osma, Soria, and Agreda, which would place him on the rear of Castaños, whose headquarters were at Cintruenigo, between Calahorra and Tudela. Marshal Ney was to march upon Aranda without loss of time, but without precipitation, so as to arrive in good condition behind an immense curtain of cavalry, which was to extend into the plain, to the foot of the Guadarrama, a great chain of mountains in advance of Madrid, and separating Old from New Castille.

Napoleon recommended to Marshal Moncey not to make any movement upon the Ebro, to avoid giving umbrage to Castaños, but to hold himself in readiness to act on the first signal. He had collected at Logroño, as we have seen, that division of Ney's which had been left behind, late Bisson's division, now that of Lagrange. After returning its artillery to it, he had left it Colbert's light cavalry, formerly attached to the 6th corps, and joined to it General Dijeon's brigade of dragoons. That division, completely collected at Logroño, where it had rested, had but a step to go to join Marshal Moncey, and would form with him a mass of 30,000 combatants, partly veteran troops—a mass quite sufficient to push Castaños and Palafox upon Ney, who would come to Soria, to place them between two fires, and to crush them. If this fine manœuvre proved successful, the entire corps of Castaños must be taken, that is to say, as far as it is possible to take a corps in Spain, where the soldiers always contrive to escape by deserting their ranks. But in order to its success, it was requisite that Marshal Moncey, holding himself in readiness to act, should not act, and that Marshal Ney should so accelerate his march as to be upon the rear of Castaños before the latter should be aware of it. Napoleon, though he esteemed Marshal Moncey, did not sufficiently depend on the firmness of his character to entrust him with a high command. He had with him the illustrious Lannes, beginning to recover from a very dangerous fall from his horse, and he destined for him the command of all the troops collected on the Ebro. It was therefore between Lannes and Ney, between those two iron hands, that the Spanish army of the right was about to find itself grasped, and probably crushed. Before he gave his last orders, Napoleon waited till Marshal Ney, having left Burgos, should have reached Lerma and Aranda, whence he was enjoined to turn off to the right by the Soria road.

While Napoleon was displaying so much activity—for no sooner had he arrived at Vittoria, and satisfied himself respecting the

incident of Villatte's division at Balmaseda, than he had sent off Marshal Soult to Burgos; no sooner was he master of Burgos than he had despatched that same marshal against Blake; no sooner was Blake destroyed than he threw Marshal Ney upon Castaños—while Napoleon, we say, was displaying so much activity, so much manœuvring science, against armies which it was sufficient to attack in front in order to conquer, the central junta of Aranjuez, and the court of generals, of demagogue royalists, around it, learned the destruction of the army of Blake and the Marquis of Belveder with extraordinary astonishment and emotion, as if these events were not to be foreseen. It did not absolutely imitate those cowardly soldiers, who, when running away, murder their officers, whom they accuse of treachery (of which we shall soon see some new and atrocious examples); but it obeyed a sentiment somewhat similar, in displacing without pity the vanquished generals. Amidst the habitual confusion of its counsels, it declared Blake, though the best of the officers of the army of Galicia, unworthy of the command, and it repaid his devotedness by stripping him of it. It pursued the same course towards the fortunate conqueror of Baylen, towards Castaños, the most intelligent of the Spanish generals, because he resisted all the silly proposals of the brothers Palafox. Certainly Castaños was not the boldest of the Spanish generals, but he had an enlightened sense of the situation, and thought that by advancing upon the Ebro they should reap nothing but disasters. Having perceived how strong the French were on the Ebro, though weak on the Guadalquivir, he desired that an attempt should be made to oppose to them, either in the southern provinces or in the maritime provinces, the obstacle of the climate, of distances, of British assistance; and he highly censured the war which he was obliged to wage with two divisions of Andalusia, tolerably good ones by-the-by, and an assemblage of untrained peasants and students, against the best armies in Europe. To all the plans of the central junta, founded on the blindest presumption, he had perfectly reasonable objections to make, and this annoying censor, who pretended to be wiser than his fellow-citizens, had already lost his glory and their favour. It was said in the army, and repeated at Aranjuez, that the Spanish ranks contained a great number of traitors, and that Castaños was the one who most deserved to be narrowly watched. Letters intercepted by our advanced corps were full of these absurd notions.

Accordingly the command was taken at once from Generals Blake and Castaños, and given to a single individual, to the fortunate favourite of Spanish mob-rule, to the Marquis de la Romana, the runaway from Denmark. A single command would have been an excellent institution had there been a

Spanish officer competent to that part, and at any rate, in the then state of the insurgent armies, Castaños would have been the only one to attempt it. But a jealousy had been excited against him on account of Baylen—he was detested for his good sense; and the eccentric Marquis de la Romana, forming every day extravagant plans, pleasing by a sort of romantic enthusiasm, recommended by an escape which had something marvellous, agreeable to all the envious because he had not yet won any victory, a stranger to all animosities because he had lived at a distance—the Marquis de la Romana was elected commander of the armies both of Blake and Castaños. It was, however, an utter impossibility to assume both these commands, because he would have been obliged, by the longest and the most arduous of marches across mountains covered with snow, to retreat to Leon with seven or eight thousand fugitives, whom he hoped to rally, and to increase to fifteen or twenty thousand. Being at Leon, more than one hundred leagues from Tudela, he would be incapable of commanding the centre and the right. Castaños, meanwhile, was to retain the command. Thomas de Morla, the perfidious and arrogant captain-general of Cadiz, of whom the French had so much reason to complain after Baylen, had been appointed director of military affairs with the junta. He was called to introduce harmony among the Spanish generals, and especially between the Spanish generals and the English, who were about to enter into line.

Napoleon, having spent the 15th, 16th, and 17th of November in collecting information concerning his different corps, and certain from this information that Marshal Soult had entered Santander without difficulty, that Marshal Lefebvre had established himself at Carrion, that Marshal Victor was on march for Burgos, and lastly, that Marshal Ney had just arrived at Aranda, behind the curtain of French cavalry—Napoleon gave orders to the latter to leave Aranda on the 18th, and to proceed to San Estevan, and from San Estevan to Almazan. He enjoined him, when once arrived there, to have an eye and an ear upon Soria and Calatayud, to learn if Castaños was falling back; and if it was upon the road from Pampeluna to Madrid, which passes through Soria, or that from Saragossa to Madrid, which passes through Calatayud, he was to place himself so as to be on the 22nd or the 23rd on the rear of the Spanish army; Lannes, with 30,000 men, was to push it violently, as he was accustomed to push an enemy, in one or the other of these directions. Considering places and circumstances, these instructions were as precise as possible. On the same day Napoleon sent off Lannes, who could scarcely sit his horse, with orders to proceed to Logroño, there to unite the infantry division of Lagrange and the cavalry of Generals Colbert and Dijeon with the troops of

Marshal Moncey, to throw himself, with 24,000 foot, 2000 artillerymen, 4000 horse, upon Castaños and Palafox, and to thrust them back upon the bayonets of Marshal Ney.

The two marshals immediately set about the execution of the movement prescribed to them. Marshal Ney, leaving Aranda on the 19th, arrived in the evening of the same day at San Estevan, and on the 20th at Berlanga. If he had always found it difficult to obtain intelligence on a march in Spain, that difficulty was increased on leaving the highroad of Madrid and penetrating into the mountainous country of Soria, across that chain which rises intermediately between the Pyrenees and the Guadarrama. He was forced to go to the back of these mountains, in order to fall upon the Ebro and to seize Castaños in rear. On advancing into this less frequented tract, where, of course, the ancient manners of Spain prevailed in greater force, Marshal Ney was fated to meet with a population more hostile, less communicative, and to be exposed more than anywhere else to false intelligence. The inhabitants fled at his approach, and left the French army to live upon what it could get, without thinking of staying on the spot to diminish damage by supplying it with what it needed. Those who did remain spoke with emphasis of the armies of Castaños and Palafox, which some represented as amounting to 60,000, others to 80,000 men. Each of these accounts assigned to them different headquarters. Nobody could tell whether Castaños was retiring upon Madrid, or whether, in case of his retiring upon that capital, he would pass through Soria or Calatayud. Napoleon, in his instructions, had admitted one or the other hypothesis as possible, and Marshal Ney found himself under great uncertainty. With Marchand's and Dessoles' divisions he numbered scarcely 13,000 or 14,000 men, and intrepid as he was, and having at Guttstädt made head against 60,000 Russians with 15,000 French, he first asked himself whether he was upon the real track of Castaños' retreat; and secondly, if it was not to be feared that Castaños and Palafox, falling back before they were beaten, might appear before him with 60,000 or 80,000 men, which would render his position serious. He marched, therefore, with cautious steps, observing, listening to everything around him, and applying to headquarters for information which he could not obtain on the spot. On the 21st he was at Soria with one of his divisions, waiting till next day for the second, which he had directed to make a circuit to the right, in order to obtain intelligence from Calatayud. This intrepid marshal hesitated for the first time in his life, surprised, embarrassed at the diverse reports which he picked up in this country of ignorance, exaggeration, and adventures. Meanwhile, time pressed, for it was on the 22nd or the 23rd that the French

troops on the Ebro were to be engaged with Castaños and Palafox.

Marshal Lannes, on his part, having mounted on horseback before he was completely recovered, had left Burgos on the 19th, and was at Logroño in the evening of the same day. He had ordered Lagrange's division, General Colbert's cavalry, and General Dijeon's brigade of dragoons to employ the 20th in concentrating themselves around Logroño, to cross the Ebro on the morning of the 21st, and to descend along the right bank of that river, till opposite to Lodosa, where Marshal Moncey was to debouch. Setting out again on the 20th for Lodosa, he had seen Marshal Moncey, who was temporarily placed under his orders, and had enjoined him to hold himself in readiness to cross the bridge of Lodosa in the evening of the 21st, in order to effect his junction with the troops of General Lagrange.

The instructions of Marshal Lannes were punctually executed, and in the evening of the 21st, General Lagrange, having descended the right bank of the Ebro, arrived before Lodosa, whence the corps of Marshal Moncey was debouching. There was a total mass of 28,000 or 29,000 men, infantry and cavalry. Marshal Lannes had placed under the command of the brave Lefebvre-Desnoettes all his cavalry, composed of Polish lancers, provisional cuirassiers, and dragoons, and light horse, which General Colbert had brought, and old dragoons brought from the extremity of Germany by General Dijeon. The infantry was composed of Lagrange's division, late Bisson's division, young troops of Marshal Moncey's corps, to which had been subsequently joined the 14th and 44th of the line, as well as the legions of the Vistula. The young soldiers had become almost worthy of the old, excepting that they were deficient of good officers, like all corps of recent creation, the skeletons of which have been formed with retired officers. Lannes made them all bivouac, in order to start the next morning. Every soldier had bread for four days in his knapsack.

Accordingly, next day, the 22nd of November, the troops set out, descending the right bank of the Ebro towards Calahorra. Lannes marched at the head with Lefebvre-Desnoettes, followed by the Polish lancers, who had rendered themselves the terror of the Spaniards. On coming in sight of Calahorra, they perceived the Spaniards retiring upon Alfaro and Tudela, where they naturally expected to find them in position on the following day. Lannes hastened the pace of the troops, and went to pass the night at Alfaro. It was impossible to proceed further that day. For the rest, if they started from Alfaro next morning by daybreak, they might reach Tudela early enough for a battle. The divisions of Maurice Mathieu, Musnier, and Grand-

jean kept along the left of the Ebro. Morlot's and Lagrange's divisions followed the right bank, and passed the night at Coralla. In this march the cavalry preceded the infantry.

Next day, the 23rd, Lannes gave orders for starting at three in the morning for Tudela. With a view to lose no time, he set off at a gallop with Lefebvre and the Polish lancers, being desirous to arrive before the troops, and to reconnoitre the position, in case the enemy should be waiting to fight.

The Spanish generals had been long disputing about the best course to be pursued, Palafox being desirous to act offensively in Navarre, Castaños, on the contrary, unwilling to cross the Ebro, and going so far as to say that it would be better to fall back ever so far into Spain, and to avoid general engagements with the French. Amidst this controversy they had been surprised by the presence of Lannes, and forced to accept battle by the outcry of the Spanish populace, who called them traitors. Things were in such a state that the Aragonese, under O'Neil, had not yet recrossed the Ebro at Tudela on the morning of the 23rd, and that between the left wing, formed by them, and the extremity of the right wing, formed by the Andalusians, there was a distance of nearly three leagues. Castaños hastened to range both in order of battle on the heights which rise in advance of Tudela, and which, gradually subsiding, extend to the environs of Cascante, amidst spacious plains of olive plantations.

Lannes, having come facing this position, perceived on his left, upon the heights preceding Tudela, and near the Ebro, a large mass of Spaniards: these were precisely the Aragonese, finishing their passage, and covered by a numerous artillery. In the centre he discovered, on somewhat less elevated heights, and protected by an olive wood, another mass: these were the Valencians, the Murcians, and the Castilians. Further to the right, but at a very great distance towards Cascante, was discernible a third assemblage: these were the divisions of Andalusia, under La Peña and Grimarest, which had not yet come into line. The whole might amount to 40,000 men.

Lannes immediately resolved to storm the heights on the left, and when he should have nearly accomplished this, to break the centre of the enemy, then to fall upon that portion of the Spanish army which was perceived on the right towards Cascante, and against which he purposed to direct his rearguard, formed by Lagrange's division, which had been left at some distance behind.

He despatched forthwith Maurice Mathieu's division, one of the best composed and best commanded, to the heights on the left, appuyed on the Ebro, and kept in reserve Musnier's, Morlot's, and Grandjean's divisions, to act against the centre

at the proper time. The cavalry was deployed in the plain, one part facing the right, for the purpose of keeping the enemy in check towards Cascante, and to give Lagrange's division time to rejoin.

Generals Maurice Mathieu and Habert, preceded by a battalion of tirailleurs, advanced at the head of a regiment of the Vistula and of the 14th of the line, an old Eylau regiment, for which battles with the Spaniards were not formidable affairs. Lannes had given orders not to be prodigal of musketry fire against an enemy superior in number and advantageously posted. Accordingly, when the tirailleurs had made the Spaniards upon the heights on the left fall back, Generals Maurice Mathieu and Habert formed into columns of attack, and began to climb the acclivity. The Aragonese, more brave, more enthusiastic than the rest of the nation, and more committed by their anterior demonstrations, were obliged to stand their ground, and most obstinately did they maintain it. After making good use of their artillery against the French, they disputed with them one hillock after another, and killed a considerable number of their men. But Maurice Mathieu's division, vigorously supported, compelled them, after a fight of two hours, to fall back upon Tudela. As soon as Lannes perceived that the issue of the combat in this quarter was not doubtful, he despatched Morlot's division, which had just arrived, to support Grandjean's division, and pushed both of them upon the centre of the Spaniards, composed, as we have said, of Valencians, Murcians, and Castilians. The obstacles of the ground, which were numerous, presented more than one difficulty for Morlot's division to overcome. Filled with young and ardent troops, they surmounted them, with the loss, it is true, of three or four hundred men, and drove back the Spaniards upon Tudela, into which Maurice Mathieu, on his part, was ordered to penetrate.

A general rout ensued; for the Spaniards, precipitated by Maurice Mathieu's and Morlot's divisions from the heights that surround Tudela upon the town itself, and into an extensive plain of olive plantations situated beyond it, fled in tremendous confusion, leaving many dead and wounded, a greater number of prisoners than usual, all their artillery, and an immense quantity of stores and baggage-waggons.

It was now three in the afternoon. Lannes ordered Marshal Moncey to pursue them upon the Saragossa road, with Maurice Mathieu's, Morlot's, and Grandjean's divisions, Colbert's light cavalry, and the Polish lancers, under the command of General Lefebvre-Desnoettes. This cavalry, passing through the gap in the centre, entered Tudela and Cascante, and dashed at a gallop upon the fugitives, by all the beaten tracks through the

olive plantations that surround Saragossa. Lannes remained, with Musnier's division and the dragoons, to make head against the left of the Spaniards, composed of La Peña's troops, who were seen in the distance towards Cascante.

Castaños, hurried away in the rout, could not rejoin his left. La Peña was there alone, with a formidable mass of infantry, that which had taken Dupont in rear at Baylen, and which had all the pride of that day, without having the merit of it. La Peña led it in line from Cascante towards Tudela, into a plain where the cavalry could deploy. Lannes let slip upon it the dragoons of Dijeon's brigade, which by several repeated charges kept it in check, while waiting for Lagrange's division, which had not yet come into action. It arrived, at length, at a very advanced hour. General Lagrange, placing it in échelons very close to one another, proceeded immediately to the attack of Cascante. He led himself the 25th light, forming the first échelon. These were old Friedland regiments, which considered it as no difficulty to have to deal with the pretended conquerors of Baylen. The 25th marched with bayonets fixed upon Cascante, overthrew La Peña's division, and hurled it back upon Borja, to the right of the Saragossa road. General Lagrange, charging at the head of his division, received a ball in the arm.

Night put an end to the battle, which, on the right as on the left, exhibited but one immense rout. The Aragonese were thrown back upon Saragossa, and the Andalusians upon Borja, and from Borja upon the Calatayud road. The retreat could not but be divergent, even if the sentiments of the generals had not disposed them to separate after a common disaster. This day put into our hands about forty pieces of cannon, three thousand prisoners, almost all wounded, because the cavalry had no means of stopping them but by cutting them down, besides two thousand dead or dying left on the field of battle. The dispersion here, as at Espinosa, was, after all, the principal result. The following days gave us a great many more prisoners, taken, like the others, by the swords of our horse.

On the following morning Lannes was unable to bear the fatigue of riding, from having exposed himself to it too soon. He charged Marshal Moncey to continue the pursuit of the Aragonese upon Saragossa, with Maurice Mathieu's, Morlot's, and Grandjean's divisions, and part of the cavalry. He consigned Lagrange's division, whose commander had been wounded, to the brave Maurice Mathieu, added to it Musnier's division, the dragoons, and the Polish lancers, and ordered these troops, placed under the chief command of General Maurice Mathieu, to pursue Castaños, with the sword at his loins, upon Calatayud and Siguenza, on the road from Saragossa to Madrid. He

hoped, though he had not heard anything of the march of Marshal Ney, that the Andalusians might meet with him on their way, and have to atone under his strokes for the day of Baylen.

Unfortunately, amidst the uncertainty in which he was, Marshal Ney, not knowing by which road to advance, that of Soria to Tudela, or that of Soria to Calatayud, awaiting ulterior orders from headquarters, which orders did not arrive, had passed not only the 22nd at Soria, for the purpose of rallying his two divisions, but also the 23rd and 24th, looking for intelligence; and it was not till the 25th that he decided to march for Agreda, at which point he would be but a day's march from Cascante. Had he only started on the morning of the 23rd, he might have been by evening or the next day on the rear of Castaños. But the instructions of the headquarters, though very clear, had left the marshal too much latitude. The last particulars collected at Soria respecting the force of Castaños had thrown him into a real perplexity of mind. He had been told * that Castaños had 80,000 men, that Lannes himself had

* Respecting this important fact in the career of the illustrious marshal, we here quote several letters from the headquarters, which prove how highly Napoleon valued this great officer, and what he thought of the motives for his hesitation. We shall there see, in the first place, that the instructions were very clear, very positive; that the dates were specified with great precision; that if there was at first some uncertainty respecting the two roads of Soria and Calatayud, on the 21st all uncertainty had ceased at the headquarters, and that Agreda, on the Soria road, was indicated. It was evidently nothing but the false reports picked up at Soria that caused Marshal Ney to hesitate. Besides, a better opinion may be formed on this important fact from the original documents. We shall add that, as for the reproach addressed to Marshal Ney, that he lost time from jealousy of Marshal Lannes, there is not the slightest foundation for such a reproach, though it has often been deserved in Spain by our generals. The better part of the triumph would have fallen to the share of Marshal Ney if he had succeeded, for it was he who would have taken Castaños. The real cause is that which Napoleon himself assigned for the conduct of the marshal, and which I have pointed out in my narrative. One may refer to such a judge as Napoleon, especially when his opinion was not formed under the influence of ill-humour; for, besides his infallibility in this matter, he had the advantage of being close to the events—he knew all the facts, and did not suffer himself to be biassed by any consideration. At any rate, here are the documents, hitherto unpublished; the reader, when he has perused them, will decide for himself.

The Major-General to Marshal NEY, at Aranda.

"BURGOS, *November* 18, 1808, noon.

"The emperor orders you to set out to-morrow, before light, with your two divisions, the whole of your artillery, the 26th regiment of horse chasseurs, and General Beaumont's brigade of cavalry, which Marshal Bessières will place at your disposal, and to proceed for San Estevan de Gormaz, and thence to Almazan or Soria, at your option, according to the intelligence which you shall receive. You will intercept at Almazan the road from Madrid to Pampeluna, and you will then find yourself on the rear of General Castaños. On your route, and particularly at Almazan, you shall have the most precise information. If you learn either that General Castaños has retreated upon Madrid, or that he has retired from Calahorra or from Alfaro, and that his

been beaten, and imposed upon by such like reports, the daring marshal had this time been fearful of being too rash. On the 25th of November, after passing the 23rd and 24th at Soria, he had marched, on repeated intimations from headquarters, had arrived in the evening of the 25th at Agreda, on the 26th at Tarazona, where he, at length, learned with great regret the error into which he had fallen, and the lost occasion for immense

line of communication with Madrid was that from Saragossa by Calatayud or Daroca, your expedition would then have for its first object the subjection of the town of Soria, which it is important to reduce before marching further. To this end you will proceed to that town; you will disarm it, and blow up the old walls; you will cause the insurrectionary committees to be seized; you will form a government of the most respectable men; and you will tell the town to send a deputation to the king. You will put yourself in communication with Marshal Lannes, who is marching with Lagrange's division, Colbert's brigade, and the whole corps of Marshal Moncey, upon Calahorra, Alfaro, and Tudela. Marshal Lannes will proceed for Lodosa on the 21st; he will be there on the 22nd, and join Marshal Moncey's corps. You, Monsieur le Duc, will be in the evening of the 21st at Almazan, and on the 22nd at Soria. The emperor will be on the 21st at Aranda. Thus, on the 22nd, the left will be at Calahorra; the centre, which you form, will be at Almazan or Soria; the right upon Aranda."

The Major-General to Marshal NEY, at Almazan.

"BURGOS, *November* 21, 1808, 4 P.M.

"On the 22nd, Marshals Lannes and Moncey attack the enemy at Calahorra; you are, therefore, to continue your movement upon Agreda, to get upon the flanks of the enemy, and to form your junction with Marshal Lannes, if that is necessary."

The Major-General to Marshal NEY, by Agreda.

"ARANDA, *November* 27, 1808, 10 morning.

"It appears that after the battle of Tudela the army of Aragon retired into Saragossa, and that the army of Castaños retreated upon Tarazona, and if you had been at Agreda on the 23rd it would have been taken.

"His majesty desires me to repeat the order to pursue Castaños—do not leave him, but pursue him with the bayonet at his loins. No rest till your army has got hold of a piece of the army of Castaños.

"Listen not to the reports of the country. It was said that at Tudela there were upwards of 80,000 men; and there were not more than 40,000, including the peasants, and they ran away as soon as our troops marched towards them, leaving behind colours and cannon. This rabble is not made to withstand you, and nothing in Spain can resist your two divisions when you are at their head. Do not, then, leave Castaños, and get your share of him."

The Major-General to Marshal NEY, by Agreda.

"ARANDA, *November* 28, 1808, 7 evening.

"The emperor desires me to give you orders to pursue Castaños with the sword at his loins. If he proceeds towards Madrid, you will follow him. Be incessantly at his heels. The emperor goes to-morrow to Somosierra, and his intention is to have Castaños cut off, if possible, towards Guadalaxara. But it is essential that you, Monsieur le maréchal, that you should pursue him, and not let him throw himself upon the French corps marching to Madrid, and which might have at the same time to defend itself against the efforts of the English, who, according to accounts, are setting themselves in motion. The emperor's headquarters will be to-morrow at Bocequillas, and the day after at Buytrago. Thus, Monsieur le Duc, the object which you have

results. What had then happened to him had happened to all our generals, who suffered themselves to be deceived by the exaggerations of the Spaniards—exaggerations against which Napoleon strove in vain to put them on their guard, by repeating to them that the troops of the insurrection were mere *canaille*, which ought to be trampled down. Of this he himself a few days afterwards set a memorable example.

Marshal Ney effected his junction with Marshal Moncey, who was much weakened by the departure of Lagrange's and Musnier's divisions, sent in pursuit of Castaños. Marshal Ney, desirous of at least rendering his presence useful on the spot, agreed with Marshal Moncey to assist him in the investment of Saragossa, in which the brothers Palafox and the Aragonese fugitives had shut themselves up. Meanwhile General Maurice

to accomplish is neither the defence, nor the conquest, nor the occupation of a territory, but to follow, to attack, and to fight the army of Castaños, particularly if it should proceed for Madrid."

The Major-General to Marshal NEY, at Guadalaxara.

"CHAMARTIN, *December* 8, 1808.

"The English are running away as fast as their legs can carry them; but we have been here for a moment in a serious situation. It is a fault to have come hither too late; it is also a fault not to have followed the spirit of your first instructions: they informed you that Marshal Lannes was to attack the enemy on the 23rd, that you were destined to cut off and pursue Castaños, and consequently to proceed rapidly upon Agreda, instead of stopping two days, as you have done, in pure waste, at Soria.

"His majesty does not approve of your having mingled your corps with that of Marshal Moncey; you ought to pursue Castaños, and leave the Duke de Conegliano to besiege Saragossa. The emperor cannot conceive why, when you left Saragossa on the 2nd, you did not leave Dessoles' division with Marshal Moncey, thereby exposing him to the necessity of making a retrograde movement. However, what is past is past: his majesty is too well acquainted with your zeal to be angry with you: he will even put it in your power to repair all this. The emperor has hesitated to give orders to Dessoles' division and the Poles to return to Saragossa, in order to spare his troops fatigue. His majesty has preferred making alterations in his ulterior plans. He has just ordered Marshal Mortier to proceed to Saragossa."

The Emperor to Marshal LANNES.

"ARANDA, *November* 27, 1808.

"Your aide-de-camp arrived on the 26th, at eight in the morning, and informed me of the brilliant affair of Tudela. I congratulate you upon it. Marshal Ney has not fulfilled my object on this occasion. Arriving at noon on the 22nd at Soria, he ought, according to the orders which he had received, to have been early on the 23rd at Agreda. But having suffered himself to be imposed upon by the inhabitants, and giving credit to the heap of absurdities which they circulated, believing upon their word that there were 80,000 troops of the line there, &c., he was fearful of compromising himself, and remained on the 23rd and 24th at Soria. I gave him orders to set out immediately and to fear nothing. He ought to have been at Agreda on the 25th. He had heard your cannonade on the 23rd and 24th, and he thought that you had been beaten, without reason, and without any reasonable indication. I have since given him orders to pursue Castaños with the sword at his loins. I am engaged in recalling Marshal Victor's corps, which I had sent towards Aragon, in order to be at length able to march for Madrid."

Mathieu was pushing with equal rapidity and vigour the wrecks of Castaños, retreating in disorder upon Calatayud. Lannes remained ill at Tudela, but offered Napoleon to mount his horse again even before he was recovered, if it were necessary to make head in any quarter against the English, and to throw them into the sea. Would to Heaven, indeed, that Napoleon had consigned to such an officer the duty of pursuing those formidable enemies of the empire!

It was not till the 26th, again owing to the difficulty of communications, that Napoleon received the news of the vigorous conduct of Lannes at Tudela, of the dispersion of the Spanish armies of the centre and the right, and of the non-execution of the movement prescribed to Marshal Ney. Regarding that marshal as one of the first military officers of his time, he attributed his error solely to the false ideas which the French generals formed of Spain and of the Spaniards; and though the fine manœuvre which he had ordered from Soria had miscarried, he nevertheless considered the regular armies of Spain as annihilated, and the Madrid road as henceforth open to him. In fact, the Aragonese, under Palafox, were barely capable of defending Saragossa. The Andalusians, conducted by Castaños, were retreating, to the number of 8000 or 9000, upon Calatayud, and could do nothing more than augment the garrison of Madrid by falling back upon that capital by way of Siguenza and Guadalaxara, if they were allowed time. The Marquis de la Romana, with 6000 or 7000 fugitives destitute of everything, was laboriously gaining the kingdom of Leon, across the snow-covered mountains. Lastly, on the Madrid road itself was left nothing but wrecks of the army of Estramadura, already so roughly handled in advance of Burgos.

There was but one obstacle that could have stopped Napoleon —that was the English army, of which he had only the most vague and uncertain accounts. But that army itself was not yet in a state to undertake anything. Sir John Moore, conducting his two principal columns of infantry across the north of Portugal, had arrived at Salamanca with 13,000 or 14,000 infantry, worn out by the long march which they had performed, and by privations to which English soldiers were not at all accustomed. General Moore had not with him either a horse or a cannon, his cavalry and his artillery having taken the route from Badajoz to Talavera, under the escort of a division of infantry. Lastly, Sir David Baird, landing at Coruña with 11,000 or 12,000 men, advanced timidly towards Astorga, being yet 60 or 70 leagues from his commander-in-chief. These three columns knew not how they were to contrive to form a junction, and in their separate state were neither capable nor desirous of entering into action. They found themselves by no

means encouraged by what they beheld around them; for, instead of receiving them with enthusiasm, the Spaniards of Old Castille, terrified at the defeat of Blake, and submitting to a mere squadron of French cavalry, received them coldly, and would not furnish them with anything but in exchange for gold sovereigns or silver piastres, delivered at the same time as the supplies themselves. Such was the account given by the discreet Moore to his government, to undeceive it in respect to the Spanish insurrection, and to prove to it that the English army was engaged in a very perilous adventure.

Napoleon was ignorant of these circumstances; he knew only that the English were coming through Portugal and Galicia; but he persisted in his plan of drawing them into the interior of the Peninsula, in order to envelop them by means of some great manœuvre, while Marshal Soult and General Junot, left upon his rear, were to keep them in check in front. For acting in this manner, Madrid, whence one might operate by the right on Portugal or Galicia, became the best centre of operation, and this was a new motive for marching thither without delay. Napoleon gave orders in consequence as soon as he was acquainted with the affair of Tudela.

In the first place, he directed Marshal Ney, whom he wished to have at hand for the purpose of employing him on difficult occasions, particularly against the English, to relinquish the investment of Saragossa, to march upon Madrid by the same route as Castaños, to pursue him to the last extremity, and until he had not a man left. He enjoined General Maurice Mathieu, who was pursuing Castaños with part of Marshal Moncey's troops, to stop, to return to Marshal Moncey the troops belonging to him, that the latter might resume the operations of the siege of Saragossa with all his divisions. He again urged General St. Cyr, charged with the war in Catalonia, to accelerate the operations that were to conduct him to Barcelona, and lead to the raising of the blockade of that great city. Having made these dispositions on his left, Napoleon sent the following instructions upon his right.

Marshal Lefebvre, posted at Carrion, to connect the centre of the French army with Marshal Soult, to whom had been assigned the task of reducing the Asturias, was to follow the general movement upon Madrid, and to proceed, with Milhaud's dragoons, upon Valladolid and Segovia, in order to cover the right of the headquarters. General Junot, whose first division was approaching, was to hasten his march, for the purpose of taking Marshal Lefebvre's place on the southern slope of the mountains of the Asturias, where Marshal Soult would soon appear again after reducing the Asturias themselves. These two corps, one of which, under Marshal Bessières, had formerly conquered Old

Castille, the other of which, under Junot, had formerly conquered Portugal, united under Marshal Soult to meet the English first in Old Castille and then in Portugal, according to the operations that one might be led to direct against them. Lastly, the head of the 5th corps, the last that left Germany, having begun to make its appearance at Bayonne, Napoleon ordered Marshal Mortier, its commander, to come to Burgos, and take the place that was about to become vacant on the transfer of the headquarters to Madrid.

Having thus regulated everything on his wings and his rear, Napoleon marched direct for Madrid. He had with him only Marshal Victor's corps, the imperial guard, and part of the reserve cavalry, that is, much less than 40,000 men. These were more than he needed to meet any enemy whom he had to conquer before he opened for himself the capital of Spain.

Having first moved Marshal Victor to the left of the Madrid road, in order to support the rear of Marshal Ney, he brought him back by Ayllon and Riaza upon that road to the very point where it begins to rise for the purpose of crossing the Guadarrama. He had already sent Lasalle with the light cavalry to the foot of the Guadarrama. He sent thither, besides, Lahoussaye's and Latour-Maubourg's dragoons. Lastly, he despatched to the same quarter the guard, the fusiliers of which, under General Savary, who had been accustomed to command them in Poland, advanced to Bocequillas, to observe the relics of the Marquis de Belveder, which had taken refuge between Sepulveda and Segovia. On the 23rd he set out himself from Burgos for Aranda.

After the rout of Burgos, the capital found itself uncovered; but the junta of Aranjuez, not yet imagining, in its presumptuous ignorance, that Napoleon could soon march thither, had merely despatched what forces were left disposable at Madrid to the gorges of the Guadarrama. There had thus been collected on the summit of the Guadarrama, towards the narrow pass leading from one slope to the other, the wrecks of the army of Estramadura, and such men belonging to the divisions of Andalusia as had remained at Madrid. This was a force of about 12,000 or 13,000 men, placed under the command of an able and valiant officer, Don Benito San-Juan. He had established an advanced guard of 3000 men beyond the Guadarrama, at the very foot of that slope which we should have to ascend, and a little to our right, and then distributed the 9000 others at the pass of Somosierra, at the bottom of the gorge which we had to go through. One part of his force, posted on the right and left of the road, which rose forming numerous windings, was to stop our soldiers by a double fire of musketry. The others barred the causeway itself, near the most difficult

part of the pass, with sixteen pieces of cannon in battery. The obstacle might be considered as one of the most serious that one is liable to meet with in war. The Spaniards imagined themselves invincible in the position of Somosierra; and the junta itself relied so much on the resistance which had been prepared there as not to leave Aranjuez. It hoped, moreover, that Castaños, whom it would not believe to be destroyed, would have time to come by the Guadalaxara road to place himself behind the Guadarrama, between Somosierra and Madrid, and that the English making a corresponding movement to that of Castaños, would press forward, some by Avila, the others by Talavera, to cover the capital of Spain. We have already seen what foundation there was for such hopes.

The orders issued on the 26th for the march to Madrid being completely executed on the 29th, Napoleon himself proceeded on the 29th to the foot of the Guadarrama, and established his headquarters at Bocequillas. General Savary had pushed a reconnaissance upon Sepulveda, not to disperse the corps which was there, but to learn its force and its intention. After taking some prisoners, he had retired, having no orders to advance further. The Spaniards, surprised at keeping their ground, had sent news to Madrid of a considerable advantage gained over the imperial guard.

Napoleon, having arrived at Bocequillas at noon on the 29th, mounted a horse, entered the gorge of Somosierra, reconnoitred it with his own eyes, and decided on all his dispositions for the following morning. He ordered Lapisse's division to proceed to the right of the causeway, in order to storm at daybreak the post of Sepulveda, and Ruffin's division to set out at the same moment, to climb the acclivity of the Guadarrama, to the very pass of Somosierra. The 9th light was to follow from height to height the right brink of the chasm, and the 24th of the line the left brink, so as to annul the defences established on the two flanks of the road. The 96th was to march in column upon the road itself. Then were to come the cavalry of the guard, and Napoleon with his staff. The fusiliers of the guard were directed to support this movement.

At this period of the year, though the weather had become superb, there was yet no sun, excepting in the middle of the day. From six to nine in the morning a thick fog covered the country, especially the mountainous part of it; then after that hour a bright sun gave the army real spring days. Napoleon, in ordering Sepulveda to be attacked at six in the morning, reckoned upon making himself master of that accessory position by nine, the moment when the column marching towards Somosierra would have reached the summit of the pass. Thanks to the fog, then, it was to arrive there unperceived, and to com-

mence firing from the top of the mountain when the fire at the foot was over.

Next day, the 30th, the column sent against Sepulveda had scarcely time to show itself. The three thousand men placed for its defence fled in disorder and ran off towards Segovia, to join the other fugitives under the Marquis de Belveder.

The column climbing the acclivities of Somosierra arrived unperceived very near to the point which the enemy occupied in force. The fog clearing off all at once, the Spaniards were not a little surprised to find themselves attacked from the heights on the right and on the left by the 9th light and the 24th of the line. Dislodged from post to post, they defended themselves but feebly on both margins of the chasm. But the main body of the assemblage was on the road itself, behind sixteen pieces of artillery, which opened a destructive fire on the column that followed the causeway. Napoleon, wishing to teach his soldiers that with the Spaniards they must not consider danger, but drive over them wherever they found them, ordered the cavalry of the guard to take at a gallop all that was before it. A brilliant cavalry officer, General Montbrun, advanced at the head of the Polish light horse, a young troop of élite which Napoleon had formed at Warsaw, that he might have all nations and all costumes in his guard. General Montbrun, with those gallant young soldiers, dashed at a gallop upon the sixteen pieces of cannon of the Spaniards, in defiance of a horrible fire of musketry and grape. The first squadron received a discharge which threw it into disorder, sweeping down thirty or forty men in the rank. But the squadrons which followed, passing beyond the wounded, reached the pieces, cut down the gunners, and took all the cannon. The rest of the cavalry started off in pursuit of the Spaniards beyond the pass, and descended with them the back of the Guadarrama. The brave San-Juan, covered with blood, having received several wounds, strove in vain to stop his soldiers. There was, as at Espinosa, at Tudela, a frightful rout. Colours, artillery, two hundred waggons with stores, and almost all the officers, were left in our hands. The soldiers dispersed on the right and left in the mountains, and made off more particularly to the right, in order to reach Segovia.

In the evening all the cavalry was at Buytrago, with the headquarters. It was the French who informed the Spaniards of the disaster of what was called the army of Somosierra. Napoleon was delighted to have proved to his generals what the Spanish insurgents were, what his soldiers were, and in what estimation both were to be held, and to have overcome an obstacle which some had seemed to think extremely formidable. The Poles had about fifty men killed or wounded at the pieces. Napoleon loaded them with rewards, and included in the dis-

tribution of his favours M. Philippe de Segur, who had received several shot-wounds in this charge; and he destined him to carry to the Legislative Body the colours taken at Burgos and Somosierra.

Napoleon hastened to spread his cavalry from Buytrago to the very gates of Madrid, and to proceed thither in person, to endeavour to take that great capital by a mixture of persuasion and force, wishing to spare it the horrors of a capture by assault. Luckily it was not in a state to defend itself; and besides, the tumult which prevailed there would have rendered defence impossible, even though it had had walls capable of resisting the formidable foe by whom it was threatened.

On the news of the taking of Somosierra, the silly presumption of the Spaniards suddenly vanished, and the junta had hastily left Aranjuez for Badajoz. On retiring, it had proclaimed its resolution to go and prepare in the south of the Peninsula means of resistance the power of which Baylen, it alleged, had plainly revealed. But it was not the less determined to dispute Madrid with the conqueror of the west. The violent and anarchical part of the population would have it so, and talked of putting to death any one who should propose to capitulate. Thomas de Morla and the Marquis de Castellar had been charged with the defence, in concert with a junta, which met at the post-office, and in which men of all sorts had seats. There were left at Madrid three or four thousand troops of the line, of very indifferent quality; but to this garrison was added a frantic population both of the city and the country, which had demanded and obtained arms, useless in its hands for saving the capital, and formidable to honest men only. Some furious persons, having fancied that they discovered in the cartridges served out to them a blackish dust, which they declared to be sand and not powder, had laid the blame on the Marquis de Péralès, corregidor of Madrid, a personage long a favourite with the multitude, because in the gratification of his licentious taste he had publicly made it his business to seek out the handsomest women of the lower class. One of these, deserted by him, having accused him of preparing this adulterated ammunition, and of being concerned in a plot against the safety of Madrid, the band of cut-throats seized the unfortunate man and murdered him, as they had murdered so many others since the fatal Revolution of Aranjuez, and then dragged his body about the streets. After affording themselves this satisfaction, the barbarous rulers of Madrid made some hasty preparations for defence, under the direction of professional men. Madrid is not fortified: it is, as Paris was some years ago, before the construction of the immense works which have rendered it invincible, surrounded by a mere wall, neither bastioned nor

terraced. Battlements were formed on this wall; the gates were barricaded, and cannon placed at them. These precautions were taken more particularly at the Alcala and Atocha gates, leading to the highroad by which the French would come. Behind the gates were cut entrenchments; barricades were raised in the corresponding streets, that the first resistance being overcome, there might be another left to conquer.

Opposite to the Alcala and Atocha gates rise on commanding ground facing Madrid the palace and park of Buen Retiro, separated from Madrid by the famous promenade of the Prado. The wall enclosing the Retiro was battlemented; several mounds of earth were thrown up, cannon were dragged to them; a fanatic multitude, capable of ravaging, but not of defending it, was placed there by way of garrison. The women, uniting their efforts with those of the men, set about unpaving the streets, and carrying the stones to the roofs of the houses, to be thrown down upon the assailants. The bells were rung day and night, to keep the population astir. The Duke de l'Infantado had been secretly sent off from Madrid to seek the army of Castaños, and bring it back to the city.

In all this agitation there were no very serious means of opposing Napoleon. He arrived on the morning of the 2nd of December under the walls of Madrid, with the cavalry of the guard and Lahoussaye's and Latour-Maubourg's dragoons. This day was the anniversary of the coronation, that also of the battle of Austerlitz, and for Napoleon, as well as for his soldiers, a superstition was attached to that memorable date. The weather was perfectly serene. That fine cavalry, on beholding its glorious chief, raised unanimous acclamations, which mingled with the shouts of rage set up by the Spaniards on seeing us. Marshal Bessières, Duke of Istria, commanded the imperial cavalry. The emperor, after surveying for a moment the capital of Spain, despatched an officer of his staff to summon it to open its gates. This young officer had the greatest difficulty to get in. A butcher of Estramadura, charged to guard one of the gates, insisted that nobody but the Duke of Istria himself ought to come upon that mission. General Montbrun, who was present, having scouted that ridiculous pretension, was obliged to draw his sword to defend himself. The officer, when admitted into the interior of the city, was assailed by the populace, and would have been murdered, had not the troops of the line, feeling their honour interested in enforcing respect for the laws of war, saved his life by snatching him out of the hands of the assassins. The junta directed a Spanish general to convey its negative answer. But the leaders of the populace required that thirty of the mob should escort that general, to have an eye upon rather than to protect

him; for that furious multitude espied treason everywhere. The Spanish envoy, thus surrounded, appeared before the imperial staff, and it was easy to guess, from his embarrassed attitude, under what tyranny he and all honest men at Madrid were placed at that moment. On the repeated observation that the city could not hold out against the French army, that by resisting they would only expose a population of women, children, and old men to slaughter in consequence of an assault, the envoy cast down his eyes without replying, for before the witnesses who were watching him he durst not betray the sentiments of which he was full. He was sent back, with his sorry escort, and assured that the firing would commence immediately.

Napoleon had as yet with him his cavalry only, and he expected his infantry towards the close of day. He made a reconnaissance himself on horseback around Madrid, and formed a plan of attack which might be divided into several successive acts, so as to summon the place after each of them, and to reduce it rather by intimidation than by the employment of formidable military means.

Towards evening, Villatte's and Lapisse's divisions, of Marshal Victor's corps, having arrived, he made dispositions for storming the Buen Retiro, which commands Madrid on the east, and the gates de los Pozzos, Fuencarral, and del Duque, which command it on the north. The moonlight was superb. In the evening the troops took position. General Senarmont prepared the artillery to batter the walls of the Buen Retiro, and everything was ready for a first act of vigour. Previously, General Maison, charged with the gates de los Pozzos, Fuencarral, and del Duque, took all the outworks under a violent and extremely well-directed fire; but on coming near the gates, he paused, waiting for the signal of attack.

Napoleon, before he commenced, despatched another officer, a Spaniard taken at Somosierra. This officer was the bearer of a letter from Berthier, at once threatening and mild, to the Marquis de Castellar, governor of Madrid. An answer was soon returned: it was negative, and intimated that time must be allowed for consulting the authorities and the people before any resolution could be taken. At daybreak, therefore, Napoleon in person took his station on the heights, having the Buen Retiro on the left, and the gates of los Pozzos, Fuencarral, and del Duque on his right, and gave orders himself for the attack. A well-directed Spanish battery having covered the spot where he was with balls, he was obliged to move a little further. It was not, however, by such balls that such a man was fated to fall. As soon as the morning fog had given place to a brilliant sun, which for some time past had shone continually, General Villatte, charged to act on the left, advanced with his division

upon the Buen Retiro. General Senarmont having broken down the walls of that fine park with cannon, the infantry entered at the point of the bayonet, and had soon dislodged 4000 men, citizens and men of the lower class, who had pretended to defend them. The resistance was next to none, and our columns, passing through the Buen Retiro without difficulty, debouched immediately upon the Prado. That superb promenade extends from the Atocha to the Alcala gate, and takes them in some measure in rear. Our troops gained possession of them and of the artillery with which they were armed. Companies of élite then fell upon the first barricades of the streets of Atocha, San Jeronimo, and Alcala, and carried them in spite of a very brisk fire of musketry. They were obliged to take by assault several palaces situated in those streets, and to put to the sword the defenders who occupied them.

On the right, General Maison, who had been forced to remain all night under a murderous fire, in order to save the houses of the suburbs, attacked the gates of Fuencarral, del Duque, and San Bernardino, for the purpose of penetrating to an extensive building which served the life-guard for quarters, and the walls of which, solid as those of a fortress, were capable of withstanding cannon. He succeeded in getting into the interior of the city, and surrounding on all sides the building of the life-guard, while sustaining a tremendous fire. The field artillery having failed to make a breach in the walls, General Maison advanced at the head of a detachment of sappers to break open the doors with hatchets. But the materials heaped up behind these doors rendered it impossible to force them. The general then ordered a violent fire of musketry to be poured from the neighbouring houses upon this building. He had been for twenty-one hours under fire, when he was struck by a ball, which shattered his foot. Two hundred men, killed or wounded, were already extended before this formidable edifice, when the emperor ordered a pause before making a general assault. He was master of the gates of Fuencarral, del Duque, and San Jeronimo, attacked by General Maison; of those of Alcala and Atocha, attacked by General Villatte; and his artillery, from the heights of the Buen Retiro, was sufficient to reduce in a short time that unfortunate city. However, at eleven in the morning he suspended the action, and sent a fresh summons to the junta of defence, declaring that everything was prepared to batter down the city if it resisted any longer, but that though ready to give a terrible example to the cities of Spain which persisted in closing their gates against him, he chose rather to owe the surrender of Madrid to the reason and humanity of those who had made themselves its rulers.

The capture of the Buen Retiro, and of the gates on the east

and north, had already made a strong impression upon the defenders of Madrid. Not one rational person doubted the consequences of a capture by assault. The populace itself had experienced at the Atocha and Alcala gates what was gained by firing from the tops of houses upon the French, and the violence of men's minds began to cool a little. The junta of defence took advantage of this to send Thomas de Morla and Don Bernardo Iriarte to the headquarters.

Napoleon received them at the head of his staff, and with a very cold and stern countenance. He knew that Don Thomas de Morla was that governor of Andalusia under whose command the capitulation of Baylen had been violated. He determined to address him in language that should ring throughout all Europe. Thomas de Morla, daunted by the presence of the extraordinary man before whom he appeared, and by the visible though repressed anger revealed by his features, told him that all sensible men in Madrid were convinced of the necessity of surrendering; but that it was necessary to make the French troops retire, and to allow the junta time to pacify the people, and to induce them to lay down their arms. "In vain you employ the name of the people," replied Napoleon, in an angry tone. "If you cannot find means to pacify them, it is because you have yourselves excited and misled them by lies. Assemble the clergy, the heads of the convents, the alcaldes, the principal proprietors, and if between this and six in the morning the city has not surrendered, it shall have ceased to exist. I neither will nor ought to withdraw my troops. You have slaughtered the unfortunate French who have fallen into your hands. Only a few days since you suffered two domestics of the ambassador of Russia to be dragged away and put to death in the streets because they were Frenchmen. The incapacity and the weakness of a general had put into your hands troops which had capitulated on the field of battle of Baylen, and the capitulation was violated. You, Monsieur de Morla, what sort of a letter did you write to that general? Well did it become you to talk of pillage, you who, having entered Roussillon in 1795, carried off all the women, and divided them as booty among your soldiers. What right had you, moreover, to hold such language? The capitulation of Baylen forbade it. Look what was the conduct of the English, who are far from priding themselves on being strict observers of the law of nations. They complained of the convention of Cintra, but they fulfilled it. To violate military treaties is to renounce all civilisation, to put ourselves on a level with the Bedouins of the desert. How then dare you demand a capitulation, you who violated that of Baylen? Behold how injustice and bad faith always turn to the prejudice of those who incur the guilt of them! I had

a fleet at Cadiz: it was the ally of Spain: you directed against it the mortars of the city where you commanded. I had a Spanish army in my ranks: it pleased me better to see it come over in English ships, and fling itself from the top of the rocks of Espinosa, than to disarm it. I preferred having nine thousand enemies more to fight to violating good faith and honour. Return to Madrid. I give you till six to-morrow morning. Go back, then; you have nothing to say to me about the people but to tell me that they have submitted. If not, you and your troops shall be put to the sword."*

These severe and deserved reproaches made Thomas de Morla shudder with terror. On returning to the junta he could not conceal his agitation, and Don Bernardo Iriarte was obliged to give an account for him of the joint mission on which they had been to the French headquarters. The impossibility of resistance was so evident that the junta itself, though divided, acknowledged by a majority the necessity for submitting. It again sent Thomas de Morla to Napoleon, to inform him of the surrender of Madrid upon certain insignificant conditions. In this same night, between the 3rd and 4th, the Marquis de Castellar purposed to escape with his troops, as well from the clemency as from the severity of the conqueror. Followed by his soldiers and all who were most compromised, he went out at the west and south gates, which the French did not occupy. Next day, although the furious populace still vented cries of rage, the armed men having received and accepted the invitation not to resist any further, the gates of the city were given up to General Belliard. The French army took possession of the principal quarters, and established itself in the great buildings of Madrid, particularly in the convents, at the cost of which Napoleon required that it should be subsisted. He gave orders for a general and immediate disarming; then, without deigning to enter Madrid himself, he went to Chamartin, to lodge amidst his guard, in a small country house belonging to the family of the Duke de l'Infantado. He directed Joseph to pass the Guadarrama, and to come and reside, not in Madrid, but out of it, at the royal mansion of the Pardo, two or three leagues distant. His intention was to make Madrid tremble under a prolonged military occupation, before he restored to it the civil government with the new royalty. His conduct on this occasion was as skilful as it was energetic.

He purposed, without employing cruelty, but merely intimidation, to place the nation between the benefits which he brought it and the fear of terrible punishments against those who should persist in rebellion. He had already ordered the confiscation

* These are the very words of Napoleon, as recorded at length in the *Moniteur* of that time.

of the estates of the Dukes de l'Infantado, Ossuna, Altamira, Medina-Cœli, Santa-Cruz, and Hijar, of the Prince of Castel-Franco, and of M. de Cevallos. These last two were punished for having accepted office under Joseph and then deserted him. Napoleon was resolved to use particular severity towards those who passed from one camp to another, and who should add to a resistance, perfectly legitimate in itself, treachery which was not so. The Duke de l'Infantado and the Prince of Castel-Franco had been merely weak; M. de Cevallos had acted like a traitor. Orders were therefore issued to seize him wherever he should be found; but he had fled. Napoleon caused Messrs. de Castel-Franco and Santa-Cruz, who had not had time to get out of the way, to be apprehended. He likewise ordered the Duke de St. Simon, a Frenchman by birth, who had incurred the penalty of those who serve against their country, to be seized and brought before a military commission. His intention was not to act with rigour, but to intimidate by the temporary confinement in a State prison of those whom he caused to be apprehended and condemned. He had also the presidents and royal procureurs of the Council of Castille seized and carried to France. He treated in the same manner some of the popular leaders implicated in the murder of French soldiers and of Spaniards who had fallen victims to the fury of the populace. At the same time, he issued orders for the most complete and general disarming. He required, as we have said, that the convents should receive part of the army, and feed it at their cost.

While exercising these apparent severities, he purposed to strike the mass of the Spanish nation by the idea of the benefits which must arise from French rule. In consequence, he decided by a series of decrees the suppression of the lines of custom-houses between one province and another, the removal of all the members of the Council of Castille, the immediate supply of the place of that council by means of the institution of the Court of Cassation, the abolition of the tribunal of the Inquisition, the prohibition for any person to possess more than one commandery, the abrogation of feudal rights, and the reduction to one-third of all the convents existing in Spain.

A desire to spare the clergy and the nobility had induced him at first to hesitate respecting the opportuneness of these important measures, when he was still at Bayonne, engaged in preparing the Spanish Constitution; but since the general insurrection, the difficulty having become as great as it was possible to imagine, he no longer had need to show any indulgence to this or that class, and had only to think how to gain the sound and intelligent part of the nation by wise institutions, leaving it to time and force to reconcile the rest of it.

These decrees being promulgated, he declared to various

deputations which were presented to him, that as for himself, he had no occasion to enter Madrid, being in Spain only a foreign general, commanding an auxiliary army of the new dynasty; that as for King Joseph, he should not restore him to the Spaniards till he deemed them worthy to possess him by a sincere return towards him; that he would not replace him in the palace of the kings of Spain to see him expelled a second time; that if the inhabitants of Madrid were resolved to attach themselves to this prince by the more enlightened appreciation of all the benefits promised by a new royalty, he would give him back to them, but not till all the heads of families, assembled in the parishes of Madrid, should have taken, on the Holy Bible, an oath of fidelity to him; otherwise, he would relinquish the design of imposing upon the Spaniards a sovereign whom they rejected; but that, having conquered them, he would exercise the rights of conquest over them; he would dispose of their country as he thought proper, and should probably dismember it, taking for himself as much as he should deem it right to add to the territory of France.

He turned his attention, moreover, to the forming of the commencement of an army for his brother Joseph. He ordered him to collect into a regiment of several battalions all the Germans, Neapolitans, and other foreigners who had been long serving in Spain, and who desired nothing better than to find a new paymaster. This regiment was to be called the Royal Foreign (Royal Etranger), and to amount to 3200 men. He ordered the Spanish Swiss, who had continued faithful, or who were disposed to come over to Joseph, to be collected into a regiment, which should be called Reding, because there was an officer of that name who had behaved well. It was hoped that this regiment would amount to 4800 men. He directed all the Spanish soldiers who had embraced the cause of Joseph, to the presumed number of 4800, to be collected under the name of Royal Napoleon; and lastly, by the name of Royal Guard, the French who, after Baylen, had taken service under Castaños, to escape captivity. It was supposed that these, joined to the conscripts drawn from Bayonne, would furnish an effective of 3200 men. This would form a first nucleus of 16,000 soldiers, who might prove valuable, if they were well paid, and pains were taken with their organisation.

After taking these measures, Napoleon awaited the effect of them, persisting in residing himself at Chamartin, and leaving Joseph in the pleasure-house of the Pardo, where he lived separate, and in royal state, without having occasion to bow before the superior sovereignty of the Emperor of the French. While waiting for the Spaniards to comprehend him, Napoleon continued to make his dispositions for the entire conquest of the Peninsula.

He had brought to Madrid the corps of Marshal Victor, composed of Lapisse's, Villatte's, and Ruffin's divisions, the imperial guard, and the greater part of the mass of dragoons. On the report that the corps of Castaños was retreating by Calatayud, Siguenza, and Guadalaxara, towards Madrid, he had sent Ruffin's division, with a brigade of dragoons, to the bridge of Alcala. This corps of Castaños', in fact, pursued to extremity by General Maurice Mathieu, at the head of Musnier's and Lagrange's divisions, and the Polish lancers, briskly attacked at Bubierca, where it had sustained considerable loss, was falling back in disorder upon Guadalaxara, numbering no more than 9000 or 10,000 men, instead of the 24,000 whom it comprehended at Tudela. Castaños had been deprived by the junta of the command, which was transferred to General de la Peña. Tossed in this manner from chief to chief, soured by defeat and hardships, it had mutinied, and taken definitively for its commander the Duke de l'Infantado, who, as we have seen, had secretly quitted Madrid, in order to bring reinforcements to the defenders of the capital. The entry of the French into Madrid, and the presence of Ruffin's division with the dragoons at the bridge of Alcala, left this former army of the centre no other resource than retreat upon Cuença. It ran no risk of being disturbed there till the French should take the resolution of marching for Valencia, which could not be immediate.

Napoleon, seeing the army of the centre retiring three-fourths dispersed, had left the dragoons to pick up the stragglers, and recalled to him Ruffin's division of Victor's corps, destining that corps to march for Aranjuez and Toledo, in pursuit of the army of Estramadura. After securing his left, by driving the old army of Castaños to Cuença, he purposed to secure his right by pushing beyond Talavera the wrecks of the army of Estramadura, which had fought at Burgos and Somosierra. He despatched Ruffin's and Victor's divisions, preceded by Lasalle's light cavalry and Lahoussaye's dragoons, and kept Lapisse's division and the imperial guard at Madrid. Lasalle hastened to Aranjuez and Toledo, and the dragoons ran to the Escurial, to drive off the disorderly remnant of the army of Estramadura. That army was in rout when it commenced its retreat. It was still more so when it felt the point of the swords of our horse. It exhibited nothing but confused bands, which, like all troops incapable of fighting, revenged themselves upon their leaders for their own cowardice. The unfortunate Don Juan Benito, who had not left the field of battle of Somosierra till the last, and covered with blood, was their first victim. With the fugitives from Somosierra, he had rejoined at Segovia what was yet left of the detachment of Sepulveda and of the troops beaten at Burgos by Marshal Soult. These different assemblages, after having for

a moment approached Madrid by the road from Segovia to the Escurial, fled for Toledo, on learning the surrender of the capital. They were joined by the garrison of Madrid, which had left the city with the Marquis de Castellar. Their indiscipline surpassed all belief. They plundered, they ravaged, much more than the conquerors, that country which was their own, and which it was their duty to defend. Their officers, overwhelmed with shame and grief at such a spectacle, exerted themselves to introduce some order into this retreat, and to save the inhabitants from the horrible treatment to which they were exposed. The gallant Don Juan Benito, the most severe because he was the bravest, became the object of their fury. Having endeavoured to restrain them at Talavera, he was attacked in a humble cell which served him for a lodging, dragged to the public road, and hung on a tree, where these monsters, who had not followed him to the fight, amused themselves for several hours in riddling him with balls. Such were the men to whom Spain, in her patriotic blindness, committed her defence against a royalty which had in her eyes the fault of being foreign.

General Lasalle, always galloping at the head of his squadrons, arriving soon at Talavera, drove these undisciplined bands to the bridge of Almaraz, over the Tagus. This bridge, about which the Spaniards had thrown up some works, could only be taken by infantry. General Lasalle paused there, waiting till orders from the emperor should prescribe fresh operations in the south of the Peninsula.

While the Spanish armies were driven back in this manner, that of Palafox on Saragossa, that of Castaños on Cuença, that of Estramadura on Almaraz, that of Blake on Leon and the Asturias, and we had thus in a few days again become masters of half of Spain, the English, who had been assured that they had only to come to gain trophies, and to complete at most the victory already secured, found themselves in the most cruel embarrassment; for they had not yet succeeded in collecting their several detachments into a single corps. The only progress which they had made in this respect was to unite the infantry, brought by Ciudad Rodrigo and Salamanca, and the artillery and cavalry, which had come by Badajoz and Talavera, under the command of General Hope. The latter, who had even well nigh fallen among Lasalle's squadrons, had got off by a skilful march in the mountains, and had at length, by Avila, rejoined his commander-in-chief towards Salamanca. After this junction, General Moore numbered about 19,000 men. But he had a last junction to effect—that with Sir David Baird, who was coming by Coruña and Astorga with about 11,000 men. The English general thought more than ever of retreating. It was not with 30,000 men that he could make head against the

French, the Spanish armies being everywhere annihilated. His anxiety to withdraw from danger, and to join Sir David Baird, had suggested the salutary idea of relinquishing the line of retreat through Portugal, and adopting that of Galicia, which afforded the twofold advantage of increasing his force by one-third, and of bringing him near a good port for embarking. He was inclined, therefore, to march by Toro for Benavente, and to order Sir David Baird to proceed thither by Astorga. In acting thus, he gave himself the appearance of threatening the communications of the French, because he had but a step to take in order to reach Valladolid or even Burgos; whereas he was in reality on the road to Coruña, that is, to the sea, his safest refuge. Thanks to this movement, he ensured his retreat, he seemed to do something for the Spanish cause, and he provided himself with a reply to the representations of Mr. Frere, who, having become the chief adviser of the insurrectional government, was incessantly reproaching the English army for not acting. The unfortunate Sir John Moore, who was both discreet and brave, who was accustomed to methodical war, who had been promised an enthusiastic reception, resources of all sorts, and easy victories, and who found the Spaniards discomfited, running away in all directions, scarcely able to feed themselves, was in a state of surprise, dissatisfaction, and disgust not to be described, and saw no safety but in beating a retreat by the shortest route. For the rest, he did not disguise from his government any of these disagreeable truths.

Napoleon had not at first concerned himself about the English, though he was well aware that a certain number of them were coming from Lisbon and from Coruña, because he intended, in the first place, to annihilate the Spanish armies, and because he purposed, in the next, to suffer the British army to penetrate into the interior of the Peninsula, in order to make the more sure of enveloping and taking it. Well conceived as was this idea, had he but known how dispersed and dispirited the English army was, he would have done better to fall upon it, and to destroy Moore at Salamanca, and Hope in the mountains of Avila. But who can know everything in war? when, in fact, nothing is known but what is guessed from certain indications; and Napoleon had here too few to conjecture with accuracy the situation of the English; which was not at all surprising, since Moore, among a friendly people, was himself completely ignorant of the movements of the French army. Napoleon, however, having learned from the excursions of his cavalry towards Talavera that the English were between Talavera, Avila, and Salamanca, and that from the Tagus they were proceeding to the height of the Duero, judged that the moment for acting

against them was come, and he made dispositions for collecting the forces necessary for their destruction.

He ordered Marshal Lefebvre to proceed from Valladolid for Segovia, and to descend from Segovia upon the Escurial, which would bring him nearly to Madrid. His intention was to make him take the position of the Escurial, Toledo, and Talavera, in order to bring Marshal Victor's corps back to Madrid. Marshal Lefebvre was, lastly, to receive the Polish division, which till then had remained behind, and the Dutch, left for some time on the coast of Biscay. With Milhaud's dragoons and Lasalle's cavalry, he was to form the right of the army upon Talavera. He would then number about 15,000 men.

Napoleon, in preparing to attack the English army, the solidity of which he was aware of, resolved to have at hand one of his best corps, led by one of the most energetic of his lieutenants. That corps was the 6th; its commander, Marshal Ney. He had reproved Marshal Ney for the tardiness of his march upon Soria, and was anxious to make amends for that reproof by giving him the English to beat. He had already recalled him from Saragossa to Madrid, and had commissioned him to push Castaños by the way with the sword at his loins. He enjoined him to hasten his march, that he might be able to rest for a moment at Madrid, before he went forward to the right for the Tagus or the Duero.

Napoleon was, therefore, about to unite at Madrid itself the corps of Victor, Lefebvre, Ney, the imperial guard, and a considerable mass of cavalry, which would soon enable him to strike a decisive blow. The recall of Marshal Ney, with the whole of the 6th corps, including Lagrange's division, which had been temporarily annexed to Marshal Moncey's for the battle of Tudela, would render it impossible for the latter to continue the siege of Saragossa, for he had not sufficient force left to hold the country while attacking the city. Napoleon ordered Marshal Mortier to turn off with the 5th corps, and to take a position on the Ebro, in order to cover the siege of Saragossa, but to leave to Marshal Moncey the exclusive direction of the attacks.

Delaborde's fine division, the first of General Junot's, had just arrived at Vittoria. Napoleon assigned Burgos to it. Napoleon ordered Heudelet's division, Junot's second, which immediately followed the first, to advance with all possible haste in the same direction. Lorge's dragoons, who accompanied the 5th corps, likewise received that destination. Millet's dragoons, a little behind these last, were drawn to Madrid. Napoleon prescribed to Marshal Soult a march conformable to these various movements. That marshal had penetrated into the Asturias, driven before him the wrecks of the Asturians returned from Espinosa,

and pushed on to the camp of Colombres. In consequence of warm and repeated fights, he had taken a certain number of prisoners, and a great quantity of stores and merchandise, accumulated by the English in the ports of Cantabria. Napoleon enjoined him to recross the mountains, and to descend into the kingdom of Leon, where, again joined with Junot and with Lorge's and Millet's dragoons, he was to make head against the English if they advanced upon our right, or to push them briskly if they fell back before the troops sent from Madrid, and even enter Portugal in pursuit of them. Thus with three *corps d'armée*, besides the imperial guard and an immense cavalry at Madrid, with two *corps d'armée* and a great quantity of cavalry also upon his right, in rear, he was prepared to act against the English in all directions, and could pursue them by whatever route they should retreat. He awaited only the arrival of Marshals Lefebvre and Ney to run from Madrid to fresh operations. For the rest, the weather had continued to be perfectly fine. The month of December was like real spring both at Madrid and in the Castilles. Our corps performed long marches without experiencing any of the ordinary inconveniences of the season. Napoleon rode out on horseback every day around Madrid, which he never entered, reviewed his corps, made a point of supplying them with all that they had lost in their long marches and in fight, and directed his particular attention to a great military establishment at the Buen Retiro, whence he could control Madrid, and where he was certain to leave in safety his sick, his depôts, and his matériel. Always careful to ensure his line of operations, what he had ordered at Miranda, Pancorbo, and Burgos, he again ordered at Somosierra, on the very plateau which had been the theatre of the battle, and at Madrid, on the height of the Buen Retiro, situated facing that capital. He had resolved to have field-works thrown up around that fine park, and a fortified retreat annexed to it, near the porcelain manufactory (where the kings of Spain produced imitations of the porcelain of China), and that in this retreat there should be a place sufficiently spacious to hold the wounded of the army and its matériel in artillery and provisions. He intended, moreover, that this retreat should bristle with cannon, and that it should require a regular attack to storm it.

While things were passing as we have seen around Madrid, other events were taking place in Aragon and in Catalonia. In Aragon, ever since the battle of Tudela, the going and coming of our different *corps d'armée* had temporarily deprived Marshal Moncey of the means of acting efficaciously against the city of Saragossa. The day after the battle, troops were required to be sent in pursuit of the corps of Castaños, and in default of those

of Marshal Ney, Musnier's and Lagrange's divisions had been despatched under General Maurice Mathieu.

From that time Marshal Moncey had been left with no more than Grandjean's and Morlot's divisions, which numbered only 9000 or 10,000 men. Marshal Ney had come, it is true, debouching from Soria, and offering to concur in the siege of Saragossa with Dessoles' and Marchand's two divisions; but on the very day when, in concert with Marshal Moncey, he was about to attack that famous capital of Aragon, and to make himself master of Monte Torrero, orders arrived from the head-quarters to pursue Castaños to extremity, and while pursuing him, to return to Madrid. If Napoleon could have known what was passing there, he would have left to Marshal Ney the conduct of the siege of Saragossa, and to General Maurice Mathieu the pursuit of Castaños. The latter, with Musnier's and Lagrange's divisions, would have brought to Madrid nearly as large a force as Marshal Ney, with Dessoles' and Marchand's divisions. There might thus have been avoided a cross and useless movement of General Maurice Mathieu's, coming back in order to proceed to Saragossa, and of Marshal Ney's, retiring from it, to march for Madrid by Calatayud. But accidents and false movements are multiplied in war with numbers and distances; and Napoleon added every day to the chances of errors by the prodigious extent of his operations. Marshal Ney, like all his lieutenants, too happy to serve near him, hastened to execute his orders, quitted Marshal Moncey, who was thus left quite alone, and deeply mortified that he could not undertake anything against Saragossa, on account of the weak state to which he was reduced, particularly as Marshal Ney was to take Lagrange's division to General Maurice Mathieu, and to send him back Musnier's division only. He even took away with him the famous Polish lancers, so accustomed to Aragon, and left Marshal Moncey nothing but the regiments of provisional cavalry formerly attached to his corps. Marshal Moncey, recovering Musnier's division only, was obliged to defer the attack of Saragossa. It is true that meanwhile the heavy artillery was brought, under the direction of General Lacoste, from Pampeluna to Tudela, and conveyed by the canal of Aragon from Tudela to Saragossa. The Aragonese, on their part, were recovering from their defeat, and fortifying themselves in their capital. All these delays on both sides served thus to lead to a memorable siege.

Serious events, not less worthy of record than those which have been already related, had occurred in Catalonia. Since the retreat of Joseph upon the Ebro, General Duhesme, who, in the early part of his establishment at Barcelona, made continual sorties, sometimes forward towards the Llobregat, some-

times backward towards Girona—General Duhesme found himself blockaded in Barcelona, and incapable of stirring beyond the gates. Lechi's and Chabran's two divisions, extremely reduced by war and fatigues, numbered scarcely 8000 infantry, and including artillery and cavalry hardly amounted to 9500 men. All the efforts made to provision Barcelona by sea had failed, the English occupying the Bay of Roses, the citadel of which was defended by 3000 Spanish regular troops. General Duhesme therefore saw that he was liable to be soon destitute of provisions, either for himself or for the numerous population of that capital. It was for this reason that Napoleon had so often urged Marshal St. Cyr to hasten his operations, and to march briskly to the relief of Barcelona.

For traversing the whole of Catalonia, in insurrection, and occupied by numerous corps of troops, General St. Cyr had, besides General Reille's division, about 7000 strong, Souham's French division, comprehending 6000, Pinot's Italian division of 5000, Chabot's Neapolitan division of 3000, 1000 artillerymen, and 2000 horse, forming a total of 23,000 or 24,000 combatants. Once united with Duhesme, if he should succeed in raising the blockade, he should have from 34,000 to 36,000 men to reduce this important province, the most difficult to conquer of any in the Peninsula, as well on account of its surface studded with obstacles, as for its very bold, very restless inhabitants, dreading for the sake of their industry too close a connection with the French empire.

The Spanish army which defended that province, and of which it was not possible to form any but an approximative estimate, amounted to about 40,000 men. It was composed of troops of the line, drawn from the Balearic Islands, and conveyed to Catalonia in English ships; troops of the line from Portugal, likewise transported by the English navy to Catalonia; a division from Grenada, under General Reding; a division of Aragonese, under the Marquis de Lassan, brother of Palafox; lastly, the regular troops of the province. It had for its commander-in-chief Don Juan de Vives, who had formerly served against France during the war of the Revolution, and boasted much of successes obtained in it. It was seconded by volunteers, called Miquelets, formed into battalions, denominated *Tercios*, and performing the duty of light troops. Active, brave, excellent marksmen, these volunteers, running about on the flanks of the Spanish army, rendered it numerous services. To these forces must be added the *Somathènes*, a sort of militia composed of all the inhabitants, who, according to ancient custom, rose en masse at the first sound of their bells, and had to defend the villages and towns, and to occupy and dispute the principal passes. These troops of the line, these Miquelets, these *Soma-*

*thènes*, aided in their resistance by a country covered with asperities and destitute of alimentary substances, presented more serious difficulties than were to be met with in the other provinces. It should be added that Catalonia was studded with fortresses which commanded all the communications by land and sea, such as Figueras, which we possessed, Roses, Girona, Hostalrich, and Tarragona, which we did not possess.

Its distance and its configuration separated this province from the rest of Spain, and rendered it a distinct theatre of war. For this reason Napoleon had selected for conquering it a general, excellent when alone, dangerous when he had neighbours, whom he always seconded ill, so meanly jealous as to imagine that Napoleon, envious of his glory, had sent him to Catalonia in order to ruin him; but setting aside this eccentricity, an able general, profound in his combinations, and the first officer of his time for methodical war, Napoleon, be it understood, being above comparison with any of the generals of the age.

The means collected in Catalonia, as elsewhere, smacked of the precipitation with which the preparations for this war had been made. The matériel of the army was insufficient; shoes and clothing were wholly wanting. Reille's division was a medley of all corps and all nations, an inconvenience compensated, it is true, by the valour of its commander. Souham's division, though formed of old skeletons, swarmed with conscripts. The Italian division of Pino was composed of Italians, seasoned and trained in the school of the grand army. The means of transport, indispensable in a country where no resource is to be found on the ground itself, were absolutely null. There was nothing there that was not seen in the Castilles, where Napoleon himself commanded. General St. Cyr nevertheless imagined that all this was maliciously done for him, and that Napoleon, on the summit of his glory, meant to measure his successes, and in particular, to render them less rapid than his own.*

The instructions of General St. Cyr left him carte blanche as to the operations to be executed in Catalonia, and were impera-

* One is ashamed, when reading the Memoirs, otherwise so remarkable, of Marshal St. Cyr, relative to the campaign in Catalonia, of the meannesses which they contain, along with the soundest and most enlarged views. I have read his whole correspondence with the imperial staff, and I affirm that it completely contradicts his assertions, upon a single point, be it understood, that the emperor had taken care to stint him in means, in order that the successes in Catalonia might not eclipse the successes in Castille. One is, indeed, grieved to see so superior a mind abase itself to such paltry conjectures. The emperor disliked the unsociable character of Marshal St. Cyr, but he did justice to his eminent qualities, and was not jealous of them. We see in his History of Cæsar that he was jealous perhaps of Cæsar or Alexander, but his jealousy descended no lower.

tive on one point only—the necessity of raising the blockade of Barcelona as speedily as possible. As we had Figueras, there were three places to reduce in the direction of Barcelona—Roses to the left on the coast road, Girona and Hostalrich to the right on the land road. In this mountainous country, those fortresses were so situated as not to be avoided without difficulty, if one made a point of pursuing the roads passable for artillery. Still, to stop for the purpose of undertaking three regular sieges before raising the blockade of Barcelona was an impracticable thing. General St. Cyr determined to confine himself to one only, that of Roses, for two reasons sufficiently cogent to excuse the delay that would arise from it: the first was, that Figueras, without Roses, did not form a sufficient point d'appui beyond the Pyrenees, for the garrison of Roses would have incessantly annoyed Figueras, and nothing could have entered or left the latter place if the neighbour fortress were not taken; the second was that the Bay of Roses was the usual shelter of the English squadrons blockading Barcelona, and that their presence prevented the revictualling of that city. General St. Cyr, being destined to establish himself there, had no inclination to be famished in the place, as General Duhesme was apprehensive of being at that moment.

Notwithstanding the urgency of the staff, incessantly recommending celerity in his operations, General St. Cyr resolved to undertake the siege of Roses before he penetrated into Catalonia. He passed the frontier in the first days of November, at the very moment when, as we have seen, the principal masses of the French army began to act in Castille, at the moment when Marshals Lefebvre, Victor, and Soult were engaged with Blake and the Marquis of Belveder. Reille's division, placed at first at La Jonquère, moved on the 6th to Roses. Pino's division immediately followed, escorting the convoys of heavy artillery. Souham's division came third, and established itself in rear of the Fluvia, a streamlet that waters the plain of Lampourdan. This last division was directed to cover the siege of Roses against any Spanish troops which might attempt to annoy it. While our armies in Castille and Aragon enjoyed splendid weather, that of Catalonia was exposed to deluging rains, which for several days inundated the country, and rendered every movement impossible. Our soldiers endured these hardships with patience. They had for their commander a general who, in the ranks of the army of the Rhine, had learned to endure everything, and to require all around him to do the same without murmuring.

It was impossible to move before the 12th of November. The rain having ceased, the troops approached Roses, and cooped up the garrison within the walls. It consisted of

nearly 3000 men, commanded by a good officer, and provided with skilful engineers, of whom, for the rest, there was never any want in Spain. The fortress of Roses is a pentagon, situated between the sea and a sandy beach, in the centre of a deep, spacious bay, screened from dangerous winds. At the entrance of this bay is a fort called Fort du Bouton, erected on a height, and protecting by its cannon the greater part of the road. Mazuchelli's division sent two battalions to commence the attack of this fort. There, as before the principal fortress, it was necessary to drive back within the walls the garrison, supported by the fire of the English squadron, consisting of six sail of the line and several small vessels.

After various sorties, vigorously repulsed, the trenches were opened before Roses, in the night between the 18th and 19th of November, on two opposite fronts, to the east and west, so as to cut off by the fire of the trenches the communication with the sea. In a few days a battery established near the shore rendered the road so dangerous for the English that they were obliged to sheer off and to leave the garrison to itself.

The little town of Roses, composed of a few houses of fishermen and tradesmen, was situated to the east, outside the fortified enclosure. It was attacked in the night between the 26th and 27th. The Spaniards, who had shown themselves so weak in the field, suddenly displayed extreme energy behind their walls, defended themselves vigorously, and did not retire till they had lost 300 men, and left us 200 prisoners. This action cost us 45 men killed or wounded. From this moment the garrison ceased to have any external support.

Meanwhile operations were pushed against Fort du Bouton. Some pieces of heavy calibre had been hoisted by main strength up to the height, and after dismantling the fort, the assailants had obliged the garrison to evacuate it. On the 3rd of December the third parallel was opened before Roses. On the 4th the breaching battery was prepared, and the assault only remained to be made, when the garrison, sixteen days after the trenches had been opened, consented to surrender themselves prisoners of war. The resistance had been honourable and conformable to all rules. We there took 2800 men, a great number of wounded, and a considerable matériel brought by the English. Thanks to this important conquest, the communications by sea with Barcelona became, if not certain, at least very practicable, and our line of operations, supported upon Figueras and Roses, was ensured at once by land and sea.

During this siege, General St. Cyr had received, either from General Duhesme or from the imperial headquarters, pressing solicitations to direct his efforts at length upon Barcelona. He

had with his usual obstinacy refused to do so till Roses should be in his power; but now that this fortress had capitulated, he had no further motive for delay. In fact, when General Duhesme, blockaded, had scarcely any provisions left, when Napoleon advanced to Madrid (he entered it on the same day that General St. Cyr entered Roses), it became urgent to move the left of the French armies to the same height as their right, and thus to turn Saragossa on both sides. Roses being taken, General St. Cyr hesitated no longer to march for Barcelona.

He had sent into Roussillon his cavalry, which he could not feed in the Lampourdan. He ordered it back, to take it with him to Barcelona. His artillery, though extremely desirable in the rencounters which he was likely to have with the Spanish army, was a very embarrassing incumbrance to drag along through Catalonia, especially as he was obliged to avoid the highroad which was closed by the fortresses of Girona and Hostalrich, not yet in our possession. General St. Cyr adopted an extremely bold course: this was to leave his artillery at Figueras, leading by hand the horses destined to draw it. General Duhesme had written to him from Barcelona that he had an immense matériel in the arsenal of that place, and that in case horses were brought, everything requisite to form a complete train of artillery would be found. In consequence, he decided to take with him only horses, mules, infantry, and not one vehicle. He gave to each soldier four days' provisions and fifty cartridges, placed some biscuit and some more cartridges upon mules, and prepared to set out thus lightly equipped. If in this daring march which he was about to undertake he should meet with the Spanish army, he was determined to break through it with the bayonet; for the real victory for him was to reach Barcelona, where he was expected by a French army, abundantly furnished with the necessary matériel, and which, joined to his own, would place him above all events.

All being thus regulated, he advanced towards the Fluvia on the 9th of December, leaving upon his rear Reille's division, which was indispensable at Roses and Figueras for preserving our base of operations, and went forward with 15,000 foot, 1500 horse, 1000 artillerymen, that is to say, with 17,000 or 18,000 men. A strong advanced guard, composed of an Aragonese corps under the Marquis de Lassan, and of a detachment of the army of Vives under General Alvarez, had already made several attempts upon Souham's division, which were victoriously repulsed. General St. Cyr drove back this advanced guard from the banks of the Fluvia to those of the Ter, and obliged it to retreat precipitately. Two routes, both very difficult to traverse, presented themselves to him. The land route, on the right, offered him Girona and Hostalrich,

under the cannon of which it was extremely dangerous, if not impossible, to pass. The sea route, which presented itself on the left, offered him the danger of the English shipping, cannonading all the passes seen from the sea, and that of the Miquelets, adding their musketry to the artillery of the English. He resolved to follow alternately each of these routes, by means of cross-roads communicating with both. For the moment he sought to persuade the Spaniards that he was marching for Girona, with the intention of besieging that place, after taking Roses. Accordingly, on the 11th, he advanced in the direction of Girona, and when he saw the Spanish advanced guard marching thither in all haste, he stole off to the left, and proceeded towards La Bisbal, a road which would lead him to Palamos, along the sea-coast. He arrived on the evening of the 11th at La Bisbal; left it on the 12th for Palamos, after meeting at the pass of Calonja with Miquelets and *Somathènes*, who kept up a fire upon his wings. The soldier, under able direction, encouraged by the successes which he had already obtained, having no incumbrance to detain him, was alert though heavily laden, well disposed, and quite prepared to undertake anything.

If, however, the Spaniards had been at all accustomed to war, they would have chosen the moment when General St. Cyr was separated from Reille's division without having yet joined Duhesme's corps, and when he hazarded himself without artillery against an enemy who had abundance of it, to stop him with the whole of their forces. It is true that no plan is good when one has troops not capable of keeping in line; it is true also that the Spanish officers were ignorant of the particulars of General St. Cyr's march, and that none of them had sufficient intelligence to guess them. Still it is incontestable that the moment in which this general was destined to be weakest was that when he moved from the Pyrenees without having yet touched at Barcelona, and that if they wished to meet him on any occasion, this was the very occasion they should have chosen for uniting en masse and waiting for him at all the passes leading to Barcelona. But the insurgents had detached about 10,000 men to the Fluvia, and the rest were employed in blockading Duhesme in Barcelona. General Claros, who commanded at Girona, on seeing General St. Cyr debouch upon that place, had contented himself with despatching a courier to Don Juan de Vives.

General St. Cyr, firm in the accomplishment of his design, set out on the morning of the 12th from Palamos, had to sustain the fire of some English gunboats which did little mischief, and directed his course for Vidreras, regaining this time the main land road, because he supposed that the Spaniards, misled

by the direction which he had taken from La Bisbal to Palamos, would throw themselves en masse towards the sea. It actually happened as he had foreseen. A corps sent from Barcelona, under Milans, proceeded by Mataro along the coast; some detachments from Hostalrich, Miquelets and *Somathènes*, hastened towards the coast to defend, with the English, the principal passes, where they expected to meet with the French.

General St. Cyr, taking cross-roads, proceeded from Palamos for Vidreras, and saw the troops of Lassan and Alvarez, whom he had misled by inducing them to throw themselves upon Girona, obliged to follow him at a distance, instead of barring the way against him, and encamping on his rear so far off as to render any attack impossible. They were not in sufficient force to cope with 17,000 or 18,000 French under a skilful and energetic leader.

General St. Cyr, having behind him the 10,000 men of Alvarez and Lassan, whom he at first had before him, having, moreover, upon his left the different detachments guarding the coast, advanced like a wild boar beset by hunters. The road which he had taken led direct to Hostalrich, and under the cannon of that place. Thanks to the lightness of his equipment, he was enabled to proceed over the heights around Hostalrich without following the beaten track, got off with a few balls, which did him no more mischief than those of the English gunboats, halted on the 14th in the environs, and marched the next day, the 15th, for Barcelona, having avoided the two fortresses which closed the land route, and having now nothing to fear upon that route but the main army of Don Juan de Vives itself. In the afternoon of the 15th he actually fell in with a detachment of that army, the one which had come from Barcelona under the command of Milans, and fell in with it at the entrance of the defile of Trenta Passos. He hastened to force this defile, unwilling to have it to pass in the face of the Spanish army, which he expected to find every moment in his road, for he was but two days' march from Barcelona.

Don Juan de Vives, apprised by the courier who had been sent to him, had at length relinquished the blockade of Barcelona, to oppose the march of General St. Cyr. He had despatched Milans before him with 4000 or 5000 men, and brought with him 15,000, of whom the division of Grenada, under General Reding, formed a part. The rest of the grand army of Catalonia was in the environs of Barcelona, on the Llobregat.

General Don Juan de Vives took a position at Cardedeu, on the wooded heights over which runs the highroad to Barcelona. He was there with the 15,000 men brought from his camp,

and was waiting for Milans to rejoin him on his right with 5000. A host of Miquelets covered the environs. It was this regular force, posted in an excellent position, accompanied by a numerous artillery, and seconded by bold riflemen, that the French general had to overthrow, in order to open for himself the road to Barcelona.

His resolution was soon taken. By sounding he would merely have encouraged the Spaniards and discouraged the French, by enlightening both respecting their situation, for the one had cannon, the other nothing but muskets; he would merely have given time to Claros, to Alvarez, to Lassan, to overtake and attack him in rear, while Vives was attacking him in front. He therefore sent orders to Pino's division, which marched first, not to deploy, not to fire, for it would be wasting time and ammunition, of neither of which they had any to throw away; to climb head foremost the steep route to Cardedeu, and to clear themselves a way with the bayonet. Unluckily, before the orders of the general-in-chief were delivered and comprehended, Mazuchelli's brigade, of Pino's division, had deployed on the left of the Barcelona road, under the fire of Reding's division, the best of the Spanish army, and it suffered severely. General St. Cyr immediately marched Souham's French division, in close column, to the extreme left of that brigade, ordering it to rush, without deploying, upon the enemy with the bayonet. He prescribed a similar movement right ahead of him, and upon the highroad, to Fontana's brigade, the second of Pino's, and directed it in close column upon the centre of the Spaniards. He sent two battalions to the right of this same road, to threaten the extremity of the Spanish line. His cavalry, ready to charge wherever the ground would permit, advanced in the intervals between the columns. These orders, executed with precision and extraordinary vigour, were followed by the most speedy and complete result. Souham's column, on the extreme left of our line, and Fontana's brigade, at the centre, attacked the Spanish line with such resolution that they broke and overthrew it in the twinkling of an eye, thus disengaging on its two wings Mazuchelli's brigade, unadvisedly deployed. The Italian dragoons and the 24th French dragoons, dashing off at a gallop, charged the Spaniards, already driven back, and threw them into frightful disorder. The enemy fled in all directions, leaving on the field of battle 600 dead, 800 wounded, 1200 prisoners, all his artillery, not excepting a single cannon, and a quantity of stores, which we were in great need of. Generals Vives and Reding, hurried along in the rout, escaped by a miracle; the one towards the sea, where he embarked to rejoin his camp on the Llobregat; the other towards the Barcelona road, which

he succeeded in reaching, thanks to the swiftness of his horse. This victory, won in less than an hour, gained us, besides all that we wanted, the road to Barcelona and an irresistible ascendency over the enemy. Lassan, Alvarez, Claros, arrived towards evening upon our rear, but too late to take part in the action. The battle being over, they had nothing to do but to return to Girona, or to proceed through byways to the camp on the Llobregat.

There was but one march more to make in order to reach Barcelona. It was of importance to arrive there for the purpose of procuring provisions, for the biscuit of our soldiers was entirely consumed. General St. Cyr, placing on the artillery and cavalry horses such of the wounded as could be removed, and being compelled to leave to the discretion of the *Somathènes* those who were incapable of bearing the journey, marched for Barcelona, where he arrived on the 17th, to the astonishment of the Spaniards and the joy of Duhesme's soldiers, whom the sight of a French army, coming to raise the blockade, filled with the greatest delight. On every side they embraced one another with transport, and promised themselves the happiest results from this junction.

Besides the cannon taken at Cardedeu, General St. Cyr found at Barcelona a very fine and numerous artillery, and quite ready for the horses which he brought with him to be harnessed to it. He had lost very few men, and numbered 17,000 fit for service. General Duhesme, on his part, still had, exclusively of sick and wounded, 9000 fit for active service. There was, therefore, a real effective of 26,000 men, equal in number and far superior in quality to all that the Spaniards could oppose to them. Their concentration was the glorious result of a march as bold as it was skilfully conducted.

Though Barcelona was not so destitute of alimentary resources as had been represented by General Duhesme, who had exaggerated his distress in order to excite the zeal of those who were charged to raise the blockade, yet it behoved the French not to shut themselves up there long if they meant to live. General St. Cyr, in fact, was resolved to follow up his advantages, to seek the Spanish army everywhere, and to destroy it entirely, and then to besiege the fortresses of the province one after another. He allowed his soldiers to rest on the 18th and 19th of December; on the 20th he left Barcelona and proceeded for the Llobregat.

In allowing his soldiers time to rest and to rally, he was not sorry to allow the Spaniards also time to concentrate themselves in the camp which they had long before prepared on the Llobregat, a few leagues from Barcelona. If it is judicious to endeavour to divide a formidable enemy, it is judicious, on the contrary, to

Massard del. H Vernet pinxit. Tavernier sc.

GOUVION-SAINT-CYR.

strive to find in a mass an enemy far more expert at running away than at fighting, in order to destroy him by a single blow. General St. Cyr marched with his *corps d'armée*, and Chabran's division, one of Duhesme's. To the other, Lechi's division, he assigned the guarding of Barcelona. With 20,000 men he had a force sufficient to overturn whatever he should meet with on his way. On the evening of the 20th he arrived before the Llobregat, the course of which he had followed from Molins del Rey to San Feliu. The Spaniards were there, to the number of thirty and some thousand men, with a powerful artillery, established on wooded heights, and covered by the Llobregat, which was fordable only at a few points. The bridge of Molins del Rey had been strongly defended by means of works very difficult of access. With good troops, the enemy might have depended upon such a position, and have deemed himself safe.

General St. Cyr set about making himself master of it with that art which rendered him one of the first tacticians of his age. On the morning of the 21st of December he posted Chabran's division before Molins del Rey, enjoining him to prepare a battery there, as if it was intended to act seriously at that point, and to neglect nothing to persuade the Spaniards that this was the real point of attack. He then directed him, when they should see that the other columns had crossed the Llobregat lower down, to fall impetuously upon the bridge, to carry it, and to place himself upon the Valence road, which led precisely upon the rear of the enemy. While he was making these dispositions with Chabran's division, he moved Pino's division lower down to the left, with orders to cross the Llobregat at the ford of Lors, and still lower down Souham's division, with orders to cross it at the ford of St. John Despi. Having passed the Llobregat, these two divisions were to turn the position of the Spaniards, to attack it vigorously, and to carry it. This movement would throw the Spaniards upon Chabran's division, if it had followed his instructions. In that case, but a very small number could escape.

The dispositions of General St. Cyr were punctually executed, in part at least. General Chabran made very cleverly the feigned attack prescribed on Molins del Rey. Pino's and Souham's divisions likewise duly crossed the Llobregat at the two points specified, which brought them to the foot of the enemy's positions in such a manner as to turn them. On arriving before these positions, they climbed them steadily under a well-directed fire, which proved that the Spaniards had already gained some instruction. At the moment when we were coming up to them, their second line, passing in column through the intervals, and performing this manœuvre with a certain precision, seemed to manifest an intention to stop us. But it broke at the sight of

our bayonets; and the Spanish reserves, not waiting till it had evacuated the ground, fired, and did as much harm to it as to ourselves. The whole mass then fled in disorder, leaving behind its artillery and its stores, and flinging away muskets and knapsacks. If at this moment General Chabran, following up a feigned attack by a serious attack, as he had received orders to do, had carried Molins del Rey in time, and debouched upon the rear of the Spaniards, not one of them would have escaped. General Chabran, it is true, took the position, but too late for his presence on the Valence road to have all the utility desired. For the Spaniards this battle was nevertheless a frightful rout, which put into our hands fifty pieces of cannon, an immense quantity of muskets thrown away in the flight, and 1200 or 1500 prisoners picked up by the cavalry. In that number was the Spanish general Caldagnes. The dispersion of the enemy was complete, as at Tudela and Espinosa.

Of the whole army of General Vives not more than 1500 men rallied at Tarragona, without arms, and deeply dispirited. From that moment General St. Cyr was master of the field in Catalonia, and no obstacle prevented him from traversing it in all directions to undertake any sieges that he should think fit to engage in. Barcelona was submissive, being incapable of attempting anything more.

A fortress reduced by means of a regular siege, one of the boldest and most difficult marches through a country covered with enemies, two battles gained, a decisive ascendency acquired for our arms—such were the results obtained by the army of General St. Cyr between the 6th of November and the 21st of December, which made ample amends for some delays for which this able general was reproached. One might have acted more speedily, not more effectively.

Thus in the second half of December the French were free in their movements in Catalonia, engaged in Aragon in preparing for the siege of Saragossa, masters of the Asturias and of Old Castille through Marshal Soult, in possession of Madrid and of New Castille by the bulk of the French army, and were sending patrols of cavalry through La Mancha to the Sierra Morena. They had but a step to take to possess themselves of the south of the Peninsula; but Napoleon resolved first to have at hand the corps which he expected, either to take the English in rear if they ventured towards the north of Spain, or to penetrate into the south if they retired into Portugal—a possible alternative, and which there was reason to expect, according to the contradictory accounts furnished by deserters and prisoners.

But at the very moment when the fortunate events which we have been recording were taking place in Catalonia, the corps on march had arrived, and more circumstantial reports threw

a light upon the situation. Marshal Ney had entered Madrid with Marchand's and Lagrange's divisions (the latter having become Maurice Mathieu's, in consequence of the wound of General Lagrange). Dessoles' division, having stayed behind for some days to pacify the province of Guadalaxara, had left there the 55th of the line, with artillery and a detachment of dragoons, and itself entered Madrid after the sixth corps. Marshal Lefebvre, rejoined, as we have said, by Valence's Polish division, had descended by the Guadarrama upon the Escurial, and been sent to Talavera, preceded by Lasalle's light cavalry and by Milhaud's dragoons. Napoleon, therefore, had at Madrid the corps of Victor, Ney, and Lefebvre, the imperial guard, and Latour-Maubourg's, Lahoussaye's, and Milhaud's divisions of dragoons, comprehending about 75,000 men capable of marching immediately. He had consequently a force sufficient for striking a decisive blow wherever he pleased. Behind there were coming Delaborde's division, which had already reached Burgos, Loison's division, which was following it, Lorge's dragoons, placed beyond Burgos, Millet's dragoons on this side of it, and lastly, Marshal Soult, repassing from the Asturias into the kingdom of Leon, with Merle's and Mermet's divisions, and a detachment of cavalry. Napoleon expected every moment to receive precise information concerning the English, before he took a definitive resolution in regard to them.

General Moore, quite as much embarrassed as himself to learn the truth in a country where the people told the French nothing, out of hatred, and the English very little more, from dislike of foreigners, even when these foreigners were auxiliaries—General Moore, after long hesitations, had at length adopted a plan of campaign. Alarmed at his situation amidst French armies, disgusted with his allies, whom he had believed to be ardent, devoted, eager to second him, and whom he had found dispirited, dismayed, supplying nothing but for money, he wished to retire, and would, in fact, have retired, if the entreaties of the central junta, which had taken refuge at Seville, had not prevented him, and above all, if the English minister, Mr. Frere, had not backed the entreaties of the junta by imperative admonitions.* The prudent General Moore, who, as we have seen, had abandoned his line of communication with Portugal to create a new one for himself upon Galicia, and had marched towards the Duero, in order to join Sir David Baird there, had just added something to this resolution: that was, to proceed to Valladolid, which would give him still more the appearance of threatening the communications of the French, and of serving in some measure the cause of the Spaniards without compromising either his

* The despatches of Sir John Moore, published by his family, cannot leave any doubt on all these points.

junction with Sir David Baird or his retreat upon Coruña. This resolution once taken, the English general had marched from Salamanca for Valladolid, directing Sir David Baird to join him by Benavente. But scarcely had he commenced this movement, when, the Spaniards having murdered a French officer who was carrying orders from the emperor to Marshal Soult, and sold his despatches to the English cavalry for a few louis, he learned that Marshal Soult was passing from the Asturias into the kingdom of Leon; that he would there be inferior in force to the British army; for it was said in the intercepted despatches that the marshal had at that moment but two divisions of infantry, which could not amount with the cavalry to more than 15,000 men, while the English would have 29,000 or 30,000 after the junction of the principal corps with Sir David Baird. General Moore, in this situation, having rather to desire than to avoid an action, nevertheless resolved, in accelerating his junction with Sir David Baird, to effect it further in rear than he had at first designed, and instead of forming it towards Valladolid, to bring it about by Toro upon Benavente. On the 20th of December they joined at Mayorga, having about 29,000 men, of whom 24,000 were infantry, 3000 cavalry, 2000 artillery, and 30 pieces of cannon, an excellent army, moreover, which had already become accustomed in Portugal to encounter the French. General Moore hastened to write to the Marquis de la Romana, who had just left Leon with the relics of Blake's army to seek refuge in Galicia, not to leave him alone in presence of the French, whom he should soon have to meet. The Marquis de la Romana, who had by this time become the Spanish generalissimo and special commander of the armies of Old Castille, Leon, Asturias, and Galicia, had rallied about 20,000 men in a state of absolute destitution, incapable of being brought before an enemy, and thinking so themselves, for they had no longer any wish to meet the French. For this reason the Marquis de la Romana was leading them by Leon and Astorga into Galicia, where he hoped to reorganise them under the protection of the mountains, which winter rendered more secure. General Moore, less regretting his support than alarmed to see the roads of Galicia encumbered, they being now the only line of retreat of the English army, prevailed upon him by dint of entreaties to return to Leon. The Marquis de la Romana actually led back thither nearly 10,000 men, the least destitute, the least disorganised of that army of Blake's, from which the Spaniards had promised themselves such wonders. The Spanish general even sent an advanced guard of 5000 or 6000 men to Mansilla, on the river Esla.

General Moore, having joined his lieutenant, Sir David Baird, and numbering 29,000 men, good troops, with about 10,000

Spaniards, useful at least as light troops, began to advance with stealthy step towards Marshal Soult, at the same time wishing and fearing to meet with him; wishing it when he thought of the small number of the marshal's soldiers, fearing it when he thought of the mass of the French spread over Spain, and of the rapidity with which Napoleon knew how to move them. On the 21st he marched for Sahagun, where General Paget took some men from a detachment of Lorge's dragoons.

It was on the 19th of December that Napoleon learned with certainty, from deserters of General Dupont's, that the English army, 15,000 or 20,000 strong, said these deserters, had left Salamanca to proceed to Valladolid. Reports of the cavalry informed him at the same time of the taking of some English in advance of Segovia, who probably belonged to the corps which, under General Hope, had been obliged to make so many circuits for the purpose of rejoining General Moore at Salamanca. Napoleon knew, moreover, with certainty that another corps had come by Coruña to Astorga. He supposed, therefore, that the English army might amount to 30,000 men, and he had at first some difficulty to account for its movements; for till then he had always believed it to be more disposed to seek refuge in Portugal than to run upon the rear of the French. But he soon guessed the truth, in concluding from its march to the north that it intended to change its line of retreat, and to place it on the route to Coruña. His resolution was instantly taken with that promptness of decision and that unerring judgment which never forsook him.

So far from being uneasy at finding the English upon his line of operations, he wished to see them venture still further than they had done, that he might throw himself upon their rear. He enjoined Marshal Soult, and all the corps which were on march for Burgos or beyond it, such as Delaborde's division of Junot's corps and Lorge's dragoons, to concentrate themselves between Carrion and Palencia, and to pass the time, not in marching forward, but in rallying; for he was more desirous to attract the English than to repel them. As for himself, by a movement in rear, briskly executed, he designed to pass the Guadarrama between the Escurial and Segovia, that is to say, to the right of Madrid, and to throw himself upon the flank of the English, if luckily they should venture far enough into Old Castille to meet Marshal Soult. If, as it was reported, they had appeared at Valladolid, it would be possible, by advancing rapidly by the Escurial upon Villacastin, Arevalo, and Tordesillas, to envelop them, and to take them to the last man. But it would be necessary to proceed in the utmost haste in that direction, and to take advantage of the weather, which

was splendid around Madrid, for executing that decisive march.

Napoleon, informed on the 19th of December, ordered Marshal Ney to set himself in march on the 20th with two divisions, which, besides the advantage of having that marshal at their head, were among the best of the grand army. Marshal Ney was to be joined on his route by Lahoussaye's dragoons, who were to proceed to him by Avila. Dessoles' and Lapisse's divisions, the latter borrowed from Marshal Victor's corps, were to follow as speedily as their then position around Madrid permitted. In case the intelligence, still uncertain, by which this considerable movement had been decided upon, should be confirmed, the emperor designed to set out, with the whole of the imperial guard, foot and horse, and an immense reserve of artillery, to join Marshal Ney, and to crush the English if he could come at them. He would thus take with him about 40,000 men, and Marshal Soult could collect about 20,000. These would be more than were required to overwhelm the English and to take them all prisoners with good manœuvring.

Napoleon consigned to Marshal Victor the duty of guarding Madrid and Aranjuez with Ruffin's and Villatte's divisions, and Leval's German division, which Marshal Lefebvre had not taken with him to Talavera. He joined with him, moreover, Latour-Maubourg's division of dragoons, the most numerous in the army. As for Marshal Lefebvre, who had at Talavera Sebastiani's fine French division, a good Polish division, Lasalle's cavalry, and Milhaud's dragoons, that is to say, 10,000 infantry and 4000 excellent horse, he ordered him to leave Talavera, where he had had leisure to rest, to move expeditiously to the bridge of Almaraz across the Tagus, to take that bridge from the army of Estramadura, to drive it beyond Truxillo, and thus to get rid of it for a long time, and then to steal away by his right to proceed by Placencia for the Ciudad Rodrigo road. It was possible, in fact, that if the English, beaten but not enveloped, should take for their retreat the road to Portugal, they might be cut off from it by Ciudad Rodrigo. There were therefore many chances of barring their return to the sea. As for the old army of Castaños, which had retired to Cuença, Marshal Victor, with Ruffin's and Villatte's French divisions, Leval's German division, and Lahoussaye's dragoons, was strong enough to prevent any attempt, if perchance it should think of making one. At any rate, instructions were left that Marshal Lefebvre, on the first signal, should make a retrograde movement towards Aranjuez and Madrid.

Napoleon, having thus provided against all contingencies, and confirmed himself more and more in the opinion that he had formed respecting the march adopted by the English, set out

himself on the 22nd, after sending off the guard after Dessoles' and Lapisse's divisions. He repeated the order to his brother to remain at the royal house of the Pardo, thinking that it was not yet time to restore him to the inhabitants of Madrid, and to substitute the civil government for the military government.

Leaving Chamartin on the morning of the 22nd, he passed rapidly through the Escurial, and arrived at the foot of the Guadarrama, when the infantry of his guard was beginning to ascend it. The weather, which till then had been superb, had suddenly become terrible, at the very moment when forced marches were to be performed. Thus Fortune had already changed for Napoleon; for after sending him the sun of Austerlitz, she now sent him the hurricane of the Guadarrama, on an occasion when it behoved him not to lose a moment in coming at the English. Was it then decreed that, always successful against coalesced Europe, we should not once be so against implacable England? Napoleon, seeing the infantry of his guard accumulating at the entrance of the gorge, in which the gun-carriages also were crowded together, spurred his horse into a gallop and gained the head of the column, which he found detained by the hurricane. The peasants declared that it was impossible to pass without being exposed to the greatest dangers. This, however, was not sufficient to stop the conqueror of the Alps. He made the chasseurs of his guard dismount, and ordered them to advance first in close column, conducted by guides. These bold fellows, marching at the head of the army, and trampling down the snow with their own feet and those of their horses, formed a beaten track for the troops who followed. Napoleon himself climbed the mountain on foot, amidst the chasseurs of his guard, merely leaning, when he felt fatigued, upon the arm of General Savary. The cold, which was as severe as at Eylau, did not prevent him from crossing the Guadarrama with his guard. His intention was to go on to Villacastin, but he was obliged to pass the night in the little village of Espinar, where he lodged in a miserable post-house, like many more in Spain. On the mules, laden with his baggage, had been brought wherewithal to serve him for a supper, which he shared with his officers, cheerfully conversing with them on that series of extraordinary adventures which had commenced at the school of Brienne, to end he knew not where; and sometimes complaining of his generals of cavalry, who had been beating the country between Valladolid, Segovia, and Salamanca for several weeks, without informing him in time of the proximity of the English army. It was left for deserters from Dupont's corps, led by accident, to acquaint him with a fact so important to his ulterior operations.

Next day, the 23rd, the emperor proceeded with his guard to

Villacastin. But having crossed the mountain, snow was succeeded by rain, and frozen ground by frightful quagmires. The troops sank in the inundated grounds of Old Castille, as they had done two years before in the soil of Poland. The infantry advanced with difficulty; the artillery could not stir. On the following day, the 24th, they could not proceed further than Arevalo. Marshal Ney, who, with two divisions of infantry and Lahoussaye's dragoons, formed the head of the column, though he was two days in advance, had not got beyond Tordesillas.

The emperor, weary of waiting, resolved to go himself to the advanced guard, in order to direct the movements of his various corps, and left the imperial guard, and Dessoles' and Lapisse's divisions, which he had brought with him, for the purpose of repairing to the advanced posts. Arriving on the 26th at Tordesillas, at the head of his chasseurs, he received a despatch from Marshal Soult, brought to him from Carrion in twelve hours. Marshal Soult, after having left the Asturias, and proceeded from Potes to Saldana, was that same day at Carrion, having on his left Delaborde's division at Paredes, and Lorge's dragoons at Frechilla. The presence of the English between Sahagun and Villalon, one march from the French troops, had been signified to him. Since his junction with Generals Delaborde and Lorge, he had 20,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry. He was able, therefore, to defend himself, without, however, having the means of overwhelming the English, who were before him to the number of 29,000 or 30,000.

This despatch filled Napoleon with hope and anxiety. If the English, he replied to the marshal, remain for a day longer in that position, they are undone, for I shall be upon their flank. On that same day Marshal Ney actually entered Medina de Rio Seco, and marched upon Valderas and Benavente. Napoleon ordered Marshal Soult to pursue the English with the sword at their loins if they retreated; but if they attacked him, to beat a retreat of one march, *for the further they ventured*, he said, *the better it would be.*

Unluckily, Fortune, which had so often been kind to Napoleon, would not grant him the satisfaction of taking an English army entire, though he had deserved this success by the skill and boldness of his operations. General Moore, having arrived on the 23rd at Sahagun, and making preparations for another march to meet the marshal, whom he hoped to surprise in a state of great numerical inferiority, had picked up a double piece of information. On the one hand, he had learned that forage in considerable quantity was provided for the French cavalry at Palencia; on the other, the Marquis de la Romana had received and communicated to him intelligence that strong columns were proceeding towards the Guadarrama, evidently for the purpose

of crossing from south to north, from New into Old Castille. On this twofold information, received in the evening of the 23rd, General Moore had countermanded the movement ordered upon Carrion, and resolved to wait before he ventured further. On the next day, the rumour of the approach of numerous French troops having increased, he became apprehensive of some great manœuvre on the part of Napoleon, and determined to commence his retreat immediately. He had, in fact, begun it in the evening of the 24th for the infantry, and had continued it on the next day, the 25th, for the cavalry and the rearguard. Sir David Baird had retired upon the Esla, by the ferry of Valencia; and the main body of the army likewise upon the Esla, by the bridge of Castro Gonzalo. Both these points of passage led to Benavente. General Moore had at the same time entreated the Marquis de la Romana to guard well the bridge of Mansilla, on the same river, that the French might not be able to turn it; which was equivalent to asking him to sacrifice himself for the safety of the English army. On decamping, General Moore took care to write to the Spanish government at Seville, to the English government in London, that if he retreated, it was after having executed an important manœuvre and rendered a great service to the Spanish cause; for by drawing Napoleon to the north, he had disengaged the south, and given time to the forces of the southern provinces to organise themselves and to arrive in line.

This presumptuous manner of representing events, very unusual with General Moore, was suggested to him by the desire to colour the sorry campaign which he had been doomed to make. At bottom, he had never thought, when once arrived on the theatre of operations, and learned the value of the Spanish armies, of anything but falling back upon Portugal, and then upon Galicia. His movement to the north, given out for an important manœuvre undertaken for the benefit of the Spaniards, had therefore no other object but to change his line of retreat, and to remove it from Oporto to Coruña. For the rest, he was at Benavente on the 26th, escaped from the net in which Napoleon had well nigh caught him, since, on the one hand, Marshal Soult was on that same day only at Carrion, and on the other, Marshal Ney was only at Medina de Rio Seco. The stragglers, the baggage, and the last corps of cavalry having in the evening and on the morning of the 27th passed, the bridge, a creation of the old dynasty, of the time when royalty, counselled by wise ministers, executed noble works in Spain, was blown up. It was a pity, and a cause of great displeasure to the Spaniards.

Impatient to come at the English, Napoleon, hastening to the advanced guard, and with his chasseurs, could nevertheless not be at Valderas before the 28th, and at the approaches to Bena-

vente before the 29th. General Moore, conducting a solid but slow army, which could not fight till it had eaten heartily, and which could not eat but upon condition of carrying a great quantity of baggage along with it, had lost a day at Benavente in making all the matériel which embarrassed his march file away before his face. On the 29th he set out with a rearguard of light troops and cavalry, when the chasseurs of the imperial guard rushed from Valderas, having at their head the impetuous Lefebvre-Desnoettes, who was accustomed to dash upon the Spaniards without counting them, and to gallop over them, whatever might be their number. He brought with him four squadrons of chasseurs of the guard. The Esla, which runs at some distance from Benavente, and the bridge over which at Castro Gonzalo had been destroyed, was swollen by the torrents of winter rain. After seeking a ford and finding one, Lefebvre-Desnoettes crossed the river with his squadrons, and galloping upon the rear of the English, began to cut down some of them. But he had not seen the English cavalry, united in mass with the rearguard, and at this moment issuing from Benavente to cover the retreat. Almost the whole of this cavalry, nearly 3000 strong, bore down upon the chasseurs of Lefebvre-Desnoettes, and enveloped them. Not disconcerted, he charged all who attempted to bar his way for recrossing the Esla, then swam over, with his men, to regain the other bank; for having but 300 horse, it was impossible for him to fight 3000. Most of his men contrived to escape, but about thirty were killed or taken, and he himself, leaping the last into the river, had like to have been drowned, as his horse, struck by a ball, could no longer support him, when two Englishmen saved and took him prisoner. He was conducted as a valuable trophy to General Moore. The English general had all the courtesy natural to great nations. He received the brilliant general who commanded Napoleon's light cavalry with infinite attentions, made him take a place at his table, and presented him with a magnificent Indian sword. The main body of the English army continued its march for Astorga, whither Sir David Baird had already received orders to repair.

While the English army was extricating itself by blowing up the bridges, the Spanish army of La Romana, behaving as people do when at home, had not destroyed the bridge of Mansilla, thrown over the Esla in advance of Leon, as that of Castro Gonzalo, over the same river, is in advance of Benavente. La Romana, not less in haste to flee than the English, had nevertheless left a rearguard of 3000 men at the bridge of Mansilla. This bridge was in the route of Marshal Soult coming from Sahagun. On the 29th, the very day of the misadventure of General Lefebvre-Desnoettes, General Franceschi, commanding Marshal Soult's light cavalry, threw himself at a gallop upon the bridge

of Mansilla, which no pains had been taken to obstruct, overthrew a line of infantry which was guarding the bridge, crossed it in pursuit of the fugitives, and attacked and overturned a second line of infantry on the other bank, took its artillery, killed or wounded some hundred men, made prisoners of 1500 with a great number of guns, and then proceeded for the city of Leon, which he forced the enemy to evacuate. Thus the river Esla was passed at all points; and though the mountains of Galicia, which you enter on leaving Astorga, presented serious and numerous obstacles, still the speed of our soldiers admitted of their overtaking the English army if the ground did not give way under their feet. But the rain continued, and the roads, destroyed by the passage of two armies, those of La Romana and Moore, might be rendered impracticable.

Napoleon, having arrived at Benavente, unluckily had not with him the bulk of his forces; for Marshal Ney, Generals Lapisse and Dessoles, and the imperial guard, though they had all hastened to join him, neither followed himself nor his horse chasseurs. On the 31st of December 1808, he was at Benavente. Marshal Soult, who had taken the Leon road, was much nearer to the enemy. Napoleon had given him orders to pursue him without intermission. But the mud was deep, and the soldiers sank up to the middle of the leg.

On the 1st of January 1809, a year destined to be not less fertile in sanguinary scenes than the most destructive years of the century, Marshal Bessières, preceding Napoleon, hastened with 7000 or 8000 horse towards Astorga, while General Franceschi, preceding Marshal Soult, hastened thither by the Leon road. They were there on the evening of the 1st. It is impossible to convey an idea of the disorder exhibited by the road, and in particular by the town of Astorga itself. Notwithstanding the urgent requests addressed by General Moore to the Marquis de la Romana to leave the road from Astorga to Coruña intact, and to go and shut himself up in the Asturias, in order to annoy the right flank of the French, the Spanish general had paid no attention to them, and had preferred gaining the Coruña road himself, thinking Galicia safer than the Asturias, because it was further distant, and better protected by mountains. The two armies, English and Spanish, so different in manners, spirit, and appearance, had therefore met on the Astorga road, and obstructing one another, had encumbered it with their wrecks. There were everywhere to be seen Spaniards in rags, halting, not because they were fatigued, but because they had been touched by the swords of our horse; English, unable to march, mostly drunk; an immense number of carts drawn by oxen, and laden with Spanish tatters or the rich matériel of the English. There were numerous captures to make; but what

most forcibly struck our soldiers was a painful sight, that of a considerable number of fine horses which had died of wounds on the road. The English, as soon as their horses were knocked up, stopped, fired a pistol-ball through the head, and then went forward on foot. They chose rather to kill their companion in war than to leave him for the enemy's use. We had never obtained this kind of courage from our horse-soldiers. All the dwelling-houses along the road were devastated. The English, not finding the inhabitants disposed to give them what they wanted, called them ungrateful wretches, plundered and then burned their houses, and often expired, intoxicated with Spanish wine, amidst the flames which themselves had kindled. "We ungrateful!" replied the unfortunate Spaniards. "They came to serve their own turn, and they are going without even defending us!" The Spaniards had arrived at such a point that they almost regarded our soldiers as deliverers.

At Astorga the spectacle appeared more melancholy than anywhere else. The matériel abandoned by the English was immense. The number of their sick and of their stragglers had increased in proportion to the distances travelled. A firm and honourable proclamation of General Moore's, forbidding marauding, pillage, and drunkenness, had produced no result; for this army, which supports itself by discipline alone, when it loses that by fatigue and precipitation, loses all that renders it respectable. Next to the satisfaction of making it prisoner, we could not have a greater than to see it pass from so much regularity and steadiness to such disorder, despondence, misery, and misconduct.

Napoleon, closely following his advanced guard, entered Astorga himself on the following day, the 2nd of January. On the way he had been overtaken by a courier coming from France, and had stopped upon the road itself to cast his eye over the despatches which he had brought. A great watch-fire was kindled, and he fell to reading the contents of those despatches. They acquainted him with what he had previously never doubted—the probability of a great war with Austria for the beginning of spring. The good understanding between that power and England, disguised at first, when she had been fearful of betraying her designs, her armaments, denied and even slackened when she was afraid of a sudden return of the troops of the grand army to the Danube, were no longer concealed, now that she conceived the more considerable and better portion of Napoleon's forces to be detained at the extremity of the Spanish Peninsula. She was mistaken in supposing that the force left between the Elbe and the Rhine was not sufficient to overwhelm her; and this she was doomed to learn from new and terrible experience. But after letting slip the opportunity

when the French were engaged upon the Vistula, she would not neglect that when they were engaged upon the Tagus, and she was arming with an evidence which left no doubt of her designs. At the same time, the east was becoming overcast. It was not by means of pacific negotiations that one could flatter one's self to obtain from the Turks what had been promised to the Russians. Russia, moreover, still faithful to her alliance, at the settled price of the provinces of the Danube, always admonishing Austria not to expose Europe to a fresh shock, manifested, however, less enthusiasm for the French alliance since the marvellous had disappeared, and instead of Constantinople, the question related to Bucharest and Jassy. This latter acquisition would assuredly have been a desirable one, for after the lapse of forty years Russia is not yet in possession of those two capitals; but it was a mere reality (so at least she then believed), and not a prodigy. She still repeated that if Austria had become aggressive, she should join the French to make her repent it; but the warmth of her demonstrations had lost its intensity; at any rate, she would be too much occupied herself on the Lower Danube not to leave the Upper Danube exclusively to the French, and Napoleon must expect that the task of overwhelming Austria, Germany, England, would rest upon him alone, as in time past. He should therefore be obliged to employ January, February, and March in preparing his armies for Germany and Italy. This would be long enough for his wonderful power of organisation, but not too long. He turned back quite pensive to Astorga. His absence of mind had been so visible as to strike those about him.

On his arrival at Astorga he changed all his plans. Be it understood, however, that he did not relinquish his intention to cause the English to be pursued with the sword at their loins, but he gave up the pursuit of them in person. He entrusted this commission to Marshal Soult, who, marching upon the Leon road, was much nearer to Astorga than Marshal Ney, marching by Benavente. He placed under his command Merle's and Mermet's divisions, which were there already, Delaborde's and Heudelet's divisions, which composed Junot's corps, and which had just joined him. Bonnet's division, formed of provisional regiments, had remained in the Asturias. But Merle's (formerly Mouton's) division and Mermet's division were excellent. Junot's whole corps had been formed into the two divisions of Delaborde and Heudelet, and it was well seasoned by its last campaign in Portugal. Heudelet's division was still behind, but Delaborde's had joined Marshal Soult, and thus the latter had at hand three fine divisions of infantry, comprehending about 20,000 men. To these Napoleon added Lorge's and Lahoussaye's dragoons, which, with Franceschi's

cavalry, numbered 4000 horse. Reinforced by Heudelet's division, Marshal Soult would have 30,000 soldiers; but till then only 24,000. Marshal Ney, at the head of Marchand's and Maurice Mathieu's divisions, was to support him in case of need. Napoleon ordered Marshal Soult to pursue the English to the last extremity, and not to neglect anything to prevent them from embarking.

Napoleon then sent back Dessoles' division to Madrid, to remain in that capital, and to be ready for whatever might happen. He kept Lapisse's division in Old Castille, intending that some troops should remain in that province. Lastly, he directed the imperial guard, and proceeded himself, to Benavente, from Benavente to Valladolid, to govern from that residence the affairs of Spain and of Europe.

There was, in fact, no other great manœuvre to execute in pursuit of the English. It was requisite to march rapidly, to push them roughly, and for this operation one of Napoleon's lieutenants was as fit as himself, especially if it was Marshal Ney. Unluckily this marshal was too far behind to be principally charged with the pursuit. Be this as it may, Napoleon, not deeming himself necessary at the tail of the English, thought that he should be better placed at Valladolid, because from that point he could conduct the war in Spain, and be there upon the route of the couriers from France; whereas if he were posted at Astorga or Lugo, couriers would be obliged to make a circuit of one hundred leagues in order to come to him, and he could not, while directing the armies in Spain, have turned his attention to the organisation of those of Italy and Germany. He proceeded, therefore, to Valladolid with his guard, which he wished to keep as near to events in Germany as himself.

Having dissolved Junot's corps to reinforce that of Marshal Soult, he resolved to compensate General Junot by giving him the command of the troops engaged in the siege of Saragossa, which Marshal Moncey was conducting with not sufficient energy for him. He subsequently destined Marshal Moncey to operate upon the kingdom of Valencia, which he was already acquainted with. Marshal Lefebvre, whom he had enjoined to drive the Spaniards from the bridge of Almaraz to Truxillo, had, it is true, taken that bridge, but also conceived the singular idea of proceeding upon Ciudad Rodrigo before he had received any order to that effect, taking a former intimation of Napoleon's for a definitive instruction. In this movement he had suffered himself to be cut in two by the Tietar, which had overflowed its banks, and he had sent one part of his corps for Toledo, while he took the other to Avila. Napoleon, highly displeased, placed under the authority of

Joseph's staff the corps of Marshal Lefebvre, with which he could no longer entrust a commander so incapable, though very brave on the day of battle. This corps was divided between Madrid, Toledo, and Talavera, till, affairs in the north of Spain being terminated, attention could be paid to those of the south. After making these dispositions, Napoleon, as we have just said, removed to Valladolid, to attend there to the organisation of his armies in Germany and Italy, as well as to the direction of those in Spain.

Marshal Soult had set out, with Merle's, Mermet's, and Delaborde's divisions, Franceschi's cavalry, and Lorge's and Lahoussaye's dragoons, in pursuit of General Moore. Unluckily the road had become almost impracticable, from the continual rains, and the passage of two armies, the one English, the other Spanish. There were met with every moment convoys of stores, arms, provisions, encamping apparatus, belonging to the English, and conducted by Spanish muleteers, who fled the moment they beheld the helmets of our dragoons. English soldiers were picked up by hundreds, worn out with fatigue or gorged with wine, who suffered themselves to be surprised in a state which rendered them incapable of making any resistance.

On the 31st of December, General Moore began to enter the mountains at Manzanal, a few leagues from Astorga. On the 1st of January he was at Bembibre, where he had in vain exerted all his authority to keep his men out of the cellars and the houses before the coming of the French dragoons. He had himself left Bembibre, constantly forming the rearguard with the cavalry and the reserve, but without being able to induce all his men to follow him, so that a good number of them fell into our hands. Our dragoons, coming up at a gallop, dashed upon a long file of English soldiers, mostly drunk, women, children, aged Spaniards forsaking their habitations without knowing where to seek an asylum, fearing their allies, who plundered them in their flight, and their enemies, who arrived famished, with the sword in their fists, and dispensed from all consideration for insurgent populations. Those who had the courage to stay congratulated themselves upon it when they compared the humanity of our soldiers with the brutality of the English soldiers, whom no curb could check, notwithstanding the honourable efforts of their general and their officers to maintain discipline.

At Ponferrada, General Moore had to choose between the Vigo and the Coruña roads, both leading to fine seaports, perfectly adapted to the embarkation of a numerous army. He preferred that of Coruña, because, in following it, three marches fewer would bring him to the point of embarkation. He had persuaded the Marquis de la Romana to take the Vigo road,

which passes through Orense, so as to leave that to Coruña unencumbered. He reinforced him with 3000 light troops under General Craufurd, which were to occupy the position of Vigo, supposing that it should be found necessary to fall back to that place in order to embark. He despatched courier after courier to Sir Samuel Hood, commanding the British fleet, with orders to send all the transports from Vigo to Coruña.

On the 3rd of January he marched for Villafranca. Wishing to halt there and to give all who were marching with him a little rest, he resolved to have a rearguard fight at Pietros, in advance of Villafranca, in a very fine military position, and where one might defend one's self advantageously.

The road, after passing through a very narrow defile, descended into an open plain, passed through the village of Pietros, then rose again up to an eminence planted with vines, which General Moore had chosen for the purpose of solidly establishing there 3000 infantry, 600 horse, and a numerous artillery.

General Morte with his fine division, and General Colbert with his light cavalry, marched up to the first defile, the infantry foremost, to overcome any resistance that might be made; but the English were further on, at the second position, at the extremity of the plain. We passed without obstacle, and the cavalry, heading the column, dashed away at a gallop into the plain. There it found a multitude of English tirailleurs, and was obliged to wait for the infantry, which, speedily arriving, soon dispersed, on its part, as tirailleurs, for the purpose of repulsing the enemy. General Colbert, impatient to bring the troops into line, was engaged in placing himself some companies of voltigeurs, when he received a ball in his forehead, and expired, expressing touching regrets at being so soon removed, not from life, but from the glorious career that was opening before him.

General Merle, having debouched in the plain with his infantry, passed through the village of Pietros, then assailed the position of the English by means of a very strong column, which attacked it in front, while a swarm of tirailleurs, gliding between the vines, endeavoured to turn their right. After a very brisk fire, the English retired, leaving us a few dead, a few wounded, and some prisoners. This rearguard action cost us about fifty wounded and killed, in particular General Colbert, an officer of the highest merit. Darkness did not permit us to push any further. The enemy evacuated Villafranca in the night to proceed to Lugo, which, it was said, offered a strong military position. On entering Villafranca, we found it devastated by the English, who had broken open the cellars, ravaged the houses, drunk all the wine they could, and who had skulked into all corners of the town, in spite of

the repeated efforts of their officers to rally them. We took several hundred more, with a great quantity of stores and baggage.

Next day the pursuit was continued, and our men could scarcely advance so fast as the English, notwithstanding the advantage which our infantry had over them in respect to marching, on account of the state of the roads and the difficulty of forwarding artillery. Our soldiers lived upon all that the English left, after plundering and driving their unfortunate allies to despair.

Continually marching thus at the heels of the enemy, we came in sight of Lugo in the evening of the 5th of January. We had picked up by the way a quantity of artillery and a considerable treasure, which the English had thrown down the precipices. Our soldiers, not afraid to descend into the deepest ravines, filled their pockets. They saved a sum, in piastres, equivalent to about 1,800,000 francs.

In the evening of the 5th the English army appeared in order of battle in advance of Lugo. General Moore, finding himself closely pressed by the French, and expecting to have them on his hands in a few days, seeing his army dissolving from the excessive rapidity of its march, took the resolution, which it is often necessary to take when beating a retreat, to halt in a good position and offer battle to the enemy. With solid soldiers like the English soldiers, in an excellent defensive position, he had great chances of conquering. If victorious, he should repel the enemy for a long time, distinguish his retreat by a signal achievement, raise the courage of his soldiers, and he could quietly finish his march to Coruña. If vanquished, he should suffer at once all the ill that he was liable to suffer in detail from this precipitate retreat. Besides, in war, when prudence counsels, the general ought to brave defeat, as the soldier ought to brave death. It was, moreover, impossible to choose a better position than that of Lugo for the execution of such a design. The town, surrounded by walls, rose above an eminence, which, terminating in a perpendicular cliff over the bed of the Minho on one side, was bordered on the other by a small river, towards which it gradually sloped. Numerous enclosures covered that slope, and facilitated the defence of it. On this field of battle General Moore ranged in two lines the 16,000 or 17,000 infantry which he had left. He placed his artillery on his front, and filled with tirailleurs the numerous enclosures which covered the accessible side of his position. He called back to him his cavalry, which had marched at the head ever since they had entered the mountainous region, and showed us about 20,000 men, firmly established in advance of Lugo. These were all who were left of the 28,000 or 29,000

that he had at Sahagun. He had sent 5000 or 6000, some upon Vigo, others in advance, and lost about 3000.

The French, arriving in the evening of the 5th before Lugo, scarcely discerned the enemy. They halted opposite, at St. Juan de Corbo, in a position equally strong, where they could, without losing sight of the English, await in safety the rallying of all those who had been left behind.

On the next day, the 6th, Mermet's and Delaborde's divisions, which followed Merle's division, arrived in line; but they had left behind half their effective, and besides this mass of stragglers, their artillery and their convoys of stores. It was not in this state that they could think of attacking the English, for they were inferior in a triple point of view—in number, in material resources, and in the ground on which they would have to fight.

Every moment, however, they were rejoined by the stragglers and the convoys of artillery, and on the following day, the 7th, they were much fitter for giving battle. But before the strong position of the English, inaccessible on one side, since it was a precipice down to the Minho, and very difficult to carry on the other, on account of the numerous enclosures which covered it, Marshal Soult hesitated, and resolved to wait till the next day, the 8th. On that day most of our means were collected, excepting, however, part of the artillery. But still engrossed by the difficulties which this position presented, Marshal Soult again deferred till the following day, the 9th, the execution, by his right, on the left flank of the English, of a movement of cavalry, which might shake them.

It was presuming too far upon the patience of General Moore to imagine that, having arrived on the 5th at Lugo, and having passed there the 6th, 7th, and 8th, he should stay on the 9th. General Moore, in fact, having spent the three entire days in sending off his baggage and his most fatigued troops, in raising the spirits of his army, in recovering, in short, the honour of arms by the thrice-repeated offer of battle, conceived himself dispensed from tempting Fortune any longer. Having realised part of the results which he purposed to obtain by halting, he decamped secretly in the night between the 8th and 9th of January. He took care to leave behind him plenty of fires and a strong rearguard to deceive the French.

On the following day, the 9th, the French found the position of Lugo evacuated, and again made large seizures of provender and matériel. They collected in the environs of Lugo and in the town itself seven or eight hundred prisoners who had been unable to withdraw in time, notwithstanding the repeated commands of their officers. The restoration of discipline effected by General Moore was of short duration; for between Lugo and Betanzos, on the 9th, 10th, and 11th, whole regiments broke up,

and our dragoons were able to seize nearly 2000 English and a considerable quantity of baggage. On the 11th, General Moore reached Betanzos, and crossing at last the belt of hills that encircles Coruña, he descended to the shores of the large and beautiful bay, on an inlet of which the city is situated. Unfortunately, instead of the multitude of sails which were expected, nothing was to be seen but a few ships of war, fit at most to escort an army, but not to transport it. The great mass of transports had hitherto been prevented by contrary winds from working up from Vigo to Coruña. This sight filled General Moore with anxiety, and the English army with despondency. Nevertheless they took measures to defend themselves in Coruña until the fleet should appear. Between the town and the heights by which they had arrived at it ran the stream of the Mero, broad and swampy at its mouth. It was crossed by the bridge of Burgo. This bridge the English blew up. They also blew up, with a tremendous explosion that shook the whole bay like a hurricane, an immense mass of powder they had collected in a magazine situated at some distance from the walls. Lastly, they took up a position with the best troops on the circle of hills round Coruña. The first line of heights, though very elevated and well adapted for defence, was too distant from the town, and might therefore be turned. It was therefore abandoned to the French, and a stand was made on the nearer and less commanding heights which rested on Coruña itself. All the invalids, the wounded, the lame, and the matériel were collected on the shore, to be immediately embarked on board some ships of war and transports previously moored in the bay. In this position General Moore waited in painful anxiety for a change of wind, without which he should be forced to capitulate.

It was only an advanced guard which had followed the English on the evening of the 11th to the Burgo bridge, on the Mero, and had seen it blown up. On the following day only, the 12th, appeared first the Merle brigade, and then the Mermet and Delaborde brigades successively. On being stopped by the Mero, Marshal Soult sent out the Franceschi cavalry to the left to look for fords, which it succeeded in finding, but none of which were fit for artillery. He lined the sea-coast on his right with detachments, which strove to arrange batteries that might throw their shot to the head of the bay and up to the quays of Coruña, a thing which was extremely difficult at such a distance.

Obliged to repair the Burgo bridge, Marshal Soult employed the 12th and the 13th on that operation, pending which the laggards and the heavy baggage had time to come up. The bridge having been made practicable on the 14th, he advanced a part of his troops over the Mero, crossed the line of com-

manding hills that had been abandoned to him, and took up his position on their declivity opposite the lower range, nearer Coruña, which was held by the English. The Mermet brigade formed the extreme left, the Merle brigade the centre, and the Delaborde brigade the right, close against the Bay of Coruña. At that distance it was possible to erect some batteries, that began to tell across the bay.

Not feeling himself strong enough, however—for he numbered at most 18,000 men, whilst the English, after all they had lost, detached, or already embarked, still amounted to 17,000 or 18,000 fighting men—Marshal Soult resolved to wait until his ranks should be filled by those who had been left behind, and until his whole artillery should have been brought into line. The English, on their side, awaited the appearance of the fleet, which still remained out of sight, and they were in a state of torturing anxiety. The chief officers of their army even suggested to Sir John Moore that he should open a negotiation whereby they might be allowed, as the capitulation of Cintra had allowed the French, to retire on honourable terms. Having, however, no chance of escape if the transports did not arrive very speedily, it was doubtful that they would have obtained conditions that would have been satisfactory to them. General Moore, therefore, repudiated all thought of capitulating, and resolved to trust to Fortune, which granted him, indeed, as we shall presently see, the safety of his army, but not of his person, and gave him glory at the cost of life.

On the 14th, 15th, and 16th, the wind having shifted, several hundred sail appeared in the bay, and crowded together near the quays of Coruña, beyond the reach of the French guns. They could be seen from the heights we occupied, and the sight filled our soldiers with extreme ardour. They loudly demanded to be led to action without more loss of time, for the English army was about to escape from them. Marshal Soult, who had arrived in presence of the enemy on the 12th, had employed the 13th, 14th, and 15th in rectifying his position, waiting the coming up of the last of his men, and above all, placing on a most advantageous point towards his extreme left a battery of twelve pieces, which, pointing athwart the English line, raked it from end to end.

On the morning of the 16th, having finally reconnoitred the position of the English, he resolved to make an attempt so as to outflank and turn their line. The little village of Elvina, situated on our extreme left, and on the extreme right of the English, in the hollow ground between the two armies, was held by a large body of sharpshooters of Sir David Baird's division. About mid-day of the 16th the French Mermet division marched, by order of Marshal Soult, upon the village of

Elvina, whilst our left battery, firing from behind our soldiers, caused the greatest carnage throughout the whole extent of the enemy's line. The Mermet division, gallantly led, carried the village of Elvina, and forced the English to retreat. At that moment General Moore, who had come upon the field with the determination of fighting vigorously before he re-embarked, pushed forward the centre of his line, composed of Hope's division, to the village of Elvina, to succour Sir David Baird, and detached a part of Fraser's division to his extreme right, to hinder the French cavalry from turning his position.

The Mermet division, having thus to do with superior forces, was recalled; and then General Merle entered into action with his old regiments, which formed our centre. The conflict grew desperate; the village of Elvina was taken and retaken several times. The 2nd light regiment covered itself with glory; but the day ended without any decided advantage on either part. Marshal Soult, who had on his right the Delaborde division, which, if brought down upon the centre of the English, would, without doubt, have overwhelmed them, nevertheless put a stop to the battle, not wishing, apparently, to engage all his remaining troops, and being reluctant to ask too great favours of Fortune against an enemy that was ready to retire.

The battle ended, then, at the close of day, after a bloody action, in which we lost three or four hundred men between killed and wounded, and the English lost about twelve hundred by the murderous effects of our artillery. In leading his regiments under fire, General Moore was struck by a cannon-ball that broke his arm and collar-bone. He was carried on a litter into Coruña, and expired there at the close of a campaign which, if less skilfully conducted, might have been disastrous for England. He died gloriously, much regretted by his army, which, though it sometimes censured him, nevertheless did justice to his prudent firmness. General Sir David Baird was also severely wounded. General Hope took the command in chief, and re-entering the town, he began the embarkation that same evening. The walls of Coruña were strong enough to stop us, and give the English time to set sail.

They embarked on the 17th and 18th, leaving behind, in addition to the wounded collected by us on the battlefield of Coruña, some invalids and prisoners, and a considerable quantity of matériel. They had lost in this campaign about six thousand men, including invalids, prisoners, wounded, and killed, more than three thousand horses killed by their riders, an immense matériel, no particle, certainly, of their military honour, but much of their political weight with the Spaniards; and they withdrew with the reputation, for the moment at least, of being powerless to save Spain.

More keenly pursued, or less favoured by the season, they would never have escaped out of the Peninsula. Subsequently, as always happens in such cases, some historians, imagining after the events arrangements which no one thought of whilst they were pending, have transferred from Marshal Soult to Marshal Ney the blame of having allowed the embarkation of the English, who ought, say these writers, to have been overtaken and captured to the last man. In the first place, it is doubtful, considering the inclemency of the season and the frightful state of the roads, that it would have been possible to march fast enough to overtake them, and that Marshal Soult himself, who was continually engaged with their rear, could have come up with them so as to surround them. Though Fortune had granted him three days at Lugo and four days at Coruña, before we can be sure that his hesitation was a fault, we should be certain that his infantry, but half of which came up every evening to answer to the roll-call, was sufficiently rallied, and that his artillery was sufficiently provided, to fight with advantage an English army, equal in numbers, and posted, every time it was reconnoitred, in positions the most difficult of access. But if such a question may be raised with regard to Marshal Soult, none such can be raised with regard to Marshal Ney, who was placed at some days' march from the British army. The supposition that he could have taken the Orense route, and turned Coruña by way of Vigo, rests upon no foundation whatever. Neither the emperor, who was on the spot, nor Marshal Soult, who had been empowered to call for the aid of Marshal Ney if he had need of him, imagined at the time that he could have made such a detour. To do so Marshal Ney must have marched double the distance by impracticable roads, totally inaccessible to artillery. And, in fact, when Marshal Soult, towards the end of the retreat, that is to say, on the 9th of January, signified his desire that the Marchand division should proceed to Orense to observe the Marquis de la Romana and the three thousand English under Craufurd, Marshal Ney gave orders to that effect to General Marchand, who could only accomplish the movement with a part of his infantry and without a single cannon. Marshal Ney would certainly have remained immired and stuck fast on that route had he attempted it with his whole force.

What might have been done, but was not, was to march the troops of Marshal Ney immediately after those of Marshal Soult, so that one day would have sufficed for their junction. Now, at Lugo, where we had three days at our command, and at Coruña, where we had four, it would have been possible to fight the English with five divisions. Marshal Ney, placed by orders from headquarters at the disposal of Marshal Soult, offered the latter to join him, and received from him only a tardy request to lend him one of his divisions when there was no longer time

for that division to arrive to good purpose.* Another instance this of the discordant intentions and efforts that prevailed when Napoleon ceased to be present. The real misfortune in this case, the real mistake was, that he was not personally in pursuit of the English, obliging his lieutenants to unite for their destruction. But he was detained elsewhere by the fault, the irreparable fault of his life, that of having attempted too many enterprises at once; for whilst he ought to have been at Lugo to crush the English, he was called to Valladolid to prepare to confront the Austrians.†

His attention being more and more claimed by the pressing importance of the events in Austria and Turkey, which revealed to him the prospect of a new general war, he even decided to quit Valladolid for Paris, leaving the affairs of Spain in a state which allowed him to hope soon for the entire submission of the Peninsula. The English, in fact, were driven into the ocean; the French were in possession of all the north of Spain as far as Madrid; the siege of Saragossa was proceeding actively; General St. Cyr was victorious in Catalonia. It was Napoleon's design to send Marshal Soult into Portugal with the 2nd division, with

* This circumstance is proved by the correspondence of the marshals.

† The following is what he wrote on the subject to the minister of war and to the King of Spain:—

To the Minister of War.

"VALLADOLID, *January* 13, 1809.

"You will see by the bulletin that the Duke of Dalmatia entered Lugo on the 9th. He was to be at Betanzos on the 10th. The English seem to intend embarking at Coruña. They have already lost 3000 men taken prisoners, 20 pieces of cannon, 500 or 600 baggage and munition waggons, part of their treasure, and 3000 horses, which they themselves slaughtered according to their odd custom. Everything leads me to hope that they will be overtaken before they embark, and that they will be beaten. *I sometimes regret that I was not there myself, but the distance from this place is more than a hundred leagues; which, added to the delays to which the couriers are subjected by the brigands, that always infest the rear of an army, would have put a space of twenty days between me and Paris; I dreaded this particularly at the approach of the fine season, which gives reason to fear new movements on the continent.* The Duke of Elchingen is in second line behind the Duke of Dalmatia. The force of the English is about 18,000. It may be computed that, with fatigued men, invalids, prisoners, and men hanged by the Spaniards, the English army has been diminished by a third; and if to that third we add the slaughtered horses, which render the cavalrymen useless, I do not think that the English can muster 15,000 men in good condition, and more than 1500 horses. This is a long way off from the 30,000 men whom that army reckoned."

To the King of Spain.

"VALLADOLID, *January* 11, 1809.

". . . I am obliged to stay at Valladolid to receive my despatches from Paris in five days. The events in Constantinople, the actual state of Europe, and the new formation of our armies of Italy, Turkey, and the Rhine prohibit my removal to a greater distance. *It was not without regret I was forced to quit Astorga.*

"There are 1000 men of my guard in Madrid; send them to me."

which that of General Junot had been incorporated; to leave Marshal Ney in the mountains of Galicia and the Asturias, to bring into thorough subjection those difficult and obstinate regions; to establish Marshal Bessières with a large cavalry force in the plains of the two Castilles; and to send Marshal Victor, with three divisions and twelve regiments of cavalry, against Seville, by Estramadura, whilst Marshal Soult was to march against Lisbon. Once master of that capital, Marshal Soult might despatch one of his divisions, by way of Elvas, to Marshal Victor, to aid in subduing Andalusia. Saragossa being taken, the troops of the old Moncey division, engaged in the siege, might march to Valencia, and terminate on their side the conquest of the south of Spain. Pending these well-planned movements, Joseph would remain at Madrid with the Dessoles brigade (Ney's third, returned to Madrid), and with Marshal Lefebvre's division, including a German brigade, a Polish, and a French (Sebastiani). Thus he would have a considerable reserve with which he might overawe the capital and move in any direction as need should dictate. According to these views, should no modification be caused by the intervention of Europe, the whole Peninsula, including both Spain and Portugal, would be subdued in two months without the employment of one additional soldier.

But for the present Napoleon resolved that his army should rest a whole month, from the middle of January to the middle of February, the period during which he calculated that the siege of Saragossa might still be protracted. In the course of that month Marshal Soult would rally his troops, unite with them the portions of Junot's division which had not yet rejoined, and would prepare his artillery; the Dessoles and Lapisse brigades would have time to return to Madrid and rest there; the cavalry would be remounted and put in marching order; and everything would thus be in complete readiness for acting in the south of the Peninsula. The only immediate operation prescribed by Napoleon consisted in pushing forward Marshal Victor with the Ruffin and Villatte corps on Cuença, to overthrow the remains of the army of Castaños, which seemed to be meditating some stroke. Napoleon's orders were given in conformity with these views. He sent the remains of Junot's corps to join Marshal Soult; he had a small park of siege artillery prepared for Marshal Victor, in order to be able to force the gates of Seville if that capital resisted; he ordered depôts of horses to remount the artillery, and sent to Bayonne for battalions of conscripts to recruit the several corps during the month's rest that was granted them. Finding that General Junot, who had replaced Marshal Moncey in the command of the 3rd division, and Marshal Mortier, who commanded the 5th,

did not co-operate vigorously enough in the siege of Saragossa, he sent Marshal Lannes, who had recovered from his fall, to take the superior command of both divisions, so that there might be more vigour and more combined action in the conduct of that siege, which was becoming an operation of war equally singular and terrible.

Lastly, Napoleon took measures for the return of Joseph to Madrid. That prince had hitherto remained at the Pardo, very anxious to return to his capital, but not daring to do so without his brother's permission, though urgently invited thither by the whole population, who regarded his return as a sure pledge of a milder rule, and as a proof that the civil would soon supplant the military power. Napoleon, in fact, had resolved, for reasons of profound policy, that his brother should become an object of desire for his subjects, and he had required that proof should be furnished him from the parish registers of Madrid that the oath of allegiance had been taken by all the heads of families. It was not, he alleged, that he pretended to impose his brother on Spain; the Spaniards were quite free not to accept him for their king; but in that case, having no cause to spare them, he would apply the laws of war to them, and would treat them as a conquered people. Moved by this threat, and delivered from the hostile influences which had excited them against the new royalty, the inhabitants of Madrid flocked to their respective parishes to plight their allegiance to Joseph upon the gospels. This formality, accomplished in December, had not yet procured them in January the king they desired though they loved him not. Napoleon at last consented that Joseph should make his entry into the capital of Spain, previously signifying that he would receive in Valladolid a deputation bringing him the register of the oaths taken in the parishes. He received that deputation less harshly than the one which Madrid had sent him in December; but he declared to it, in very plain terms, that if Joseph was a second time obliged to quit his capital, it should undergo the most cruel and terrible military execution. Napoleon very distinctly discerned in the alleged devotion of the Spanish people for the house of Bourbon the demagogue passions that stirred them, and which took that strange way to manifest themselves; for it was the most violent democracy under the appearance of the purest royalism. This people, extreme in all things, had, in fact, begun again the work of assassination in revenge for the disasters of the Spanish armies. Since the murders of the unfortunate Marquis de Paralès in Madrid, and of Don Juan Benito at Talavera, they had massacred in Ciudad Real Don Juan Duro, canon of Toledo, and a friend of the Prince of the Peace; and at Malagon, the ex-minister of finance, Don Soler. Wherever there were no

French armies, honest men trembled for their property and their lives. Napoleon, resolving to make a severe example of the assassins, ordered the arrest in Valladolid of a dozen of ruffians known to have been concerned in all the massacres, particularly in that of the unfortunate governor of Segovia, Don Miguel Cevallos; and he had them executed, notwithstanding the apparent entreaties of the principal inhabitants of Valladolid.* "You must make yourself feared first, and loved afterwards," was his frequent remark in his letters to his brother. "They have been soliciting me here for the pardon of some bandits who have committed murder and robbery, but they have been delighted not to obtain it, and subsequently everything has returned to its proper course. Be at the same time just and strong, and as much the one as the other, if you wish to govern." Napoleon likewise insisted on the arrest of a hundred assassins in Madrid, who murdered the French on the pretext that they were foreigners, and the Spaniards on the pretext that they were traitors; and he ordered that some of them should be shot, further desiring that these acts should be imputed to himself alone, so that above the known clemency of the new king there should lower over the guilty the terror inspired by the vanquisher of Europe.

These orders having been given, Napoleon quitted Valladolid

* To the King of Spain.

"VALLADOLID, *January* 12, 1809, noon.

"The operation effected by Belliard is excellent. You must have a score of rascals hanged. To-morrow I hang seven here, notorious for having committed all sorts of atrocities, and whose presence was an affliction for the honest folks, who secretly denounced them, and who are recovering courage since they are quit of them. You must do the same in Madrid. If a hundred incendiaries and brigands are not got rid of there, nothing is done. Of these hundred have a dozen or fifteen shot or hanged, and send the rest to France to the galleys. I have had quiet in France only in consequence of arresting 200 incendiaries, September murderers, and brigands, whom I sent off to the colonies. Since that time the tone of the capital changed as if at a whistle."

To the King of Spain.

"VALLADOLID, *January* 16, 1809.

"The court of Alcades of Madrid has acquitted, or only condemned to imprisonment, the thirty rascals arrested by order of General Belliard. They must be tried again by a military commission, and the guilty must be shot. Give orders forthwith that the members of the Inquisition, and those of the Council of Castille, who are detained at the Retiro, be transferred to Burgos, as well as the thirty rascals arrested by Belliard.

"Five-sixths of the inhabitants of Madrid are good; but the well-disposed need encouragement, and they can only be encouraged by holding the rabble in check. Here they made incredible exertions to procure pardon for the bandits who were condemned; I refused; I had the fellows hanged, and I have since ascertained that at the bottom of their hearts the petitioners were very glad not to have had their suit granted. I think it necessary that your government should display some vigour against the rabble, especially in the beginning. The rabble likes and esteems only those it fears, and the fear of the rabble can alone make you liked and esteemed by the whole nation."

and proceeded with the utmost speed to Bayonne, so eager was he to arrive in Paris. His brother having, in a complimentary letter on the occasion of the new year, addressed him in the following terms, "I pray your majesty to accept my wishes, that, in the course of this year, Europe, pacified by your efforts, may render justice to your intentions,"* Napoleon replied, "I thank you for what you say relatively to the new year. I do not hope that Europe can yet be pacified this year. So little do I hope it that I have just issued a decree for levying 100,000 men. The rancour of England, the events of Constantinople, everything, in short, indicates that the hour of rest and quiet is not yet arrived!" The terrible days of Essling and Wagram were announced, as it were, in these hard and melancholy words. Napoleon set out from Valladolid on the morning of the 17th of January with some aides-de-camp, escorted by piquets of the imperial guard, which had been stationed in advance along the road from Valladolid to Bayonne. He rode the whole way on horseback. He stated everywhere that he would be back in about twenty days; and he even told Joseph so—promising him that he would return in a month if he had no war with Austria.

Having permission to establish himself in Madrid, Joseph made preparations for his solemn entry into that capital. He was fond of pomp, as were all the brothers of the emperor, being compelled to seek in outward show what he found in his glory. Joseph wanted money, and he had obtained from Napoleon two millions in cash, to be debited against the price of the confiscated wools, of which the Spanish treasury was to have its share. Napoleon had procured these two millions by coining, under the new king's effigy, a great deal of plate seized at the houses of the principal grandees whose property he had sequestrated for treason. Joseph, however, wished to reappear in his capital under the auspices of some brilliant exploit. The expulsion of the English from the Spanish soil after the battle of Coruña, which was represented as having been disastrous for them, was itself an imposing achievement, and one that tended to destroy all confidence in the support of Great Britain. But news was daily expected of an exploit by Marshal Victor against the remains of the army of Castaños, which had retired to Cuença; and Joseph made all his arrangements for entering Madrid upon intelligence of what had been done in that quarter. The taking of Saragossa would have been the most welcome of events of that kind, but the strange pertinacity of that town forbade such a hope as yet.

Marshal Victor had marched with the Villatte and Ruffin divisions to the Tagus as soon as the arrival of the Dessoles

* Letters of Joseph and Napoleon deposited in the Secrétairerie d'Etat.

division in Madrid had rendered it possible to withdraw from that capital some of the troops it contained. He had moved to his left against Tarancon, in order to meet the troops that had sallied out from Cuença. The following were the reasons for this sort of offensive movement on the part of the old army of Castaños, which had passed after his disgrace under the orders of General la Peña, and recently under those of the Duke del Infantado.

When General Moore, quite dismayed at what he was about to attempt, had advanced along the Burgos road, ostensibly to menace the enemy's communications, but in reality to approach the road to Coruña, he had been apprehensive of soon seeing all the forces of Napoleon turned against him, and he had requested that the armies of the south should make a demonstration against Madrid, with a view of attracting thither the attention of the French. The central junta, incapable of commanding, and competent only to transmit the demands for succour which the insurgent bodies addressed to each other, earnestly pressed the army of Cuença to operate some movement of the kind suggested by General Moore. The Duke del Infantado, always unfortunate in war as in politics, lost no time in sending out a part of his troops in advance of Cuença, along the road to Aranjuez. Reduced at first to 8000 or 9000 very indocile and disorderly soldiers, who had been handed over to him by La Peña, he had succeeded in restoring some discipline amongst them, and had successively augmented them, first with laggards that rejoined, and afterwards with some detachments from Grenada, Murcia, and Valencia, until his strength amounted to a score of thousands. In accordance with the despatches of the central junta, he sent off between 14,000 and 15,000 men to Uclès on the Tarancon road, giving the command of this detachment, which formed the bulk of his army, to General Vénégas, who had shown some energy in the retreat of Calatayud, and he proposed to follow it himself with a rearguard of 5000 or 6000 men.

Marshal Victor, being enabled to dispose of the Ruffin division since the return of that of Dessoles to Madrid, immediately sent it to Aranjuez to join the Villatte division, which was already on the banks of the Tagus with Latour-Maubourg's dragoons. On the 12th of January he moved his two divisions of infantry and his dragoons on Tarancon, the whole forming a force of 12,000 men of the best troops in Europe, capable of overthrowing three or four times more Spaniards than he was about to encounter.

Knowing that the Spaniards were waiting for him at Uclès, in a pretty strong position, he conceived the plan of setting against them only Latour-Maubourg's dragoons and the Villatte

division, which were quite sufficient to dislodge them, then making a detour to his left across the mountains of Alcazar with the Ruffin division, and cutting off their retreat so that they could not escape.

On the morning of the 13th the Villatte division advanced boldly against Uclès. The position consisted of two rather elevated peaks, between which lay the little town of Uclès. The Spaniards had their wings resting against the two peaks, and their centre in the town. General Villatte fell upon them with his old regiments, and drove them from all their positions. Whilst on the left the 27th light infantry broke the right wing of the Spaniards, in the centre the 63rd of the line stormed the town of Uclès, and put to death nearly two thousand of the enemy, with the monks of the convent of Uclès, who had fired on our troops. On the right, the 94th and 95th of the line, manœuvring to turn the Spaniards, obliged them to retire upon Carrascoso, where the Ruffin division was in wait for them in the gorges of Alcazar. The unfortunate fugitives, running in all haste to Alcazar, were met by the Ruffin division, which came upon them through a narrow gorge. They immediately took up a position to defend themselves like men of resolution, but being attacked in front by the 9th light infantry and by the 96th of the line, and in flank by the 24th, they were constrained to lay down their arms. A part of them made an attempt to escape by the gorge of Alcazar, whence the Ruffin division had debouched, and which was occupied only by General Senarmont's artillery, which had been left behind on account of the badness of the roads. The general might have been borne down by the fugitives; but with the same intrepidity and intelligence as he had shown at Friedland, he formed his artillery into a square, and firing in every direction, he stopped the fugitive column, which was thus thrown back on the bayonets of the Ruffin division. About thirteen thousand men laid down their arms in consequence of this brilliant operation, and surrendered thirty flags with a numerous artillery.

Without losing an instant, Marshal Victor rushed upon Cuença to attack the little that remained of the Duke del Infantado's army; but he had fled precipitately in the direction of Valencia, leaving in our hands more wounded invalids and matériel. Our dragoons picked up the remnants of his army and sabred several hundreds.

After this exploit there was a certain prospect of long quiet in Madrid, and the victory of Uclès proved that the south of the Peninsula might be overcome without much difficulty. The attempt, however, could not yet be made. It was necessary that Joseph should first establish himself in Madrid, that the

French army should have rest, and that Saragossa should have been taken. The events of Coruña were now thoroughly known. It was known that the English had retired in disorder, abandoning all their matériel, and having lost on the route or on the field of battle a quarter of their effective, their principal officers, and their commander-in-chief. The capture at Uclès of a whole Spanish army, an exact counterpart of the affair of Baylen, if the capture of a Spanish army could have produced the same effect as that of a French army, was a new trophy most proper to adorn the entry of King Joseph into Madrid. It was Napoleon's desire that there should be something triumphal in that entry. He placed the Dessoles and the Sebastiani divisions with his brother, in order that the latter might have with him the finest troops in the French army, and that he might only appear amongst the Spaniards surrounded by the old legions that had vanquished Europe. "*I sent them lambs,*" he said, in speaking of Dupont's young soldiers, "*and they devoured them; I will send them wolves, who will devour them in their turn.*" It was at the head of those formidable soldiers that Joseph entered Madrid on the 22nd of January, amidst the pealing of bells and the firing of cannon, and in presence of the inhabitants of the capital, tamed by victory, resigned almost to the new royalty, and though still mortified at heart, yet preferring in a manner the sway of the French to that of the bloodthirsty populace who shortly before had assassinated the unfortunate Marquis de Péralès. The mob alone was angry and still to be feared. But a hundred of its leaders, the most notorious for their crimes, had lately been arrested; and at the Retiro, facing Madrid, stood a formidable work bristling with cannons, and capable of reducing the capital of the Spains to ashes in a few hours. Joseph was therefore received with much deference, and even with a certain satisfaction, by the bulk of the peaceable inhabitants, but with concentrated rage by the populace, who felt themselves dethroned on the accession of a regular government; for it was their own reign, rather than that of Ferdinand VII., of which they deplored the fall. Joseph repaired to the palace, where he was waited on by the civil and military authorities, the clergy, and such of the grandees of the court of Spain as had been unable or unwilling to quit Madrid. Joseph was so much looked upon as the protector of the Spaniards, who pleaded for them to the conqueror whose terrible hand was outstretched over them, that it was not considered a crime to go and see him. But so much are men subdued by glory that in reality the Spaniards were nearer to liking (if anything they could like in the court of France) the fearful grandeur of Napoleon than the indulgent weakness of Joseph; and if the latter was the pretext, the former was

the true motive, that still caused many a homage to be laid at the feet of the new monarch.

Joseph then had courtiers enough about him in his palace to believe himself established there. The celebrated Thomas de Morla accepted office from him. Petitions were addressed to him for the mitigation of certain sentences. More than one intimation was sent to him from Seville, that it would not be impossible to bring Andalusia to terms; for, besides that the central junta had fallen into the lowest degree of contempt by its manner of governing, it had lost the president who alone had imparted some credit to it, the illustrious Florida Blanca. For one who was not in the secrets of destiny, it was natural to be mistaken as to the fate of the new dynasty imposed on Spain, and to think that it was beginning to become established, like those of Naples, Holland, and Cassel.

Amidst these appearances of submission, one single event, constantly predicted, but too slow to be accomplished, the capture of Saragossa, held men's minds in suspense, and still left some hope to the obstinately resisting Spaniards. We have seen the Spaniards fly on the plain without any care for their military honour and their ancient glory; they effaced at Saragossa all the humiliations inflicted on their arms, by maintaining against our soldiers the most glorious defence that a besieged city ever made against foreign invasion.

We have already made known the inevitable delays occasioned in the siege of Saragossa by the movements and counter-movements of our troops round that place. Though the victory of Tudela, which opened Aragon to our soldiers and suppressed every obstacle between Pampeluna and Saragossa, had been won on the 23rd of November, it was not until the 10th of December that Marshal Moncey had been able to approach Saragossa, having been deprived, in the first place, of the best part of his forces by the despatch of two divisions in pursuit of Castaños, then having been joined by Marshal Ney, and quitted by him again at the moment he was about to attack the outworks of the town. At last, being reinforced on the 19th of December by Marshal Mortier, who had orders to cover the siege, and even to second the besiegers on pressing occasions, without fatiguing his soldiers in the works and assaults, he availed himself of that very limited aid to invest the place more closely and carry the outworks. On the 21st of December, the Grandjean division, by a bold and skilful manœuvre, took possession of the Monte Torrero, which commands the town of Saragossa, and on which the Aragonese had erected a work; whilst the Suchet division of Mortier's *corps d'armée* made itself master of the heights of St. Lambert, on the right bank of the Ebro; and on the left bank the Gazan division of the same body carried the position

of San Gregorio, drove back the enemy into the faubourg, and took prisoners or killed 500 Swiss who had remained true to Spain. That day's work had decidedly shut up the Aragonese within the town itself, and enabled the besiegers to begin the works of approach. After so far co-operating with the third *corps d'armée*, Marshal Mortier resumed the passive part of an auxiliary, whose duty was confined to covering the siege. Leaving the Gazan division on the left of the Ebro, to blockade the faubourg situated on that bank, he crossed over to the right bank with the Suchet division, and took up a position far from the theatre of the attacks, at Calatayud, so as to hinder any attempt that might be made by the Spaniards from Valencia or from the centre of Spain. This was sufficient for connecting the operations at Saragossa with the general range of our operations in Spain; it was too little for the progress of the siege, for the third *corps d'armée*, formed, subsequently to the departure of the Lagrange division, of the Morlot, Musnier, and Grandjean divisions, hardly exceeded 14,000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, 1000 artillery, and 1000 engineers. With such difficulties as were to be encountered, the besiegers ought to have been able to avail themselves of the 8000 men of the Gazan division, who were blockading without attacking the faubourg on the left bank, and the 9000 men of the Suchet division, who were posted towards Calatayud at a distance of twenty leagues. This arrangement, which was made in obedience to orders transmitted from a distance by Napoleon, whose wish it was to keep Mortier's corps always fresh and ready for service elsewhere, had the inconvenience common to plans laid down too far from the spot, that, namely, of not fitting with the actual state of things. We repeat that the 36,000 or 38,000 men that constituted the two corps put together would not have been more than enough for the conquest of Saragossa.

Both parties turned all these delays to account in preparing the most terrible means of attack and defence both within and without Saragossa. Proud of the resistance they had made in the preceding year, and having proved the strength of their walls, the Aragonese were resolved to avenge themselves by the defence of their capital for all their defeats in the open field. After the battle of Tudela they had retired into the place to the number of 25,000, and taken with them 15,000 or 20,000 peasants, rank fanatics and smugglers, good shots, and capable of killing, one by one, from a roof or a window, those same soldiers whom they fled from in the plain. To these were added many of the inhabitants of the country whom terror had driven from their houses, so that the population of Saragossa, usually 40,000 or 50,000 souls, amounted at that period to more than 100,000.

Palafox was still the commander. Brave, presumptuous,

possessed of little intelligence, but led by two clever monks, and seconded by two affectionate brothers, the Marquis de Lassan and Francis Palafox, he exercised an unbounded influence over the Aragonese populace, particularly since it had come to be known that the prudence of Castaños, which was denounced as treason, had always been opposed by him with a headlong rashness which was called heroism. The peaceable middle classes of Saragossa were destined to be cruelly sacrificed in that horrible siege to the fury of the multitude, which governed through the instrumentality of two monks, Palafox, the town, and the army. Immense stores of corn, wine, and cattle had been amassed through the very fears of the inhabitants of the environs, who carried with them in their flight to Saragossa all that they possessed. The English, moreover, had sent abundant munitions of war; and thus the besieged had all the means for indefinitely prolonging their resistance. To make it endure the longer, gibbets had been erected in the public places for the immediate execution of any one who should talk of surrendering. Nothing, in short, had been neglected that could add to the natural pertinacity and true patriotism of the Spaniards the support of a barbarous and fanatical patriotism.

In the army of Aragon, enclosed within the walls of Saragossa, there were numerous detachments of troops of the line, and many very able and zealous officers of engineers. In old military nations that have degenerated from their ancient valour, skilled arms are always those that longest maintain their superiority. The Spanish engineers, who were so skilful in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, had preserved a part of their old ability, and they raised numerous and formidable works round Saragossa.

The town, as we have stated (Book XXXI.), was not regularly fortified, but its site and the nature of its constructions were such as to render it very strong in the hands of a people resolved to defend it to the death. It was surrounded by a wall without either bastions or terraces; but it was protected on the one side by the Ebro, on the right bank of which it was situated, having only a faubourg on the left; and on the other side by a range of large edifices, such as the Castle of the Inquisition, and the convents of the Capuchins, of Santa Engracia, St. Joseph, the Augustins, and Santa Monica—real fortresses, which it would be necessary to batter and breach before making way into the town, and which were covered by the Huerba, a small stream enclosed between deep banks and running along half the outer wall of Saragossa before its junction with the Ebro. Within the town were vast convents quite as solid as those beyond the walls, and large massive square houses, receiving light from their interior quadrangle, as usual in southern countries, having few openings on their outer sides, and devoted beforehand to

destruction, for it was thoroughly determined that when the outworks should have been forced, every house should be converted into a citadel which should be defended to the last extremity. Every house was looped and battlemented, and internal communications were opened from the one to the other. Every street was intersected by barricades with plenty of cannons. But before being reduced to this interior system of defence, the besiegers reckoned on holding out a long time in their outworks, which were really of considerable strength.

To compensate for the want of a regularly fortified wall, there had been erected, in front of the position occupied by our left, a wall of dry stone with an embankment, extending from the Castle of the Inquisition, situated on the margin of the Ebro, to the convent of the Capuchins and to that of Santa Engracia. At that spot the town formed a salient angle, and was met by the little stream of the Huerba, which ran along it until it fell into the lower Ebro opposite our extreme right. A *tête de pont*, of a quadrangular form and strongly entrenched, had been formed at the point where the Huerba met the town. Lower down the stream, on the Huerba itself, and in front of its bed, was the convent of St. Joseph, a sort of fortress with four fronts which had been surrounded by a ditch and a bank. Behind that line ran a portion of wall, embanked in some places, and everywhere bristling with artillery. A hundred and fifty guns covered these various works. The besiegers would therefore have to carry the line of the convents and the Huerba, then the embanked wall, and after it the houses, and to take them one after the other under the fire of 40,000 defenders—some, it is true, indifferent soldiers; the rest fanatics of singular prowess behind walls; all provided with victuals and munitions, and resolved to bring destruction upon a town that did not belong to them, but to trembling and submissive inhabitants. Such, too, was the superstitious reverence for a very ancient cathedral, that of Our Lady del Pilar, that all were assured the French would fail against its miraculous protection.

Setting aside the 8000 men of the Gazan division, who were only employed in watching the faubourg on the left bank, and the 9000 of the Suchet division placed at Calatayud, General Junot, who had just taken the chief command, had for the besieging of this place, guarded by 40,000 defenders, 14,000 infantry, 2000 artillerymen or engineers, and 2000 horse, young and old, French and Poles, all admirable soldiers, led by matchless officers, as the reader will presently perceive.

The commander of the engineers was General Lacoste, one of the emperor's aides-de-camp, an officer of great merit, active, indefatigable, full of resources, seconded by the engineer Colonel Rogniat, and by the chef-de-bataillon, who was afterwards the

illustrious General Haxo. Forty officers of the same arm, all eminent for bravery and skill, completed his staff. General Lacoste had not lost for the works of his arm the month spent in marchings and counter-marchings of troops, and he had caused to be conveyed from Pampeluna to Tudela by land, and from Tudela to Saragossa by the canal of Aragon, 20,000 tools, 100,000 sandbags, and 60 guns of large calibre. At the same time he had employed engineer soldiers in constructing several thousand gabions and fascines. In these various operations he was most ably assisted by General Dedon of the artillery.

On the night of the 29th of December, whilst Napoleon was pursuing the English beyond the Guadarrama, whilst Marshals Victor and Lefebvre were driving the Spaniards into La Mancha and Estramadura, and General St. Cyr had just made himself master of the country in Catalonia, General Lacoste, in concert with General Junot, opened the trenches within 160 fathoms of the first line of defence, which consisted, as the reader is aware, of fortified convents, portions of embanked wall, and a part of the bed of the Huerba. The plan of attacking in three places was adopted on his recommendation: the first attack, on the left, before the Castle of the Inquisition, was assigned to the Morlot division, but it was intended rather as a diversion than as a real attack; the second, in the centre, before Santa Engracia and the *tête de pont* of the Huerba, was to be made by the Musnier division, and was to be quite in earnest; the third, to the right, before the formidable convent of St. Joseph, was to be made by the Grandjean division, and was the most important of the three, because, after taking the convent, it was to be continued beyond the Huerba on the weakest part of the wall, and on a quarter by which the besiegers expected to get access to the Cosso, a wide street that traverses the whole town, and very much resembles the Boulevard in Paris. The trenches having been gallantly opened, the first parallel was completed without loss of time, and steps were taken for opening the second, with a view to approaching the convent of St. Joseph on the right, and the *tête de pont* of the Huerba in the centre.

On the 31st of December the regular troops of the garrison made a sortie, which was sharply repulsed. It was not in the open field that the Spaniards could recover their natural prowess. The second parallel was opened on the 2nd of January, and the following days were employed in placing thirty guns, already arrived, in several batteries, in order to destroy the *tête de pont* of the Huerba and the Castle of St. Joseph, and also to reply to the enemy's artillery behind that first line of defence. During the progress of these works, on which 2000 men were employed daily under the direction of

the engineer soldiers, the besieged threw showers of stones and grenades from mortars into our trenches. We replied to them with the fire of sharpshooters, who were posted behind sandbags, and shot with great accuracy at all the enemy's embrasures.

Our batteries, having been completed, began to fire on the 10th, some directly, some ricochetting, upon the *tête de pont* of the Huerba and the convent of St. Joseph. Though the Spanish artillery was well served, the superiority of ours soon enabled it to extinguish the fire of the former, and to open a large breach in the convent of St. Joseph on the right, and to begin in the centre a breach on the *tête de pont* of the Huerba. This one not being practicable, the storming of it was postponed; but not so that of the convent of St. Joseph, because the breach there was practicable, and its capture would greatly accelerate the approaches. The firing had continued until four in the afternoon of the 11th of January, and the breach being quite practicable at that hour, the besiegers advanced boldly to storm the convent. At the very same moment the enemy made a sortie, which was repulsed at double quick time, and our men proceeded at once from defence to attack. The difficult enterprise devolved on two old regiments, the 14th and 44th of the line, with two battalions of the regiments of the Vistula. They were commanded by an officer named Stahl, chef-de-bataillon in the 14th, and a man justly admired by the whole army. The convent was of a square form, and was flanked by the Huerba. The enemy had placed in it 3000 men.

At the hour before mentioned, whilst chef-de-bataillon Haxo, with four companies of infantry and two four-pounders, marched openly from the trenches, and took the convent of St. Joseph in the rear, sweeping with his fire the face next the Huerba, which dismayed the defenders, and made a considerable number recross the stream, chef-de-bataillon Stahl advanced in front to the edge of the ditch to ascend the breach. But the fragments of the wall had not filled the ditch, which was eighteen feet deep, and cut vertically, for the dry and solid soils of Spain stand at a very slight inclination without masonry. The intrepid Junot, who was present at the operation, had provided his grenadiers with ladders, by means of which some of the party descended into the ditch, others jumped into it unaided, and followed their brave leader Stahl to the breach under a rain of balls. But they had much difficulty in climbing it. Whilst they were engaged in the perilous effort, Daguenet, an officer of engineers, ran along the bottom of the ditch at the head of 40 voltigeurs, turned to the left along the side face, and perceived a bridge thrown

across the ditch and leading into the interior of the work. He mounted it with his 40 men, and rushing upon the garrison of the convent, facilitated chef-de-bataillon Stahl's entry by the breach. Three hundred Spaniards, who had been left behind by their fugitive comrades, were put to the sword or drowned, and 40 were taken prisoners.

This operation, which had occupied at most half an hour, cost us 30 killed and 150 wounded, almost all of them severely, a fact which, coupled with the small extent of the works attacked, sufficiently proved the severity of the action.

Once in possession of the convent, our men immediately set to work to ensure their position, and protect themselves from the efforts of the enemy, and from the numerous artillery of the place, which poured out grenades, bombs, and grape in increasing abundance as we advanced. Every day cost us from 40 to 50 men put hors de combat, and generally with very severe wounds.

On the 16th, the breach in the *tête de pont* of the Huerba having been declared practicable, it was resolved to storm it, and 40 Polish voltigeurs, led by officers and soldiers of the engineers, climbed the work rapidly, some with their hands, others with ladders. Whilst they were climbing, a mine was sprung by the enemy, but without wounding any of our men. They made their way into the *tête de pont* and drove out the defenders, who recrossed the Huerba and blew up the bridge.

Having taken on the right the convent of St. Joseph, which was washed by the Huerba, and in the centre the *tête de pont* of the Huerba, we were masters of the outer line of works throughout half their extent. It was the most important half, for the works of the left were useful only as a demonstration. The next thing to be done was to cross the Huerba at the two points of contact with it which we had secured, to throw bridges covered with epaulements over that narrow but deep stream, and to breach the portions of wall beyond it, which rested on the convent of Santa Engracia on the one side, and on that of the Augustins on the other. Lastly, it was requisite to erect new batteries to resist those of the town, which became more numerous and more murderous as the assailants approached. The interval from the 16th to the 21st of January was employed in this way.

During this time the sufferings both of the besieged and the besiegers grew more severe. The crowded state of the town, and the multitude of sick and wounded within it, had produced an epidemic. Every day showers of projectiles augmented the number of victims to the siege, even among those who took no part in the defence. But a furious populace, wrought to fanaticism by the monks, overruled the peaceable inhabitants, in

whose eyes that hopeless resistance was but an act of useless barbarity. The gallows erected in each of the principal streets silenced all complaints. All sorts of news, too, were invented to keep up the courage of the besieged. Napoleon was reported to have been beaten by the English, Marshal Soult by the Marquis de la Romana, and General St. Cyr by General Vives. The arrival of a powerful army to succour the town was promised; and these news, announced by beat of drum by the public criers, called forth wild vociferations that resounded even in our camp.

What we have related of the general events of the war is enough to show what truth there was in these rumours designedly propagated by Palafox and the monks by whom he was led. Nor, after all, were these stories totally false, for Palafox's two brothers, the Marquis de Lassan and Francis Palafox, had gone forth with terrible orders to raise the country in every direction—to Tudela on one side, and to Calatayud, Daroca, Teruel, and Alcanez on the other. All the men capable of bearing arms were called out, and were to march under chosen officers, one to every ten, in order to form an army to break the blockade. Every village was obliged to furnish pay and provisions to the men who marched. Those that did not march were to destroy our commissariat, kill our invalids, and starve our camp. These orders were given under threat of the most severe penalties in case of disobedience.

It must be owned that the Aragonese had shown very patriotic zeal in executing them. Twenty or thirty thousand men were already in motion from Alcanez, on the right of the Ebro, and from Zuera, Perdiguera, and Liciñena on the left. In spite of the efforts of our cavalry, no meat arrived in our camp, the sheep sent to it being intercepted on the way. Our soldiers, without meat to make soup, and often with but a deficient ration of bread, sustained severe privation without murmuring, and anticipated without dismay two or three months more of an atrocious siege. They were sad, however, when they thought of their small number, and considered that all the difficulties of the siege lay upon 14,000 of them, whilst Gazan's 8000 foot had nothing to do but to blockade the faubourg on the left bank, and Suchet's 9000 men were living at their ease in Calatayud. More than 1200 had already sunk under their fatigues or the enemy's fire. When they were wounded or seized with sickness, they were carried to the hospital of Alagon—a filthy place, in which there was only rotten linen, without victuals or medicines. General Harispe was sent to inspect it, and with the humanity of a hero he severely punished the negligent administrators, carefully reorganised the establishment, and procured at least for our soldiers the comfort of not being

worse off in the hospital than in the trenches. At last the 21st brought to the camp the illustrious Marshal Lannes, who was then approaching the close of his heroic career, for it was in January 1809, within a few months of the terrible day of Essling; and his presence was fitted to support the spirits of the soldier, and restore his confidence if he had lost it. He was delighted with General Junot's bravery; but there was need of a commander who, taking upon himself to modify the emperor's orders, should make all the French forces co-operate towards the success of the siege. It was for this that Marshal Lannes was useful in the first place.

He began, by virtue of his superior command, by making the 5th corps co-operate towards the taking of the place and the suppression of the troubles without that tended to starve our camp. He ordered General Gazan, who was posted with his division before the faubourg on the left bank, to undertake its attack in regular form. By depriving the inhabitants of that ground, they would be driven into the interior of the town and increase its crowded condition, whilst we should have the means of battering it from the left bank of the Ebro. He appointed Colonel Dode, an excellent engineer officer, to superintend this operation.

Marshal Lannes next ordered Marshal Mortier to quit his position at Calatayud, where he was of no use, since no hostile force could come upon us from Valencia, and to cross over to the left bank of the Ebro, to disperse the gatherings that annoyed us.

Marshal Mortier crossed the Ebro on the 23rd, in obedience to orders, and leaving the 40th of the line to support the Morlot division, which was the weakest of the besieging force, he advanced with the 34th, 64th, 88th of the line, the 10th hussars, the 21st chasseurs, and ten guns on the road to Perdiguera. He found in position at Liciñena, on the slope of the mountains, the greatest part of a body of 15,000 men which was advancing from the north of Aragon to succour the besieged capital. This force consisted of troops of the line and peasants, and comprised detachments from the regiments of Savoy, Prado, and Avila, Jaca battalions, Palafox chasseurs, and other troops of old and new formation. Marshal Mortier assailed the Spaniards with the 64th of the line, which marched against them in front with the steadiness and resolution of our old regiments, whilst the 34th and 88th of the line, turning them by the heights, drove them down into the plain. The Spaniards did not withstand this double attack; they fled as fast as they could run across the plain, and passed within reach of the 10th chasseurs, who charged the mass of fugitives at a gallop, and sabred them without mercy.

Fifteen hundred were left dead on the field. We took six pieces of cannon and two flags. At the same moment the adjutant-commander Gasquet, having advanced with three divisions of the Gazan division parallel to Marshal Mortier, routed about 3000 Spaniards of the same body, and took from them men and cannon. Marshal Mortier, having repulsed the levies of Northern Aragon for all the rest of the siege, descended the course of the Ebro to Pina, with orders to exterminate the insurgents, spare the villages that were submissive, burn those that were otherwise, and send cattle to the camp of the besieging army, under an escort of cavalry.

Whilst Marshal Mortier was clearing the left bank, General Junot had sent General Wathier, commander of the cavalry of the 3rd division, with 1200 choice infantry and 600 horse, to disperse an assemblage formed by the insurgents of eighty parishes within the jurisdiction of Alcanez. They were entrenched in the town of Alcanez, which they had barricaded and embattled. In that position General Wathier charged them at the head of his cavalry, as he might have done in the plain, and with such impetuosity that he entered pell-mell with them into the town, forced all the barricades, and put more than 600 of them to the sword. The rest were pursued by our cavalry, and escaped to their homes. The town was plundered, and all the cattle found in the surrounding country was sent off to Saragossa.

By means of these various expeditions the besieging army had nothing more to fear for its rear. Still it received no sheep but such as were well escorted, and meat remained very scarce in our camp.

Whilst Marshal Lannes was having these operations executed in the environs of Saragossa, the extreme activity with which the engineering works were prosecuted by General Lacoste, and his lieutenants Rogniat and Haxo, at last rendered it practicable to make the general assault, which should place the besiegers within the town, and enable them to begin the terrible war against the houses.

On the right attack two *ponts de chevalet* covered with epaulements were thrown across the Huerba beyond the convent of St. Joseph, which had been stormed on the 11th of January. Having crossed the Huerba at that point, the assailants proceeded towards an oil-mill, an isolated building contiguous to the wall of the town. A branch trench was carried to another point of the same wall a little to the left; and in these two places two assaults were to begin as soon as the cannon should have made practicable breaches.

In the centre it was found advisable to forego all use of the *tête de pont* of the Huerba, taken from the besieged, on account

of the flanking fire to which it was exposed. The Huerba was passed by tunnelling opposite the convent of Santa Engracia at the very point of the salient angle made by the town at that place. A breaching battery playing upon the convent was to make its walls accessible for a storming party. Having mastered these several breaches, two on the right and one in the centre, we should have three entrances to the town, all opening into large streets which joined the Cosso at right angles.

On the 26th of January, fifty pieces of ordnance of large calibre played together upon Saragossa, some opening the breaches on the right and the centre, others throwing bombs, shells, and balls into the town, which bravely endured that fiery rain, for the Spaniards could hold out against anything behind their walls, provided they were not face to face with the enemy; and as for the inoffensive population, they cared no more for them than for the cattle they slaughtered for their daily food. The fire having been kept up the whole day on the 26th, and half the day on the 27th, the three breaches appeared practicable, and it was resolved to proceed immediately to the general assault.

The whole 3rd corps was under arms, with Junot and Lannes at their head. On the right the Grandjean division, consisting chiefly of the 14th and 44th of the line, was in the works, awaiting the word of command for action. In the centre the Musnier division, most of them Poles, impatiently awaited the same order. It was supported by the Morlot division, which was massed on its right to second the assault of the centre. The 40th of the line and the 13th cuirassiers occupied the place vacated by the Morlot division, and were to repulse any sorties that might be made from the Castle of the Inquisition, against which only a false attack had hitherto been made.

At noon Lannes gave the eagerly desired word of command, and the storming columns issued immediately from the works. A detachment of voltigeurs of the 14th and 44th, having at their head a detachment of sappers, and commanded by chef-de-bataillon Stahl, issued from the isolated oil-mill before mentioned, and rushed to the breach that lay furthest to the right. The enemy, foreseeing that a storming party would proceed from that building, had mined the ground our soldiers had to traverse. Two tremendous explosions took place, but fortunately in the rear of our first storming column, without cutting off one man. Our soldiers rushed to the breach and took possession of it; but when they attempted to advance beyond it they were stopped by a fire of musketry and grape from houses behind, as well as from batteries erected at the top of the streets. The fire was such

that it was impossible to stand against it; and the assailants, after having many men put hors de combat, particularly the brave Stahl, who was severely wounded, were obliged to content themselves with establishing a position on the breach and forming a communication there with the oil-mill from which they had marched. The soil turned up by the enemy's mine served to facilitate their work.

At the second breach, opened close to the former and a little to the left of it, thirty-six grenadiers of the 44th, led by a brave officer named Guettemann, mounted the breach, crossed it in spite of a shower of balls, and made a lodgment in the houses next the wall. A column followed them, and strove to debouch from the houses into the streets. But the moment any one showed himself at a door or a window, he was brought down by a tremendous fire of musketry issuing from a thousand openings. Our men, however, got possession of the contiguous houses by opening interior passages from the one to the other, and proceeding in this way towards the left, they reached one of the chief streets, the Calle Quemada, which runs straight from the wall to the Cosso. But the grape from the barricades rendered advance impossible, and the assailants of this second breach, though more fortunate than those of the first, were obliged to content themselves with the capture of a dozen houses.

In the centre the action was not less keen. Voltigeurs from the Vistula, led by a detachment of soldiers and officers of the engineers, mounted to the breach in the convent of Santa Engracia. Between the Huerba and the convent wall they had to traverse unsheltered a space of 120 fathoms, which they crossed in double quick time under a most violent fire. They reached the breach without much serious loss, and climbed it without other obstacle than that of the musketry, for the singular courage displayed by the Spaniards behind their walls was not such as to make them wait for us with their bayonets on the top of every breach. The brave Poles, mingled with our sappers, entered the convent, drove out its occupants, debouched on the square of Santa Engracia, forced their way even into the houses surrounding it, and proceeded to a small convent adjoining, which they also carried. Masters of the square of Santa Engracia, they were so likewise of the great street of that name, which, like that of Quemada, joined the Cosso at right angles. But numerous barricades, bristling with artillery and pouring out grape, prevented their advancing further without enormous loss. Any further advance could only be made by sapping and mining.

A piece of open ground lay between the convent of Santa Engracia and the point of the angle which the town wall made about the middle of its extent. Our soldiers rapidly crossed

that space, which was mined, and by most extraordinary good luck it happened that not one of our men was struck, though vast funnels were opened in the earth by the simultaneous explosion of several mine-chambers. From that angle running towards the left was a line of dry stone wall, with a ditch and embankment, terminating at the convent of the Capuchins, and further on at the Castle of the Inquisition. Though it was no part of the plan of attack to carry that line of works, which had not been breached, the Morlot and Musnier divisions dashed at it with unparalleled daring, in consequence of an unforeseen accident.

The Morlot division having been incommoded by a battery placed on the convent of the Capuchins, some carabineers of the 5th light infantry made a charge to rid themselves of the annoyance. The regiment followed them, and the battery was taken. At this sight the 115th of the line, one of the newly formed regiments, could not remain in the trenches. Rushing to the long wall between Santa Engracia and the Capuchin convent, it leaped down into the ditch, scaled the scarp through the embrasures, took possession of the wall and all the artillery, and dared to advance into the interior of the town; but there the furious populace shot down our soldiers, firing upon them with almost certain execution from the adjoining houses. Bolder at this point than at the others, the Spaniards even advanced from their entrenchments to recapture the Capuchin convent. Monks acted as their leaders, and women urged them on. But they were driven back at the point of the bayonet, and our men remained masters of the convent, but were exposed to a tremendous fire of artillery which pierced the walls in several places. They tried to shelter themselves with sandbags, but not being able to hold their ground without cover along the wall, they were obliged to fall back behind it, at the same time without abandoning it, but, on the contrary, endeavouring to secure their footing.

In this bloody day the assailants had got possession of the whole range of the town wall. Had it been an ordinary siege, consummated by the taking of the fortified part of the place, Saragossa would have been ours. But we had to carry each island of houses one after the other against a frantic populace, and the great horrors of the strife were but beginning. The Spaniards had lost 600 men put to the sword, and 200 prisoners, with the whole line of their outer wall. The loss on the French side was 186 killed and 593 wounded:* that is to say, nearly 800 put hors de combat, a considerable loss, due to the excessive ardour and heroic temerity of our troops.

Struck by this frightful spectacle, Marshal Lannes himself

* We give the precise numbers, because on this occasion they are furnished in detail in the reports existing in the war depôt.

ordered the engineer officers no longer to allow the soldiers to advance without cover, for he would rather lose time than men. They were to proceed by way of sapping and mining, and to blow up the buildings, but above all, to be frugal of the blood of his army. That great warrior, as humane as he was brave, experienced a deep impression from what he had seen.*

The occupation of three points in the fortifications of the town made it unnecessary to push forward a fresh attack on the extreme left against the Castle of the Inquisition, for the work now to be done was to assail the Spaniards in their houses; and as the wall and its appurtenances no longer constituted their main defence, they were of little importance. The Morlot division was left in observation on the left with the Musnier and Grandjean divisions, both together mustering 9000 men. Our men proceeded to the taking of each house by sap and mine, whilst General Gazan was to push on his works before the faubourg on the left bank, so as to deprive the population of that last asylum. To this end he received a portion of the siege artillery, which was no longer needed on the right bank, since the town wall had been laid open, and our men had to fight from street to street.

The Musnier and Grandjean divisions formed themselves into two moieties of 4500 men each, which relieved each other in that dreadful struggle in which it was necessary alternately to work as sappers, and to fight hand to hand in narrow passes. Never had the like been seen even at the time when war consisted almost entirely in sieges. The Spaniards had barricaded

* His despatches to the emperor testify what he felt. They contain the following passages:—"Never, sir, have I seen so much desperate pertinacity as our enemies display in the defence of this place. I have seen women come and meet their death before the breach. We have to lay siege to each house severally. If we did not take great precautions we should lose many men in this way, the enemy having from 30,000 to 40,000 men in the town exclusive of the inhabitants. We occupy everything from Santa Engracia to the Capuchins, and we have taken fifteen pieces of ordnance.

"In spite of all the orders I had given to hinder the soldiers from rushing too far ahead, it was not possible to control their ardour. The consequence is, that we have had 200 more wounded than we ought to have had." (Dated, Headquarters before Saragossa, January 28, 1809.)

"The siege of Saragossa in no respect resembles the war we have hitherto made. It is a business that requires great prudence and great vigour. We are obliged to take all the houses by mining or by storm. The unfortunate men defend themselves with a desperate pertinacity which it is impossible to conceive. *In short, sir, it is a war that excites horror.* The town is at this moment on fire in three or four places; it is shattered by shells; but all this does not intimidate our enemies. We are working hard to approach the faubourg. It is a very important point. I hope that when we shall have made ourselves masters of it, the town will not hold out long.

"A gathering of some thousand peasants yesterday attacked the 400 men left at El Amurria. I ordered General Dumoustier to march last night with a column of 1000 men, 200 horse, and two four-pounders. I am sure he will have killed or dispersed all that rabble. Good as they are behind their walls, they are just as contemptible in the plain."

the doors and windows of their houses, cut passages from one to the other on the inside, and made loopholes in the walls so as to be able to fire into the streets, which, moreover, were crossed at intervals by barricades mounted with artillery. So the moment our soldiers attempted to enter them, they were assailed by a shower of balls from the upper storeys and from the ventholes of the cellars, and by the grape from the barricades. Sometimes, in order to make the Spaniards waste their fire, they amused themselves by presenting a shako at a window on the point of a bayonet, when it was instantly pierced with balls.* There was no choice left then but to move like them from house to house, to advance under cover against a covered enemy, and to proceed slowly, in order not to lose the whole army in combats of that horrible kind. A long and desperate struggle was the necessary result.

The Spaniards, whom the taking of their walls had exasperated to the highest degree by the aggravation of their danger, were brought to an actual state of frenzy. They would no longer content themselves with acting on the defensive, but sought to recover what had been taken from them. In the centre they aimed at repossessing themselves of the Capuchin convent, in order to outflank the position of Santa Engracia. On the right they remained masters of the convents of Santa Monica and the Augustins, contiguous to the two breaches we had seized, and they made incredible efforts from those points to dislodge us. The monks, more active than ever, aided by some of those female enthusiasts whose excitable nature renders them even more ferocious than men when they give themselves up to violent courses, led into action bands consisting of the most fanatical of the population and the most determined portion of the troops of the line. Thus, at the central approaches, after having attempted with their artillery to breach the Capuchin convent, which remained in our hands, they dared to return once more to the charge without cover. Our soldiers again drove them back at the point of the bayonet, and this time so thoroughly deprived them of all hope of success as to cure them of all desire to repeat such attempts.

The success begun at Santa Engracia was followed up. From that convent ran a tolerably wide street of the same name, and abutting on the Cosso. It was lined on both sides with enormous edifices: on the right (of the French) was the convent of the Nuns of Jerusalem and the madhouse; on the left, the monastery of St. Francis. These edifices being taken, the besiegers would have a means of debouching on the Cosso (an

* This is a fact I had from the lips of the illustrious and ever-to-be-regretted Marshal Bugeaud. He was captain of grenadiers at the siege of Saragossa, and he related the details of it once more to me some days before his death.

interior boulevard, as we have said), and would be in possession of the principal and widest thoroughfare in the town.

They went to work then at house after house on both sides of the street of Santa Engracia, in order to get hold of the large buildings it was essential to possess. When our men entered a house, either by the opening made in it by the Spaniards, or by one of their own making, they charged the defenders with the bayonet, and drove them out or killed them if they could. But often they left behind them in the cellars or the garrets men who obstinately remained in houses one or two floors of which were already taken. Thus the two parties were mingled together, and the French had, beneath their feet or above their heads, and firing through the floors, men habituated to that kind of warfare, familiarised with the nature of its perils, and displaying in it a sagacity and courage they had never exhibited on the plain. Our soldiers, brave in every kind of fight, but wishing to abridge the strife, employed various means to that end. They rolled bombs into the houses of which they had secured the middle part; sometimes they put bags of powder in them and blew up the roofs with their defenders. Or they had recourse to mining, and pulled down the whole house. But when they had destroyed too much in this way, they had to march without cover, and fully exposed to the enemy's marksmen. A few days' experience taught them not to charge the mine too heavily, and to produce only as much destruction as was necessary to open a breach for themselves.

In this way they proceeded down the street of Santa Engracia to the convent of the Nuns of Jerusalem, into which they endeavoured to gain access by mining. Our miners soon perceived the presence of the enemy's miners, who were advancing towards them to defeat their purpose. But we got the start of them in charging our mine, and the Spaniards were buried in theirs. A breach having been made in the convent of the Nuns of Jerusalem, it was taken at the point of the bayonet, many of its defenders were killed, and a certain number made prisoners. From that convent our men made their way into the madhouse, which was likewise on the right side of the street. But it was necessary also to procure a covered way on the left side of the street, in order to reach the gigantic monastery of St. Francis, after the capture of which there would remain nothing between us and the Cosso. They began therefore to mine in that direction.

Whilst the besiegers' centre was advancing from house to house towards the Cosso, their progress on the right was as keenly contested, and was achieved by the same means. We had deprived the Spaniards of the convents of Santa Monica and the Augustins, by blowing them up with their defenders at the

moment they would have dealt in that way with us but for the sagacity and skill of our miners. Our men had then advanced, always after the method already described, along the streets of Santa Monica and St. Augustin, leading into the Cosso. The Spaniards had devised a new expedient to retard our progress: this was to set fire to their houses, which, as they contained little wood, and had arches instead of floors, burned slowly, and were inaccessible whilst they were burning. Our men were then reduced to the necessity of making their way through the street under cover of sandbags; but the first that showed themselves before they were protected by the epaulement were almost sure to be wounded or killed. Whilst by one of the two breaches on the right our men were advancing along the streets of Santa Monica and St. Augustin towards the Cosso, by the second they were advancing along the Calle Quemada, likewise towards the same goal, passing from one side of the street to the other, sometimes underground by aid of the miner, sometimes on the surface by aid of epaulements of sandbags. In this way they arrived by these several streets at two great edifices, both touching on the Cosso, the one forming its bottom, the other its side; and there the two hostile parties had to exert all their courage, all their artifices, and employ the most violent means, sometimes mining and counter-mining to blow each other up, sometimes crossing bayonets, or shooting at each other at a distance of a few paces. In these thousand fights, the most extraordinary conceivable, our soldiers generally had the advantage, in consequence of their sagacity and boldness, and if they often lost numbers, it was because their impetuosity in attacking exposed them openly to an enemy that was always under cover. We had not less than 100 men killed and wounded every day since the house fighting began, and the Spaniards, who had to brave the double danger of our fire and the epidemic, had as many as 400 men every day carried to the hospitals. It was in one of these attacks that the brave and able General Lacoste was killed by a ball in the forehead. Colonel Rogniat succeeded him, and was also wounded; so also was chef-de-bataillon Haxo.

In operations of this kind was spent the time between the 26th of January, the day of the general assault, and the 7th of February, when the faubourg on the left bank was attacked. Marshal Lannes had ordered General Gazan to make very active exertions in that quarter, and the latter, always in the saddle though ill, and seconded by Colonel Dode, was near enough to the faubourg on the 7th to make a breach in the large convent of Jesus, which was not far from the Ebro, and very near another, the capture of which would be decisive for the taking of the faubourg. In fact, the general was able on the 7th to bring into play twenty guns of large calibre, open in two hours a large

breach in the convent we wanted to take, and drive out 400 Spaniards by whom it was garrisoned. A column of voltigeurs rushed in and soon took possession of it; but attempting too impetuously to quit the convent, which was isolated, and to advance either upon the houses of the faubourg, or against the second convent, which it was most important to secure, they were driven back by the severity of the fusilade. It was then resolved to push forward the approaches from the first convent, already taken, to the second, called that of St. Lazarus, which was washed by the Ebro, and was in contact with the head of the great bridge. From that point it would be possible to become masters of the bridge, cut off the retreat of the troops that defended the faubourg, and conquer it at a blow. The whole artillery of the right bank was instantly sent to General Gazan, in order that this important operation should be executed as soon as possible.

In the interior of the town, where the assailants of the right and the centre were engaged, the subterraneous warfare we have described continued to be waged with the same ferocity. On both sides, however, the sufferings it entailed were severely felt. The epidemic was raging in Saragossa. More than 15,000 out of the 40,000 engaged in its defence were already in the hospitals. The inactive population were dying without any one heeding them. There was no time to bury the dead or to carry off the wounded: they were left amidst the ruins and the rubbish, whence they diffused a horrible stench. Palafox himself laboured under the prevailing malady and seemed approaching his last hour, yet nothing of the firmness of command was wanting. The monks who governed under him, retaining their unbounded influence over the populace, had every man hung on a gibbet who was accused of timorous weakness. The bulk of the peaceable population abhorred this tyranny, but durst not say so. The wretched inhabitants of Saragossa wandered like shadows about their desolated city.

In such extremities as these, men think only of their own sufferings, and do not take sufficient account of those of the enemy, which hinders them from accurately appreciating their real position. Our soldiers, ignorant of the state of things within Saragossa, and seeing that after forty and some odd days' hard fighting they had barely got possession of two or three streets, began to ask themselves what would become of them if they had to conquer the whole town by the same means. "We shall perish in the attempt," they said. "Was there ever such a war as this? What are our officers thinking of? Have they forgot their business? Why do they not wait for reinforcements and fresh matériel, and bury these bedlamites under bombs, instead of sending us to be killed one by one for the sake of taking a

few cellars and garrets? Could they not find some way more useful to the emperor for expending our lives, which they say are his due, and which we do not refuse to sacrifice for him?" Such was the tenor of the conversation every night at the bivouacs of that moiety of the Grandjean and Musnier divisions whose turn it was to rest. Lannes soothed and cheered them by his harangues. "You suffer, my friends," he said to them; "but do you suppose that the enemy is not suffering also? For one man you lose he loses four. Do you suppose that he will defend all his streets as he has defended some of them? He is at the end of his strength, and in a few days you will be triumphant and possessors of a town on which the Spanish nation has set all its hopes. Come, my friends; a few efforts more, and all your toils and troubles will be at an end." The heroic marshal, however, did not think as he spoke. Bearing himself as a general with them, but as a soldier with the emperor, he wrote to him that he knew not when that terrible siege would end; that to fix any probable term was impossible, for there were single houses that had cost whole days.

Neither Lannes nor his soldiers, however, relaxed in activity or courage, notwithstanding their complaints. Whilst the central assailants were mining from the madhouse to the large monastery of St. Francis, they discovered that the besieged were also mining. They then charged their mine with 3000 lbs. of powder, and in order to effect a greater carnage, they made a feint of an open attack, in order the more to attract the enemy to the spot. Hundreds of Spaniards immediately thronged every floor, and awaited us steadily. Major Breuille of the engineers then gave orders to fire the mine; the whole town shook with the tremendous explosion, and a whole company of the Valencia legion was blown into the air with the fragments of the monastery of St. Francis. Every heart shrank with horror for a moment; and then dashing through the ruins, the flames, and the balls, our men drove the Spaniards before them at the point of the bayonet. But the latter took refuge in a belfry and on the roof of the convent church, and flinging hand-grenades through an opening they had made, they forced our soldiers to retreat for a moment. In spite, however, of all their resistance, we were masters of the fort, and at that point we were at last in contact with the Cosso. Mining operations were immediately begun to pass under it, and to blow up with still more terrible explosions both sides of that public promenade.

We had also reached the Cosso by the approaches of the right, along the streets called Quemada, Santa Monica, and St. Augustin. Our troops had taken the college of the Ecoles Pies, undermined the vast edifice of the university, and pushed a point towards the Ebro to join the party attacking the faubourg.

The university was to be blown up on the day the faubourg was taken.

It was the 18th of February. We had been fifty days attacking Saragossa, had spent twenty-nine days in penetrating within its walls, twenty-one in making way along its streets, and the moment was approaching when the exhausted courage of the enemy would find in some great incident of the siege a decisive reason for surrendering. On that same day, the 18th, the university was to be blown up in the town, and in the faubourg the convent adjoining the bridge of the Ebro was to be taken. On the morning of the 18th, mounted on horseback, with General Gazan at his side, Lannes ordered the attack of the faubourg to be begun. Fifty pieces of artillery played upon the convent, the walls of which were of brick and four feet in thickness. At three o'clock in the afternoon the breach was practicable. A battalion of the 28th and one of the 103rd charged into it at double quick step, and killed 300 or 400 Spaniards. Had the breach been wide enough to give passage to the whole Gazan division, it would have been all over with the 7000 men who guarded the faubourg, for they could have moved from the convent to the bridge and cut off the faubourg from the town. As many troops, however, were introduced as was possible, and they hastened from the convent to the bridge. The garrison of the faubourg, finding their retreat cut off, endeavoured to cut their way through. Three thousand men rushed to the entrance of the bridge; our men tried to stop them, got mixed with them, cut down a part of them, but the rest made good their escape. The four thousand remaining in the faubourg were forced to lay down their arms, and to surrender the faubourg itself.

This brilliant and decisive operation, conducted by Lannes himself, cost us only ten killed and 100 wounded. It took from the population their principal asylum, and laid open the town to all the fire of the left bank. Whilst this event was in progress in the faubourg, the troops of the Grandjean division were under arms waiting for the moment when the university should be blown up to rush into the ruins. It was blown up at last by a charge of 1500 lbs. of powder, with a horrible noise, and the soldiers of the 14th and 44th immediately rushed forward and took possession of the head of the Cosso and its two sides. The central assailants required only one day more to undermine and destroy the middle of the Cosso.

However obstinate was the courage of those monks and peasants, who had gladly exchanged the monotony of their convents or the hard life of the fields for the emotions of war, their fury could not hold out against the repeated blows of

the 18th. Only a third of the fighting population was left standing; the non-combating portion was in despair. Palafox was dying. The junta of defence, yielding at last to such accumulated disasters, resolved to capitulate, and sent a flag of truce, who presented himself in the name of Palafox. The unfortunate defenders of Saragossa had so often repeated that the French armies were beaten, that they had come at last to believe the tale. The envoy therefore requested permission to send out an emissary from Saragossa to know if the Spanish armies were in good truth dispersed, and if the resistance of that unhappy city was really useless. Lannes replied that he never gave his word in vain, even for a ruse in war, and that they might believe him when he affirmed that the Spaniards were beaten from the Pyrenees to the Sierra Morena, that the remains of La Romana's force were taken, the English were embarked, and Infantado was without an army. He concluded by saying that they must surrender unconditionally, for otherwise he would blow up the whole centre of the town next day.

Next day, the 20th, the junta repaired to the camp and consented to the surrender of the place. It was agreed that all that remained of the garrison should come out by the principal gate, that of Portillo, lay down their arms, and become prisoners of war, unless they would enter the service of King Joseph.

On the 21st of February, 10,000 infantry and 2000 horse, pale, gaunt, and drooping, defiled before our pity-stricken soldiers. The latter then entered the hapless city, which presented only ruins filled with putrefying corpses. Of 100,000 individuals, inhabitants of Saragossa, or who had taken refuge within its walls, 54.000 had perished. A third part of the buildings was knocked down, the two other thirds, shattered with balls and stained with blood, were reeking with deadly miasmata. The hearts of our soldiers were deeply moved. They, too, had suffered sore losses. They had had 3000 men put hors de combat out of 14,000 who participated actively in the siege. Of 40 officers of engineers, 27 were wounded or killed; and among the latter was the illustrious and unfortunate Lacoste. Half the engineer soldiers had fallen. Nothing in modern history had resembled this siege, and only in two or three instances, such as Numantia, Saguntum, or Jerusalem, did the records of antiquity present similar scenes. Nay, the horror of the modern siege surpassed that of its antique parallels by all the might of the means of destruction devised by science. Such are the sad consequences of the collision of great empires! "Princes and peoples deceive themselves," says an ancient writer, "and thousands of victims suffer innocently for their errors."

The resistance of the Spaniards was prodigious, above all, for its obstinacy, and attested their natural courage, as much as their conduct in the open field showed them to be deficient in that acquired courage which constitutes the strength of regular armies. But the courage of the French, 15,000 of them attacking 40,000 entrenched enemies, was more extraordinary still; for without fanaticism—without ferocity—they fought for that ideal of greatness whereof their flags were then the glorious emblem.

Such was the end of this second Spanish campaign, begun at Burgos, Espinosa, and Tudela, finished at Saragossa, and marked by the presence of Napoleon in the Peninsula, the precipitate retreat of the English, and a new apparent submission of the Spaniards to King Joseph. Napoleon's manœuvres had been admirable, admirable also his troops, and yet, though the results were great, they did not equal those we had obtained against the skilfully organised troops of Austria, Prussia, and Russia. It seemed as though so much science, experience, and valour were baffled by the inexperience and disorganisation of the Spanish armies; as the skill of a master of fence is sometimes defeated by the awkwardness of one who had never before handled a sword. In the open field the Spaniards did not stand their ground, but fled, leaving behind them their muskets, cannons, and flags; but they themselves were not taken, and we had yet to conquer their vast plains, their rugged mountains, their consuming climate, their hatred of the foreigner, their alacrity to begin again a kind of adventures that had cost them little more than the trouble of running away, which was easy for men so agile and so denuded; and from time to time also we had to vanquish some terrible resistance behind walls, like that of Saragossa! It is true, however, that Saragossa was the last effort of this kind to be apprehended on the part of the Spaniards. Indefatigable as they were, they might be wearied out; blind as they were, they might be enlightened, and made to appreciate the advantages of the government which Napoleon brought them by his brother's hand. After Espinosa, Tudela, Somosierra, Coruña, Uclès, and Saragossa, they were actually prostrate and disheartened, at least for the time; and if no new complications of general policy afforded them aid, they were once more about to be regenerated by a foreign dynasty. But the secret of destiny was then unpenetrated and impenetrable. On receiving a letter from Prince Cambacérès, wishing him a good year, Napoleon replied, "In order that you may address the same wish to me thirty times over again, *we must be discreet.*" But having discovered the necessity of being discreet, would he be able to be so? There, we repeat, was the question, the sole question. He

alone under God held in his hands the destiny of the Spaniards, the Germans, the Poles, the Italians, and unfortunately, of the French as well as all the rest.

Whilst his armies, after resting a brief space, were preparing to march, that of Marshal Soult from Coruña to Lisbon, that of Marshal Victor from Madrid to Seville, that of Aragon from Saragossa to Valencia, we have to follow himself from the summits of the Guadarrama to the banks of the Danube, and from Somosierra to Essling and Wagram. He had still some fair days to hope for, because it was still time to be discreet, and the last most irremediable faults had not been committed. It was not impossible, in fact, though doubtful, considering the course things were taking, that Spain should be regenerated by his hands, that Italy should be emancipated from the Austrians, that France should remain great as he had made her, and that his tomb should be reared on the banks of the Seine, without having rested for a while on the remote verge of the ocean.

# BOOK XXXIV.

## RATISBON.

HAVING left Valladolid on horseback on the 17th of January 1809, having reached Burgos on the 18th, and Bayonne on the 19th, where he stopped merely to despatch certain orders, Napoleon took coach there and arrived in the Tuileries on the night of the 22nd, surprising everybody by the promptitude of his appearance. He was not expected back so soon, and his abrupt return naturally excited some perturbation both in France and Europe. The reasons for the one and for the other were the same. He had quitted Valladolid, leaving to his generals, unfortunately divided and feebly held together by Joseph's timid command, the task of completing the conquest of Spain; he had quitted, because from all quarters he had received intelligence that Austria was more actively than ever prosecuting the military preparations she had so often intermitted and renewed during the last two years; because he was furnished from Vienna, Munich, Dresden, and Milan with precise details of those preparations, so as to leave no doubt of the imminence of the danger; because from Constantinople he had reports of the incredible efforts of Austria to make the Turks break with France, and to reconcile them with England; and lastly, because it was intimated to him from Paris that there was a strange uneasiness abroad, that intrigues were timidly but visibly urged at the court, that bold language was uttered in the town, and that everywhere, in short, people were uneasy, discontented, ill-disposed, and ill-spoken. In the sudden irritation of his passionate nature he could not help returning immediately to France. Those who both within and without had provoked his return might expect to feel its consequences. European diplomacy prognosticated an explosion. The affrighted court dreaded some act of severity.

Napoleon was, in fact, about to find France such as he had not yet seen her. Though during the ten years of his reign he might have discerned through all her admiration for him some symptoms of distrust and even of disapprobation, he had never known her such as she was now depicted to him by some faithful servants, and as he was about to behold her with his

own eyes. This change was entirely owing to the Spanish war, which was beginning to produce its disastrous consequences.

Public opinion had from the first condemned the enterprise itself as likely to augment the heavy burden with which the empire was already encumbered. The form, too, had been censured as nothing but a perfidy towards stupefied and helpless princes. But the public had relied on the genius and the good fortune of Napoleon to conquer these new difficulties; they had been dazzled and exalted by the homages rendered to him at Erfurth, and thus they had fluctuated between fear, hope, and gratified pride. Then that very campaign in which it had seemed as though his mere presence sufficed to scatter the levies en masse of the Spaniards, had suggested painful reflections. He had been obliged to transfer his valiant armies from the north, where they were still necessary, to the south, whence no serious danger threatened France; to spread them over a devouring soil, where they exhausted themselves in destroying gatherings that nowhere stood their ground, but that revived incessantly in guerillas when they could no longer give battle as regular armies; to force the English to re-embark, who retired defending themselves vigorously, and soon showed themselves again on other points of the coast, displaying as much mobility with their ships as the Spaniards with their legs. The universal cry was, that the Spanish war was a gulf to swallow up much money and many men for a result which was very uncertain, which was, no doubt, desirable in the age of Louis XIV., but infinitely less important at an epoch when France was mistress of the continent; which, moreover, might very well have been postponed in presence of so many other unfinished enterprises, and which would be sure to render more difficult that general peace which was already so difficult and so justly desired. But what completed the public disapprobation was the very general conviction that Austria, taking advantage of the departure of the French armies for the Peninsula, would seize the opportunity to recommence the war with better chances of success. To this certainty was added the fear that other powers would join her, and that the coalition would again become general. Thus in one fault were seen a thousand faults linked one with another, and importing an interminable series of disastrous consequences. At the same time, reiterated summonses, addressed not only to the class of 1809, but to that of 1810, levied a year in advance, and even to the anterior classes of 1806, 1807, 1808, and 1809, which had supposed themselves freed from liability, were beginning to produce universal dissatisfaction in families, and make them feel as a keen affliction that war which until then had been only an occasion for triumph, a subject of pride, a means for making proofs of

imperial munificence to old soldiers descend into the most sequestered rural districts. The old royalists, partly converted, had hitherto held their peace, and so had the clergy; but now the most inveterate among them found in the events in Spain and Austria, and in the grievances of families, a pretext for bitter invectives. To the clergy, usually united with the royalists in interest and in sentiment, the ill-usage dealt to the Pope at Rome was quite as offensive as the forced renunciations of Bayonne were to the royalists. Hence many curés both in town and country indulged in very equivocal language in their pulpits, and under pretext of preaching Christian submission they were beginning to speak to their flocks as the Church is used to do in times of persecution.

People expressed themselves in public places with strange freedom, and that restless Paris, so turbulent or so docile by turns, so disparaging or so enthusiastic in its admiration, never wholly obedient or wholly disobedient, and of which one may always expect a return to discretion at the moment when it is most extravagant, or a lapse into folly in the midst of its steadiest mood—Paris, almost weary of admiring its emperor, forgetting even the gratitude it owed him for having put down the scaffold and restored the altar, and for having brought back security, wealth, and pleasure—Paris now liked to note his errors, to criticise his faults; and whilst enjoying the satisfaction of inveighing against its ruler, it was beginning to entertain serious apprehensions for the future, which it translated into sad and often bitter language. The public funds, notwithstanding the continual purchases of the treasury, fell below eighty francs, the price declared normal by the emperor for the five per cents., and would have fallen much lower but for the efforts made to keep them up.

Nor was there less uneasiness and frowardness in the governmental circles. The Legislative Body had remained assembled during the whole time of Napoleon's brief campaign beyond the Pyrenees. It had been occupied, as usual at that period, not with political, but with financial and legislative matters. It had had to discuss the Code of Criminal Instruction, a difficult subject, and one likely to awaken many an old dissension. The oppositionists, then a very small body, which had never been used to muster more than from 10 to 15 votes, had now been able to meet the government with as many as 80 to 100 negative votes, out of a total of 250 to 280 voters, in the debates on the several articles of that code. Perceiving with his usual clear discernment this revival of the spirit of contradiction, and fearing to excite it by bringing under discussion a code which brought so strongly into collision the old penchants of one party for liberty, of another for authority,

the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès had warned the emperor of the danger, and had sought to dissuade him from terminating the Code of Criminal Instruction in that year. He would rather have chosen a time when members were more inclined to approbation, and when the emperor should be present, for everybody grew bolder in his absence. But Napoleon, ignoring all obstacles, had resolved that the Code of Criminal Instruction should be discussed that very year, and vehement debates, followed by votes more than usually divided, had astonished reflecting minds, and had contributed to indispose a master who, though absent, was attentive to all that occurred in France.

Encouraged by that absence, certain persons, too, had given free course to their tongues and to their propensity to intrigue. Two especially had imprudently forgotten the submissiveness to which they had seemed inured for nearly ten years: these were MM. Fouché and de Talleyrand. We have elsewhere made known the characters and the positions during the first year of the consulate of these two very dissimilar and mutually hostile personages, the most important of the day after the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès. The latter, though less consulted than formerly, always strove in secret and without ostentation to incline Napoleon's mind to moderation and prudence, wherein he succeeded much more seldom than formerly. Events were now beginning to weary and sadden him, and he was daily become more and more disposed to retire into the background, a thing which is always easy to do, for the crowded actors on the world's stage are never loth that others should make room for them. Napoleon alone noticed the fact with regret, for he valued his signal prudence, though often irksome to himself. The public thought, therefore, much less than before of the prince arch-chancellor. MM. Fouché and de Talleyrand, on the other hand, liked much to be thought of, and gladly drew upon themselves whatever attention a public could bestow whose thoughts were all but engrossed by Napoleon alone. M. Fouché, who was an excellent minister of police in the early days of the consulate, by reason of his indulgent indifference towards all parties, which led him to deal tenderly with everybody, had yet two serious defects for a minister of police, namely, an anxiety to magnify himself at the expense of the government, and a propensity to meddle in everything. Whenever he mitigated or prevented an act of rigour he attributed the merit to himself, giving the parties interested to understand that but for him they would have suffered far more severely from the tyranny of an impetuous master. He affected to curb the headlong zeal of the prefect of police, Dubois, who was personally devoted to the emperor, ridiculed his alleged discoveries, and treated as chimerical all the plots denounced by that functionary. In

this M. Fouché may have been right; but he, too, had his own excesses of zeal. He liked to meddle with everything, in order to appear influential in everything. Recently, in the desire to give himself importance, he had taken upon him to recommend a divorce to the Empress Josephine, believing that he should thus gratify Napoleon by bringing about a sacrifice that the latter ardently desired but durst not demand. This self-seeking and indiscreet interference in what did not concern him had already gone near to bring M. Fouché into disgrace with Napoleon, who naturally did not choose that others should exalt themselves at his expense—should depict him as stern and cruel, and appropriate to themselves the honours of indulgence —should affect incredulity with regard to plots that might compromise the safety of the government—and should presume to take the initiative in weighty State or family matters which concerned himself alone, and the maturity of which he alone could and should determine.

A very recent circumstance had given him an opportunity to signify his sentiments in this respect, and he had done so in an unpleasant way for M. Fouché. A veteran officer, General Malet; an incorrigible conspirator, Servan, formerly minister of war; an ex-conventional, Florent Guyot, an obscure employé in the department of public instruction, were compromised in a plot of no very serious nature, but which was so far significant, as it marked a beginning of resistance to absolute power. There was only one thing of moment in the matter, and no one then took note of it, namely, a scheme that had taken hold of General Malet's mind, to avail himself of one of Napoleon's frequent absences in war, in order to declare the death of the emperor and provoke an insurrection. Whether this scheme of General Malet's, which he afterwards put in operation, was then only in the germ, or was ripened in the plot which M. Dubois supposed he had discovered, it is impossible to decide. M. Fouché rallied M. Dubois a good deal, and the latter, feeling that he was supported, treated his superior with little respect. Napoleon having been informed in Spain of this disagreement, and not choosing that the minister of police should play the sceptic in matters of conspiracy, or should perhaps have an opportunity of ingratiating himself with the *corps d'état* by hushing up an affair in which several of their members were compromised, gave full support to M. Dubois, and ordered that the question should be examined in a council presided over by Prince Cambacérès. The prudent arch-chancellor pacified the quarrel by deciding that if there were no grounds for further prosecuting the inquiry, at least there was great attention to be given to these first symptoms of the spirit of revolt. M. Fouché was sharply reprimanded by order of the emperor. He had just been still more harshly

reproved for his proposal of a divorce. This proposal, spontaneously made by the minister of police to the Empress Josephine, had struck the latter as dictated by the emperor himself, for she could not suppose that a minister would have taken it upon himself to risk such a step without authority, and there had ensued domestic agitations that had strongly affected Napoleon. To ensure the stability that was passing away from him, he desired an heir, and began gradually to entertain the project of a divorce. But the nearer he approached the realisation of that project, the more unwilling he was to anticipate the poignant distress it must occasion him. M. Fouché was therefore disavowed as regarded this matter, and condemned to make humiliating excuses to the empress. M. de Cambacérés was again the intermediary and the pacificator on the occasion. But from thenceforth M. Fouché might perceive the rapid decline of his credit.

As for M. de Talleyrand, his situation was likewise very much compromised, and through his own fault. He had already given many occasions of distrust and displeasure to Napoleon, particularly in quitting the ministry of foreign affairs, in 1807, for the vain motive of becoming a grand dignitary of the empire. He had regained the imperial favour by becoming the active instrument of the policy that had brought about the war in Spain, and Napoleon had by turns taken him to Erfurth or left him in Paris, in order to palliate the offensiveness of that policy in the eyes of European diplomacy. But M. de Talleyrand was of all men the least capable of resisting the opinion of the day, and the Spanish war having at last incurred universal reprobation, it was now in his eyes good for nothing but to be disavowed. Accordingly, he failed not to say that he had not advised it, his grounds for the assertion, no doubt, being, that among the projects proposed he had preferred the dismemberment of Spain to the usurpation of the crown. Once in the way of disavowal, he went back to the affair of the Duke d'Enghien, for in that moment of disfavour censure fastened upon all the faults that Napoleon might have committed, and M. de Talleyrand would not own that he was an accomplice in any of them. His imprudence was great, for he could not fail to be soon denounced to the emperor.

His misdeeds were not confined to some groundless disavowals. He had come to a reconciliation with M. Fouché, after ten years of mutual hatred and vilification. As mutually portrayed, the one was a frivolous intriguer, affecting to direct a diplomacy which went on of itself, aided by victory; the other was a subaltern intriguer, teasing the emperor with vulgar denunciations, and pompously parading a system of police which the general submissiveness rendered easy and even useless. M. de Talleyrand

despised the vulgarity of M. Fouché; the latter the frivolity of M. de Talleyrand. Nevertheless, as though some serious contingency had required them to forget their old animosities, MM. de Talleyrand and Fouché had become reconciled, and publicly visited each other, to everybody's surprise. The real motive of their reconciliation was, that circumstances might soon occur in which their union would be necessary to both. It was strongly surmised, in fact, that Napoleon would end by encountering the poniard of a fanatic in Spain or a cannon-ball in Austria. MM. Fouché and de Talleyrand, being well inclined to believe in the fall of an order of things which they no longer liked, seemed to share the belief that Napoleon's person would infallibly succumb before a peril braved too often. "What will become of us? what shall we do?" were the questions they had asked themselves, and for which they had certainly found no answer. But the persons who had brought them together, exaggerating, as usual, the semi-confidential communications between the two principals, alleged that a whole plan of government had been prepared by them in case Napoleon should fall. There was even ascribed to them the idea of transmitting the imperial crown to Murat, who, before repairing to Naples, had exhaled in Paris his dissatisfaction at not being King of Spain.

These idle rumours would be unworthy the notice of history did they not indicate a commencing change in men's minds, a result of Napoleon's faults, and if they had not had the unfortunate effect of keeping foreigners awake to what was passing in Paris, and persuading them that Napoleon's authority was much weakened, that the nation was disgusted with his policy, that his means of action were much diminished, and that the moment was come to declare war against him again. It is certain that the state of men's minds in Paris at that time acted strongly on the minds of Europe generally, and contributed extremely to rekindle war, as we shall presently see.

Napoleon knew before he left Valladolid a great part of what we have just related, and it filled him with an anger he could not contain. On the eve of his departure, hearing that the grenadiers of the old guard were murmuring because they were left in Spain, at least for a while, and learning, too, that General Legendre, one of the signers of the capitulation of Baylen, was to appear before him in a review he was about to hold, Napoleon gave way to impulses of anger, which deeply afflicted those who witnessed them. Traversing on foot the ranks of his grenadiers, who presented arms to him, whether it was he had heard some murmur, or that he had recognised one of the malcontents, he snatched the musket out of the man's hands, and pulling him to him, "Wretch!" he said, "you deserve that I should have you shot, and I have almost a mind to do so."

Then flinging him back into the ranks, and addressing his comrades, "Ha!" said he, "I know it; you want to get back to Paris, to your mistresses and your amusements, but I will keep you under arms till you are eighty years old!" Afterwards, perceiving General Legendre, he seized his hand and said: "That hand, general—that hand; how is it that it did not wither up in signing the capitulation of Baylen?" The unfortunate general seemed overwhelmed with shame, and every one bent before the inflamed visage of Napoleon, whilst secretly blaming these inordinate displays of violence.

He then set out for Paris, where he arrived, as we have said, with a rapidity equal to his passion. He had received many letters in Spain, for he had numerous correspondents who communicated to him all they thought and all they picked up.* He had learned much on the road, rapidly as he travelled; he had given a great number of orders; in particular he had ordered the arrest of an abbé Anglade in the Gironde, who had spoken ill of the conscription in the pulpit, and he had summoned to Paris the Archbishop of Bordeaux, who had tolerated the abbé Anglade's sermons. He had scarcely entered the Tuileries when he was beset with thousands of reports on what had occurred in his absence. Highly exaggerated as they were, they could not deceive a mind so sagacious as his; but an angry man readily listens to what coincides with his present passion, and Napoleon believed, or appeared to believe, many unlikely things. He sent for the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès, and repeated to him with extreme animation all that had been reported to him, inveighing especially against MM. Fouché and de Talleyrand, who, he maintained, could not have made up their quarrel without very bad intentions. The arch-chancellor strove to calm him, but with imperfect success. What incensed Napoleon was that the offending persons disposed of the succession to his crown as though his death was certain; what incensed him still more was the disavowal of his policy by a man who had been its accomplice, and who had been taken to Erfurth and left in Paris to be its apologist. Hence the main force of the storm was destined to fall on the head of M. de Talleyrand, M. Fouché having already been sharply reprimanded in writing, and not having yet filled up the measure of his offences sufficiently to be sacrificed.

In a council of ministers, at which were present several great dignitaries then in Paris, Napoleon complained of everything and everybody, for there was nothing with which he was not

* Among these correspondents were MM. Fiévée and de Montlosier, and Madame de Genlis, who wrote, not to denounce, but to give their opinions respecting what they saw daily passing before them. M. Fiévée's correspondence has been printed, and proves that Napoleon allowed many things, and of the boldest sort, to be said to him.

dissatisfied. At that period acquaintance with public opinion and its rapid shiftings had become lost amid the tranquillity of the empire; the notion prevailed that a government could direct it at pleasure, and in this respect a puerile faith was reposed in the influence of the police, because it had absolute authority over the public journals. Napoleon complained that the public mind had been allowed to fall into error respecting the events of the day; that it had been suffered to interpret his last signally successful campaign as one abounding in disasters; and he threw out several acrimonious hints against those who had spoken and acted as if at the close of an expiring reign and the eve of a new one. Above all, he complained with extreme bitterness of those who, in order to disavow him, did not hesitate to disavow themselves; till losing all self-control, striding across the council-hall, and addressing M. de Talleyrand, who was standing with his back to a chimney, he said to him, with the most vehement gesticulations, "And you dare to assert, sir, that you had nothing to do with the death of the Duke d'Enghien! You dare to assert that you had nothing to do with the war in Spain! Nothing to do with the death of the Duke d'Enghien! Do you forget, then, that you advised me to it in writing? Nothing to do with the war in Spain! Do you forget, then, that you advised me in your letters to recommence the policy of Louis XIV.? Do you forget that you were the intermediary in all the negotiations that terminated in the war now pending?" Then passing and repassing before M. de Talleyrand, and each time addressing him in the most galling terms, accompanied with menacing gestures, he froze all the beholders with dismay, and left those who loved him full of sorrow at that debasement of the twofold dignity of the throne and of genius.* Napoleon then dismissed the council, vexed at what he had done, and having superadded to his dissatisfaction at others the dissatisfaction he could not but feel with himself.

M. de Talleyrand was seized with a sort of fit on his return home. His physicians had some fears for his life, for he had by no means the courage to bear up against disgrace, though he endured it with seeming impassibility. Napoleon, meanwhile, was too angry to content himself with words, and chose that the public should learn by an official manifestation that M. de Talleyrand had incurred his displeasure. That personage, who loved all kinds of honour, had aspired to be grand chamberlain whilst he discharged the important functions of minister for foreign affairs. Having become a grand dignitary, he had remained grand chamberlain, and enjoyed the pecuniary emoluments of both dignities on the day after the stormy scene in

* The veracious and honourable Duke de Gaëte, who was an eye-witness of this scene, related it to me in minute detail some days before his death.

the council of ministers. Napoleon made him resign the grand chamberlain's key, and transmitted it to M. de Montesquiou, one of the most deservedly honoured members of the Legislative Body, who, besides his more recent distinctions, possessed others of ancient date of a kind much valued by Napoleon when conjoined with intrinsic worth. M. de Talleyrand, however, perceiving that he had been too hasty in behaving towards the imperial government as towards a government undone, sought to redeem by extreme submission the imprudent language imputed to him. Two or three days afterwards he appeared at a grand fête at the Tuileries in the most brilliant costume, bowing profoundly before the master whose outrages he had endured, as if he would almost make him, and, above all, the public doubt all that had happened. In this he succeeded to a certain extent, for Napoleon, disarmed by this cunning submissiveness, detected the cunning, but accepted the humility.

After having silenced the babbling tongues about him without silencing the public whom he could not disgrace, Napoleon immediately applied himself to the important matters that had brought him to Paris. These included both diplomacy and war, which were to be pushed on simultaneously, for a rupture with Austria was imminent. That power which we have seen so agitated for three years, oscillating between the desire to avenge her humiliation and the fear of fresh disasters; continually seeking a favourable opportunity, having found one as she thought in Napoleon's bold movement towards the north in 1807, but having let it pass unused, and bitterly regretting that neglect; thinking she perceived a new opportunity in the Spanish war, hesitating for six months whether to avail herself of it or not, and amidst her hesitations arming with incessant activity—that power seemed at last on the point of declaring war. All she did throughout her own empire in the way of preparations, and among the cabinets of Europe in the way of political intrigue, revealed an almost matured resolution. The approach of spring, moreover, gave reason to think that there remained at most but two or three months for preparing to confront her. It was necessary to make haste, therefore, to avoid being taken unprepared; but it was in the act of well employing time and of creating by a miracle what did not exist that Napoleon excelled; of this he afforded a new and striking proof on the present occasion.

With his military preparations he had to conduct simultaneously the negotiations which should either prevent war or render its result more certain by means of well arranged alliances. He had some months previously, on his first return from Spain, explained himself so fully and explicitly to the ambassador of Austria, and yet to so little purpose, that it seemed superfluous

and undignified to repeat the process. Napoleon was of opinion that an extreme reserve with regard to that ambassador, an extreme openness with regard to the others, and a display of great administrative activity, were the proper course to be pursued, and the only way to excite salutary reflections at Vienna, if it were yet possible. He was therefore polite, but cold and chary of words with M. de Metternich; and he enjoined the whole imperial family, in which M. de Metternich was usually well received, to imitate his own reserve. On the other hand, he was much more open with the other ambassadors, avowed to them the reason of his return to Paris, and declared to them that it was Austria and her armaments that brought him back so soon, that he might respond to them by armaments no less formidable.

"It seems," he said to them all, "that it is the waters of Lethe, not those of the Danube, that flow past Vienna, and that they have forgotten the lessons of experience there. They want fresh ones; they shall have them, and this time they shall be terrible, I promise you. I do not desire war; I have no interest in it, and all Europe is witness that all my efforts and my whole attention were directed towards the field of battle which England has selected, that is to say, Spain. Austria, which saved the English in 1805, when I was about to cross the straits of Calais, has saved them once more by stopping me when I was about to pursue them to Coruña. She shall pay dearly for this new diversion in their favour. Either she shall disarm instantly, or she shall have to sustain a war of destruction. If she disarms in such a manner as to leave no doubt on my mind as to her future intentions, I will myself sheathe my sword, for I have no wish to draw it except in Spain against the English; otherwise the conflict shall be immediate and decisive, and such that England shall for the future have no allies on the continent."

The emperor produced on all who heard him the effect he intended; for he was sincere in his language, and spoke the truth in asserting that he did not desire war, but that he would wage it tremendously if forced into it again. Even though believing he had drawn it upon himself by his conduct in Spain, every one thought that Austria was committing a great imprudence, and trembled for the sake of Europe at the consequences to which that court was about to expose itself.

For one reason or another, M. de Romanzoff, the Russian minister for foreign affairs, had been detained in France since the interview at Erfurth. As we have already stated, that minister had repaired to Paris in Napoleon's suite, to watch personally over the negotiations which were to be begun with England, and to hasten as much as possible the acquisition of the Danubian provinces. The negotiation with England having

broken down, M. de Romanzoff might have returned to St. Petersburg, where his young master awaited him impatiently; but he remained for the purpose of promoting their common desires. Not more than two months, he had been told in Paris, would be requisite to terminate matters in Spain, bring back King Joseph to Madrid, recrown him there, drive the English into the sea, and inspire Europe with thoughts of resignation instead of resistance to the plans laid down at Erfurth. It might therefore be really expedient to put off still longer the overtures which were to be made at Constantinople relatively to Moldavia and Wallachia; for if Napoleon was completely victorious, Austria would not dare to engage in a fresh conflict, England would find no allies on the continent, the Turks would find none either on land or sea, and Russia would, without a general conflagration of Europe, acquire the Danubian provinces, as she was on the point of acquiring Finland, by means of a merely local war of very limited importance. These considerations were worth some further patience; for it was, after all, only a delay of two months, and that interval M. de Romanzoff thought it advisable to spend in the vicinity of the events whereof he awaited the issue. Meanwhile he carefully observed the colossus of which Russia was for a time the accomplice rather than the ally; he studied its strength, whether transient or durable; tried to ascertain the validity of the thousand phrases repeated at St. Petersburg by the echoes of European diplomacy, and lived amidst a cloud of incense, for the imperial court had received orders to be lavish of attention to the ex-minister of Catherine and actual minister of Alexander—orders, of all others, the most easily obeyed at Paris, where people delight so much in pleasing, when they do not make it a point of honour to be offensive.

M. de Romanzoff passed his two months in Paris, and then three, hardly noticing the lapse of time, and striving to allay the impatience of his master, who was continually urging him to return. Napoleon had so far kept his word that in two months he had scattered the Spanish armies like dust, driven the English out of the Peninsula, and brought back his brother to Madrid, yet without making it in the least degree probable that the Spanish war was done and ended. This was not quite what he had hoped, nor what he had promised, for no chance now remained of realising the great acquisitions projected in the east by a simple act of volition. Napoleon saw M. de Romanzoff immediately after his arrival; exerted upon him his usual power of fascination; expressed his indignation at seeing Austria interfere again at the decisive moment to snatch the English out of his hands, for if he had himself pursued them, not one of them, he said, would have escaped; and he avowed his deter-

mination to take signal vengeance for such a breach of faith (alluding to the promises made him at the bivouac of Urschitz). Confident as he was in the immense means that remained to him, he behaved towards the representative of Russia neither braggingly nor obsequiously, but firmly and positively, and peremptorily required from him the accomplishment of the engagements entered into at Erfurth—like a man who was ready again to wage war with all who should break their word with him, whether by attacking him or by not aiding him after they had engaged so to do. "If your emperor had followed my advice at Erfurth," said he to M. de Romanzoff, "we should now be in a different position. Instead of mere exhortations, we should have held out serious threats, and Austria would have disarmed. But we have talked instead of acting, and we are about, perhaps, to have war—I, for what I want to accomplish in Spain; you, for what you want to terminate in Finland and begin in Turkey. In any case, I rely on your master's word. He promised that if the cabinet of Vienna should become the aggressor, he would place an army at my disposal. Let him fulfil his promise; let him proceed more actively with the war in Finland, so as to have done with that petty power which holds him in check; let him have an army on the Danube sufficient to baffle all the intrigues of the confederate English and Austrians with the Turks; and let him have an imposing army on the Upper Vistula, in order to let Austria see that we are both in earnest. As for me, I will assemble on the Danube and the Po 300,000 French and 100,000 Germans, and probably their presence will oblige Austria to leave us at peace, which I should prefer for your sake and my own, for in that case you will have Moldavia and Wallachia almost without a blow, and I shall be able to complete the subjection of the Peninsula without fresh expenditure. If these demonstrations are not sufficient—if we must employ force, then we will crush for ever the resistance made to our common projects. But an alliance for peace and for war, a thorough, effective alliance, that is what I have promised, what has been promised me, and what I expect."

To this language, which was that of a man by no means intimidated, Napoleon added every gracious art necessary to complete the effect he wished to produce, and he obtained the most satisfactory declarations from M. de Romanzoff. The latter did not conceal the dissatisfaction he felt at seeing Russia exposed to a collision with Austria; the difficulty of the projected acquisitions in the east augmented by all the difficulties which the French policy might encounter in the west; in a word, the circle of the strife extending instead of contracting; but he admitted the necessity of holding strong language at Vienna to prevent the necessity of acting; he agreed that to make words

effectual, certain demonstrations should be superadded to them; and he promised in consequence that Russia should have an army in Galicia ready to take the route by Prague or by Olmutz, both of which lead to Vienna.

Satisfied with M. de Romanzoff, and wishing to prove to him how much he desired peace and not war, Napoleon suggested the idea of offering to Austria the double guarantee of France and Russia for the conservation of its actual dominions, a guarantee which ought completely to reassure that power, if the fears were genuine which it professed for itself in consequence of the events of Bayonne. In fact, if Austria was actuated by nothing else than personal fears, the idea of this guarantee was of a nature to satisfy her and prevent a war. M. de Romanzoff undertook to communicate the proposal promptly both to his own court and to that of Vienna.

To these interviews with M. de Romanzoff, Napoleon added a thousand delicate attentions, such as taking him himself to the manufactories of the Gobelins, Sèvres, and Versailles, showing him the marvels of his empire, and every moment presenting rich specimens of them, so that, as M. de Romanzoff himself said, he durst no longer praise anything in the presence of so magnificent a sovereign, for fear of bringing upon himself fresh presents of tapestries, porcelains, and costly arms.

Having done what was proper by the ambassador of his principal ally, Napoleon addressed himself to the ministers of the Confederation of the Rhine. He told them, and wrote to the same effect to their masters, the Kings of Bavaria, Saxony, Wurtemberg, and Westphalia, and the Dukes of Baden, Hesse, and Wurzburg, that he did not wish to put them to premature expense by requiring the immediate assemblage of their troops, but that he desired them to prepare for it, since there was a new prospect of hostilities; that to prevent war if there was yet time, or to secure its prosperous issue if it was inevitable, they must put themselves in a condition to meet force with force; that for himself he was about to assemble 150,000 French and Italians on the Po, 150,000 French on the Upper Danube, that he counted on 100,000 Germans, and that with these 400,000 men he would prevent war or would render it decisive, and would for ever secure his allies from the claims which Austria threatened to assert against the German powers that had formerly been dependent on or subject to her empire. He wrote in particular to the King of Bavaria and to the King of Saxony, and formally demanded of them the assemblage of a first moiety of their troops round Munich, Dresden, and Warsaw. Distrusting Prussia, which might be tempted to imitate Austria, and seek the reparation of her misfortunes in an act of despair, he notified to her that if she levied a single

man beyond the 42,000 authorised by the secret conventions, he would forthwith declare war against her. He commissioned Russia to make known at Königsberg that the least act of hostility would be the occasion of a new contest which would be mortal to the one side or the other, if there was any symptom of a wish to join Austria.

To these manifestations, which were the more significant from the fact that they rested on precautions no less real than apparent, Napoleon added certain movements of his own troops, which were but the consequence of arrangements already conceived and prescribed at Valladolid. These arrangements were on a scale proportioned to the occasion, and to the mass of enemies known and unknown that were soon to be encountered.

Whilst he was in Spain, Napoleon had watched with extreme solicitude over the execution of his orders, foreseeing that Austria, though intimidated by the presence of the two emperors at Erfurth, and though not quite prepared, nor as yet sufficiently excited to lose all prudence, would nevertheless break out at last in the spring. These orders related principally to the levy of the two conscriptions authorised by the Senate in 1808. The one comprised the conscripts of 1810, levied according to custom one year in advance, but who could not be called out before the 1st of January 1809, and were only liable to serve in the interior during that year. It was a levy of 80,000 men; but this amount not being adequate to Napoleon's plans, he had thought of recurring to the anterior classes of 1806, 1807, 1808, and 1809, which had never furnished more than 80,000 men each. The hundred and fifteen departments of that period contained a population not much greater than of the eighty-six of the present day, for whereas the present class amounts to 320,000 young men of an age fit for service, the hundred and fifteen departments furnished 377,000. Napoleon held that 80,000 out of 377,000 was too small a portion, and that he might call out 100,000, or rather more than one-fourth of the whole. It was certainly a thing that might be done, provided it was not repeated too often; for there is no population that would not soon perish if a fourth part of the adult males were abstracted from it every year.

He resolved then to fix at 100,000 the annual contribution of the population, so that applying the rule retrospectively he might demand a supplement of 20,000 men from each of the anterior classes. This plan had the advantage of procuring him much more robust recruits than those furnished by the ordinary levies, since they would be of the ages of 20, 21, 22, and 23 years, whilst those of 1810 were only aged about 18. But it was a serious inconvenience to drag from their homes

men who might have deemed themselves exempt from all service, the class to which they belonged having already furnished its contingent. Accordingly, to diminish the unpleasant effect of this measure, he took care to subjoin to the decision of the Senate an assurance that the classes anterior to 1806 should be definitively exempted, thus leaving the unfortunate classes of 1806, 1807, 1808, and 1809 liable to fresh demands. Further to allay discontent, the men who had married in the interval were not to be called out; but these mitigations of the new measure did little towards soothing the displeasure of the people, who saw the price of substitutes rising every day, and calls succeeding calls without interruption. However, except in some departments of the west, where a small number of malcontents recommenced the life of chouans, but were promptly put down, obedience was general, and the men, once enrolled, adopted forthwith the vigorous spirit of the French army.

Employment was to be found for this vast levy of young men, and no one, it is confessed, ever equalled Napoleon in the arts of organisation. He had two years previously decreed the formation of all regiments in five battalions. Various causes had hitherto prevented the complete execution of this measure: first, the number of conscripts, which was not yet sufficient, and would not become so until the arrival of the 160,000 men lately called out; next, the expense, which could not but be great; lastly, the movements of the regiments, which were continually in transit, and passed their time when they were not fighting in marching from the Vistula to the Tagus, or from the Po to the Ebro. For these reasons most of the regiments were still engaged in forming the fourth battalion, and scarcely any had formed the fifth.

After having sent into Spain three corps of the grand army —those of Marshal Victor (formerly the first), of Marshal Mortier (formerly the fifth), and of Marshal Ney (formerly the sixth), and the troops that had formed Marshal Lefebvre's division, besides all the dragoons; after having detached from the army of Italy wherewith to treble the army of Catalonia, Napoleon had considerably weakened his forces in Germany, particularly in old soldiers. He had still under the denomination of the army of the Rhine, commanded by Marshal Davout, six divisions of infantry—the fine Morand, Friant, and Gudin divisions (which had formerly formed the third division); the excellent St. Hilaire division, which had made part of Marshal Soult's division; Oudinot's famous division of grenadiers and voltigeurs, then at Hanau; Dupas' division of two regiments only, constituting with the Dutch troops the guard of the Hanse towns; fourteen regiments of cuirassiers, an incompar-

able force, which no infantry in Europe had ever withstood; seventeen regiments of light cavalry, the best drilled in the world, and a formidable artillery. To these forces were to be added the Carra St. Cyr and the Legrand divisions, which had belonged to Marshal Soult's corps, and were now marching for Paris to make a demonstration towards the camp of Boulogne; and the Boudet and Molitor divisions, long left on the Elbe as a nucleus of the army of reserve in 1807, and afterwards removed to Lyons with a view to the constantly projected but never executed expedition against Sicily. These fine troops, the best in Europe, formed, however, a total of not more than 110,000 men, after deducting all the soldiers who were incapacitated for service by age or wounds. It was not with such forces, however excellent the soldiers composing them, that Napoleon could reduce the house of Austria. This was the way in which he had resolved to increase them.

The army of the Rhine comprehended twenty regiments of infantry, which had received their three war battalions since the formation of the fourth battalions had been begun. When they had four, as was about to be the case, this army of the Rhine would present eighty-four battalions and 70,000 infantry soldiers. Oudinot's corps, consisting of companies of grenadiers and voltigeurs originally detached from the regiments that did not form part of the army in active service, was a body formed for reasons which had ceased to operate. Now that the regiments were acting so far from their depôts, and had battalions at the same time in Germany, Italy, and Spain, it was becoming difficult to detach picked companies to such great distances. Having, moreover, in the imperial guard a choice corps which was developing itself more and more every day, Napoleon was no longer reduced to seek for one by combining companies of grenadiers and voltigeurs. It occurred to him, therefore, merely to convert Oudinot's corps into an assemblage of fourth battalions, which should be detached from the regiments to which they belonged. At first, as the body comprised twenty companies of voltigeurs and grenadiers belonging to Marshal Davout's army, he sent them to him to serve as a nucleus for the formation of the fourth battalions in that army. The fusilier companies were to march as soon as possible from the depôts in Alsace, Lorraine, and Flanders, to complete these fourth battalions. The other choice companies of Oudinot's corps belonged to thirty-six regiments which had passed from Germany into Spain. Napoleon resolved likewise to make of these companies the nucleus of thirty-six fourth battalions, which were for the present to serve in Germany, whither they were all marched, the intention being to move them afterwards into Spain if their regiments continued to serve there. The fusilier

companies were to be sent successively to them from the depôts in the north and east of France. They were to be distributed into three divisions of twelve battalions each, and to consist, after their formation, of 30,000 infantry.

The four divisions of Carra St. Cyr, Legrand, Boudet, and Molitor comprised twelve regiments, then of three war battalions, and soon to be raised to four, which would make forty-eight battalions more, and give about 30,000 men. The army of the Rhine might thus amount to 130,000 foot, without counting the 5000 of Dupas' division. Out of the vast recruiting decreed, Napoleon resolved to take what was requisite to raise all the cavalry regiments to 1100 men each, which could not fail to ensure them 900 fighting men. The fourteen regiments of cuirassiers reckoned 11,000 or 12,000 men in the ranks; he hoped, by taking all that the depôts could supply, to raise them to 13,000 or 14,000 present under arms. He proposed to extend to 14,000 or 15,000 men the effective of the seventeen regiments of light cavalry. He resolved also to turn to account the twenty-four regiments of dragoons employed in Spain. Such a force was more than sufficient for the requirements of that war, especially considering what would be wanted for the other wars in preparation in the north of Europe. The depôts, moreover, swarmed with dragoons quite trained, whom Napoleon deemed more useful at that moment in Germany than in Spain. He therefore ordered the état-major of Madrid to send back to the depôt the skeleton of the third war squadron, drafting into the first two squadrons the men capable of serving, whereby the active force in Spain would be left at nearly the same effective amount, and skeleton squadrons would be formed for incorporating the cavalry soldiers already trained in the depôts. His scheme was to draft successively from the depôts into the third and fourth squadrons all the trained men, and to send them into Germany, forming with these forty-eight squadrons twelve provisional regiments of dragoons of four squadrons each. The dragoon depôts were spread over Languedoc, Guyenne, Poitou, and Anjou. Napoleon hoped thus to have first 3000, then 6000, and up to 12,000 dragoons, as soon as the conscription should have furnished the necessary personnel. He might consequently reckon on having before two months 13,000 or 14,000 cuirassiers, 14,000 hussars and chasseurs, and 3000 dragoons—that is, together, 30,000 cavalry, almost all veterans. With 130,000 infantry, 30,000 cavalry, 20,000 artillery, 5000 of Dupas' division, and 15,000 or 20,000 of the guard, he would have 200,000 French in Germany, who, with 100,000 German and Polish auxiliaries, would give him 300,000 fighting men on the Danube. The same system of formation would procure him 100,000 in Italy.

Napoleon had in Italy twelve regiments of infantry, the formation of which by four battalions was completed, and that by five begun. They were parted into four divisions of three regiments, and of 9000 to 10,000 men each, including artillery. The first of these divisions was at Udine, the second at Treviso, the third at Mantua, and the fourth at Bologna. The skeletons of the third battalions of the eight regiments composing the army of Dalmatia had been recalled, after the men fit for active service had been drafted into the first two battalions, whereby the effective force appointed to guard that remote province was not sensibly weakened. By means of these eight skeleton battalions, and by the creation of eight others resulting from the new organisation, there was formed at Padua a fifth division of sixteen battalions of infanty, at least 12,000 strong. In consequence of the rest enjoyed by the army of Italy, and the care Napoleon had taken to secure it its share of each conscription, the new formations were more advanced there than elsewhere. Lastly, with some third and fourth battalions of the army of Naples, and two whole regiments taken from Naples itself, there had been formed a fine division, which guarded the Roman States, under the command of General Miollis. Napoleon had ordered Murat, now King of the Two Sicilies, to distribute his army into two divisions, the one placed between Naples and Reggio, the other between Naples and Rome, so that the latter, by detaching a brigade to Rome upon occasion, might render Miollis' division free and disposable. The English were sufficiently occupied in Spain, and were likely to be sufficiently occupied on the German coasts if the war was rekindled in the north, to prevent their making any very formidable attempts upon the south of Italy. There could therefore be brought into the field six divisions, comprising about 58,000 infantry, all old soldiers who had not fought for a long while, and had a strong desire to resume their old trade. Five regiments of dragoons, and five of hussars and chasseurs, which was enough in Italy, afforded by drawing upon the depôts a further supply of 8000 cavalry. With 6000 artillery, there was a certainty of having an army of 72,000 Frenchmen. Adding to these 18,000 or 20,000 Italians, and in case of a march forwards, 10,000 Frenchmen from Dalmatia, there would be a total of about 100,000 men in Italy who might be easily moved into Germany. Combining all these forces, it would be possible to assail the house of Austria with 400,000 fighting men.

These formations, ordered whilst Napoleon was commanding in Spain, that is to say, in November and December 1808, and accelerated in January 1809, during his stay in Valladolid, were prosecuted with more activity than ever since his return to Paris. But though the men were arriving rapidly in the depôts,

other parts of the organisation were less advanced. Much was still wanting as regarded clothing, which is always slow of production; training, which cannot be extemporised; and the formation of new skeletons of battalions, which demanded a great number of capable officers and non-commissioned officers. It is true that in the latter respect our old armies afforded Napoleon great resources. But it was necessary to collect together the scattered elements of these various creations, and the nature of things does not yield absolute submission even to genius. One man may employ time better than others, but none can dispense with it altogether. Two or three months, which were yet hoped for, were not sufficient, and it was to be feared that all would not be ready if the war broke out too soon.

The depôts had furnished all their disposable personnel to the divisions of the army of the Rhine, and to the Carra St. Cyr, Legrand, Boudet, and Molitor divisions, so that these had their three war battalions quite complete in veteran soldiers, and in young ones tolerably well trained. The organisation of the fourth battalion did not proceed in as satisfactory a manner. It was on this occasion that Napoleon made excellent use of the imperial guard. He had resolved to entrust to that body 10,000 conscripts of 1810, and 6000 or 7000 of the anterior classes, that it might employ its leisure in training them; which had the double advantage of keeping the guard itself from the dangers of idleness, and of propagating the excellent spirit with which it was animated. It was at Versailles, Paris, and the adjacent places that it applied itself to this useful task, whilst the younger soldiers composing it were serving in Spain under the emperor's eyes. A part of the conscripts intended for it having arrived, had been converted in a few months into soldiers who were on a par with the veterans in point of training and tenue. Selecting the strongest and most advanced of these recruits, Napoleon formed them into companies of grenadiers and voltigeurs, which he sent to Oudinot's corps, to supply the place of the twenty-two companies already given back to the army of the Rhine. He likewise sent other companies of these grenadiers and voltigeurs to the depôts of the army of the Rhine, to facilitate the organisation of its fourth battalions. At the same time he urged forward the arrival and the training of the conscripts still due to the guard, that they might serve to recruit those corps that might not find adequate resources in their own depôts. He despatched General Mathieu Dumas, an intelligent, exact, and active staff-officer, to visit quickly all the depôts of the south, east, and north, from Marseilles, Grenoble, Lyons, and Strasburg, to Mayence and Cologne, and send off from them, without waiting for the orders of the minister of war, the fusilier companies that were ready, and that were to

complete the fourth battalions. He further prescribed that as soon as the 80,000 conscripts of 1810 began to arrive in the depôts, the regiments which were in a more advanced state of progress should proceed to the formation of their fifth battalions, so as to prepare the elements of a strong reserve in the interior and on the coasts.

The cavalry depôts abounded in men and horses, for Napoleon had not ceased to devote attention and funds to that end. He sent off more than 3000 cuirassiers, chasseurs, and hussars, and made the necessary arrangements for the prompt departure of as many more. He gave orders to purchase 12,000 artillery horses, and to prepare all the furniture of that arm. He ordered General Lauriston to add to the artillery of the guard a reserve of 48 pieces, and to purchase 1800 horses in Alsace, where the guard was to receive them en route, with the matériel of that reserve. Lastly, as though he had divined the great works he would have to execute on the islands of the Danube, and foreseeing certainly the part which that vast river would play in the approaching war, he ordered that besides the usual implements of the engineer corps, there should be laid in an extraordinary store of 50,000 pick-axes and shovels, which were to follow the army in artillery waggons. Moreover, he joined with the guard a battalion of 1200 sailors from Boulogne. As he had special need of officers and non-commissioned officers for the new battalions, independently of the officers taken from the guard, he took 300 from St. Cyr. He even directed that from each lyceum in which there were only youths not exceeding sixteen or seventeen years of age, there should be taken for this purpose ten of the most precocious and the most adapted for war. Not content with this, he ordered M. Fouché to make out a census of the old noble families that were living in retirement on their estates, and having no connection with the government, in order to enrol their sons in spite of them, and send them to the military schools. If they complain, he wrote, you shall say that *such is my good pleasure;* and he added a less extravagant reason, namely, that it was not right that in consequence of pernicious divisions certain families should be allowed to withdraw themselves from the efforts which the present generation was making for the glory and grandeur of the future generation.* He also took some non-commissioned officers from the

* The following extraordinary letter was among those he wrote when he was beginning in Spain to give orders for his first preparations :—

To the Minister of Police.

"BENAVENTE, *December* 31, 1808.

"I am informed that some families of emigrants withdraw their children from the conscription, and keep them in a mischievous and culpable idleness.

velites and fusiliers of the guard, troops already well inured to war, though younger than the rest of the same body. Having much cavalry, and intending to make great use of it against the Austrian infantry, he recalled from Spain the two officers of that arm he most esteemed, Generals Montbrun and Lasalle. He recalled from Aragon Marshal Lannes, who had just terminated the siege of Saragossa, and he summoned to him Marshal Massena.

Without wishing yet to commit any act of hostility, for hitherto Austria had abstained from such, he thought it expedient to draw his troops nearer to the probable theatre of war, for the double purpose of afterwards moving them without fatigue towards the points of concentration, and of giving Austria a significant hint, which might, perhaps, inspire her with more prudent reflections. In consequence he ordered the Dupas division to quit the borders of the Baltic and approach Magdeburg. He made Saxo-Polish troops replace all the French detachments he had still in Dantzig, Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau. He ordered Marshal Davout to proceed from Saxony to Franconia, to fix his headquarters at Wurzburg, and to direct one of his divisions to Bareuth. General Oudinot was to transfer himself, with the consent of the King of Bavaria, from Hanau to Augsburg; the Carra St. Cyr and Legrand divisions were to march from the environs of Paris to those of Metz; and the Boudet and Molitor divisions were to advance from Lyons to Strasburg. These three rallying points—Wurzburg, Augsburg, and Strasburg—could not but be highly significant for Austria. He instructed Prince Eugène not to encamp his troops, the season not yet being sufficiently advanced, but to assemble successively in the Friuli his first four divisions, his artillery matériel, and his cavalry, so as to be able in twenty-four hours to bring out 50,000 men in order of battle. He renewed the order to Murat to call back his forces to Rome, so as to leave the Miollis division free to act. He directed that all the forts in Italy should be put in a state of defence, and that the most important works at Osopo, Palma Nova, Venice, Mantua, and Alessandria should be completed. Lastly, he sent orders to General Marmont, who commanded in Dalmatia, to concentrate his army on Zara, leaving only the necessary garrisons

It is a fact that the ancient and wealthy families which *are not in the system* are against it. I desire that you have a list made out of ten of those principal families in each department, and of fifty for Paris, making known the age, fortune, and quality of each member. My intention is to make a decree for sending to the military school of St. Cyr the young men belonging to these families aged more than sixteen and less than eighteen. If any objection is made, no other answer is to be given than that such is my good pleasure. The future generation must not suffer for the rancours and petty passions of the present. If you ask information of the prefects, do it in this sense."

at the mouths of the Cattaro and some interesting points; to form at Zara an entrenched camp, which should be provisioned for a year, and thus prepare to hold out for several months against considerable forces, or to advance and join the army of Italy.

To these military manifestations, which yet did not constitute acts of hostility, Napoleon added a diplomatic manifestation. He ordered General Andréossy, ambassador at Vienna, to quit that capital, not after demanding his passports, which would have looked like a declaration of war, but on the pretext of a congé formerly solicited and recently obtained. The dissembled recall afforded Napoleon, in addition to the advantage of signifying his dissatisfaction, that of removing a cause of irritation between the two cabinets, for General Andréossy felt for the court of Austria a hatred which the latter reciprocated. He had orders to pass through all the Austrian cantonments on his way back, so that on his return he might be able to give precise information as to the military resources of the enemy. These very active and provident arrangements prove that Napoleon took as much pains to prevent war as to prepare for it. Unfortunately his ambitious policy had imposed war upon him as a fatal necessity after it had ceased to be for him an object of predilection.

All these vast preparations demanded commensurate financial means. We have already made the painful remark that the Spanish war, whilst disastrously diminishing the military forces of France by their dispersion, diminished in an equal degree her financial resources by the excessive multiplication of the causes of expense; though the twofold creation of the service-chest and the army treasury secured Napoleon from all present want of funds, resources were nevertheless beginning to be less abundant, and it was easy to foresee an end to them and to the power of France if a stop was not soon put to this course of exorbitant enterprises.

The budgets promised to be liquidated without deficit, being kept rigorously within the assigned limits, which was easily done, since the only possible excesses arising out of the state of war were covered by drafts on the army treasury. The expenditure of the years anterior to 1800, defrayed by means of bills on the *caisse d'amortissement* (which, as the reader recollects, were but a slow alienation of the national property), was advancing to a final settlement. That of 1806 and 1807, fixed at 730 millions for the general expenses, and 40 for the departmental, which with the costs of collection made a total of 890 or 900 millions, inspired no uneasiness for its liquidation, especially as the armies beyond the Rhine continued to be paid out of the contributions of Prussia. It was not the same as to the expenditure of 1808. This had been fixed, like the others, at 730 millions for general

expenses, and 40 for special; the army of the Rhine being still paid down to the 31st December by the war contributions. But if the balance between requirements and resources was not broken by the augmentation of outgoings, it was about to be affected by a decline in receipts, till then unknown in Napoleon's reign. This decline was not manifested in the indirect taxes, or in the proceeds of registration, which would have indicated a diminution of prosperity in the interior, but in the customs and in the alienations of the national domains. The foreign imports had been remarkably reduced by the Milan decree, and there was reason to fear a diminution of 25 millions in that branch of the public revenue. The overdue instalments of the purchasers of national property, and the slackening in the sales of that property, had caused a further falling off of 15 millions in the receipts of the treasury. A surplus expected but not realised in 1807, and debited at 3 or 4 millions in the estimates of 1808, and a deficiency of some millions on the post-office, on powder and saltpetre, and on the outport receipts of Italy, raised the total deficit for 1808, the year just ended, to 47 or 48 millions.

This was but a part of the difficulty. The expenses of the preceding years 1807, 1806, 1805, might be considered as balanced, on counting at their cash value certain securities, valid enough, but of remote realisation, such as the debt of the united merchants, which was still 18 or 19 millions; the loan for Spain, which had been computed at 25 millions, and had not yet been carried beyond 7 or 8; the deposits in Bayonne, which were to have been only provisional, and were becoming permanent, like the war beyond the Pyrenees; and the advances for the Russian and Neapolitan troops, which amounted to 2 or 3 millions, and had not been repaid. These together made a total of receipts in arrear of 40 millions, and formed with the 47 or 48 millions of deficient receipts in 1808 a general deficit of about 90 millions. It is further to be observed that to put the several corps in a condition to make their preparations for war, it had been necessary to pay them sooner than usual the sums remaining due for 1808, whence it resulted that in this department the receipts were in arrear, whilst the expenditure was in advance, which doubled the difficulty.

The difficulty, however, was not serious as regarded the present, for the service-chest and the army-chest were quite adequate to meet it. The reader, doubtless, recollects the creation of the service-chest and its principle, devised by M. Mollien. Instead of employing the bank or a financial company to discount the obligations of the receivers-general, the treasury had instituted a chest into which the receivers-general were required to put their funds as soon as they received them, even when according

to the regulations they did not owe them yet.* They were paid interest up to the day when the tax represented by those funds was due, the amount being carried to their credit in the settlement of their obligations. This operation rendered it unnecessary to discount those obligations. However, as the estimated receipts of every year included more than 125 millions, which were payable only in the four or five first months of the following year, there would have been no way of avoiding the necessity of discounting a part of that amount, had not Napoleon lent to the treasury, in the name of the army-chest, 84 millions deposited therein. Thus with the advances obtained from the receivers-general, and with the 84 millions lent to it, the treasury had been able to abstain from discounting the 125 millions of obligations falling due the following year, and these were locked up and did not make their appearance in the market. For want of these obligations to employ their money, capitalists were now obliged to purchase the bills of the service-chest, which thus took the place of the former, much more cheaply for the treasury, with more order, and above all, with the advantage of realising the proceeds of the taxes as soon as they were in the receivers' hands. The treasury was thus put in possession of considerable resources, and was not embarrassed to meet a present deficiency of some 50 or 100 millions. If, for instance, it held securities for 40 millions of income not yet realised for the anterior budgets, it could obtain their amount by paying interest during the time of the advance. If the income of 1808 fell short by 48 or 50 millions, the treasury could provide for that deficiency, provided a corresponding value was quickly created. And this Napoleon did. He caused to be selected from the national domains of France, Piedmont, and Tuscany, property to the amount of 50 millions, the sale of which, slowly effected by the *caisse d'amortissement*, should serve to cover the amount by which the receipts of 1808 fell short of the estimates. Thus the service-chest furnished the immediate, and the national property of France and Italy the ultimate, means of supplying the deficit of 1808.

The budget of 1809 was fixed at the same figure as those of 1808 and 1807, that is to say, 730 millions for general expenses, and 40 millions for departmental, making 890 millions with

* This may appear obscure to readers who do not recollect what has been said in the preceding volumes, or who are unacquainted with finance. They will ask how it can be that receivers have to pay over funds which are not yet due by them. The paradox is thus explained: The direct taxes, which form the chief branch of the public revenue in France, are due by months, that is to say, by twelfths. Now, some of the taxes are paid six months or a year in advance, whilst others remain in arrear. The receivers set off the advances against the arrears, and the more to interest them in the prompt collection of the taxes, they are themselves allowed, under the name of bonifications, two or three months' delay, during which time they have the use of the money in their hands.

the costs of collection. But in 1807 and 1808 the troops beyond the Rhine had been paid by the army treasury. It was necessary that the same should be done in 1809. We have already said that all the expenses of our armies in Germany having been paid to December 31, 1808, there remained about 300 millions in the army treasury, 20 millions of which were derived from the Austrian war, and 280 millions from the Prussian. Napoleon had subsequently reduced the contribution of Prussia by 20 millions, at the request of the Emperor Alexander. Sundry rectifications had raised other items of income, and the total assets of the army treasury in January 1809 were found to be 292 millions, of which 84 millions were lent to the treasury, and were represented by a like sum in rentes, 10 millions in excellent immovable property accruing from the liquidation of the united merchants, 24 millions in specie or in tangible value, 64 millions falling due in the year 1809, 106 millions in the years 1810 and 1811, and 3 or 4 millions lent to various persons whom Napoleon had desired to aid. The whole of these consisted of values either well placed, or current, or proximately recoverable. The 24 millions in specie or tangible value added to the 64 millions falling due in 1809 made up an immediate resource of 88 millions, respecting which Napoleon had already made certain arrangements. He had recently bestowed 4 millions in gifts to certain corps, paid 1 million to the towns that had fêted the army, lent 800,000 francs to the town of Bordeaux, 2,500,000 to the vine-growers of La Gironde, 8 millions to the city of Paris, and 1 million to the university. He had, moreover, applied 1 million in aid of maritime expeditions, 10 millions to purchasing the Canal du Midi, 12 millions to the purchase of rentes, for the purpose of upholding the market, and some hundred thousand francs to the creation of burses in the lyceums. Most of these were very good investments, which, whilst doing service to the establishments to which they had been applied, or to the credit of the treasury, enabled Napoleon to recompense certain members of the army as he desired. Nevertheless they reduced the resources of the year to some 50 millions ; enough, it is true, for the immediate requirements of the war. In continuing to pay the troops in Germany out of the army-chest, Napoleon would have required 77 millions for the year (22 of which were to be levied from the vast magazines that remained to us, and 55 in cash), if he would not see a deficit in the budget of 1809, which had quite enough to do to pay the armies of Spain and Italy. Napoleon contented himself with taking three months' subsistence for the army of the Rhine, which required about 20 millions. These 20 millions, all he took immediately from the army-chest, with

the sums advanced upon the ordinary budget to the several corps, were sufficient to put them all at their ease. Napoleon thought that in the first months of 1809 his troops would be on the enemy's territory, where they would live gratuitously on the fat of the land, that victory would reopen the source of the war contributions, and would amply indemnify the army-chest for the sacrifices he was obliged to impose on it. Of the 12 millions of rentes (in capital) recently purchased, he immediately distributed 7 millions among his generals, wishing to procure them some gratifications before leading them again to death.

Thus, as we have said, the budget of 1808 was to have its diminished receipts compensated for by a sale of national property; the budget of 1809 was, like the preceding budgets, to be relieved by the army-chest of the expense of the troops in Germany; and as for current facilities until certain values should have been realised, these were to be immediately provided by the service-chest, which enjoyed the greatest credit, and by the army-chest, which was incessantly receiving the produce of the war contributions. But if there was no actual want of money as yet, it was nevertheless full time to stop, if the finances were not to be ruined as well as the army. Napoleon himself thought so; for whilst he suspended the loan assented to for Spain, and left his brother to depend solely on the wool revenues of Castille, and on some hundred thousand francs' worth of silver-plate converted into money, he interrupted the purchases of rentes which had been effected from August to December 1808, with the intention of keeping up the price. There had been purchased 46 millions, of which 10 were on account of the bank, 11 for the service-chest, 25 for the *caisse d'amortissement* (acting for itself and for the army). Independently of these sums, the bank had already purchased 16 millions on its own account, which gave for the purchases of this year a total of 62 millions. No less an effort could, in defiance of the events in Spain, have maintained the rente at the price of 80, which Napoleon called the normal price in his reign—a painful admission to make, for after Tilsit and before Bayonne the price had been 94. Austrian events having given a fresh shock to credit, and there being a strong tendency to a fall of the funds in January 1809, Napoleon would not abridge his disposable resources to stop a decline of credit which was now imputable, not to the Spanish war, but to the Austrian. The ill effect, he maintained, would fall not on him, but on perjured powers, which, when vanquished, promised him peace, and the moment they were recovered from their defeat recommenced war. He was mistaken, for everybody connected the Austrian with the Spanish war; and he

became responsible for the present decline of credit which he refused to resist, as well as for the former one which had stopped by force of money. His best justification after all would be found in victory, and he neglected nothing, indeed, to make it certain; for, as we have seen, conscripts were flocking into the depôts, new battalions were becoming organised, and the principal armies were advancing to the Upper Palatinate, Bavaria, and Friuli, to oblige Austria to reflect, or to crush her if from threats she advanced to action.

Unfortunately that power had gone too far to retract. Never had she been able to console herself for having lost in fifteen years (from 1792 to 1806) the Low Countries, the imperial possessions of Swabia, the Milanese, the Venetian States, the Tyrol, Dalmatia, and lastly, the imperial crown itself! Perhaps, if the world had settled down, as in 1713 after the Treaty of Utrecht, and in 1815 after that of Vienna, she would have submitted to necessity amidst the general immobility. But whilst Napoleon was daily exposing the fate of Europe and his own to new hazards, she could not help thrilling at every chance that presented itself; and though the Austrian was an oligarchical court that had little communication with its subjects, it now felt no emotion which was not shared by the Austrian people; for nations, whatever be the form of their institutions, never remain indifferent to the fate of their government. It is not necessary they should possess free institutions in order to have pride and ambition. So, when passing over Prussia to rush upon Poland, Napoleon had left half the continent behind him, Austria had thought of profiting by the opportunity to assail him in the rear. But this scheme was so formidable, so much remained to be done before the Austrian armies should have been reconstituted, and Napoleon had been so prompt, that the opportunity had been lost almost as soon as seen, and had left behind it in Vienna a vexation, almost a despair, that had vented itself both in words and actions. That first opportunity, offered by fortune, and lost by the hesitations of prudence, had excited an universal clamour against the men whose importunate discretion was said to spoil every chance for action. It was only the restoration of Braunau to Austria by Napoleon that quieted her for a while. She did, in fact, remain quiet for some months, from the end of 1807 to the beginning of 1808, on seeing Napoleon carrying elsewhere his incessant activity, Russia uniting with him, and England giving offence to all Europe by her barbarous expedition against Copenhagen, and she even signified to the latter power the necessity of remaining quiet at least for a time. But this resignation had been of short duration. The attack upon the crown of Spain had aroused all her passions. Her indignation was sincere, and

she showed it the more freely because Napoleon for the first time seemed embarrassed. His sudden return in August after the events of Bayonne, his sharp speeches to M. de Metternich, and his intimacy with the Emperor of Russia at Erfurth, had restrained, but not calmed, Austria, which had, on the contrary, been still more vexed and disquieted at the silence observed towards her. Without being informed of it, she had guessed that the Danubian provinces were the price paid by Napoleon at Erfurth for the Russian alliance, and this had not contributed to appease her. Lastly, the campaign Napoleon had just made in Spain had rather exalted than cooled her ardour. No doubt he had beaten the Spanish army, which was not a miracle, having set his best armies against undisciplined peasants; but these peasants were rather dispersed than vanquished, and were certainly not reduced to submission. As for the English, Napoleon had forced them to re-embark without destroying them; and if the capitulation of Baylen had done great damage to the prestige of France, the weak pursuit of the English by Marshal Soult was doing it no less at the present moment. The English were extolled with strange exaggeration, and people repeated in Vienna, with as much satisfaction as they could have done in London, that at last the French had found on the continent an army capable of withstanding them. Nor were other grounds of encouragement wanting in Vienna. The spirit of all Germany was said to be exasperated against the French, who, not content with having so often beaten and humbled it, had been too long occupying and devouring it. It is certain that the presence of our troops in the conquered countries, added to the bitter recollections of the last years, produced an extraordinary feeling of irritation. The odious act of Bayonne and the difficulties encountered in Spain had both in Germany and Austria aroused indignation and revived hope. Men felt not only detestation but contempt for a perfidy which had not succeeded, and they declared that Europe should take vengeance for it. Prussia, deprived of her king, who, since the fatal field of Jena, lived obscurely at Königsberg, not venturing to show himself to subjects to whom he had nothing to announce but the necessity of paying another 120 millions of taxes—Prussia was ready to revolt to a man, from the peasant to the noble, from Königsberg to Magdeburg. The retirement of the French, which was regarded, not as the faithful execution of a treaty, but as a consequence of their disasters in Spain, gained for them a contempt which was equally unjust and imprudent. The last detachments of our troops issuing from the fortresses of the Oder, and escorting our magazines to their place of assemblage at Magdeburg, were everywhere insulted, and could not pass through the villages without being pelted with mud

and stones. The French durst hardly show themselves in Berlin, whilst an officer of partisans, a Major Schill, who had incommoded the besiegers of Dantzig by some marauding attacks, was welcomed and fêted with enthusiasm, as if a partisan officer could pluck Germany out of Napoleon's hands.

The feelings manifested in the countries allied to France were not much better. In Saxony, though we had given back Poland and a royal title to the reigning house, they said that the king betrayed the cause of Germany for his personal interests, and crushed down his subjects with taxes and levies of troops; for the conscription was already a European sore, which was everywhere imputed to Napoleon. In Westphalia, where a young prince of the Bonaparte family had supplanted the old house of Hesse, and presented by his gorgeous magnificence, much more than by the wisdom of his government, a striking contrast with the hereditary stinginess of that house, the popular hatred was most keen. In Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Baden, where the sovereigns had gained aggrandisements of titles and territories, which the people paid for in lodgments of troops, conscriptions, and taxes, they loudly complained of princes who sacrificed their country to their personal ambition. Among all these peoples the feeling of national independence awoke that of liberty, and they talked of freeing themselves from princes who could not free themselves from Napoleon. Some bolder spirits went still further, and were already forming secret societies to deliver Europe from her oppressor and the nations from their absolute governments. An alarming phenomenon was even beginning to appear. Certain persons, fired by the general flame, were secretly cherishing, as will presently be seen, the horrible thought of assassinating Napoleon, whom the admiration and the hatred of the world represented to all eyes as the sole cause of the events of the age.

The Tyrol, in which there subsisted an old hereditary attachment for the house of Austria, impatiently supported the yoke of Bavaria. The people boldly displayed this impatience, assembled in the houses of the innkeepers, the chief persons of those mountains, as of those of Switzerland, and made preparations for a general rising on the first outbreak of hostilities. Numerous emissaries went every day to report these tidings at Vienna, without concealing their purpose from the Bavarian authorities, who were too weak to make themselves respected. All this, it is true, was but a first impulse of the heart among all the German peoples. There needed many sufferings yet on their part, and many disasters on that of the French, before they dared to rise against the so-called Attila. But if Austria raised her banner and was successful in the first instance, there was no doubt but that the insurrection might soon become general

throughout Germany, and that our allies themselves would make a prompt defection.

These facts, reported, of course, with much exaggeration at Vienna, put the climax to the enthusiasm already felt there. The time was come at last, it was said, for acting, and for no longer letting slip opportunities, as had been done in 1807; if that afforded by the Spanish insurrection was neglected, it could never be recalled; the moment was the more favourable since Napoleon had not 80,000 men in Germany (which was very incorrect), dispersed from the Baltic to the Upper Danube; since Italy itself was stripped of troops for Catalonia; since the conscription was raised with the greatest difficulty; and since the tyrant of Europe was also that of France, for in order to keep down his fellow-citizens, become first his subjects and then his slaves, he had been obliged to smite even his best servants (meaning MM. de Talleyrand and Fouché, who were said to be in disgrace). It was said, moreover, that Napoleon could not supply the place of the veteran troops sent across the Pyrenees; that he would be taken in an unprovided condition; that his German allies would fall off from him at the first signal, the German States hostile to him would rise with enthusiasm, and Prussia to the last man; that the Emperor Alexander himself, entangled in a policy which the Russian nation condemned, would, on the first occasion of adverse fortune, abandon an alliance which he had adopted because it was powerful, not because it was agreeable to him; that, in a word, it was only necessary to give the signal, for all the world would obey it, and those who gave it would thus be the authors of the general salvation.

Besides these very plausible reasons, others much less cogent were adduced, in order to swell the excitement. It was alleged that not merely for the sake of retrieving the national fortunes, but for self-preservation, it was necessary to act with all speed, for the ruin of the house of Hapsburg was decreed after that of the house of Bourbon. The Emperor of the French, it was said, intended to supersede all the old dynasties by others of his own creation. In confirmation of this belief, extraordinary stress was laid upon an insignificant expression which Napoleon had addressed to the Spaniards under the walls of Madrid, when he had displayed a sort of affectation in making them await his brother Joseph's return. "If you do not like him for your king," he said, "I do not want to force him upon you. I have another throne to give him; and as for you, I will treat you as a conquered country." This was a phrase suggested by circumstances, and uttered only to produce a momentary effect; and if Napoleon really thought of any other throne than that of Spain, at the very most it was that of Naples, which Joseph

had again pressed for, and of which Murat, who was then ill, had not yet taken possession. But according to the upper classes of Viennese society, that other throne was neither more nor less than the throne of Austria. Nothing remained then but to submit and perish ignominiously, or to resist and perish, it might be, but perish gloriously. There was no other alternative, and the choice must be made, and made quickly. In short, Vienna in 1809 was just like Berlin in 1806.

The impulse thus springing from accumulated resentments coincided with another arising out of the armaments themselves, which had been so much advanced since the end of 1808 that it was absolutely necessary either to use them or abandon them. After her military disasters Austria had naturally applied herself to discover the cause and apply the remedy. In consequence of this she had entrusted the ministry of war to the Archduke Charles, with the understanding that he was to reorganise the Austrian army in such a manner that on the first favourable opportunity the contest with France might be renewed with greater chance of success. Applying himself conscientiously to the task imposed on him, the prince began by completing the third battalions of the several regiments, so as to make them fit to become war battalions. He then created the landwehr, a sort of militia, formed in imitation of our national guard. It was composed of the nobles and the people, the former acting as officers, the latter as privates, and was required to assemble at certain points to form *corps de réserve*. This landwehr was diligently trained; and every Sunday the young men of all classes, wearing uniform and moustachios, and affecting the military air which Napoleon obliged all Europe to assume, manœuvred in the towns of Austria, under the direction of old nobles who had long retired from the army, but were ready to return to it for the service of a dynasty to which they were devoted. Strangers who had formerly known Austria so calm, so averse to war, could scarcely recognise her in the agitated and martial people they now beheld. The Diet of Hungary had just been held, and had voted the rising, as it was called—a sort of levy en masse, consisting chiefly of cavalry, and independent of the regular regiments which are recruited with Hungarian soldiers. Besides this rising, the Diet had voted extraordinary funds to defray its expenses. No pains, therefore, were any longer taken to conceal these preparations, and they were even hurried forward as for a war which was to break out in the spring, that is to say, in two or three months.

Austria reckoned on about 300,000 active troops, whom the Archduke Charles had spent three years in organising, 200,000 men of the reserve, including the most military portion of

the landwehr, and a force which it was impossible to estimate, namely, that of the Hungarian rising. Regiments had already begun to assemble in Carinthia, Upper Austria, and Bohemia, in order to the formation of *corps d'armée*. Artillery traversed the streets of Vienna in broad day, preceded and followed by regiments of infantry, amidst the acclamations of the people of the capital. Considerable works were carried on in those fortresses which were to enter into the plan of operations. These were that of the Enns, at the confluence of the Danube and the Ens, with a bridge at Mauthausen to cover Vienna against an invasion from Bavaria; that of Brusk on the Muhr, to cover Vienna from an invasion from Italy; and that of Comorn, to serve as a great fortress depôt in case of retreat into Hungary —an indication that it was intended to fight to the last, and not regard the war as ended after the loss of Vienna. That city was publicly put in a state of defence, and cannons were mounted on the ramparts.

The language adopted by the Austrians to explain to themselves and others such conduct as this in the midst of peace was, that the destruction of the house of Spain presaged an approaching attack on that of Austria; that it was necessary, therefore, to be in readiness for the month of March or April; that they should be attacked infallibly, and with such a certainty they ought not to let themselves be anticipated, but anticipate a perfidious enemy; that it mattered little who should fire the first cannon-shot, for in the eyes of honest men the real aggressor would be the author of the Bayonne crime. The bulk of the population believed in this reasoning with perfect good faith; the court had little or no belief in it, although the dethronement of the Bourbons had seriously alarmed it; but it was deeply exasperated by its own mischances, and after the lost opportunity of the Polish war it was afraid of letting slip that of the war in Spain. All the nobility were of this way of thinking, being moved at once by just national resentments and by the bad passions of the German aristocracy. Moreover, the numerous agents of England, reintroduced officiously at Vienna, were doing all in their power to excite the nation. The archdukes were among the most eager in this sort of crusade, except, however, the chief and most responsible of them, the Archduke Charles, who, being destined to command in chief, trembled not at the thought of the cannon-balls, for there was no braver soldier than he, but at the idea of finding himself again in front of the victor of the Tagliamento, playing at the game of war with him for the fate of the Austrian monarchy. According to his custom, he prepared for war without desiring it. In order to pique his courage, a nickname was applied to him, borrowed from the events of Spain, that of Prince of the Peace. The

Emperor Francis, always rational, but wanting in energy, yielded to an infatuation he blamed, contenting himself with a few sarcastic comments upon the faults he suffered to be committed, especially when those faults were the work of his brothers. Recently united, since the death of his first consort, with a princess of the house of Modena, who was most deeply imbued with Austrian prejudices, he found in his family a unanimity that perfectly accommodated his weakness, for all its members, except himself, approved of the tendencies to which he passively yielded. This suited his character and sufficed for his repose.

Thus arming continually, talking and exciting each other for months, the princes and nobles who governed Austria had come at last into a state of open hostility, which made some decisive step inevitable. Moreover, Napoleon's abrupt return to Paris, his appeal to the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine, and the movements of French troops towards the Upper Palatinate and Bavaria, gave reason to think that France was preparing for the war with what it had been intended to surprise her. Thus the endeavour to take securities against a danger that did not exist had actually created that danger. An attempt might, no doubt, have been made to come to an understanding with Napoleon by means of the guarantee proposed in Paris by the Russian and French diplomatists. But this kind of *dénoûment* was stale, for it had been already employed after Tilsit to escape from a similar perplexity. To escape a second time from such a position by a sham reconciliation was not an easy thing. War, then, or immediate disarming was the only alternative; for besides the impossibility of finding specious apologies for preparations so far advanced, it was also becoming impossible to support the expense. But in the face of Germany, of England, and of the nation itself, suddenly to express a sense of security after having appeared so alarmed, to abandon those who had been fondly called the heroic Spaniards, and to let slip what had been on all hands declared to be the finest of opportunities—this was impossible. It was come to this, that Austria must conquer or fall in arms. And had she not many chances in her favour? Her army reorganised and more flourishing than ever; exasperated Germany breathing earnest good wishes, and ready upon the least encouragement to pass from wishes to the most active cooperation; England offering her subsidies; Russia wavering; France beginning to think what Europe thought, and less disposed to back the conqueror who exhausted herself in order to ravage the world; and the French army dispersed from the Oder to the Tagus, from the mountains of Bohemia to those of the Sierra Morena, decimated by eighteen years of incessant wars, and feebly recruited by young soldiers, torn from their despairing families at an age which was scarcely that of adoles-

cence. Under the headlong influence of these motives, one day it came to pass, one knew not how, that war was decreed. Orders were given to assemble five *corps d'armée* in Bohemia, two in Upper Austria, two in Carinthia, and one in Galicia. The Archduke Charles was to be commander-in-chief. The efforts of diplomacy were employed to prepare alliances as another means of war.

The relations with England, which had only been fictitiously interrupted, were renewed; the plenteous subsidies she offered were accepted; and the business of effecting a reconciliation between her and Turkey was continued. It was resolved also to try and bring back the Emperor Alexander to a sense of what was called the interests of Europe, by which was meant his own.

Austrian diplomacy had much to do at Constantinople. To alienate the Turks from France, bring them into relations with England, and dispose them to fall upon Russia if the latter continued to act in concert with Napoleon, or leave her at peace if she broke with him, so that there might be none but the common enemy of Europe to encounter—this was a very judicious line of policy, and one which deserved to be actively pursued. Moreover, the continual revolutions of the court of Turkey facilitated all kinds of foreign intrigues.

Since the fall of Sultan Selim fresh catastrophes had ensanguined the seraglio, and given Turkey the appearance of an empire perishing through its inward convulsions. The famous Pacha of Rutschuk, Mustapha Baraïctar, whether really attached to his master Selim, as he alleged, or offended because a fanatical faction of Janissaries and Ulemas had disposed of the sceptre without consulting him, had taken up his position at Adrianople with a large army. All the other pachas had sent deputies to him, or had repaired to him in person, and Mustapha himself, the new sultan, had sent ambassadors to his camp, as if to put himself at the pacha's discretion. Thus, under the pretext of conferring on the fate of the empire, Mustapha Baraïctar became its actual ruler. Presently he encamped under the walls of Constantinople, and one day at last he marched upon the seraglio to release Selim, who was kept shut up with the women, under the guard of eunuchs, and replace him on the throne. But at the moment he was about to execute that design, the head of his unfortunate master, the best sovereign that for a long time had reigned in Constantinople, was flung at his feet. To avenge Selim, Baraïctar deposed Mustapha after a short reign, and for want of a more eligible successor he had been obliged to take Mustapha's brother Mahmoud, aged twenty-four, a prince who was not without merit, and who had been inoculated by the imprisoned Selim with a taste for European civilisation. Having

effected this revolution, Mustapha Baraïctar governed the empire for some months with absolute authority in the name of the young sultan; but a fresh revolt of the Janissaries put an end to his despotism, and heaped catastrophe on catastrophe. Baraïctar having been surprised by the Janissaries before he could retreat to the seraglio, hid himself in the cellarage of his burning palace, and had perished in the ruins.

Mahmoud, who was a man of some boldness as well as cunning, had not been a stranger to this last revolution. Delivered from an insolent master, he had taken upon himself to govern his tottering empire, and he was engaged in the attempt at the moment when France and Austria were about to measure each other's strength once more on the banks of the Danube. To win the Turks to her, that she might dispose of them to her own advantage, was, as we have said, of great importance to Austria, for thus she could either set on an enemy the more against the Russians if they continued to be allies of France, or relieve them from that troublesome enemy if they consented to join what was called the European cause.

The thing was becoming easy since the new position assumed by France towards Turkey, with which it was impossible for her to remain on a friendly footing whilst united as she was with Russia. As a colourable pretext for the change which took place after Tilsit, she had at first alleged the fall of her excellent friend Selim. To this Sultan Mustapha replied that this event ought not to occasion any coolness on the part of France, for the Porte remained her best friend. Upon this Napoleon rejoined that such being the case, he would endeavour to effect a good peace between the Russians and the Turks, but he did not venture to speak of conditions. The Russians, however, insisting both before and after Erfurth that France should end matters with the Turks and demand from them the Danubian provinces; the Turks, on their part, complaining to France that she did not procure them the promised peace, whilst Napoleon was running continually from Bayonne to Paris, from Paris to Erfurth, from Erfurth to Madrid; the latter, in order to amuse both parties, ended by hinting to the Turks, with demonstrations of the liveliest regret, that they were no longer capable of defending Wallachia and Moldavia, that they would do well to give them up, and at that price secure themselves a solid peace, and concentrate all their energies within the provinces that were strongly attached to the empire; and if at that price they would terminate a war which threatened to be most disastrous to them, he promised to procure them an immediate arrangement, and to guarantee the integrity of the Ottoman empire in the name of France. Nothing could give any idea of the revolution that took place in the

temper of the Turks upon this overture of French diplomacy. Though it had been made with great caution, and nothing had been said which it was possible to avoid saying after the engagements contracted with Russia, the indignation of Sultan Mahmoud, the divan, the Ulemas, and the Janissaries was extreme; and this mere hint so violently agitated the Turkish ministry that the emotion communicated itself like lightning to the entire nation. The talk was immediately of arming 300,000 men, of even levying the Ottoman people en masse, and sacrificing the very last disciple of the prophet rather than yield. France was no longer regarded as a friend who reluctantly made known a painful necessity to her allies, but as a false friend who betrayed her ancient allies to an insatiable neighbour. Watching these vicissitudes with extreme impatience to profit by them, Austria assured the Turks that the secret of the famous interview at Erfurth had been nothing less than the sacrifice of the mouths of the Danube, promised by the French to the Russians; that to ensure the indulgence of Russia in the affairs of Spain, France surrendered the Porte to her, and thus after having betrayed her friends the Spaniards, she sought for pardon by betraying her friends the Turks, and relieved herself from a difficulty by heaping treachery on treachery. To these dark representations was added a very incorrect account of what was happening in Spain, showing how the French were beaten by insurgent peasants and by the armies of England; and as the Mussulmans entertain a superstitious respect for victory, it produced the most decisive impression upon them, since it represented Napoleon as judged by the result, that is to say, condemned by God Himself. From all these allegations Austria drew the conclusion that the Porte ought to forsake France and unite with England, forget the recent passage of the Dardanelles by Admiral Duckworth, and rely on the support of the Austrian and English armies to resist the ambition of a formidable neighbour and the treachery of a false friend.

This language penetrated with incredible promptitude the exasperated hearts to which it was addressed, and in a short time there was effected in the foreign policy of Constantinople a revolution quite as strange as that which had occurred in its domestic policy. A year ago the French had been in high favour with the Turks, who erected great batteries under their direction, whence they discharged red-hot balls at the detested English; now the French could not show themselves in the streets of Constantinople without being insulted, and the presence of the English was invoked by the whole population. Attentive to all these movements of an ardent and fanatic people, Austria notified the English of the success of her manœuvres, and had Mr. Adair sent to the Dardanelles. He

anchored there on board an English frigate, and had not long to wait for permission to appear in Constantinople, where, after some discussion, the peace concluded with England was signed in the beginning of January 1809. From that moment the Porte was at the disposal of the new coalition, ready to do whatever Austria and England should desire for their common cause.

Austria was not less active in her exertions in St. Petersburg than in Constantinople, but without the same success. The court of Vienna had chosen as her representative on this occasion Prince Schwarzenberg, a brave soldier, unskilled in the refinements of diplomacy, but capable of imposing by his very integrity, and misleading inquirers as to the real intentions of his court, which were hardly known to him. He was instructed to aver that the intentions of Austria were upright and disinterested, that she had no enterprise in view, her whole anxiety being, on the contrary, to defend herself against enterprises like that of Bayonne; that if the Emperor Alexander would return to a better appreciation of the interests of Europe and of Russia, he should find in her a sure friend, by no means jealous, nor at all inclined to oppose his aggrandisement in any way compatible with the balance of power. M. de Schwarzenberg was enjoined to lay particular stress on the grand argument of the moment, the perfidy committed against Spain, which made it impossible for any one to remain in alliance with the French cabinet without dishonour. On this point M. de Schwarzenberg, who was a man of strict honour, was to endeavour to awaken whatever honourable susceptibility there was in the breast of Alexander. Lastly, if he succeeded in obtaining a favourable hearing, he was to offer the hand of the heir of the Austrian empire for the Grand Duchess Anne, a proposal which could not encounter any obstacle on the part of the empress-mother, and which, if accepted, would have re-established the intimacy between the two imperial courts.*

The Emperor Alexander was at this period no longer sincere in his relations with Napoleon, though he had been so in the beginning, when the enthusiasm of chimerical projects led him to approve of everything in his ally. He had then sincerely admired the genius of Napoleon and the man himself, both worthy to be admired, and interest helping enthusiasm, he had become a perfectly cordial ally. But the illusion that had attended his grand projects had disappeared when Constantinople was no longer in question, but only Bucharest and Jassy. Doubtless the conquest of the Danubian provinces, which is not even yet accomplished at this day, was a very sufficient matter of

* Prince Schwarzenberg's mission, which was of great importance at that period, was entirely known to the French cabinet through the communications made to M. de Caulaincourt by the Emperor Alexander.

interest for Russia; but it was one of a less dazzling character, that left Alexander's mind in a more sober mood, and made him careful about the means of execution. It had seemed in the beginning that no more would be wanting than Napoleon's consent to obtain the Danubian provinces; but when the time approached for realising the design, the practical difficulties appeared much more serious than had been anticipated. If Napoleon by rapidly subjugating Spain, and inflicting some signal disaster on the English, had hindered Austria from even conceiving a thought of resistance; and if the Turks had consequently been forced to submit to whatever had been desired respecting their provinces, Alexander might have retained, if not the enthusiasm inspired by his first projects, at least the fervour of an alliance which brought him such sure and prompt advantages. But great as were the genius and the resources of Napoleon, he had created for himself such difficulties as gave his enemies of all kinds courage to attack him again. Russia, on her part, had not been as successful in Finland as had been expected in St. Petersburg and in Paris. That vast empire, a Hercules in the cradle, with an immense future before it, but with a present far from equalling its future, had never been able to send more than 40,000 men into Finland during the summer campaign, and had spent the fine season in waging a sort of war against Sweden that ill became her own greatness. In short, this Swedish war, which was in its origin not a jot more moral than that of Spain, had not been more successful, and the two emperors, though much superior to their enemies, had not obtained any very enchanting favours from fortune; accordingly the Emperor Alexander was by no means enchanted. He found that what Napoleon conceded to him he had still to conquer with painful efforts; and the process of disenchantment, which was always so prompt with him, was already making visible progress in his mind. He deemed Napoleon still powerful enough to make it unsafe to quarrel with him; but he did not deem him victorious enough to make his alliance as advantageous as ever, nor pure enough to make it as much an honour; and as, moreover, he probably would not have obtained the consent of Austria and England to the conquests which continued to be his ruling passion—that of the Danubian provinces—and as a new revolution in his friendships would have dishonoured him, he had resolved to persist in the French alliance, but to draw from it the largest profit at the cost of the least possible return.

Under these circumstances this war between France and Austria could not but be most inopportune for Alexander, for it would render more difficult the conquest of the Turkish provinces, compel a costly effort if it was requisite to aid Napoleon by sending an army into Galicia, and add a new war to the

four already on hand with the Swedes, the English, the Persians, and the Turks. This war would, moreover, put Russia in still more flagrant contradiction with her past proceedings, for it might expose her to fight in the plains of Austerlitz for the French against the Austrians, and furnish fresh grounds of complaint to the Russian aristocracy, who blamed the close connection with France. Finally, whether prosperous or unprosperous, it would bring about a result equally to be deprecated; for if prosperous, it might inspire Napoleon with the pernicious design of destroying Austria, and thus extinguishing every intermediate power between the Rhine and the Niemen; if unprosperous, it would render ridiculous, dangerous, and at the least fruitless, the alliance contracted with France, to the great scandal of all old Europe. There is no worse position than that of not being able to wish either the success or the failure of a war, and the best thing to do in such a case is to try to hinder it. This was what Alexander resolved to do by every imaginable means.

M. de Romanzoff had returned to St. Petersburg, seduced by Napoleon's attentions, as much as M. de Caulaincourt had been by those of Alexander. But the two sovereigns were sufficiently superior to their ministers to escape from the seductions which beguiled the latter. Alexander listened to M. de Romanzoff's accounts of the marvels of Paris, and the attentions lavished on him by Napoleon, just as Napoleon received from M. de Caulaincourt details of the gracious favours daily bestowed on him; but he did not deviate from any of his resolutions. He settled with M. de Romanzoff the language and the conduct he was to use towards France, and held several important conversations with M. de Caulaincourt. He scarcely at all concealed from him what he thought of the existing situation, of which he spoke impartially for Napoleon, and with moderation for himself. He admitted that the war in Finland had not been well conducted, but expressed regret that Napoleon, on his part, had not obtained more decisive successes against the English. He appeared even to think that after all the English alone had gained something by the enterprise against Spain, since they were about to have the Spanish colonies at their disposal, which was much more than an equivalent for the conquest—the very dubious conquest —of Lisbon and Cadiz by the French. He declared how painful it would be to him to have to fight the old allies by whose side he had stood at Austerlitz, and what perplexities that singular situation would cause him in the higher circles of St. Petersburg, and even in the nation. He avowed the difficulty he should have in assembling, besides a new army in Finland, an army of observation along the Baltic, a grand conquering army to act against Turkey, and an auxiliary army to act with the French against Austria—a difficulty which was not only military, but in

a still higher degree financial. He even went so far as to declare that the success of the new war would cause him much uneasiness, for he should look with alarm on the extinction of Austria, and would not consent to its being replaced by another Poland. Peace was necessary for himself, but he believed it necessary also for Napoleon; for it did not escape him, he said, that France was beginning to desire it, and to experience a change of feeling towards her glorious sovereign. These were all so many reasons why he should be left to act with freedom as regarded Austria, and do all he could to prevent a war, the very idea of which was utterly repugnant to him. Unfortunately, he added, he was far from believing with Napoleon that it was enough to threaten and to deliver ultimata in the name of the two greatest powers in the world to stop the headlong course of people swayed by hate and terror, in whose breasts there subsisted, allowing for much exaggeration of language, a portion of genuine fear, which must be taken into consideration. He asked, therefore, that he should be permitted to reassure them and at the same time intimidate them; to reassure them by peremptorily denying the existence of any intention to treat them like Spain; to intimidate them by demonstrating the disastrous results which a new war would bring down upon them. Furthermore, Alexander refused to entrust the conduct of this affair, as Napoleon desired, to the two ministers of Russia and France at Vienna. Napoleon, whilst wishing for peace, thought that those two ministers would be more peremptory, and would therefore be more attended to. Alexander, on the contrary, thought they would go straightway for war. "Our ministers will make a mess of everything," said he to M. de Caulaincourt. "Let me be left to act and to speak, and if war can be avoided, I will avoid it; if it cannot, I will act, when it shall have become inevitable, loyally and frankly."

There was no choice then but to leave him to act, since after all, his views, being quite pacific, were perfectly in accordance with those of Napoleon. So earnestly did the latter desire peace that he had secretly authorised Alexander to promise not only the joint guarantee of Russia and France for the integrity of the Austrian dominions, but also the complete evacuation of the territory of the Confederation of the Rhine, which signified that there should not remain a single French soldier in Germany.

Alexander kept his word, and expressed himself with perfect frankness to M. de Schwarzenberg. Though unable to hide his confusion when the Austrian minister upbraided him with being the accomplice of the base conduct practised at Bayonne, he was callous to the appeal made to his feelings in favour of the European cause; and reproaching the Austrian policy with all the falsehood and dissimulation it had been guilty of for two

years, for it had never ceased to talk of peace whilst it was preparing war, he ended by declaring that he was under formal engagements contracted solely for the interests of his empire, and which he was resolved to fulfil; that if Austria was foolish enough to come to a rupture, she would be crushed by Napoleon, but that she would force Russia also to take part in the war, for the latter having pledged her word, would unite her troops with those of France; that the enfranchisement of Europe, which the Austrian cabinet was incessantly talking about, would not be effected; that no more would be gained by occasioning a new effort of him whom they called an overwhelming Colossus than to make him more overwhelming still, and to give England, another overwhelming Colossus by sea, the means of postponing the peace which was so urgently needed; that as for him, peace was all he desired (including the Danubian provinces, he might have added); that peace must be had at last; that he would regard as an enemy whoever rendered it more remote; and that he would employ against such an offender, be it who it might, the whole strength of his empire. Alexander put aside all idea of a family alliance with Austria; for he would not have committed the indecorum of bestowing on an archduke a princess he had almost promised to Napoleon.

The Austrian minister was confounded by these frank declarations. The higher circles of St. Petersburg, though certainly less ardent than those of Vienna, had made him expect a different result. He had found everybody of the European party and opposed to France, though they were afraid of speaking openly for fear of vexing the emperor. He had, moreover, ascertained that the imperial family entertained the same feelings, and he had hoped for a better reception from the emperor. A more practised ambassador would have seen that beneath these very genuine feelings, which were to a certain extent shared by Alexander himself, there lay the interests of the nation, which were just then associated with those of France; that if the Russian aristocracy and the imperial family might indulge in language which accorded best with their prejudices, the emperor and his cabinet had a different conduct to pursue; and that if they could acquire a fine territory, their course was plainly to let the courtiers and the women talk on, and to attend to the business of the empire by trying to secure in this commotion the long-coveted banks of the Danube.

Understanding nothing of these apparent contradictions, the excellent Prince Schwarzenberg filled St. Petersburg with his lamentations, and sent despatches to his government which ought to have made her pause, had it been possible yet to arrest her precipitate course. Alexander, seeing he had produced a certain impression on the representative of Austria, hoped that

the latter would effect something with his own court; but not reckoning on this with much confidence, he made his preparations for a speedy war. Being most desirous of terminating the war in Finland as soon as possible, he sent a reinforcement which raised the number of men acting in that province to about 60,000. He gave orders for marching against the centre of Sweden across the Frozen Sea. A column was to wind round the Gulf of Bothnia, and march by Uleaburg against Tornea and Umea. Another was to march from Wasa across the Gulf of Bothnia, on the ice, and meet the first column at Umea. A third and principal column was also to make its way across the ice by the Isles of Aland to Stockholm. The guard and two divisions were to remain between St. Petersburg, Revel, and Riga, to protect the shores of the Baltic from the English. Four divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, forming 60,000 men, were to enter Galicia, to hold the balance of events much rather than to second the French armies. Lastly, as was natural, the greatest efforts of Russia were directed towards Turkey, for if Alexander desired to be a moderator in the west, in the east he chose to be a conqueror, and he sent eight divisions to the Lower Danube, one of which was a reserve consisting of third battalions. It was to take up a position midway between Transylvania and Wallachia, so that it might either second the invading army in Turkey, or join the army in Galicia, and take part in some way or another in the events which should arise in that quarter. This division was reckoned by M. de Caulaincourt as one of those which was devoted to the service of the alliance. The whole body of troops acting in this direction amounted to about 120,000 men. Thus to end the conquest of Finland, make head against the English, conquer the mouths of the Danube, and moderate events in Germany, were the several employments to which Alexander destined the 280,000 active troops at his disposal. If he did no more, he imputed it to his finances, of the state of which he complained constantly to M. de Caulaincourt, talking incessantly of the five wars he was about to have on his hands, and though always proud in his bearing, yet becoming almost humble when money was in question, and requesting aid to enable him to contract loans in France or in Holland.

The conduct of Russia greatly disconcerted the cabinet of Vienna, which had expected to find her less refractory, because it had judged of the cabinet by the language of the aristocracy. However, though it regarded the mission of Prince Schwarzenberg as a failure, it flattered itself that the Russian cabinet could not long resist the opinion of the nation, especially when strengthened by a first victory of the Austrian arms. The 60,000 men ordered for Galicia were considered as a mere corps of observation, to which it would be enough to oppose

very inferior forces, with orders likewise to observe rather than act. Neither the language, then, nor the armed demonstrations of Russia were taken as an argument against war; on the contrary, it was resolved to hurry everything forward so as to gain over the French forces, still dispersed from Magdeburg to Ulm, that first victory which was to bring all the powers to side with Austria. The latter was in one of those situations in which, being no longer able to retreat, one takes every circumstance, adverse or favourable, for a reason for advancing.

Preparations for war and diplomatic movements having occupied the month of February and a part of the month of March, it was resolved to take the field in the beginning of April, the earliest period when war is possible in Austria, grass having then but just begun to cover the ground. The plan of the campaign was laid down at Vienna. In the first place it was settled that only the least forces of the empire should be made to act in Italy and Galicia. Fifty thousand men were to be sent under the Archduke John to second the insurrection of the Tyrol, and to occupy by their presence the French forces in Italy. Eight or ten thousand men were to act against General Marmont in Dalmatia. The Archduke Ferdinand, with 40,000 men, was to hold in check the Saxo-Polish army assembled under the walls of Warsaw, and to observe the Russians who were marching into Galicia.

The principal body, that which contained the best and most numerous troops, was to act in Germany by the Upper Danube, and attempt the bold enterprise of surprising the French before their concentration. It was the Archduke Charles who was to command it as generalissimo, and had organised it as minister of war. Nothing, consequently, had been neglected. It was a force of about 200,000 men, strong especially in infantry, which the Archduke had taken pains to render excellent; strong also in artillery, which had always been very good in Austria; but not so well provided with cavalry, which the Archduke Charles had not augmented, but which, though not numerous, was as well trained as it was brave. It was divided into six *corps d'armée* and two *corps de réserve*, distributed between Bohemia and Upper Austria. Behind this main body the reserve and the Hungarian rising were to cover Vienna, and if Vienna were lost they were to retreat into the heart of Hungary, where, uniting with the remains of the active army, they were to prolong the war. This second body, consisting of more than 200,000 militiamen unused to war, but tolerably well trained, swelled to above 500,000 men the resources of Austria, which had never before made such a display of force.

The question next to be determined was, how to employ the 200,000 men of the main body, who were to act in Germany

and strike the first blow. The Aulic Council, reputed to be the ordinary cause of the disasters of Austria, because it was said to paralyse the authority of the generals, had been deprived of its influence in favour of the generalissimo without there resulting much more unity in the command; for unity can only subsist where there reigns a strong will directed by a steadfast mind. The archduke, though a prudent, enlightened, brave prince, and the best captain of Austria, had not the force of mind and character necessary to secure unity of command; and the conflict of opinions which had been complained of in the Aulic Council was about to be repeated around him between the leading officers of his staff, with the improvement, it is true, of being exercised nearer to the field of battle; and this improvement was certainly not to be despised.

The archduke's staff were divided between two opinions as to the best plan to be pursued. The one was to take Bohemia for a point of departure, and supposing the French still scattered over Saxony, Franconia, and the Upper Palatinate, to debouch on Bareuth, that is to say, on the centre of Germany, beat them in detail, and raise up the population of Germany by this sudden apparition and prompt success. This bold plan, which conducted the Austrians by Bareuth and Wurzburg to the very gates of Mayence, had the advantage of leading them to the Rhine by the shortest route, carrying confusion into the cantonments of the French, and the liveliest emotion into Germany. But for the very reason that it was bold, it supposed in its execution a character that is in general possessed only by captains of a superior order, who are usually fortunate, and confident because they are fortunate. There was none of that kind then in Germany or elsewhere, except in France. This plan, moreover, supposed a degree of advancement in the military preparations of Austria which its plodding administration had not succeeded in giving them. It was not until the beginning of March that the troops destined for Bohemia were concentrated there. Many regiments wanted their third battalions, and the artillery had not arrived. This plan of surprising the French would, no doubt, have been a good one if adequately executed; but if they were not sufficiently surprised, it might turn out disastrously, for if they should have had time enough to move from the Elbe to the Danube, and rally between Ulm and Ratisbon, the Austrian army would be exposed to have them on its left flank, making way to Vienna by the Danube, dispersing all the detachments it had left in Bavaria, and perhaps even breaking its line of operations. With a general so fertile in unexpected manœuvres as Napoleon, this latter chance was much to be apprehended.

The second plan was humbler and safer. It was to take the

ordinary route, that of the Danube, by which the French would naturally arrive, on account of the facility of communication along that great river; to confront them on that route with the enormous mass of 200,000 men, and to take advantage of their less prepared state, not to surprise them, but to beat them before they had rallied their numbers sufficiently to dispute the victory. This plan afforded no opportunity for any of those sudden manœuvres of Napoleon's which commonly baffled all calculations, and exposed to no risk but that of the field of battle, always perilous enough against such a captain and such soldiers.

These two plans were long debated between two officers of the Archduke Charles's staff, General Meyer and General Grünn, and divided the opinions of the ablest tacticians of Austria. But as always happens in such cases, the decision of the question was left to events; and nothing was settled until spies had reported the march of General Oudinot on Ulm, and of Marshal Davout on Wurzburg. It was then perceived that the Austrians would arrive too late for the successful execution of the first plan, and that by debouching by Bohemia on Bareuth they would have the French on their left flank, reaching Vienna by the Danube. It was therefore suddenly resolved to move back into Upper Austria the corps which were originally to have assembled in Bohemia. But in this instance again the usual effects of feeble command displayed themselves: some portion of the first plan was retained; and the second was only adopted with a reduction of the main body of forces which should have been employed for its execution. Thus some 50,000 men were left in Bohemia under Generals Bellegarde and Kollowrath, and about 150,000 were moved into Upper Austria, to be marched across Bavaria to meet the French at Ratisbon. The first of these bodies was to debouch by the Upper Palatinate on Bamberg, and extend its left towards Ratisbon. The second was to invade Bavaria and ascend the Danube, extending its right towards Ratisbon, that the two masses communicating with each other along the river might be able, if need were, to form a junction, though with many chances of failing in that operation. In this way the Austrian army advanced astride of the Danube, as it were, wavering between two plans, still with the hope of acting before the French, and guarding against a flank movement on their part by pouring part of the Austrian forces in Bohemia into Bavaria. General Meyer, who is said to have advocated the first plan, was sent from the headquarters of the Archduke Charles to those of the Archduke John, to employ in Italy the talents that were rejected in Germany; and General Grünn, the author of the second plan, remained alone with the Archduke Charles as his principal adviser.

In consequence of this new system, the first corps, which had

formed at Saatz under Lieutenant-General Bellegarde, and the second, which had formed at Pilsen under General Kollowrath, of the artillery, retained the same rallying points, and had orders to debouch with 50,000 men by the extreme frontier of Bohemia on Bareuth in the beginning of April. The corps of Hohenzollern, of Rosenberg, and of the Archduke Louis, which had formed at Prague, Piseck, and Budweis, and the first *corps de réserve* of Prince John de Lichtenstein, which had formed at Iglau, and which was composed of grenadiers and cuirassiers, received orders to pass from Bohemia into Austria by the route from Budweis to Lintz, to cross the Danube by the bridge of the latter town, and to be before the Inn, the frontier of Bavaria, about the beginning of April. There they were to unite with Lieutenant-General Hiller's corps, formed at Wels on the Traun, and with General Kienmayer's second *corps de réserve*, formed at Enns on the Ens. These six corps were to march together on Bavaria, having the Danube on their right, thus tending to meet Bellegarde and Kollowrath's left towards Ratisbon. Orders were likewise given to commence hostilities in Italy and Poland in the beginning of April, as well as in Bavaria and Bohemia.

Now it was not possible, without carrying dissimulation far beyond all tolerable limits, to continue talking of peace whilst putting armies in march, and sending them orders to cross the frontier within a fortnight. This would have been too much like the conduct of the English at sea, who usually seized the enemy's traders without any previous declaration. Besides, victory was not so sure that one might venture to violate the law of nations in the hope of doing so with impunity. Orders were consequently given to M. de Metternich to make a preliminary declaration to the French cabinet, which might serve as a transition between the language of peace and the actual fact of war.

Accordingly, on the 2nd of March, M. de Metternich presented himself at Paris to M. de Champagny, the minister for foreign affairs, and declared to him, in the name of his court, that the sudden arrival of the Emperor Napoleon in Paris, the call to the princes of the Confederation to assemble their contingents, certain newspaper articles, and sundry movements of French troops, determined it to raise its armies above the peace footing on which they had been kept until then, but that it only adopted this resolution because it was forced to it by the conduct of the French government, and that it took these indispensable precautions without yet departing from its pacific intentions.

M. de Champagny replied to this communication with coldness and incredulity, saying that this change from a peace footing to a war footing was six months old, Austria having

been actually engaged for six months in preparing for hostilities; that the Emperor Napoleon had not been duped in the matter, and had made preparations on his own side; that the alarm now affected could not be real, for when the French were occupying Silesia with formidable armies, Austria had not thought herself menaced, whereas, now that the greater part of the French troops had been removed into Spain, she affected the liveliest uneasiness; that this could not be the language of good faith; that evidently the English policy had prevailed at Vienna; that the Austrian government believed itself ready, and acted because it supposed the moment was favourable for action; but that France was not to be surprised, and Austria could have only herself to blame for the consequences of the war should they prove disastrous.

Having to explain himself more fully, M. de Metternich then complained both of the silence observed towards him by the Emperor Napoleon, and of the ignorance in which Austria had been left during the negotiations at Erfurth. He appeared to attribute solely to a want of friendly explanations the misunderstanding that threatened to end in war. M. de Champagny haughtily replied that the emperor deigned no longer to speak with an ambassador whom the court of Austria deceived, or who deceived the court of France, for nothing he had promised had been fulfilled: neither the suspension of military preparations, nor the recognition of King Joseph, nor the return to pacific dispositions; that explanations were therefore useless with the representative of a court whose word could no longer be relied on; that it was not M. de Metternich personally who was treated so coldly, but the representative of a government unfaithful to all its promises; that Austria had saved the English by crossing the Inn in 1805, when Napoleon was preparing to cross the Straits of Calais; that it had just saved them once more by hindering Napoleon from pursuing them to Coruña; that it had thus twice hindered the triumph of France over her rival; that it should pay the penalty, and should this time find Napoleon neither less prompt, nor less prepared, nor less terrible than formerly.

After some other complaints of the same nature, the two ministers separated without any overture which afforded the least hope of peace; M. de Metternich appearing to deplore war, for his sagacity foresaw its disastrous consequences, and his situation in Paris made him regret his departure from that capital; M. de Champagny appearing not to fear a fresh conflict, and, moreover, displaying the anger of a devoted subject who never could see any fault in his master.

All hope of peace being now at end, Napoleon was seized with that extraordinary ardour that possessed him whenever

events became serious, and on the 3rd and 4th of March he gave his orders with unparalleled activity. Believing as he did at first that Austria could not take the field before the end of April or the beginning of May, he had assigned as mustering places—Augsburg for General Oudinot, Metz for the Carra St. Cyr and Legrand divisions, Strasburg for the Boudet and Molitor divisions, and Wurzburg for Marshal Davout. He now chose others nearer to the enemy, and hastened the despatch of men and matériel to these new points. Ulm was made the mustering place of the Boudet, Molitor, Carra St. Cyr, and Legrand divisions. The first two, already en route from Lyons to Strasburg, were ordered to diverge towards Befort, and go straight to Ulm, crossing the Black Forest by the shortest road. The Carra St. Cyr and Legrand divisions had orders not to stop at Metz, and to march by Strasburg to Ulm without losing an instant. Their reinforcements and their matériel were immediately despatched to meet them on their road. Fortunately these troops were old enough not to be in danger of being disorganised through such precipitation. Oudinot's corps, already on its march to Augsburg, was not so well constituted. From an accidental assemblage of grenadiers and voltigeurs, it had had to pass to a formation of fourth battalions. The emperor despatched ten days earlier the grenadiers and voltigeurs taken from the guard to form the two *compagnies d'élite* of these fourth battalions, and the fusiliers drafted from the depôts to form the four centre companies. But the utmost that could be hoped for was that at the opening of hostilities this corps would have four companies to a battalion instead of six, two divisions instead of three, and 20,000 men instead of 30,000. Besides this, it would have to form almost in presence of the enemy. But the military spirit of the time, the experience of the officers, soldiers, and generals, and the fervour that animated and sustained everybody, would make up for all deficiencies.

Napoleon did not change the place of muster appointed for the corps of Marshal Davout, still called the army of the Rhine. He sent to it in all haste the reinforcements necessary to complete the first three war battalions, and the detachments which were to serve as nuclei of the fourth battalions. Each of the divisions of cavalry and infantry, having to pass by Wurzburg, would find there the men and the matériel belonging to it. He only ordered Marshal Davout, whose headquarters were at Wurzburg, to move his divisions immediately into the Upper Palatinate, so as to have one soon at Bareuth, one at Bamberg, one at Nuremberg, and one at Ratisbon, in order to confront the Austrian troops in Bohemia. So pressed for time was Napoleon, that in order to hasten the departure of recruits, he

had recourse to a very irregular measure, which under any other administration than his would have been attended with serious inconvenience and produced strange confusion. Certain depôts abounded with conscripts, ready trained and clothed, whilst others were without any. He ordered the conscripts who were ready to join the regiments that wanted men, whether they belonged to them or not. Only care was to be taken when they joined to change their buttons for others with the appropriate numbers. Napoleon, moreover, took the precaution not to make known to the officers of the depôts the destination of the conscripts required of them, lest taking no more interest in them, they might give them inferior equipments. He prescribed the same arrangements for the light cavalry, sending off all the chasseurs and hussars who were ready, without caring whether or not they joined their own regiments, only desiring that resemblance of uniform should be attended to as much as possible. However, as hussars could not be mixed with chasseurs on account of the extreme difference of equipment, and as there were more hussars than could be employed, he formed of them squadrons of guides to serve in the headquarters of each *corps d'armée*, so as to relieve the light cavalry from escort service, which obliges it to squander its strength in numerous detachments.

We mention these details in order to give an idea of the expedients to which Napoleon was reduced, in consequence of having sent his principal resources into Spain. After having attended to these various matters, he applied himself to organising the fifth battalions. These he intended, as we have said, to serve both in their ordinary capacity as depôts, and also as reserves, whether to protect the coasts from the assaults of the English, or to set at liberty a certain number of fourth battalions then employed at the camp of Boulogne, or to meet the various contingencies of the war. Having already demanded 80,000 men on account of the conscription of 1810, he resolved to levy 30,000 more, in order to raise the effective of the fifth battalion to 1200 men at least; and he also resolved to take 10,000 strong men for his guard from the classes of the preceding years, notwithstanding the reiterated calls that had been made upon them. He ordered that such of the fifth battalions as should be first formed should be united provisionally into demi-brigades of two, three, or four battalions each, at Pontivy, Paris, Boulogne, Ghent, Metz, Mayence, Strasburg, and Milan. As for the 10,000 conscripts of the anterior classes, these were to be employed in giving a quite new development to the imperial guard. To the regiments of grenadiers and chasseurs composing the old guard he had added in 1807 two regiments of fusiliers, which

had served very well. He now determined to create four regiments of tirailleurs and four of conscripts, which would make the infantry of the guard amount to at least 20,000 men, and the whole body to 25,000, including its magnificent cavalry and its artillery, now increased by forty-eight pieces. The young soldiers of that gallant body would soon equal the old ones in military spirit, whilst they had the advantage over them in point of youth and physical vigour. No conception more thoroughly attested Napoleon's profound knowledge of armies, and the inexhaustible fecundity of his organising genius. Furthermore, he made all arrangements for a forced march of the old guard from Bayonne to Paris, and from Paris to Strasburg.

He had only addressed a word of advice to the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine; but from the 2nd of March he gave them orders as head of the Confederation. He demanded 40,000 men of Bavaria in order to have 30,000, whom he put under the command of old Marshal Lefebvre, who knew German, and who under fire was always worthy of the grand army. The King of Bavaria would have had his son command the Bavarian troops, but Napoleon would not consent. "Your army," he said, "must fight in earnest in this campaign, for it concerns the conservation and even the extension of the aggrandisements which Bavaria has received. Your son may be able to command when he shall have made six or seven campaigns with us. Meanwhile let him come to my headquarters. He will be received there with all the consideration due to him, and he will learn *our trade*." By way of compromise, Napoleon granted the young prince the command of one of the Bavarian divisions. Napoleon appointed Munich, Landshut, and Straubing as mustering places of these three divisions, far enough behind the Inn to prevent their being surprised by the Austrians, and sufficiently in advance of the Lech and the Danube to cover our musterings. Of the King of Wurtemberg he demanded 12,000 men, who were to muster at Neresheim, and serve under the orders of General Vandamme, the choice of whom was objected to by the King of Wurtemberg, but confirmed by Napoleon, who wrote in these terms to the king: "I know General Vandamme's defects; but he is a true soldier, and in this difficult calling much must be forgiven in consideration of great qualities." Of the Grand Duke of Baden he demanded a division of 8000 to 10,000 men, and a like force of the Duke of Hesse-Darmstadt. They were to muster towards the end of March at Pforzheim and Mergentheim. As for the minor princes, the Dukes of Wurzburg, Nassau, and Saxony, he required of them a division composed of their joint contingents, which was to repair to Wurzburg,

Marshal Davout's headquarters. Of the King of Saxony he demanded 20,000 Saxons in advance of Dresden, and 25,000 Poles in advance of Warsaw. These contingents amounted together to a nominal 110,000 or 115,000 men, and to a net total of 100,000, 80,000 of whom were Germans and 20,000 Poles. Marshal Bernadotte, coming from the Hanse towns with the French Dupas division, was to take the Saxons under his command, and was then to join the grand army on the Danube. The Poles, covered by the vicinity of the Russians, sufficed to guard Warsaw. As the events of the war might induce the temporary abandonment of Dresden and Munich, Napoleon sent word to the two monarchs to be ready to quit their respective capitals and retire towards the centre of the Confederation; offering, if they felt inclined for a short visit to France, to place at their disposal all the imperial dwellings magnificently provided. He furthermore gave orders to his brother Jerome to muster 20,000 Hessians; and to his brother Louis, 20,000 Dutch; upon neither of which forces he counted much, because Jerome administered his new kingdom without economy, and Louis administered his with quite Dutch parsimony.

These forces, being thus prepared, were organised as follows by Napoleon. He had not all his marshals at hand, for four of them, Ney, Soult, Victor, and Mortier, were serving in Spain. Among those he could dispose of there were three he prized more than all the rest: these were Davout, Lannes, and Massena. He resolved to divide the mass of the French forces between them, giving 50,000 men to each. Massena had already commanded more considerable forces, but Davout and Lannes had not yet had that honour, of which, however, they were altogether worthy. Marshal Davout was to retain the three old divisions of the army of the Rhine, those of Morand, Friant, and Gudin, the St. Sulpice cuirassiers, a division of light cavalry, and a fourth division of infantry under General Dumont, composed of the fourth battalions of that body—the whole forming 50,000 veteran soldiers, the best without comparison which France possessed at that period. They were placed between Bareuth, Amberg, and Ratisbon, having the latter for their rallying point. The St. Hilaire division, detached from the army of the Rhine, with a portion of light cavalry and the cuirassiers of General Espagne, joined to Oudinot's three divisions, was to form another corps of 50,000 men under the illustrious Marshal Lannes, and to concentrate at Augsburg. Napoleon added to it a brigade of 1500 or 2000 Portuguese selected from the best troops of that nation cantoned in France, who were weary of inactivity, and were better placed with the army than in the interior. He also added to it the Corsican chasseurs and the chasseurs of

the Po, a brave and tried body of men. The Carra St. Cyr, Legrand, Boudet, and Molitor divisions, a fine division of light cavalry, the Hessians, and the Baden troops, were to form another corps of the same strength, and were to muster at Ulm under the heroic Massena. The cuirassiers and carabineers under General Nansouty, a numerous division of light cavalry, and the dragoons organised as we have elsewhere stated, were to compose a reserve of 14,000 or 15,000 cavalry under Marshal Bessières, in the absence of Murat. With the addition of the guard, 20,000 strong, the principal mass concentrated between Ulm, Augsburg, and Ratisbon would amount to 190,000 French, including artillery. The Bavarians under Marshal Lefebvre formed in advance an excellent auxiliary corps of some 30,000 men; and another was formed in the rear by the troops of Wurtemberg, Baden, and Hesse, under Marshal Augereau. Further still in the rear were the Saxons, commanded by Prince Bernadotte. Consequently there were five French corps, two being reserves, having one auxiliary corps in advance and two in the rear, the whole made up of old and young soldiers, animated by the breath of Napoleon, perfect as regarded bravery, but far from perfect as to experience and age; but such as they were, quite competent to uphold the glory of France at its existing elevation. Prince Berthier was appointed major-general, and M. Daru intendant or commissary-general of this army, Napoleon constituting himself its commander-in-chief. It was designated the army of Germany instead of grand army, the grand army unfortunately being no longer in Germany or Italy, but in Spain.

Napoleon's plan was to march straight from Ratisbon to Vienna, by the highway of the Danube, and to send down by the river his matériel, his sick, and all his baggage—a plan which inferred, in the first instance, some terrible blow dealt on the Austrians. With this view he had a quantity of boats purchased on all the rivers of Bavaria, to be sent down successively to the Danube in proportion as he should pass the several confluents of that great river. It was also with this view that he had added to the guard 1200 of the best seamen of the Boulogne flotilla.

It was at Ratisbon, then, that he intended to concentrate his forces, neglecting the Tyrol, and leaving the Austrians to entangle themselves there as much as they pleased, being sure of enveloping and capturing them between his army of Germany and that of Italy, if they did not make haste to retreat. He gave orders, however, to execute works at Augsburg, to deepen the ditches and fill them with water, to palisade the walls, and construct *têtes de pont* on the Lech, so as to cover his right flank by a fortified post whilst he was marching with the left

in advance. This was the only precaution he thought of on the Tyrolese side, and it perfectly sufficed.

Ratisbon was chosen as a point of departure, on the supposition that the Austrians would not assume the offensive before the end of April. Should they take the field earlier, Napoleon had fixed his eyes on a less advanced point of departure in Bavaria, such as Donauwerth or Ingolstadt, at which the musters from Augsburg and Ratisbon might form a junction; and he resolved to have magazines of provisions and ammunition at both those towns. Thus Ratisbon in case of deferred, and Donauwerth or Ingolstadt in case of immediate hostilities, were to be his first headquarters. Major-General Berthier was despatched in advance with these instructions. M. Daru received similar instructions for the movements of the matériel. Expresses were established between Augsburg and Strasburg on the one side, and between Wurzburg and Mayence on the other, to connect the telegraphic lines of the frontier, and to transmit news daily to Paris from the theatre of war. Special relays of post-horses were kept, that Napoleon might rapidly clear the distance between the Seine and the Danube. Thus prepared, he awaited the movements of the Austrians, intending to remain at Paris as long as possible, in order to animate the war administration by his will, before going to animate by his presence the army destined to fight under his orders.

Some further arrangements were made with regard to Italy, Spain, and the navy. Napoleon repeated his orders to Murat to march a brigade to Rome, in order to disengage the Miollis division. He traced out for Prince Eugène the direction in which he was to attack the Austrians, and ordered him to mask with some light troops the road from Carniola by Laybach, and to move the five French divisions, Seras, Broussier, Grenier, Lamarque, and Barbou, from Udine to Ponteba, in order to debouch by Tarvis on Klagenfurth in Carinthia, the direct road from Lombardy to Vienna. He had despatched some vessels from Toulon for the Adriatic, with orders to keep the best under sail, and to unrig the others, in order to procure 12,000 or 15,000 French sailors at Venice, who would be very useful for the defence of the place. He enjoined his sister Eliza, governante of Tuscany, to watch over the tranquillity of that country, for discontent was already beginning to infect Italy. He sent her a column of French gendarmes in order to organise an Italian gendarmerie; and directed that the castles of Florence, Sienna, and Leghorn should be put in a state of defence, to serve at need as places of refuge from new Sicilian vespers—so much did his own foresight acknowledge the dangers of his political imprudence.

As for Spain, he ordered Joseph to continue the preparations

for the Portuguese expedition, which Marshal Soult was to execute with four divisions, and not to send Marshal Victor into Andalusia until Marshal Soult should have passed Oporto. He recommended that particular care should be taken of the Valence, Leval, Dessoles, and Sebastiani divisions, left in Madrid as the mainstay of the Spanish monarchy, and above all, that Marshal Ney with his two divisions should vigorously keep down the north of the Peninsula. He gave General Suchet Moncey's old corps, which had just finished the siege of Saragossa, with orders to prepare to march on Valencia as soon as General St. Cyr should have terminated his operations in Catalonia. He moved the fifth corps, commanded by Marshal Mortier, from Saragossa to Burgos, that it might at need either support Marshal Ney against the north of Spain, should that region become troublesome, or return into France, if the war in Germany required fresh reinforcements.

Lastly, Napoleon ordered Admiral Willaumez to sail from Brest with two 120 gun ships and six seventy-fours, and touch at L'Orient and Rochefort, where he was to be joined by Vice-Admirals Troude and Lhermitte, each with a division. After conducting them to the West Indies, where they were to land provisions, munitions, and recruits, and to receive colonial produce in exchange, he was to return to Europe and join Admiral Ganteaume at Toulon, to take part in various expeditions in the Mediterranean. Whilst Admiral Willaumez was executing this cruise, Admiral Ganteaume was to quit Toulon with his squadron, and convey a considerable store of powder, projectiles, and corn to Barcelona. On the Scheldt, Vice-Admiral Allemand had orders to take the squadron out of Flushing, and keep it in the river always in readiness for sail, which could not fail to puzzle the English, and occupy a notable portion of their force. Napoleon, moreover, directed the navy administration to collect a certain number of gunboats at the mouths of the Scheldt and the Charente, to guard all the channels and keep watch against the probable attempts of the English to destroy the squadrons moored in those latitudes. The minister Decrès was to set out for the coast on the day Napoleon departed for Germany, in order to superintend the punctual execution of these several orders.

Suddenly, whilst Napoleon was thus making his last arrangements, it became known that the Austrians had had the audacity to seize at Braunau a French courier bearing despatches from the legation at Vienna to that at Munich. This courier was a retired French officer settled at Vienna, who, leaving that capital at the moment of impending war, had been charged with several despatches for the ministers of his nation. The seizure of these, notwithstanding the bearer's strong protest, and in spite of the

seals of the two embassies, appeared to Napoleon tantamount to a rupture. He gave way to the most violent anger, caused M. de Metternich to be vehemently interpellated, and ordered, by way of reprisals, the immediate arrest of the Austrian couriers on all the roads. His orders being strictly and instantly executed, very important despatches were intercepted on the Strasburg road. Their attentive perusal satisfied him that hostilities would begin in the middle of April. The imminence of the danger was confirmed by M. de Metternich's demanding his passports, and Napoleon ordered Major-General Berthier to proceed to Donauwerth, either to assemble the army at Ratisbon if there was time, or to make it fall back behind the Lech to Donauwerth if time failed him, leaving Ratisbon to be occupied by one of Marshal Davout's divisions. This done, Napoleon remained with his eye upon the telegraph, ready to set out at the first signal.

Hostilities began a few days earlier than he had expected. Orders had, in fact, been given in Italy, Bavaria, and Bohemia to open the campaign on the 9th or 10th of April. Lieutenant-General Bellegarde, who commanded the 50,000 men destined to debouch by Bohemia, passed the frontier of Upper Westphalia at two points, Tirschenreit and Wernberg. The four corps of Generals Hohenzollern, Rosenberg, Archduke Louis, and Hiller, and the Jean de Lichtenstein and Kienmayer reserves, forming with the artillery a mass of about 140,000 men, were along the Traun on the 1st of April, and on the 9th of April they were along the Inn, the Franco-Bavarian frontier, the violation of which was to be decisive of war, and to bring on one of the bloodiest campaigns of the age. On the evening of the 9th the Archduke Charles, who had put himself at the head of his troops, and was accompanied by the emperor, who had come from Lentz to be nearer the theatre of war, sent one of his aides-de-camp to the King of Bavaria with a letter announcing that he had orders to advance and treat as enemies whatever troops should resist him. He was willing to believe, he said, that no German force would offer any impediment to a liberating army which came to deliver Germany from its oppressors. This letter was the only declaration of war addressed to France and her allies. The King of Bavaria's only reply was to quit his capital and go to Augsburg, and the Bavarian troops, encamped on the Isar at Munich and Landshut, had orders to resist. Marshal Lefebvre had already taken command of them to lead them against the enemy.

On the morning of the 10th of April the whole Austrian army put itself in motion to cross the Inn and begin the war. It did not know very well where the French were, but it was informed there were some of them at Ulm, Augsburg, and

Ratisbon, whither Marshal Davout was marching. It hoped to surprise them in that state of dispersion, reach the Danube before their concentration, cross it between Donauwerth and Ratisbon, form a junction by its right with Bellegarde's corps, and sweep victoriously over Upper Westphalia, Swabia, and Wurtemberg. Hiller's corps, that of the Archduke Louis, and the second reserve, forming a mass of 58,000 men, and having the prince generalissimo at their head, crossed the Inn at Braunau on the morning of the 10th of April. Hohenzollern's corps, 27,000 or 28,000 strong, crossed it at the same moment below Muhlheim. Lastly, the fourth corps, with the first reserve, 40,000 men in all, effected its passage at Scharding, not far from the point where the Inn falls into the Danube. On the extreme left Jellachich's division of about 10,000 men, after crossing the Salza, proceeded to pass the Inn at Wasserburg and march on Munich. At the extreme right the Vecsay brigade of 5000 men, all light troops, marched along the Danube to clear the ground for the army on its right, and to occupy Passau at the junction of the Inn and the Danube. Aware of the importance of that fortress, Napoleon had incessantly urged the Bavarians to put it in a state of defence, and had even sent French officers with the necessary funds for the execution of the works; but nothing had been done in time, and the Bavarian commandant could not help surrendering to the Austrians. It was a point d'appui much to be regretted, which had been yielded to them through negligence, and which they might afterwards use to very great advantage.

Having crossed the Inn, the Austrians marched in three columns towards the Isar, where they were to encounter the Bavarian troops and exchange the first musket-shots. Though they had applied themselves to render their army more prompt in its movements, they advanced slowly, first from habit, next in consequence of the bad weather, and lastly, from the encumbrance of their baggage. Intending to wage a war of invasion, and not possessing the art of finding subsistence everywhere like the French, they had thought of substituting for their immense victualling depôts rolling magazines, which were to accompany them in all their movements. In this way they hoped more easily to imitate Napoleon's suddenly and generally decisive concentrations. Besides these magazines there was a very fine bridge apparatus and an immense artillery matériel. They remained, therefore, for several days between the Inn and the Isar, and did not arrive before the latter until the 15th. Until then they had seen only patrols of Bavarian cavalry, which they had affected not to attack, in order to prolong the pleasing illusion that they should encounter no hostilities on the part of the Germans. The archduke made ready to

cross the Isar before Landshut on the following day, the 16th; and now at last all illusion was at an end, for the Bavarians lined the river with all the appearance of men resolved to defend themselves.

He made some change in the disposal of his columns for this important operation, which was the first of the war, and which for that reason was to be made prompt and decisive. He detached Hiller's corps from his left towards Moosburg, to protect the operation which was to be made before Landshut from all opposition from Munich. He moved Hohenzollern's corps up to that of the Archduke Louis, which had been left alone by the detachment of Hiller's, and he ordered them both to force the passage of the Isar opposite Landshut. He posted the two reserves in the rear in column. He ordered Prince de Rosenberg's corps, which held the right, to pass the Isar at Dingolfing, where there was no resistance to be apprehended; and to send its light troops to Ebelsbach, to discourage the enemy from holding out at Landshut, when they saw that the Isar had been crossed lower down. Lastly, the Vecsay brigade, already sent forward along the Danube, was to push on to Straubing, very near Ratisbon, in order to procure intelligence of the French.

On the morning of the 16th, Archduke Charles, personally directing the corps of the Archduke Louis, the advanced guard of which was commanded by General Radetzki, advanced upon Landshut to cross the Isar there. When one comes by the Braunau road, as the Austrians did, one descends by wooded hills to the banks of the Isar, which flows through the pretty town of Landshut, and then through verdant meadows. The town is half on the slope of the hills, half on the border of the stream, which divides into two arms in passing through it. Deroy's Bavarian division occupied Landshut with orders to dispute the passage. After evacuating the upper town and all that portion which stands on the right bank of the river, it cut down the bridge over the large arm, filled the Seligenthal suburb with sharpshooters, and drew up in order of battle on the wooded heights of Altdorf, opposite those by which one debouches on Landshut. General Radetzki, advancing from the upper town to the edge of the large arm and opposite the broken bridge, was received with a brisk fire of sharpshooters, to which he replied with that of the sharpshooters of the regiment of the Gradiscans. The archduke, on his side taking advantage of the heights to use his formidable artillery, played with it upon the faubourg of Seligenthal, on the other bank of the Isar, which he laid in ruins and rendered untenable by the Bavarians who were lodged there. He then had the footway of the bridge replaced on the uprights, which were still standing, and crossed

it without encountering any resistance in the evacuated faubourg. Towards noon the corps of the Archduke Louis debouched with a numerous cavalry, followed at a little distance by Hohenzollern's corps, and deployed before the Bavarian division of Deroy, which was drawn up in order of battle on the opposite heights of Altdorf. A brisk cannonade took place between the Austrians and the Bavarians; but the latter, receiving intelligence that the Isar had been passed above at Moosburg and below at Dingolfing, withdrew in good order through the woods by the highroad from Landshut to Neustadt on the Danube. The loss on either side amounted to about a hundred men. The Bavarians, though divided between two feelings, their displeasure at fighting for Frenchmen against Germans, and their old jealousy of the Austrians, who wanted to take the Tyrol from them, nevertheless behaved very well. They fell back upon the Danube, in the forest of Dürnbach, to which the division of the prince-royal coming from Munich, and that of General de Wrede coming from Straubing, had already retired. They were there near the French, and awaited them with extreme impatience.

Archduke Charles had crossed the Isar with two corps, those of Archduke Louis and Prince Hohenzollern. He was immediately followed by his two reserves, the Jean de Lichtenstein and the Kienmayer corps. He had, moreover, occupied Moosburg on his left with General Hiller's corps, and Dingolfing on his right with de Rosenberg's. He was therefore beyond the Isar with the six *corps d'armée* destined to operate in Bavaria, and with a mass of about 140,000 men. He had but a little way to go to encounter the French, for between the Isar and the Danube the distance is but a dozen leagues, with no considerable stream intervening. But to march that dozen of leagues he had to cross small streams, such as the Abens on the left, and the big and little Laber on the right, steep banks, woods, and marshes. Much consideration was necessary before venturing into that dangerous region, with the chance of running at any moment against the French army, always very formidable, though not yet having Napoleon at its head. On his left Archduke Charles had Augsburg and Ulm, on his right Ratisbon. All he knew was that there were French at Augsburg and at Ulm, he could not tell how many or of what kind; and others at Ratisbon, better known, being Marshal Davout's corps, the arrival of which in that direction had long been announced. The Austrian commander's plan was to advance straight before him across the country between the Isar and the Danube, and to strike the latter at Neustadt and Kelheim, by pursuing the road which leads from Landshut to those two points. At Neustadt and Kelheim he would find himself between the two known musters of French, that of Augsburg and that of Ratisbon; and

he might fall upon the latter, beat Marshal Davout, take Ratisbon, and form a junction with General Bellegarde. Having then at his disposal nearly 200,000 men, it would be easy for him to march to the Rhine across Wurtemberg, sweeping the French before him, surprised and beaten before they had been able to come together. But it was necessary to cross that almost impenetrable country before the concentration of the French and the arrival of Napoleon, and it was already somewhat late to execute this ambitious project—a very good one, it must be owned, if it was as well executed as it was well conceived.

On entering that region Archduke Charles had on his left the Abens, running directly towards the Danube, and falling into it after passing through Siegenburg, Biburg, and Abensberg. On his right, passing to his front, flowed the big and the little Laber, which he was to cross near their source, for they rise in the environs and fall into the Danube. Thus he had to advance between the Abens, with which he was to move parallel on his left, and the little and big Laber, which he was to cross on his right, marching across woods and marshes to reach the Danube by the two causeways from Landshut to Neustadt and Kelheim. If he did not choose to advance to these towns, he might make for Ratisbon by a shorter route, by taking the Eckmühl road to the right, which, after crossing the swampy bed of the big Laber at Eckmühl, rises over wooded gorges, and then descends into the plain of Ratisbon, in the midst of which flows the Danube, which here changes its direction to the east, having run in a north-eastern direction from its source to Ratisbon.

Archduke Charles resolved on the 17th to pursue the two roads from Landshut to Neustadt and Kelheim. He directed General Hiller to march from Moosburg to Mainburg on the Abens, to guard himself against the French who were known to be at Augsburg, while Jellachich's division, further to the left, was to come from Munich to Freising and join this same Hiller's corps, of which it was a dependency. A little less to the left Archduke Louis was to advance by the Neustadt road and pass through Pfaffenhausen and along the Abens, in order to watch the Bavarians posted in the forest of Dürnbach. In the centre and along the road from Landshut to Kelheim by Rottenburg, the Hohenzollern corps, after having passed the two Labers, was to march on Kelheim, followed by the two reserves, whilst on the right the Rosenberg corps and the Vecsay brigade were to attempt a reconnaissance of Ratisbon by the cross-road to Eckmühl.

Thus with two corps on the left, three in the centre, and a sixth on the right, at distances of twenty leagues, Archduke Charles advanced from the Isar to the Danube, across the rough country we have described, and which is comprised between

Landshut, Neustadt, Kelheim, Ratisbon, and Straubing. He ordered Lieutenant-General Bellegarde, who had debouched in Upper Westphalia, to press hard on Marshal Davout's rear towards Ratisbon, in order to prepare for the general junction of all the Austrian forces.

The archduke marched steadily on the 17th, and with more speed than usual, but still too slowly for the circumstances. He advanced on Pfaffenhausen on the one side, on Rottenburg on the other. The bad weather, his movable magazines, his great bridge equipage, and his artillery matériel, dragged over roads made swampy by the rain, accounted for this slowness, if they did not justify it. The only skirmish during the march was with the Bavarian light cavalry, which was now encountered without scruple, since the Austrians had already fought at Landshut against the Germans of the Confederation of the Rhine.

On the 18th, Archduke Charles, still badly supplied with intelligence from his left, having only learned that on that side there were Bavarians behind the Abens, and French towards Augsburg, but better informed on his right, where he knew that Marshal Davout was approaching Ratisbon, was thus made certain that the French were divided into two masses, and became confirmed in his intention of falling first upon Marshal Davout. Uncertain as yet whether he should go straight to Kelheim on the margin of the Danube, and thence descend along the river-side to Ratisbon, or whether he should go at once to Ratisbon by the Eckmühl cross-road, he made a further move, the corps of Hiller and the archduke forming his left along the Abens, Hohenzollern and the two reserves forming his centre round Rohr, Rosenberg forming his right towards Lancqwaid on the big Laben, and the Vecsay brigade at the extremity of his line pushing forth reconnaissances by way of Eckmühl and Egglofsheim on Ratisbon. The most decisive events were approaching, for the archduke was surrounded on all sides by French and Bavarians in a country of almost impenetrable obscurity, in which he might at any moment find himself suddenly in face of the enemy. Three or four hundred thousand men, Austrians, French, Bavarians, Wurtembergers, Badeners, and Hessians, were about to hurtle together in that close space for five consecutive days with enormous pertinacity, the advantage being destined to remain not alone with the bravest, for both sides were brave, but with that side which could best make its way through that chaos of woods, marshes, hills, and valleys.

Whilst the Austrians, having thus the advance of the French, were preparing to surprise them, the latter fortunately, from their warlike habits and their assurance in danger, were not men to let themselves be disconcerted even before they were in

possession of all their advantages. The field of battle, on which they arrived from the opposite side, appeared to them inversely, but quite as confused. On our right and on the left of the Austrians, Marshal Massena, concentrated on Ulm with the Boudet, Molitor, Carra St. Cyr, and Legrand divisions, was marching on Augsburg to form a junction with Oudinot's corps. Marshal Massena, by order of Major-General Berthier, had taken the command of all these troops, which scarcely exceeded 55,000 or 60,000 men, the reinforcements not having arrived. At five-and-twenty leagues thence towards Ratisbon, consequently on our left and to the right of the Austrians, Marshal Davout debouched with the army of the Rhine, composed of the Morand, Friant, Gudin, and St. Hilaire divisions, the St. Sulpice cuirassiers, and the Montbrun light horse, amounting to about 50,000 men, the best soldiers in the army. General Espagne and General Nansouty's heavy cavalry had already quitted him, the former to join Oudinot's corps, the latter to form the cavalry reserve. We see that the distribution into three corps was not yet effected, for the St. Hilaire division ought to have been then with General Oudinot, to complete the corps of Marshal Lannes, and Massena ought to have had only his four divisions with the Hessians and Badeners.

Lastly, between these two masses, but nearer Ratisbon than Augsburg, towards Kelheim and Neustadt, were the Bavarians, covered by the Abens, and posted in the forest of Dürnbach, to the number of 27,000 men. The Wurtembergers were arriving from Ingolstadt to the number of 12,000. There was therefore a scattered mass of 140,000 to 150,000 men, of whom 100,000 were French and 40,000 to 50,000 were Germans. The imperial guard was not yet on the ground: the reinforcements covered the roads of Swabia and Wurtemberg with long columns of men, horses, and matériel.

Major-General Berthier had remained a long time at Strasburg to superintend the organisation of the army, not believing that the moment for action was come. On the 11th of April, being made aware at Strasburg of the march of the Austrians to the Inn, he had set off for the banks of the Danube, and had arrived on the morning of the 13th at Gmünd, and on the evening of the same day at Donauwerth. In consequence of the contradictory intelligence he received on the way, he had often given contradictory orders, always striving to accommodate matters to Napoleon's plan, which consisted, as we have stated, in assembling the army, in the first place, at Ratisbon if time allowed, or at Donauwerth if hostilities began sooner than was expected. Having arrived at Donauwerth in the evening, the major-general learned that Marshal Davout occupied Ratisbon, that Marshal Massena and General Oudinot were at Augsburg, that the

Austrians had marched slowly, that Napoleon's plan consequently was still capable of being executed; and then placing under the orders of Marshal Davout all the forces round Ratisbon, under those of Marshal Massena all that were round Augsburg, he thought it right to concentrate the army at Ratisbon, and ordered General Oudinot to proceed thither. But suddenly receiving on the 14th a very ambiguous despatch from Paris, in which Napoleon, foreseeing the anticipated movement of the Austrians, advised him to muster at Augsburg, at the same time leaving Marshal Davout at Ratisbon with a part of his forces, he countermanded the orders he had issued to General Oudinot, and remained in presence of the enemy until the 17th, with the army divided into two masses, the one at Ratisbon, the other at Augsburg, with the Bavarians between both. In the interval he employed himself in putting the corps in order; but he did not venture to take any decided step before the arrival of the emperor.

Fortunately Napoleon was informed in good time of what was passing, thanks to the means of communication he had prepared beforehand. On the evening of the 12th he was made acquainted with the passage of the Inn, and entered his carriage that night. On the 15th he stopped some hours at Strasburg, and some at Stuttgard on the 16th; saw by the way and reassured the German kings, his allies, and arrived on the morning of the 17th at Donauwerth, time enough to repair everything.

Though it was not less difficult for him than for the Archduke Charles to ascertain the truth amidst a quantity of contradictory reports and in so thick a country, he had learned from the Bavarians the passage of the Austrians at Landshut, and with his usual sagacity he guessed that the main body of the Austrians was advancing to the Danube in the hope of passing between the French at Augsburg and those at Ratisbon. Some moments having sufficed for him to unravel this fact, he formed his determination with incredible promptitude.

Two plans presented themselves to him. If he could have known everything very exactly, which never happens in war; if he could have guessed, for instance, that the archduke was about to move on Ratisbon with several corps ill connected together, he would have had nothing to do but let him proceed to Ratisbon, where Marshal Davout with 50,000 soldiers would have detained him the necessary time, and then with the mass of forces round Augsburg, with Oudinot, Molitor, Boudet, the Bavarians, and the Wurtembergers, that is to say, with 90,000 men, he might have fallen on the Austrian commander in the rear, have placed him between two fires, and taken his army prisoners to a man. This, however, would have been braving many chances, for Napoleon would have left to the archduke the advantage of a concen-

trated position, which would have been contrary to the true principles of war, which he more than any other captain had professed and illustrated by immortal examples. The archduke, in fact, when placed between the two masses of the French, might have beaten them one after the other, as Napoleon had done by many an enemy on similar occasions. Besides, for the success of such a plan it would have been necessary to know more than Napoleon knew as to the situation of things, as to the moral and physical state of the French and Austrian armies, as to what was to be feared from the one and hoped from the other; lastly, as to the march of the enemy, for the bolder one wishes to be the more one needs to know with whom and with what he has to do. Having therefore thought for a moment of this plan, he preferred the second, which was safer. It was to take advantage of the time that remained to him and concentrate the army, bringing Davout from Ratisbon and Massena from Augsburg to Neustadt. Then with 140,000 or 150,000 men under his hand Napoleon would be certain to bear down everything, happen what might, for the chances are never very formidable against a well-concentrated army, which can bring its whole mass to bear on any side on which it is attacked. But this concentration by means of a double march, Davout's and Massena's, in face of the enemy, likewise presented serious dangers. To surmount these, Napoleon applied all his genius in executing one of the finest operations of his long and prodigious career.

Having arrived at Donauwerth on the 17th, without guard, aides-de-camp, horses, or staff, he immediately gave his orders, transmitting them by the first officers at hand, for Major-General Berthier was at that moment at Augsburg.

First he ordered Massena to quit Augsburg on the following morning, the 16th, and go down by the Pfaffenhofen road to the Abens on the left flank of the Austrians, whence he would afterwards direct the march of the marshal towards the Danube or the Isar, towards Neustadt or Landshut, according to the position the army might occupy on his arrival. He enjoined him to leave at Augsburg a good commandant, two German regiments, all the sick and fatigued, with provisions and all necessaries for a fortnight; to make believe that he was marching into the Tyrol, and then descend towards the Danube in all haste, for never, said the emperor, have I had more need of your devoted zeal. The despatch concluded with these words, *Activity and speed.* At the same moment he gave orders to Marshal Davout to quit Ratisbon immediately, leaving there a regiment to defend the town, to ascend the Danube with his *corps d'armée*, move cautiously but resolutely between the river and the mass of the Austrians, and join him by Abach and Obersaal, in the environs of Abensberg, where

the Abens falls into the Danube. Marshal Davout, after what he had detached to form the other corps, might retain about 50,000 men, fortunately very capable of encountering any number of Austrians. These being marched to the Abens, behind which lay the Bavarians, and whither were directed the Wurtembergers, the Nansouty and Espagne cuirassiers, the Demont division, composed of the fourth battalions of Davout's corps and the grand park of artillery, Napoleon would have in hand about 90,000 men, quite enough to enable him to await Massena, who was to arrive with 40,000 or 50,000. This last junction effected, he would be in a condition to destroy the great Austrian army, whatever its position, or manœuvre how it might.

These arrangements having been settled, and communicated to those who were to execute them, Napoleon left Donauwerth for Ingolstadt, to be near the point of concentration he had chosen. His orders had not far to travel to Augsburg, and Massena was able, on the same day, to begin his preparations for marching on the following morning, the 18th. But it was more than double the distance from Donauwerth to Ratisbon, and it was not until late in the evening that Marshal Davout received the orders that concerned him. He was then in the environs with four divisions of infantry, one of cuirassiers, and one of light horse—altogether, as we have said, about 50,000 men. Generals Nansouty and Espagne, with the heavy cavalry and part of the light, and General Demont, with the fourth battalion and the great park, had taken the left of the Danube.

In concentrating round Ratisbon, Davout had had several difficulties to encounter. The Friant division, in its march from Bareuth to Amberg, had been for a while engaged with Bellegarde's 50,000 men; it had bravely sustained the assault, repulsing the advanced guards of the Austrians; and whilst it was resisting them the rest of the corps, preceded by the St. Hilaire division, had moved away towards Ratisbon, along the Wils and the Regen. The whole day of the 17th, on which Napoleon despatched his orders, had been spent in exchanging a brisk cannonade with the Austrians under the very walls of Ratisbon, in order to give General Friant time to rejoin. The Morand division, occupying Stadt-am-hof, beyond the Danube, checked them by its superb bearing, and returned them many a cannon-shot. The projectiles shot from the heights, enfilading the streets of Ratisbon, killed some men among our troops which were passing through the town to cross the Danube. A shell even burst between the legs of Marshal Davout's horse, killing or wounding the horses of his aides-de-camp. The old soldiers of the Morand, Gudin, Friant, and St. Hilaire divisions shared in the highest degree the

passions of the French army, and they were exasperated. A French sharpshooter, under the marshal's eyes, ran upon an Austrian sharpshooter, and after braving his fire, plunged his sword in his breast.

It cost Davout the whole day of the 18th completely to rally the Friant division, and to move the whole body of his troops to the right of the Danube; whilst the Morand division remained in order of battle under the walls of Ratisbon, to hold Bellegarde's Austrians in check, and cover the passage of the river. The St. Hilaire and Gudin divisions passed on that day from the left to the right bank of the Danube. So did the St. Sulpice heavy cavalry, whilst the light horse, under the brave and intelligent Montbrun, executed reconnaissances in all directions, on Straubing, Eckmühl, Abach, to get news of the archduke; for Davout was placed between the 50,000 men from Bohemia and the main Austrian body coming from Landshut by Eckmühl. The object of these reconnaissances was to explore all the roads on the right bank, by which Davout proposed to ascend the course of the Danube. He might, no doubt, have done so by the left bank, to which the Austrians had not yet penetrated, and which was covered with our detachments and convoys; but the roads on that side were impracticable, and led rather far from the point of concentration chosen by Napoleon between Obersaal and Abensberg. Marshal Davout preferred the right bank, though exposed to the enemy, because the roads there were practicable, and led more directly to the point aimed at. He knew well that the archduke would move along it during his march; but his troops were so steady that he had no fear of being driven into the Danube; he was certain that if jostled they would give back shock for shock, and not fail the more to meet the emperor at the rendezvous appointed.

It was necessary to ascend the back of the wooded heights that separate the valleys of the big and little Laber from the Danube, to cross them and descend the opposite slope, in sight of the Austrians, to reach the plateau of the Abens at Abensberg, whither Napoleon was striving to bring together the scattered portions of his army. Divers routes presented themselves for this purpose. On Marshal Davout's right was the highway from Ratisbon to Ingolstadt, running continuously along the margin of the Danube, and leading by Abach and Obersaal to Abensberg. It was large and in fine condition, but pressed in between the heights and the Danube. Davout might have marched by it, but had he been surprised by the enemy in such a defile he would have been exposed to a disaster. He reserved it for his baggage and his heavy artillery waggons, and sent a battalion of infantry in advance to secure it by

occupying the principal passes. On his left was the cross-road from Ratisbon to Landshut, leading over the big Laber at Eckmühl. This, too, was a fine wide road, but it led right into the midst of the enemy, and was only to be chosen if a great battle was to be desired, which was not the case. Marshal Davout sent forward by it his vanguard, composed of four regiments of chasseurs and hussars and two battalions of the 7th light infantry, commanded by General Montbrun, to observe the Austrians, and occupy them during the march that was about to be executed. Between these two highways there were village roads leading from one height to another, and these were reserved for the bulk of the army. The Friant and Gudin divisions, forming a first column, preceded and followed by the St. Sulpice cuirassiers, were to march by Burg Weinting, Wolkering, Saalhaupt, and Ober Feking. The St. Hilaire and Morand divisions, forming a second column, preceded and followed by Jacquinot's chasseurs, were to march by Ober Isling, Gebraching, Peising, Tengen, and Unter Feking. These two columns, thus advancing side by side, were to reach the back of the heights which separate the big Laber from the Danube, join the baggage column at the issue from the defile of Abach towards Obersaal, and debouch opposite Abensberg, near the Bavarians, with a chance even of not being seen by the Austrians, so woody, hilly, and obscure was the country. The vanguard taking the highroad from Eckmühl to Landshut, and consequently exposed to the risk of meeting full front with the main body of the Austrians, who were coming from Landshut, was to advance cautiously, and after having served to screen the two columns of infantry, was to make a deflection to the right, in order to reach the point assigned for rendezvous to the whole *corps d'armée.*

Marshal Davout gave orders to march on the morning of April 19. In the course of the 18th the troops were clear of Ratisbon, and the Friant division itself, having crossed the bridges in the evening, passed the night with the rest of the army on the right bank of the river. To the 65th of the line Marshal Davout committed the perilous task of defending Ratisbon against the large armies that were about to attack it from both banks. He ordered them to shut the gates, barricade the streets, and defend themselves to the uttermost until he relieved them, which could not fail to be soon.

At daybreak on the 19th, the four columns began their difficult march, the baggage on the right along the Danube, two columns of infantry in the centre by village roads, the vanguard to the left on the highway from Ratisbon to Landshut by Eckmühl. Starting so early and traversing wooded hills, the French at first perceived no enemy. The encounter, how-

ever, could not long be delayed, for it was impossible but that hundreds of thousands of men manœuvring within three or four leagues of each other should come at last in contact. At that moment, in fact, the Archduke Charles, having passed the day in the camp at Rohr, on the plateau which separates the Abens from the big Laber, at the opposite side of the very hills the French were engaged in crossing, had at last resolved on his proceedings. Learning more and more positively as he advanced that Marshal Davout was at Ratisbon, he determined to march there on the 19th, his arrangements being as follows. General Hiller, forming the extreme left with his own corps and Jellachich's division, had orders to come from Mainburg to Siegenburg to join the Archduke Louis, who had been left before Abensberg with his own corps and the second reserve corps to guard the Abens. Archduke Charles, followed by the Hohenzollern corps, with the exception of some battalions placed in observation at Kirchdorf under General Thierry, by Rosenberg's corps, the first reserve and the Vecsay brigade, making together 70,000 men, was to march on Ratisbon after leaving more than 60,000 on his left under General Hiller and the Archduke Louis. Thus, whilst Napoleon was making the greatest efforts to concentrate his army, the Austrian commander-in-chief was dispersing his from Munich to Ratisbon, over more than thirty leagues.

He put himself in motion on the morning of the 19th, at the same time as Marshal Davout, and in a nearly similar order of march. Two columns of infantry, the one consisting of the Hohenzollern corps, the other of Rosenberg's and the grenadiers of the reserve, were to quit the camp at Rohr and advance across the heights over which the French were marching, the first column by Gross Muss, Hausen, and Tengen, the second by Lancqwaid, Schneidart, and Saalhaupt. The Vecsay brigade, a brigade borrowed from the Archduke Louis, the light cavalry and the heavy cavalry detached from the reserve, were to march on Ratisbon by the road from Landshut by Eckmühl, and probably to have an affair with the vanguard under General Montbrun.

Our men had started at daybreak. Of our four columns, that of the baggage moving along the side of the Danube, and sheltered by the heights and by the mass of our infantry divisions, could not encounter any enemy. The two columns of infantry, both preceded and followed by cavalry, marched for some time without discovering anything. At nine o'clock in the morning the head of the two columns crossed the heights, descended on the other side, and only had a glimpse of some Austrian sharpshooters. The Gudin division, which formed the head of our left column, and which had sent out the sharp-

shooters of the 7th to a distance, was alone engaged with the Austrian sharpshooters of Prince de Rosenberg. The village of Schneidart was rather hotly contested. But our troops, having orders to march, did not stop; and whilst the tirailleurs of the 7th kept up their fire, Morand and Gudin defiled by order of Marshal Davout, who had galloped up to hasten the march of the troops. The two divisions hurried on to Ober Feking and Unter Feking, where they were to fall in with the baggage column as it issued from the defile of Abach, very near the general rendezvous. The tirailleurs of the 7th followed Gudin after having fought gallantly, and abandoned Schneidart to the Austrians, who thought they had taken it by force of arms. But as the Austrians continued to advance, the St. Hilaire and Friant divisions, which formed the rear of our two columns of infantry, could not fail to encounter them. Whilst Rosenberg's corps, after its skirmish with the 7th light infantry, traversed Schneidart and moved on Dingling, Hohenzollern's corps entered Hausen just as the last companies of the 7th evacuated it, and occupied a mass of wood that extended in a horse-shoe form opposite Tengen.

At that moment General St. Hilaire, passing through Tengen with his division, perceived opposite him on the verge of the wood the Austrian masses of Hohenzollern, preceded by a cloud of tirailleurs. The 10th light infantry having driven back the latter, Marshal Davout, who was at that moment with General St. Hilaire, ordered the 3rd of the line on the right and the 57th on the left to storm the wooded heights that formed a semicircle in front of him, in the centre of which stood the farm of Roith. The 3rd advanced rapidly, charging its arms under fire; but having attacked with too much precipitation, and before having had time to form, it did not succeed, and was obliged to retreat under a shower of grape and balls. Meanwhile the 57th, having formed its attacking columns, put itself on the left of the 3rd, and drove the enemy from the heights he occupied in advance of the wood. The 3rd, being soon brought back into line, supported this movement, and the two regiments succeeded in driving back the Austrians into the woods, and in establishing themselves firmly on the disputed ground. During this time the three other regiments of the division, the 10th, 72nd, and 105th, were drawn up right and left behind Tengen, ready to support the first two. Unfortunately the artillery was delayed by the bad state of the roads, and there were but six pieces to set against the mass of the enemy's artillery. Marshal Davout,*

* I have often had much difficulty in unravelling the truth from amidst the contradictory assertions of witnesses who report military events: I have never had more than on this occasion, and especially with respect to the battle of Tengen. We have the sober, clear, and moderate narrative of General Stutterheim, and many others by Germans. We have on the French side General

seeing the battle well established at this point, hastened to the Gudin and Morand divisions, which had already defiled, to satisfy himself that they had arrived without accident at Unter and Ober Feking, to place them at his extreme right, and thus hinder the enemy, of whose position he was ignorant, from taking that course to the Danube.

At the opposite extremity to the left, General Friant, whose march had been retarded by the state of the roads, had debouched on Saalhaupt between noon and one o'clock, and hearing heavy firing in the direction of Tengen, had hastened to take up a position to the left of the St. Hilaire division with the intention of supporting it. He made the 15th light infantry and the 48th of the line advance under the orders of General Gilly, to enter the wood and clear the flank of the St. Hilaire division. He placed in the plain between Saalhaupt and Tengen the second brigade of the St. Sulpice cuirassiers, with the 33rd, 108th, and 111th, to secure the extremity of his line. General Piré, who commanded a regiment of light cavalry, was ordered to connect the division with General Montbrun's vanguard towards Dingling.

As soon as he was within musket-shot General Gilly proceeded to clear the wood on the left of the St. Hilaire division. The chef-de-bataillon Sarraire entered it with four companies of the 15th and dislodged the Austrians. The 15th and the 48th thus took up their position on the flank of the St. Hilaire division, and the voltigeur companies of all the regiments stepped out and began to exchange a tremendous fire with the Austrian sharpshooters.

Whilst these movements were taking place on the wings of the St. Hilaire division, the battle on its front had several times changed aspect. The 33rd on the right, and the 57th on the left of the horse-shoe enclosing the farm of Roith, had lost a great many men, and exhausted their ammunition, which could not easily be replaced, the artillery waggons not having yet arrived. General St. Hilaire ordered up the 72nd in place of the 33rd, and the 105th in place of the 57th, and the fire began again with extreme violence. Prince Hohenzollern pushed forward the Manfredini and Wurzburg regiments, led by Prince Louis of Lichtenstein, which made immense efforts to debouch by the horse-shoe, of which the French occupied the middle. All the

Pelet, and the manuscript narratives of Generals St. Hilaire, Friant, and Montbrun, and better still, an account by Marshal Davout himself. All these narratives contradict each other as to places, hours, and the troops engaged. After having read them again and again, as many as five or six times each, I have come to understand the facts as I have stated them, and I think the account I have given is as near the truth as possible. What I am sure of is, that I have preserved the true character of the event, and that is what is most important in history. The notes I have collected on this matter would form a memoir like those which are drawn up for the Academy of Inscriptions.

officers were wounded in these attempts. Marshal Davout, having returned to the St. Hilaire division, had placed himself at the centre with a battalion of the 53rd, and fell upon all who attempted to debouch by the extremities, making prisoners at every fresh move of the Austrians.

The enemy's generals then resolved to make an attempt on St. Hilaire's left, at the point of junction with the Friant division. Prince Louis de Lichtenstein, putting himself at the head of the Wurzburg regiment, and seizing a flag, debouched in column, marching straight against the French. General Gilly with the grenadiers of the 15th and a battalion of the 111th met Prince Louis at the bayonet's point and drove him back. The prince returned to the charge, received several shots, and was put hors de combat. The Austrians were withdrawn. In front of the St. Hilaire division Prince Hohenzollern made a fresh attempt; but our artillery had just then come up, and its fire checked the assailants. The 10th light infantry then charged into the wood and forced the Austrians to fall back upon Hausen. This movement was supported by our whole line, and the Austrians were on the point of being driven into Hausen, when Prince Maurice of Lichtenstein, at the head of the Kaunitz regiment, stopped the furious pursuit of the French. The prince was wounded in saving his *corps d'armée*.

The day was drawing to a close, and in the confusion of this rencontre the French were no more willing than the Austrians to risk a more general engagement. It was enough for Marshal Davout that he had accomplished his task by arriving safe and sound at the environs of Abensberg. His right, formed by the Gudin and Morand divisions, having arrived at the rendezvous, and his left, formed by St. Hilaire and Friant, being master of the field of battle, he contented himself with bivouacking there as victor, and awaiting Napoleon's orders for his ulterior movements. His march had been successful on all points; for the brave Montbrun, having encountered Rosenberg's corps, had gallantly resisted it, and fell back in the evening on the *corps d'armée* without having sustained any check.

The Archduke Charles, stationed on the heights of Grub, with twelve battalions of grenadiers belonging to the first *corps de réserve*, had remained a passive spectator of the battle. Seeing a fight on his left with Hohenzollern, and on his right with Rosenberg, he feared he had the main body of the French before him; and wishing to rally all his troops before risking a general engagement, he had let the fight go on without succouring the Hohenzollern corps. His intention was to renew the conflict on the following day, after having made Archduke Louis join him from his post before Abens, and made General Hiller take up the position thus left vacant.

The day had been very bloody, for there had been fighting not only at Dinzling, between Montbrun and Rosenberg, and at Tengen, between St. Hilaire, Friant, and Hohenzollern, but also between the intermediate posts left by the Austrians and the French to connect the two extremities of their lines. Our loss was 200 men of General Montbrun's vanguard, 300 of the Friant division, 1700 of the St. Hilaire division, a few men only of the Morand division, and 100 or 200 of the Bavarian horse—in all, 2500 men. The Austrians lost 500 at Dinzling, about 4500 at Tengen, and some hundreds at Buch and Arnhofen—in all, nearly 6000.* A considerable number of their soldiers were missing. The general result was of very great importance as regarded the position of the two armies, for Marshal Davout, who might have been stopped in his march, and perhaps thrown into the Danube, had fortunately slipped through between the river and the Austrians, had reached the environs of Abensberg with his right, and victoriously assailed the centre of the Austrians with his left. Had the Archduke Charles marched in closer order, had he hesitated less for fear of the ground and of Napoleon, he might have routed the Friant and St. Hilaire divisions with his reserve of grenadiers, or at least have severely injured them. But he saw in the whole mêlée only reasons for waiting till matters became more clear, and till his left had come up.

Napoleon made a different use of the advantages gained by Marshal Davout. Arriving from Ingolstadt at Vohburg on the night of the 19th, he learned the events of the day, and immediately mounting his horse, he galloped to Abensberg to reconnoitre the ground in person. From that plateau he perceived that the Austrians had only a chain of posts, neither numerous nor well placed, to connect the masses that had fought at Tengen with those which were spread along the Abens. He did not know exactly where was the Archduke Charles with his main body, whether before Tengen, over against the St. Hilaire and Friant divisions, or along the Abens, before the Bavarians; but he saw clearly that the Austrian commander had strangely extended his line; and availing himself of the advantages of concentration which began to be on his side since Marshal Davout's successful movement, he thought of making the Austrians suffer the consequences to which they had exposed themselves by their imprudent dispersion. He therefore made the following arrangements on the spot. Leaving Marshal Davout the victorious St. Hilaire and Friant divisions with Montbrun's light troops (in all, 24,000 men), he took from him for

* I repeat once for all that these numbers (and others of the same kind) can only be approximate; but I have taken all possible pains to make them as near the truth as I could.

the moment the Morand and Gudin divisions, bivouacked between Unter and Ober Feking, the St. Sulpice cuirassiers and the Jacquinot chasseurs, and put them under the temporary command of Marshal Lannes, who had just arrived. Bidding Marshal Davout stand fast at Tengen and resist any attack whatever that might be made on him, for the army was about to make that point its pivot, in order to break the enemy's centre and drive it back upon Landshut, he ordered Marshal Lannes to march straight forward with the 25,000 or 26,000 men at his disposal, and storm Rohr, which seemed to be the centre of the Austrian position. Having himself under his hand the Wurtembergers, who were at that moment debouching on the field of battle, he placed them towards Arnhofen, between Lannes and the Bavarians, which latter he ordered to cross the Abens at Abensberg, and go and storm Arnhofen. The Wrede division especially, posted behind the Abens from Biburg to Siegenburg, was to wait until the enemy's line was in motion to pass the Abens by force and debouch to our right on the left flank of the Austrians. Each of these attacks was directed against one of the detached posts of the Austrians, which formed a long chain from the Abens to the Laber. It was Napoleon's design, after forcing all these posts, to push on to Landshut and seize the archduke's line of operation, either by falling on his rear, or upon the prince himself, if he fell back in person on Landshut. To render the operation more sure, he hastened to modify the order of Massena's march. He had made him descend on Pfaffenhofen perpendicularly to the left flank of the Austrians, having it in view to bend his march either to the Isar or the Danube, according to circumstances. Thinking he had forces enough by him, since he had Marshal Davout at Tengen with 24,000 men, Marshal Lannes about to storm Rohr with 25,000, Marshal Lefebvre preparing to attack Arnhofen and Offenstetten with 40,000 Wurtembergers and Bavarians, and the Demont division and the Nansouty cuirassiers, who were arriving at the rear, he sent Massena forward to Landshut by Freising and Moosburg, ordering him to be there early on the following day, the 21st, in order to hinder the return of the Austrians to that place. It was possible, if Massena arrived in time, that he might carry everything between the Danube and the Isar.

Whilst Napoleon was making arrangements for thus employing the 20th, Archduke Charles, stopped in his movement on Ratisbon by the encounter with the St. Hilaire and Friant divisions, equally uninformed as his adversary respecting the march of the enemy, but not guessing so well as he what he had to fear, had imagined that the violent resistance he had just met with indicated the presence of Napoleon at Tengen with all his

forces, and had resolved to call up the corps of his brother Louis, which had been left before Abens, directing General Hiller, who had had to march all the 19th, to occupy the position quitted by the Archduke Louis. He therefore resolved to await on the 20th, between Grub and Dinzling, the junction of his left, in order to renew the fight. He left his brother at liberty, however, to interpret this order, and to fight wherever he might be, if he was attacked from the direction of the Abens.

And this conjecture was realised. On the morning of the 20th the Archduke Louis perceived masses debouching, some from the Abens by Abensberg and Arnhofen: these were the Wurtembergers and Bavarians, Demont and Nansouty; the others from the Ratisbon road by Reising and Buchhofen: these were Morand, Gudin, Jacquinot, and St. Sulpice. He saw he was about to be seriously attacked, and instead of manœuvring to rejoin his brother, he thought of defending himself where he was until Hiller's corps should come to his aid.

At that moment Napoleon saw defile before him on the plateau in front of Abensberg the Wurtembergers and Bavarians, who were going to put themselves in line, and whom the pride of fighting under that great man filled with quite French feelings. He harangued them one after the other (Wurtemberger and Bavarian officers translating his words), and said that he was making them fight not for himself, but for themselves against the ambition of the house of Austria, which was enraged at not having them as of yore under its yoke; that this time he would soon restore them peace and for ever, with such an increase of power that for the future they should be able to defend themselves against the pretensions of their old dominators. His presence and his words electrified his German allies, who were flattered to see him amongst them, entirely trusting to their honour, for at that moment he had no other escort than some detachments of Bavarian cavalry.

Between eight and nine o'clock the whole line was in motion from left to right, from Ober Feking and Buchhofen to Arnhofen and Pruck. Lannes on the left advanced with his 20,000 foot and 5000 horse on Bachel, on the road to Rohr, through a country covered with wood and intersected by numerous defiles. He encountered the Austrian general Thierry, followed by his infantry alone, for his cavalry, marching with more speed, were already near Rohr. Lannes ordered the Jacquinot chasseurs to charge, whereupon the Austrian infantry made all haste to seek the cover of the woods, but were overtaken before they could reach them, and sabred before they could form in square. They retired in disorder, running from one clump of trees to another, and leaving behind them many killed and prisoners.

It was a pitiable rout, the mass of the assailants being so disproportioned to that of the assailed.

At Rohr, Generals Thierry and Schusteck, having formed a junction, endeavoured to aid each other. Lannes' two divisions of infantry marched against them with the chasseurs and the cuirassiers at their head. Kienmayer's hussars vigorously charged the Jacquinot chasseurs, but were broken up by a counter-charge of French cuirassiers, and obliged to fall back on the village of Rohr. At that moment Morand's infantry assailed the village. The 30th, supported by the cuirassiers, attacked it in front, whilst the 13th and 17th were manœuvring to surround it. Seeing this, Generals Thierry and Schusteck retreated again, and after an ineffectual volley, fell back on Rottenburg by one of the two causeways which lead from the Danube to the Isar, that from Kilheim to Landshut. Beyond Rohr, the country being more open and retreat more difficult, the Austrian cavalry made noble efforts to cover its infantry. The Kienmayer hussars had just been joined by four squadrons of Levenehr's dragoons detached from the second reserve corps. Both charged at every rencontre with the most brilliant bravery; but if they had some advantage over our hussars, our cuirassiers, dashing upon them, sabred them unmercifully. All the infantry found on the road was taken. In this way Rottenburg was reached towards the close of the day, the disorder continually increasing among the Austrians. General Thierry, having dismounted from his horse to rally his troops, was surprised by fresh charges, and lost three whole battalions. Kienmayer's hussars and Levenehr's dragoons paid for their gallantry by almost complete destruction. Generals Thierry and Schusteck, after having lost in killed, wounded, and prisoners between 4000 and 5000 men, would have perished with all their forces if fortunately for them General Hiller had not afforded them very timely aid. Instead of descending the Abens to Siegenburg and Biburg, where Archduke Louis was engaged, General Hiller, perceiving from a distance the rout of Generals Schusteck and Thierry, had turned off to the right and perpendicularly to the road from Neustadt to Landshut, and continuing his march in the same direction, on that from Kelheim to Landshut, he had taken up a position at Rottenburg.

Lannes might have attacked Hiller's corps with the forces at his disposal and have worsted it. But he had executed a long march without having been joined by the right, composed of the Wurtembergers and Bavarians, and the day being far advanced, he halted to await further orders. He had lost barely 200 men against 4000 or 5000 killed or taken prisoners from the enemy, and he had collected cannon, baggage, and almost all the wounded of the battle of Tengen who were spread over

the villages he had passed through. Whilst Lannes was thus routing the Austrian generals Thierry and Schusteck, the Wurtembergers and Bavarians were most vigorously assailing the position of Kirchdorf, which was strongly defended by the troops of Generals Reuss and Bianchi, under Archduke Louis. Victory was more sharply contested at this point, for the Austrian troops were more numerous, in a very strong position, and though well attacked, yet not so well as they might have been by the Morand and Gudin divisions.

The Wurtembergers had marched on Offenstetten, connecting themselves by their left with Marshal Lannes, by their right with the Bavarians. The latter had marched by Pruck on Kirchdorf. The Austrian general Bianchi had fallen back from Biburg on Kirchdorf to join the troops of Prince de Reuss, whilst Archduke Louis was cannonading Siegenburg to prevent Wrede's Bavarian division from debouching beyond the Abens. The battle grew very hot round Kirchdorf, where the Austrians defended themselves with great energy. The Bavarians were several times repulsed, sometimes with musketry, sometimes at the point of the bayonet. But in the afternoon the Wurtembergers, having carried a village that covered the right of the Austrians, and General Wrede having at the same time crossed the Abens on their left, Archduke Louis was constrained to retire to Pfaffenhausen by the road from Neustadt to Landshut. The Bavarians hotly pursued him, and did not halt until very late at the environs of Pfaffenhausen, before the Aspre grenadiers, who formed the remainder of the second reserve corps, and who rendered to Generals Reuss and Bianchi the service which General Hiller had rendered to Generals Thierry and Schusteck. The loss of the Austrians on that side was about 3000 killed or taken prisoners, that of the Bavarians and Wurtembergers about 1000.

The battle of the 20th, to which Napoleon gave the name of the battle of Abensberg, though much less keenly contested than that of the 19th, cost the Austrians about 7000 or 8000 men, which made a total of 13,000 or 14,000 men for the two days. But as a manœuvre it was of immense importance, and decided the fate of that first part of the campaign, for it separated the Archduke Charles from his left by forcing back the latter upon the Isar, whilst he himself was about to be backed against the Danube towards Ratisbon. Regarded in this light, it was worthy of all the encomiums that could be bestowed on it. When Napoleon arrived that evening at Rottenburg he was intoxicated with joy. He saw his adversary driven back on the Isar at the very beginning of the operations, and the Austrians disheartened, like the Prussians after Jena. He did not clearly see yet all that fortune had in store for him, for he

could not collect from the replies of the prisoners where were the several archdukes; but supposing that Archduke Charles might be in front of him on the Landshut road, he resolved to march on that town, in order to surprise and defeat him at the passage of the Isar, if Massena arrived in time at that point. He determined therefore to proceed thither on the following day, the 21st, and to push matters to extremities with the Austrians. From what he had seen during the day he was inclined to believe that their whole force was flying towards the Isar, and that Marshal Davout, who had become his left pivot, would have only to march straight before him to pick up the remains of the fugitives. In this belief he ordered him to drive back the few troops he supposed to be placed before Tengen, so as to follow the movement of the whole French line on the Isar, and ultimately to fall upon Bellegarde at Ratisbon, when an end had been made of Archduke Charles. He did not suspect that what seemed to be the few troops before Tengen was the Archduke Charles himself with the main body of the Austrian forces.

The archduke had waited all the day of the 20th for the renewal of the battle of Tengen and the junction of his brother Louis. But neither having taken place—on the contrary, many French being seen on the two roads from the Danube to the Isar—he began to be apprehensive for his left, and in order to try and rally it, if no disaster had befallen it, he took up a position on the wooded heights that separate the big and the little Laber from the valley of the Danube, athwart the road leading from Landshut to Ratisbon by Eckmühl. The whole reserve of cuirassiers had orders to place themselves on the back of those heights at the entrance of the plain of Ratisbon, the grenadiers at the summit, and the Hohenzollern and Rosenberg corps on the slope next the Laber, right and left of Eckmühl. In this position the archduke was backed against Ratisbon, faced Landshut, and was ready to change his line of operation if his left was absolutely cut off from him, and to reinforce himself with Bellegarde's corps if he were deprived of Hiller's. On his part, Lieutenant-General Hiller, who besides his own corps commanded that of Archduke Louis by right of seniority, seeing himself hard beset on the Neustadt and Kelheim roads, thought he could not too soon reach Landshut, for he despaired, with reason, of rejoining Archduke Charles, and he feared that Landshut itself, where the whole matériel of the army, with a vast number of wounded, had just been collected, had been carried by the enemy. In consequence he ordered the columns on the two roads to make a night march to Landshut, so as to arrive there very early in the morning.

On the night of the 20th the Austrians poured on upon Landshut from the two roads. The French, almost as early as the Austrians, burst upon it like two torrents.

After sleeping a few hours on a chair, without undressing, Napoleon was in the saddle at daybreak of the 21st, to direct in person the pursuit along the Landshut road. Though still ignorant of the presence of Archduke Charles at Eckmühl, he had made further reflections on that subject, in consequence of which he had detached the Demont division, the Nansouty cuirassiers, and the Bavarian divisions of General Deroy and the prince-royal, on his left towards the big Laber, not wishing, in so uncertain a situation, to leave Marshal Davout reduced to a force of 24,000 men. With the 25,000 under Lannes he continued to pursue the corps of Hiller and Archduke Louis along the road from Rottenburg to Landshut, whilst the Bavarian general de Wrede pursued them by the Pfaffenhausen road. He reckoned on the arrival of Massena at Landshut with at least 30,000 men.

Marching with Morand's infantry, the St. Sulpice cuirassiers, and the light cavalry, he arrived very early at Landshut, having picked up at every step fugitives, wounded, cannon, and heavy baggage. On arriving at Altdorf at the débouche of the woods, whence the view commanded the verdant plain of the Isar and the town of Landshut, an indescribable confusion was perceived. The Austrian cavalry was passing towards the bridges with their infantry, both arriving by the two roads before mentioned. The obstruction was further increased by the matériel of the army, and notably by a superb train of pontoons brought on waggons for passing the Danube, and even the Rhine, had heaven favoured this levy of bucklers against France. Bessières, who had come up suddenly like Lannes and the emperor, and had only an aide-de-camp or two at hand, was leading the St. Sulpice cuirassiers, the Jacquinot chasseurs, and 15th light infantry of Morand's division. Perceiving the spectacle before him, he ordered his chasseurs to charge the Austrian cavalry, which defended itself bravely, notwithstanding the disorder and the swampy and slippery state of the ground; but the French cuirassiers, charging it en masse, obliged it to give way. The Austrian generals then made it hastily pass the bridges, in front of which they drew up their infantry against us, to give time for the baggage to defile; and they placed the Aspre grenadiers in Landshut itself, and especially in the elevated quarters of the town. But the whole Morand division soon came up. The 13th light and the 17th of the line attacked the Austrian infantry, whilst the French cavalry charged it again. It could not withstand these reiterated attacks, and was compelled to fall back in all haste upon the bridges, in

order to pass them in time. It did effect its retreat, leaving in the meadows many prisoners, a considerable number of artillery carriages, and the train of pontoons before mentioned. The 13th and a battalion of the 17th threw themselves into the suburb of Seligenthal, which they carried under a most severe fire of musketry. It remained for them to cross the great bridge over the main branch of the Isar. The Austrians had set it on fire. General Mouton, the emperor's aide-de-camp, at the head of the grenadiers of the 17th, whom he animated by voice and gesture, led them on, sword in hand, to the blazing bridge, crossed it under a hail of bullets, and ascended with them the steep streets of Landshut, situated on the other bank of the Isar. At that moment Massena arrived with the Molitor and Boudet divisions, one of Oudinot's divisions, and the light cavalry of General Marulaz, too late to hinder the retreat of the Austrians, but soon enough to precipitate it. At sight of this overwhelming combination of forces the Austrians evacuated Landshut, abandoning to us, besides an immense matériel, 6000 or 7000 prisoners, and some dead or wounded. Their line of operation then was forced from them, and with it they had lost all the military wealth one loses when the principal road is seized by which one has marched against the enemy.

Whilst Napoleon was executing this triumphant pursuit, with his centre augmented by a part of Massena's forces, cannon was heard on his left, where Marshal Davout was once more encountering the masses of Archduke Charles. The cannonade, in fact, was extremely loud, though at the distance of eight or nine leagues from Landshut, and was of a nature to disquiet Napoleon, who, though believing he was pursuing the bulk of the Austrian army, was not certain that he had not left Marshal Davout a large part of it to contend with. Had the latter only the army of Bohemia to deal with, even that would be much for the two divisions at his disposal. What had actually happened was as follows.

Having, as we have seen, received orders on the preceding evening to sweep before him the slight forces that were supposed to have been left on the Laber after the battle of Abensberg, he had put himself in motion in the morning, at the very moment Napoleon was marching on Landshut. The St. Hilaire and Friant divisions, after resting on the 20th from the battle of the 19th, had quitted Tengen on the 21st, at five in the morning, following the corps of Hohenzollern and Rosenberg, which were going to take up the positions assigned to them by Archduke Charles on the slopes of the hills between the valley of the big Laber and the plain of Ratisbon. The vanguard of our two divisions, in debouching from the valley of the Tengen

into that of the big Laber, encountered the rear of the Austrians on a woody plateau between Schneidart and Päring. The tirailleurs of the 10th moved forward to repulse those of the enemy, whilst our hussars charged his light cavalry. The Austrians were forced to give way, and presently our flying artillery galloped up, poured a shower of grape after them, and obliged them to retreat with all speed. The Rosenberg and Hohenzollern corps, fearing that they had to do with a considerable part of the French army, thought it advisable to fall back immediately, in order not to lose time or the means of occupying the posts designed for them on the road from Landshut to Ratisbon, right and left of Eckmühl. Our two divisions advanced then, that of St. Hilaire on the right, along the margin of the big Laber, that of Friant to the left, along the foot of the wooded heights that form one of the sides of the valley. These heights being filled with Rosenberg's sharpshooters, the Friant division suffered much more severely than the St. Hilaire, which had the open valley of the Laber to traverse. Wishing to relieve himself from these sharpshooters, General Friant sent out from the regiments a considerable number of voltigeurs, who, led by the brave engineer Captain Henratz, dislodged the Austrians, and cleared the woods on our left. As the divisions continued their march, two villages presented themselves—Päring at the foot of the rocks, Schierling on the edge of the stream. Both were to be carried. Whilst our tirailleurs were penetrating into the woods, General Friant pushed forward the 48th on the village of Päring. As he was giving his orders with his usual resolution and ability, having Marshal Davout at his side, his horse was knocked down by a cannon-ball. Immediately mounting another, he had the village of Päring taken under his own eye at the point of the bayonet, and made 400 prisoners there. At the same moment General St. Hilaire made an equally vigorous and successful attack on Schierling, and likewise took there some hundreds of prisoners. Just then the Bavarians, the Demont division, and the Nansouty cuirassiers were seen approaching from Landshut, by the very provident orders of Napoleon. The bridges of the Laber were repaired with all haste, in order to effect a communication with these very welcome reinforcements. It was mid-day, and the very hour when Napoleon entered Landshut.

Whilst Friant and St. Hilaire were thus advancing, Rosenberg and Hohenzollern had proceeded to take up a position on the heights bordering on the big Laber, just at the point where they are traversed by the cross-road from Landshut to Ratisbon. This road, crossing the big Laber here in front of the castle of Eckmühl, rose in successive inclinations through the woods, and then emerged by Egglofsheim on the plain of Ratisbon. To

the left of that road, above Eckmühl, were two villages (Ober Leuchling and Unter Leuchling), leaning one on the other, and commanding a small ravine that debouches into the great Laber. Rosenberg's corps had posted itself in these two villages. Hohenzollern's occupied the road itself, along the inclined plains above Eckmühl, with an advanced guard beyond the big Laber, in the direction of Landshut. It was very distinctly seen in that strong position, barring the route it was ordered to defend.

Marshal Davout approached, and deployed in face of the Austrians, within a cannon-shot of them, having Friant on his left, before the villages of Ober and Unter Leuchling; St. Hilaire and the Bavarians on his right, in the low grounds adjacent to the big Laber. Whilst he was thus deploying, a column of Hungarians advanced as if to make a sortie against us. Marshal Davout, having at hand a battery of flying artillery, made it fire immediately, and with such effect that the Hungarian column fell back in disorder. The marshal then took up a position within a short cannon-shot of the Austrians, and a tremendous cannonade began on either side. It lasted several hours without results; for the Austrians, having no other orders than to cover the approaches to the plain of Ratisbon, were not likely to assume the offensive; and Marshal Davout, surmising that he had considerable forces before him—probably the archduke himself at the head of his main army—did not choose to come to a decisive engagement without the emperor's orders and without sufficient means. He contented himself then with securing his position for the night, and making it convenient for the next day's attack, if, as he was convinced would be the case, Napoleon gave orders for it, with means proportioned to the difficulty. At night he put a stop to the useless firing, and the Austrians gladly followed the example, to take the rest of which they had great need. General Friant established himself opposite Ober Leuchling, with his left resting on the woody summits that separated us from the plain of Ratisbon. General St. Hilaire, bearing slightly to the left, established himself before Unter Leuchling, separated from the Austrians by the little ravine which ran into the big Laber. The Bavarians and the cavalry spread over the plain on the margin of the river. The events of this day, made up of rearguard conflicts, storming of positions, and a long cannonade, cost the Friant division 1100 men; the St. Hilaire division, 300; total, 1400; and the Austrians at least 3000. Adding to these, for the taking of Landshut, 300 men on our side and about 7000 on that of the Austrians, our reckoning for killed, wounded, and prisoners was 1700, and that of the Austrians 10,000. The number of men whom this disheartening series of disasters induced to quit their colours was very great on the enemy's side.

The day's work being done, Marshal Davout immediately sent General Piré to the emperor, to give him an exact account of what had taken place, and of as much as could be perceived of the position and force of the Austrians in that maze of woods and streams which lay between Landshut and Ratisbon. Anxious about the cannonade heard on his left, towards Eckmühl, the emperor had not lain down, that he might receive the reports that would of course be sent to him from all sides. With his prodigious penetration he had already partly discovered the state of things, and he was beginning to have no doubt as to the enemy's position. In fact, Massena, on his march from Augsburg by Pfaffenhausen to Landshut, had fallen in with no more than a body of some thousand flankers, whom he had driven before him in disorder beyond the Isar. The masses of the Archduke Louis and of General Hiller, which had been pursued through the town of Landshut, neither by their number nor by any other sign, denoted the presence of the main army. Marshal Davout's last engagement, news of which arrived in the night, cleared up all remaining doubts. Napoleon plainly discerned that he had on his left, along the road from Landshut to Ratisbon by Eckmühl, either the Archduke Charles himself with the main body of his forces, or at least the army of Bohemia, removed by the Ratisbon bridge from the left to the right of the Danube. In the former case he ought to move to Eckmühl with all his forces; in the latter, he ought considerably to reinforce Marshal Davout. On the strength of what he had heard of the battle of Leuchling, Napoleon, at two in the morning, sent off the St. Sulpice cuirassiers and the Wurtembergers, under General Vandamme. Both these bodies had removed a little in the rear of Landshut, and had consequently a shorter distance to retrograde towards Eckmühl. He also sent General Piré to Marshal Davout, to announce this reinforcement, and to promise others more considerable when all was certainly known.

The indications, which would have been vague and indefinite for any but him, were momentarily accumulating, and at last his conviction was settled. Among other facts made known to him, there was one that dissipated all his doubts; this was the taking of Ratisbon by the Austrian army.* The reader remembers that Napoleon had ordered Marshal Davout to leave a regiment in Ratisbon to guard the town, which would have

* A long series of letters he wrote during the night, and which has remained unknown to historians, displays with the greatest precision the series of views he successively entertained until his mind was made up, and he gave his final orders for the battle of Eckmühl. This correspondence of a few hours is one of the most curious and instructive spectacles as regards the study of the human mind. I have read it several times with attention, and I have deduced from it the facts I relate.

been a fault, since a regiment was not sufficient, had it not been urgently necessary to march to Abensberg with the greatest possible mass of forces. Davout then had left the 65th, an excellent regiment, commanded by Colonel Coutard, with orders to barricade the gates and the streets of the town, for Ratisbon had no other fortification than a mere wall, and to defend the place to the last extremity. Colonel Coutard had had to do on the 19th with the army of Bohemia, and had so well resisted it with his musketry that he killed 800 of the enemy. But on the following day, the 20th, the army of the Archduke Charles appeared before him on the right bank of the river coming from Landshut, and he was without cartridges, having spent them in the fight of the preceding day. Marshal Davout, being informed of this, had sent him two chests of ammunition, which fell into the enemy's hands, and not a single packet of cartridges entered Ratisbon. Beset by two armies, not having a shot to fire, and not being able to defend himself from the top of the walls or the barricades with his bayonets, Colonel Coutard was constrained to surrender. Archduke Charles was then master of Ratisbon, of the two banks of the Danube, and of the point of junction with the Bohemian troops, which partly indemnified him for having been separated from Archduke Louis and General Hiller, but did not indemnify him either for the 24,000 men already lost in three days, or for the loss of his line of operation, or above all, for his moral ascendency wholly gone and passed over to his adversary's side. When Napoleon was made aware of the misfortune of the 65th, he was filled with a desire for vengeance, and at the same time convinced that Archduke Charles was on his left, since the 65th had been caught between two armies; that Marshal Davout had before him at Eckmühl the greater part of the Austrian forces, and that he himself must instantly make a move to the left with all the forces he could command, to support Marshal Davout, and overwhelm Archduke Charles. He had already sent off in the night, as we have said, General St. Sulpice with four regiments of cuirassiers, and General Vandamme with the Wurtembergers. He immediately despatched Marshal Lannes with General Nansouty's six regiments of cuirassiers, and the two fine divisions of Generals Morand and Gudin, ordering him to march all night so as to reach Eckmühl towards noon, and be able to afford his troops an hour's rest before battle. Doing nothing by halves, because he did not discern the truth by halves, Napoleon further resolved to march in person with Marshal Massena and his three divisions, to which he added General Espagne's superb division of cuirassiers. Marshal Davout, with the Friant and St. Hilaire divisions much reduced by the engagements of the 19th and 21st, with the

Bavarians and Demont's division, numbered from 32,000 to 34,000 men. Generals Vandamme and St. Sulpice brought him 13,000 or 14,000, and Marshal Lannes 25,000, which made a total of 72,000. Napoleon, accompanied by Massena and Espagne's cuirassiers, was about to swell to 90,000 the total of fighting men before Eckmühl, more than enough to overpower Archduke Charles, even were he already joined by the Bohemian army. Napoleon sent word to Marshal Davout that he would arrive with all his forces between twelve and one o'clock, that he would announce his presence by several salvoes of artillery, and that on hearing that signal he should begin the attack forthwith.

Napoleon made some further arrangements before his departure for Eckmühl. He gave Marshal Bessières, who was to pursue the two corps of Hiller and Archduke Louis beyond the Isar, besides the Marulaz light cavalry and a portion of the German cavalry, Wrede's Bavarian division and Molitor's fine French division. The Boudet division, one of Massena's four, and the Tharreau division, Oudinot's second, remained to be disposed of. Napoleon echeloned them between the Isar and the Danube, from Neustadt to Landshut, to watch everything that might happen between the two rivers, and to move either to Neustadt on the Danube, if a part of the army of Bohemia threatened our line of operation, or to Landshut on the Isar, if Archduke Louis or General Hiller attempted to repair their mischance by facing round against Marshal Bessières.

Having given these orders, Napoleon galloped off, accompanied by Marshal Massena, for Eckmühl, one of the battle-fields immortalised by his genius. It was daybreak on the 22nd when he started. There had been incessant fighting since the 19th, and it was about to be renewed on that memorable day with more vehemence and larger bodies of combatants.

On both sides all was ready for a decisive action. Archduke Charles could no longer indulge any hope of recovering his left from beyond the Isar, nor ought he to have had any other desire than to form a junction with the Bohemian army—a move which the taking of Ratisbon facilitated. But he wished in his turn to attempt something which, in case of success, might have turned the chances in his favour, and cut Napoleon off from his line of operations, as he had cut the Austrians off from theirs. He conceived therefore the singular project of making an attack in three columns on Abach, in the same direction that Marshal Davout had taken in his march from Ratisbon to Abensberg. Having his back now to Ratisbon and his face to Landshut, he had only to make a movement by his right on Abach to execute this plan, whereby he would have been placed on the French line of communication; and as there was at Abach only General Montbrun's vanguard, it would have been possible

to break through a nd debouch on our rear. But whether from fear of what might result from any bold enterprise in presence of such an adversary as Napoleon, or from anxiety for the fate of an army on which depended the safety of the monarchy, the archduke proceeded to the execution of this new scheme in so hesitating a manner as must have rendered its success impossible. In the first place, in order to give General Kollowrath, detached from the Bohemian army, time to cross the Danube, he decided that the attack should not take place until between twelve and one o'clock, the time fixed on by Napoleon for forcing the passage of Eckmühl. He distributed the troops into three columns. The first, consisting of Kollowrath's corps with part of the Vecsay brigade for a vanguard, was to march from Burg Weinting on Abach. It was 24,000 strong. The second, made up of the Lindenau division and the rest of the Vecsay brigade, and commanded by Prince John of Lichtenstein, was to march by Weilhoe on Peising. It was 12,000 strong, and had the commander-in-chief at its head. The third, nearly 40,000 strong, composed of Rosenberg's corps, which was placed in the villages of Ober and Unter Leuchling, in face of Marshal Davout, of Hohenzollern's corps, which was barring the Eckmühl road, and of the grenadiers of the reserve and the cuirassiers, who were guarding the entrance of the plain of Ratisbon by Egglofsheim, was to remain in its place and defend the road from Landshut to Ratisbon against the French, whilst the first two columns were making their attempt on Abach. So then the archduke was preparing to assume the offensive with his right, 36,000 strong, whilst his left, 40,000 strong, would stand on the defensive midway up the heights which separate the big Laber from the valley of the Danube. Napoleon, on his side, marching on Eckmühl to the support of Marshal Davout, was about to fall on that left with all his forces, the two hostile commanders thus acting on each other's means of communication, but the one with hesitation, the other with irresistible vigour. That left of the archduke's, which was to contest with us the road from Ratisbon to the environs of Eckmühl, was disposed as follows. Rosenberg's corps was stationed midway up the heights bordering on the Laber, behind the two villages of Ober and Unter Leuchling, flanking the Ratisbon highroad. A little further and lower was Hohenzollern's corps, occupying the margin of the great Laber, the castle of Eckmühl, and the slopes of the Ratisbon road above it. On the reverse of the hills in the plain of Ratisbon was the whole mass of the cuirassiers and grenadiers in front and rear of Egglofsheim. It was then in front of the two villages of Ober and Unter Leuchling, then on the Eckmühl road, and lastly, on the plain of Ratisbon, that the action was to take place.

Until eight o'clock a thick fog enveloped that rural scene which was soon to be drenched with the blood of thousands of men. As soon as it cleared away both sides prepared for action. Marshal Davout placed the Friant division on his left over against the wooded heights against which rested Ober and Unter Leuchling, on his right the St. Hilaire division, to attack those two villages in front. More to the right and lower down on the margin of the Laber he had ranged the Bavarian and Wurtemberg cavalry, and behind these the divisions of French cuirassiers, which were already arrived. The Austrians, on their side, posted themselves as strongly as they could on the heights. Prince Rosenberg barricaded the village of Unter Leuchling, the more menaced of the two, and posted part of his forces in the two villages, the rest on a woody plateau which commanded them. To connect himself with the Eckmühl road, which ran in his rear, he deployed the Czartoryski regiment on a hillside, with a large quantity of artillery, so as to sweep the whole valley by which the French were to present themselves. The Biber brigade of Hohenzollern's corps was deeply massed along the road above Eckmühl, whilst Wukassovich occupied the other bank of the big Laber with several detachments, awaiting the French who were coming from Landshut. Not a musket or a cannon-shot was fired before noon; only there were seen frequent movements of men and horses, and the masses of the Austrian army marked with long white lines the wooded hillsides and the moist and verdant meadows. Towards noon dense columns appeared in the direction of Landshut. These were the Morand and Gudin divisions preceded by the Wurtembergers, and followed by Marshals Lannes and Massena and by Napoleon himself, all coming up at a gallop. The French troops from Landshut debouched by Buchhausen from a chain of hills facing Eckmühl, and forming the opposite side of the valley of the big Laber. There was no need for the appointed signal, for the battle began at once on the meeting of the vanguards. The Wurtembergers, on debouching from Buchhausen, were met with grape and charges of Wukassovich's light cavalry. They were driven back, but soon rallied by the brave Vandamme, and supported by the Morand and Gudin divisions they took Lintach, lined the Laber opposite Eckmühl, and connected themselves by their left with the Demont division and the Bavarians. On their right the advanced posts of the Gudin division spread themselves out between Deckenbach and Zaitzkofen, opposite Eckmühl and Roking.

At the sound of the first cannon-shot fired by the vanguard the intrepid Davout put his two divisions in motion. The French artillery at first poured out a storm of projectiles on the whole front of the Austrians, and obliged them to shut them-

selves up in the two villages. The Friant and St. Hilaire divisions advanced in order, the former to the left upon the woods on which rested the right of Rosenberg's corps, the latter to the right upon Ober and Unter Leuchling, both of which were within a musket-shot. A most destructive fire of musketry was opened on the St. Hilaire division as it moved upon the village, but made no impression on that veteran body, which was led by the brave St. Hilaire, surnamed in the army *the knight without fear and without reproach.* Ober Leuchling, which was more sunk in the ravine and of easier access, was first taken. Unter Leuchling, which was steep and barricaded within, was vigorously defended by the Austrians. The 10th infantry, which was ordered to attack, being exposed to the fire both of the village and of the wood above it, lost in a moment 500 men between killed and wounded. It forced its way into the village notwithstanding, bayoneted all who resisted it, and made several hundred prisoners. The Bellegarde and Reuss-Graitz regiments that had been posted in the villages then retired to the wooded plateau in the rear, and there defended themselves with fresh vigour. During this time the Friant division on the left had attacked the woods adjacent to the villages, and driven back their defenders, the Chasteler, Archduke Louis, and Cobourg regiments, forming Prince Rosenberg's right. After a very destructive fire of sharpshooters, the 48th and the 111th, led by General Barbanègre, charged and drove before them with the bayonet all the Austrian troops in the woods. Rosenberg's corps, thus pushed on one side towards the woods which crowned the chain, on the other beyond the two villages on the wooded plateau that commanded them, was backed against the opening through which ran the Eckmühl road, and there it tried to maintain its ground. At that moment, low down to the right before Eckmühl, the attacks were beginning with equal vigour. Whilst the Bavarian cavalry, supported by our cuirassiers, was charging the Austrian cavalry in the meadow, the Wurtemberg foot had rushed forward to take Eckmühl from the Wukassovich infantry, which they did in spite of a dense fire from the walls of the castle. The slopes of the road up the mountain were then seen covered with deep masses of infantry and cavalry. On the left were the remains of Rosenberg's corps defending the plateau above the two Leuchlings; to the right were the wooded heights of Roking, on which a part of the Biber brigade was posted. It was necessary therefore to carry these points, and so outflank on both sides the masses that barred the road.

Napoleon, accompanied by Lannes and Massena, ordered the decisive attack, whilst General Cervoni, a brave officer who was holding a map open before them, was killed by a cannon-ball.

Lannes led the Gudin division to the right against the Roking heights. Crossing the great Laber at Stangelmühle, the division on one side ascended the heights directly, on the other, extending its movement to the right, it passed round them, and took them one by one from the Biber brigade, which contested the ground foot by foot. On the road, which was of rather steep ascent, the Bavarian and Wurtemberg horse charged the Austrian light cavalry, which, having the advantage of the ground, rushed down upon our allies and swept them away to the margin of the Laber. The French cuirassiers, coming to their aid, galloped up the slopes, overthrew the Austrian horsemen, and reached the summit of the road at the moment when Gudin's infantry appeared above their heads masters of the Roking heights. Seeing the French cuirassiers galloping up the road and knocking the Austrians over in spite of the disadvantage of the ground, the Gudin infantry clapped their hands and shouted, "Vivent les cuirassiers!"

On the left the struggle was continued between the St. Hilaire and the Bellegarde and Reuss-Graitz regiments, which contested with each other the wooded plateau above Leuchling. St. Hilaire at last forced his way across it towards the road, driving the two regiments before him. Seeing this, the brave generals Stutterheim and Sommariva charged with Vincent's *chevaux legers* and the Stipsicz hussars upon St. Hilaire's infantry, but was met at the point of the bayonet, and driven to the edge of the Ratisbon road, the summit of which was then occupied by St. Hilaire on one side, whilst Gudin's infantry crowned it on the other. The Austrian horse, now accumulated on the road, made fresh efforts against the mass of our cavalry, charged, was charged in its turn, and ended by yielding the ground.

Every impediment was now overcome, and the Ratisbon road belonged to us, for Friant on the left, traversing the wood which surmounted the chain, was already descending on the other side, and Gudin on the right, having also crossed that chain, was beginning to debouch on the plain of Ratisbon towards Gailsbach. Rosenberg and Hohenzollern's troops, outflanked right and left, retired behind the mass of Austrian cuirassiers, ranged in order of battle at Egglofsheim. Our cavalry followed them at full trot, having on its left the Friant and St. Hilaire infantry, and Gudin's on its right. It was seven in the evening, night was coming on, and behind the Bavarian and Wurtemberg cavalry the ten regiments of the Nansouty and St. Sulpice cuirassiers debouched en masse, making the earth resound under their horses' hoofs. A terrible collision was inevitable between the two cavalries, the one wishing to cover the plain upon which Archduke Charles was then falling back, the other wanting to possess itself of that plain in order to terminate its

victory beneath the walls of Ratisbon. The Gottesheim cuirassiers were the first to charge. The French cuirassiers, coolly awaiting them, met them with a discharge of all their firearms, and then a portion of them charging in their turn, took them in flank, broke, and pursued them. Then the Austrian cuirassiers, surnamed the emperor's, came to the aid of the Gottesheimers, and were also driven back by ours. The brave Stipsicz hussars strove to support their heavy cavalry, and did not hesitate to assail our cuirassiers. After a gallant effort they were overthrown like the others, and the whole mass of the Austrian cavalry fled in disorder beyond Egglofsheim to Kofering. Whilst our men were galloping along the road, the Austrians, finding the plain swampy, endeavoured to regain the road, and thus became mingled with the mass of our cavalry. A multitude of single combats then took place by the uncertain light of the moon, and nothing was heard but the clashing of sabres on their cuirasses, the shouts of the combatants, and the tramp of horses. Our cuirassiers, wearing double cuirasses, which covered them all round, could more easily defend themselves than the Austrians, who, having only breastplates, fell in great numbers, mortally wounded by the thrusts dealt them behind. Never within twenty years had there been such a scene of carnage.

Night had now fallen, and it became a matter of prudence to stop the fight. By advancing there was a chance of meeting the archduke's army falling back in disorder on Ratisbon, and throwing it into the Danube; but on the other hand, it might be found drawn up in order under the walls of the town, and capable of arresting the victors, who debouched promiscuously by several issues from the valley of the Laber. Napoleon now came up with Massena and Lannes to Egglofsheim. After a few minutes' deliberation the more prudent course was adopted, and he left it open till the morrow, either to fight another battle if the archduke made a stand before Ratisbon, or to pursue him across the Danube if he retreated beyond that river. He therefore gave orders to bivouac on the spot. This was wise, for the troops were spent with fatigue, especially those which came from Landshut. There were none, indeed, come up but the Wurtembergers, Morand and Gudin. Massena's three divisions were still in the rear.

This decisive battle of the 22nd, known as the battle of Eckmühl, cost us about 2500 men put hors de combat, most of whom belonged to the Friant and St. Hilaire divisions, which, by their conduct on these four days, obtained for their commander the glorious and well-merited title of Prince of Eckmühl. It cost the Austrians about 6000 killed and wounded, a great number of pieces of artillery, and 3000 or 4000 prisoners,

collected at night in the villages passed through in following up the retreat of the Austrian army. By this battle Archduke Charles was finally separated from Hiller and Archduke Louis, and driven back in disorder on Bohemia, after the loss of his line of operation, Bavaria, and the highroad to Vienna.

For the first time in four days Napoleon could take some rest, and very little he took, for he wished to complete the series of these grand operations on the following day. He foresaw that there would be no battle to fight, for that Archduke Charles would cross the Danube in all haste; but it was his intention to make that a work of difficulty and disaster.

The archduke, who had halted in his movement on Abach upon learning the disaster of his left, had no other course open to him than to cross the Danube, and rejoin the army of Bohemia, half of which he had rallied under Kollowrath, and then to march down one bank of the river whilst Napoleon was marching down the other. To give battle with the Danube at his back would have been contrary to the rules of war, and quite inexcusable in the state of the Austrian army, which, though it had behaved very well, had returned to a sense of its inferiority as compared with the French army. Besides this, the Austrian cavalry was not numerous enough to contend with the French for the possession of the vast plain of Ratisbon. It was therefore resolved that Kollowrath's corps, which had been marched to Abach in the morning, and back to Burg Weinting in the evening, should cover the retreat; for not having fought yet, it was less fatigued than the others. The bulk of the army was to pass through Ratisbon and over the town bridge, whilst the reserve corps crossed by a bridge of boats lower down, and that the cavalry should occupy the French by skirmishing with them in the plain. These arrangements were carried into effect on the 23rd with tolerable order and success. Long before day the several *corps d'armée* traversed Ratisbon, whilst General Kollowrath, retiring slowly towards the town, gave the archduke's troops time to defile. The grenadiers were collected below Ratisbon, to effect their passage; the cavalry manœuvred between Ober Traubling and Burg Weinting.

The French, too, were very early in motion. As soon as there was light enough to see by, the light cavalry was sent forward to reconnoitre, and being attacked by the Austrian cavalry, another mêlée ensued, in which all arms fell into frightful confusion. In this gallant service the Austrian cavalry lost nearly a thousand men, but retiring upon the town, through which they defiled at a gallop, they drew our attention in that direction, and away from the bridge of boats over which the grenadiers were passing. A detachment of light cavalry at last caught sight of it, and Lannes' artillery galloped up and began

to play on the Austrians. A great number of grenadiers were shot or drowned, the bridge was destroyed, and the blazing boats were carried down the Danube; but the bulk of the troops effected their retreat with the loss of only some hundred men. Marshal Davout on the left, with the Friant and St. Hilaire divisions, and Marshal Lannes on the right, with the Morand and Gudin divisions, and the cavalry in the centre, did not debouch on the town until the last Austrian battalions were passing through it. The gates were immediately shut against our voltigeurs.

Napoleon was determined to enter it that very day, both to avenge the mischance of the 65th, and to get possession of the bridge, by which he might pursue Archduke Charles. The town was only surrounded with a wall, with towers at intervals, and a ditch. It could not give occasion for a regular siege, but if defended by numbers, it might hold out for some hours, or even days, and for so long delay the pursuit. Napoleon ordered the whole mass of Lannes' and Davout's artillery to be ranged in line, to batter down the walls. The unfortunate town was immediately assailed with volleys of shot and shells, and took fire in several places.

Impatient to overcome this resistance, Napoleon approached the town amidst a fire of sharpshooters, kept up by the Austrians from the walls and by the French from the edge of the ditch. Whilst he was looking through a telescope he received a ball in the instep, and said, with the coolness of an old soldier, "I am hit!" The wound might have been dangerous; for if it had been higher up, the foot would have been shattered, and amputation would have been inevitable. The surgeons of the guard took off his boot and dressed the wound, which was not serious. At the news that the emperor was wounded, the soldiers of the nearest corps broke spontaneously from their ranks, and gathered round him with the loudest expressions of affection. There was not one of them but thought his own existence bound up with his. Napoleon shook hands with those that were nearest to him, assuring them that it was a mere nothing, and immediately mounted his horse and rode along the front of the army, which received him with delirious joy and enthusiasm. The soldiers hailed in him the fortunate victor of Eckmühl, whose person death had just grazed, to show them all that he shared danger with them, and that if he was prodigal of their lives he was not thrifty of his own. He passed before the regiments that behaved best; called out from the ranks the officers and even the privates who had distinguished themselves by their bravery, and bestowed rewards on them all. There were privates who received grants of 1500 francs a year.

But victory was to be completed, and Napoleon sent aide-de-

camp after aide-de-camp to Lannes to expedite the taking of Ratisbon. The intrepid marshal had approached the Straubing gate, and had directed all his artillery against a projecting house which rose above the wall. The house was knocked down, and the ruins fell into the ditch, which it partly filled up. Still there were two escarpments to cross, one on either side of the ditch. Ladders were procured, and were placed at the edge of the ditch by grenadiers of the 85th; but every time one of them appeared he was instantly brought down by the well-aimed balls of the Austrian sharpshooters. After some men had been thus struck, the rest appeared to hang back. Thereupon Lannes advanced covered with decorations, seized one of the ladders and cried out, "You shall see that your marshal, for all he is a marshal, has not ceased to be a grenadier." But his aides-de-camp, Marbot and Labédoyère, sprang forward and snatched the ladder out of his hands. The grenadiers followed them, took the ladders and descended into the ditch in crowds. The enemy's shots, fired upon a larger number of men at once, and with more precipitation, were not so well aimed. The ditch was crossed, and the wall, half broken down by our cannon, was scaled. The grenadiers of the 85th, following MM. Labédoyère and Marbot, thus entered the town and opened one of the gates to the 85th, which marched a column into Ratisbon. The town was ours. Our men rushed along the streets under the fire, making prisoners in all directions. But suddenly they were stopped by a cry of terror uttered by the Austrians. "Take care, we shall all be blown up!" cried an officer. There were some barrels of powder left in a street which were in danger of being fired by the shots exchanged on either side. The belligerents stopped with one accord, and rolled the barrels away, so as to spare each other a mortal peril. The Austrians then withdrew and left the town to our troops.

This day, again, cost the enemy about 2000 men hors de combat, and 6000 or 7000 prisoners. It was the fifth since the opening of the campaign. Let us recapitulate the proceedings of those eventful days. On the 19th of April, Marshal Davout, going up the Danube side from Ratisbon to Abensberg, met Archduke Charles at Tengen, and stopped him there. On the 20th, Napoleon, combining half Davout's corps with the Bavarians and the Wurtembergers, and summoning Massena to the common rendezvous at Abensberg, broke the Austrian line at Rohr, and separated Archduke Charles from General Hiller and Archduke Louis. On the 21st he continued the movement, and definitively separated the two masses of the enemy, by taking Landshut and the Austrian line of operations, whilst on the same day Marshal Davout, forming the pivot of his movements on the left, again encountered Archduke Charles at Leuchling, and held him in check.

On the 22nd, learning that Archduke Charles had not retired by Landshut, but was at Eckmühl on his left, before Marshal Davout's corps, he suddenly moved down on Eckmühl, and giving battle on the extremity of the enemy's line, beat the Austrians and drove them back on Ratisbon. On the 23rd he terminated this five days' struggle by taking Ratisbon, and driving into Bohemia Archduke Charles's force, now combined with the Bohemian army, but separated from that of Hiller and Archduke Louis. Besides the advantage of opening for himself the road to Vienna, which was defended at the most by 36,000 or 40,000 disheartened men, of having taken the immense mass of matériel which was found on the enemy's principal line of operation, of having driven Archduke Charles into the defiles of Bohemia, where he would long remain paralysed, and of having restored to his armies all their former ascendency, Napoleon had destroyed or taken about 60,000 men and more than a hundred pieces of cannon. Of these 60,000 men, nearly 40,000 had been struck by the fire of infantry or the sabres of our cavalry.* And all this Napoleon had achieved by conducting himself in accordance with the true principles of war, amidst an incredible confusion of places and men. No doubt, had he risked more, had he left the archduke to march upon Ratisbon without calling Marshal Davout to him, Napoleon might have thrown himself on the enemy's rear by Lancqwaid and Eckmühl, and perhaps have taken the whole Austrian army in one day. But besides that it would first have been necessary to guess the secret of that situation, which no man could have done, Napoleon would thus have violated the true principles of war by remaining divided in presence of a concentrated enemy, whom he would have afforded the chance of a great triumph. On the contrary, by making Davout on his left and Massena on his right converge to a common point, he put himself in a condition to meet all contingencies, and he was enabled to cut the enemy's line before him, make his way into Landshut, then bear down to the left, and finally defeat the great Austrian army at Ratisbon. May we venture to add, that it was better to have triumphed a little less whilst conforming to the true principles of war, which are, after all, only the rules of good sense, than to have triumphed more in consequence of risking too much. Napoleon would never have fallen if he had always governed his policy as on this occasion he made war. Be that as it may, those terrible blows he had dealt prostrated Austria, kept down Germany, and awed Europe. Napoleon had never better merited the favours of fortune, which in these five days seemed once more fully restored to him.

* I state these numbers after due abatement made for the exaggerations of the bulletins.

# BOOK XXXV.

## WAGRAM.

THE Austrians had intended to assail the French armies whilst still dispersed from the Vistula to the Tagus, and notwithstanding the customary slowness of their movements, they would perhaps have succeeded, if Napoleon, arriving unexpectedly, had not baffled by his presence, his promptitude, and his energy that dangerous plan of surprise. In five days' fighting he had broken up their principal force, and thrown back its severed fragments on both banks of the Danube. But though he had by his personal qualities made up for all that was still wanting to his armies, he could not do so where he was not present, as in Italy, whither Archduke John was marching with the eighth and ninth corps, and in Poland, whither Archduke Ferdinand was marching with the seventh.

In Italy the commencement of the campaign was not fortunate, and it would certainly have exercised an injurious influence over the general course of events if our successes had been less signal between Landshut and Ratisbon. In that country the rash and inconsistent spirit of Archduke John, opposed to the prudent but inexperienced mind of Prince Eugène, obtained a temporary triumph over the valour of our soldiers. Archduke John, as usual with those who command in a province, would have fain drawn everything thither, and have converted Italy into the chief theatre of war. But as he could not hinder the Danube from being Napoleon's direct road to Vienna, neither could he hinder the bulk of the Austrian forces from being on the Danube instead of the Tagliamento. Jealous of his brother, the Archduke Charles, and surrounded by a staff who were jealous of the commander-in-chief's staff, he had raised many a dispute about the plan to be pursued. He wished, in the first place, to enter directly into the Tyrol by the Pusther Thal, passing from the sources of the Drave to those of the Adige, to descend by Brixen and Trent on Verona, and thus to break down all the advanced defences of the French by arriving at once on the line of the Adige through the mountain road opened to him by the insurrection of the Tyrolese. Not having the fear of finding General Bonaparte

or the intrepid Massena on the plateau of Rivoli, and being able to reckon on the zealous co-operation of the Tyrolese, he had excellent reasons for adopting such a project, which had, among other advantages, that of keeping him within reach of Bavaria, and in a position to take part in the operations on the Danube. But as always happens in the case of plans debated between rival authorities, a middle course was adopted, which consisted in invading the Tyrol with a detached corps, and Upper Italy with the bulk of the army. It was in accordance with these views that the forces destined to operate in Italy were distributed. The eighth corps mustered at Villach in Carinthia under General Chasteler, who was at first designated as its commander; the ninth at Laybach in Carniola, under Count Ignatius Giulay, ban of Croatia. General Chasteler, being well acquainted with the Tyrol, was detached from the eighth corps with 12,000 men, and ordered to operate by the Pusther Thal, advancing from east to west, whilst the bulk of the army moved in the same direction on the plain. With his 12,000 men and the co-operation of the Tyrolese, General Chasteler was strong enough for the Bavarians, who were barely 5000 or 6000 in the Tyrol. Whilst he was proceeding by Lienz and Brunecken to Brixen, the eighth and ninth corps, marching from Villach and Laybach, were to debouch on Udine. These two corps, including artillery, amounted to about 48,000 men, excellent soldiers. Twenty thousand men of the landwehr, well clothed, well disposed, but imperfectly trained, were to guard the frontier, cover it with campaigning works, and form with their best battalions a reserve for the active army. A detachment of 7000 or 8000 men, to which was to be joined the rising of Croatia, was to keep watch on Dalmatia, whence it was feared that General Marmont might succeed in debouching. However, as the hope was entertained of surprising the French in Friuli as well as in Bavaria, and as it was known that by reason of family complaisance, which prevailed in Napoleon's court no less than in the oldest courts of Europe, Prince Eugène had obtained the command of the army in Italy, to the exclusion of Massena, its natural chief, the Austrians flattered themselves they should soon be on the Adige, or even on the Po, and keep General Marmont shut up in Dalmatia. A summons to surrender was already prepared for the latter, and it was thought the only trouble he could give was that of discussing and signing a capitulation.

It was not alone on force of arms that reliance was placed for a victorious advance on Italy, but also on secret practices carried forth from the mountains of Tyrol to the straits of Messina. Supported in their rash attempt by the persuasion that Europe and France too were weary of Napoleon's power,

the Austrians counted not only on Tyrol, which had always been attached to Austria, but on the old Venetian States, which still groaned for their recent downfall; on Piedmont, become, in spite of itself, a French province; on the States of the Church, some of them converted into departments of the empire, others witnesses to the Pope's thraldom; and lastly, on the kingdom of Naples, deprived of its ancient sovereigns, separated from Sicily, and longing to recover its dynasty and its territory. Secret intelligence had been arranged in all these countries with the nobles who were dissatisfied with the system of equality introduced by the French, and with the priests, who regretted the supremacy of the Church, or deplored the contumelious oppression exercised over the Holy Father. However, though French domination was disagreeable to the Italians, as being that of foreigners, and though it cost them much blood and treasure, it possessed for the greater number of them advantages which they did not overlook, and which the evils of war had not made them wholly forget. The Italians were not, therefore, so easily moved as the Tyrolese, whose impatience for the return of the Austrian flag was extreme. Nothing could afford an idea of the attachment they then bore to Austria. Those simple mountaineers, habituated to the purely paternal government of the house of Hapsburg, had passed in 1806, with abhorrence, under the yoke of Bavaria, their detested neighbour. The latter, feeling itself disliked by its new subjects, repaid them hate for hate, and treated them with a harshness that had only exasperated their resentment. Accordingly, they had never ceased to send emissaries to Vienna, promising to rise at the first signal, and by their relations with the Grisons and with Switzerland to effect a movement which would soon spread to Swabia on the one side and Piedmont on the other. Their ardour had even contributed to mislead the court of Austria, and make it believe that there were in all Europe only Tyrolese or Spaniards panting to cast off the yoke of the modern Attila. M. de Hormayer, a very active employé in the department of foreign affairs at Vienna, holding in his hand the threads of these Tyrolese, German, and Italian intrigues, was appointed to accompany Archduke John, and set in motion the secret springs of policy whilst the archduke was moving the open springs of war. The English had, of course, been made privy to these hopes and secret practices, and had promised to co-operate actively with the Austrians as soon as the latter should have invaded Lombardy as far as Pavia, and opened the coast of the Adriatic from Trieste to Ancona.

All was ready for action in Carinthia on the same day as in Bavaria, namely, the 10th of April. On that day, whilst the advanced guards of Archduke Charles were crossing the Inn,

those of Archduke John presented themselves at the passes of the Carnic and Julian Alps, without any previous declaration of war. It was deemed sufficient to send a trumpeter to the advanced posts of the French at Ponteba with a declaration on the part of Archduke John, to the effect that he was entering Italy, and that if his passage was opposed he would employ force. Half an hour afterwards detachments of cavalry and light infantry fell upon our advanced posts, and even carried some of them. Using still less ceremony towards the Bavarian possessors of the Tyrol, General Chasteler entered on the preceding day, the 9th of April, the mountainous country called the Pusther Thal, which separates Carinthia from the Italian Tyrol.

Two great roads presented themselves to the Austrians for invading Friuli: the one which leads from Vienna through Carinthia, descends the Carnic Alps to the Tagliamento, and runs by Villach, Tarvis, and Ponteba to Osopo; the other which starts from Carniola, descends the Julian Alps to the Izonzo, which it crosses between Gorice and Gradisca, and abuts on Palma Nova or Udine. Napoleon had taken precautions on both roads against Austrian invasion by constructing the fort of Osopo on the first-named; on the second, the important fortress of Palma Nova. But both of these, though quite adequate as points d'appui for an army, could not supply the absence of one, and were, in fact, but difficulties for an invader, not invincible obstacles. Prince Eugène's troops not having yet assembled, it was easy to defile under the cannon of Osopo and Palma Nova, blockade them, and pass on.

Archduke John used neither of these roads, but preferred one that lay between them, and which, passing by the sources of the Izonzo, debouched by Cividale on Udine. It was a difficult road, especially for a numerous army encumbered with a bulky matériel, but for that reason it seemed less likely to be defended than the two others. He entered upon it therefore with the bulk of his army, and sent only two advanced guards along the roads from Carinthia and Carniola. Colonel Wockmann, an able officer, was to force the pass of Ponteba with some battalions and squadrons, whilst General Gavassini, passing the Izonzo with a detachment above Gradisca, was to march on Udine, the point to which the several portions of the Austrian army were to converge.

All these arrangements were superfluous, for Prince Eugène, not expecting to be attacked before the end of April, had at hand only the Seras division before Udine, and the Broussier division before Ponteba. He himself was engaged in personally inspecting his advanced posts, in obedience to Napoleon's advice that he should visit the places where he should have to fight battles. The Austrians therefore had only mere advanced posts to drive in on all the roads where they presented them-

selves. On the 10th Colonel Wockmann compelled the advanced guard of the Broussier division to fall back to Portès, General Gavassini crossed the Izonzo without difficulty, and the main body debouched with equal facility on Udine, where there was but a solitary French division.

Prince Eugène, surprised by this sudden apparition, and little habituated to command, although already well trained to war under his adopted father, was highly excited by a situation so new to him. Of eight divisions which composed his army, he had with him only the two French divisions of Seras and Broussier. There were a little in his rear the French divisions of Grenier and Barbou, together with Severoli's Italian division, and still further, near the Adige, Lamarque's French and Rusca's Italian division, besides the dragoons, who formed the bulk of his cavalry. As to the sixth French division, that of Miollis, it was still far behind, retained by the position of affairs at Rome and Florence. In such an exigency Prince Eugène had but one course to take, which was to effect a rapid concentration by retreating upon the main body of his forces. Odious as a retrograde movement must be, it was necessary to decide on it with promptitude, since no resolution should ever be deemed unpleasing which leads to a good result. It is true that to brave appearances a general must be already in possession of an established reputation, whereas Prince Eugène was still young, and without other distinction than that derived from the well-merited love of his adopted father. He decided, then, on a retreat, but with a regret which soon proved fatal, by preventing the completion of his design to concentrate the army. He ordered the Seras and Broussier divisions to recross the Tagliamento, and proceed to the Livenza, whither the Barbou, Severoli, Lamarque, and Grouchy divisions were to make a rapid march. General Seras effected his retreat without fighting; General Broussier had some sharp engagements with Colonel Wockmann, who skilfully disputed the valleys of the Upper Tagliamento, but he retreated, leaving the ground strewed with dead. Happily the Austrians, though desiring to surprise us, failed to use all possible diligence. They occupied four days in marching from the frontier to the Tagliamento. This allowed for the process of concentration, an opportunity by which an experienced general would have profited better than did Prince Eugène.

When recrossing the Tagliamento to reach the Livenza, he was again joined by the Grenier, Barbou, and Severoli divisions; and then being but slowly pursued by the Austrians, he halted between Pordenone and Sacile. Arrived there, he was imprudent enough to leave at Pordenone, too far from him and from all support, a strong rearguard, composed of two battalions

of the 35th and a regiment of light cavalry, under the orders of General Sahuc. This officer, who in this instance displayed little of the vigilance necessary to the advance guard in a forward march, and to the rearguard in retreat, instead of scouring the country to keep the army clear from surprise, did not even take that precaution for the force he himself commanded, but shut himself up with it in Pordenone. The Austrians, hearing of a French rearguard at this place, advanced with a detachment of infantry and a considerable body of horse, under General Nugent—an extremely able officer, eminent among the war party. With his cavalry he completely surrounded Pordenone, cutting off all communication with Sacile; with his infantry he attacked the place itself, and surprised the French asleep and feebly guarded. Suddenly assaulted, they were unable to maintain the defensive, and sought refuge in a precipitate flight; but instead of finding the road from Pordenone open to their retreat, they were assailed on every side by numerous troops of horse. Our hussars endeavoured to cut their way through by charging at full gallop. Some escaped, others were sabred or made captive. As to the infantry, it looked for safety only to a valiant resistance. The two battalions of the 35th, an old Italian regiment, formed in squares, and received the Austrian cavalry in a manner that would have repulsed any less powerful force. They shot several hundreds, and strewed the ground with the bodies of men and of horses; but soon their ammunition was exhausted, and their bayonet points alone remained to resist the finest cavalry of Austria. Five hundred of our unfortunate soldiers expiated, under the Austrian sabre, the blunder of their general; all the rest were made prisoners.

This melancholy occurrence greatly incensed the French army, and diminished its confidence in the commander-in-chief. On the other hand, it augmented the ardour of the Austrian troops, who, for the first time during a long period, saw the French retreat before them, and began to entertain hopes of victory. What Prince Eugène should have done under these circumstances, since he had begun a retreat, was to continue it, until he found a solid line to defend, and all his forces united behind that line. He would thus have retrieved the discredit of some days of humble attitude, and would have imparted an aspect of dignity to his retrograde movement. But he was young, and most sensitive on the point of honour. The remarks of the soldiers, who retained all the pride of the old army of Italy, cut him to the heart. Much as they loved the young prince, the son of their renowned leader, they judged for themselves; they saw his inexperience, and complained of it aloud; showed no greater deference for the generals under

him, and demanded to be led against an enemy who had insolently pursued them, and from whom they had never been used to fly. To the clamours of the soldiers was added the despair of the people, who were old subjects of Venice, attached for the most part to France, terrified by the approach of the Austrian army, and praying to be rescued from its vengeance. Eugène assembled his generals, whom he found equally disconcerted with himself; for they had learned, under Napoleon, to fight as heroes, but not to command. They were ready to die, but not to decide whether a conflict should be hazarded. The wisest course, then, to take was to continue the retreat, until all the troops were rallied upon a ground where they could give battle with advantage. By marching as far as the Piave they should have brought to the field successively five divisions of French and one of Italian infantry, besides two magnificent divisions of dragoons, and the royal Lombard guards, which was a serviceable troop. They would have found also in the Piave a line admirably adapted for defence; but Eugène had neither sufficient experience nor sufficient reputation to resist steadily the clamour of the army. Piqued by the silence of his generals and by the indiscretion of his soldiers, he resolved to halt before the Livenza, between Sacile and Pordenone, upon a ground unknown to him, which offered no advantageous post, and upon which his troops had not had time to concentrate.

On the evening of the 15th, after the disaster at Pordenone, he gave orders to halt and resume offensive measures at all points. He had, in his retreat thus far, united with the Broussier and Seras divisions, those of Grenier, Barbou, and Severoli, which had joined him before the Livenza. These altogether amounted to about 36,000 men, some of them old soldiers of the army of Italy, others young but already trained, and forming the fourth battalions of the armies of Naples and Dalmatia. The Austrian force, on the other hand, numbered about 45,000 of their choicest troops. The disproportion was therefore great. It is true that Prince Eugène reckoned upon a reinforcement of 10,000 foot and horse, which Generals Lamarque and Grouchy, then on their way to join him, were to bring. But this addition was not certain, and besides, the ground was very unfavourable. To our right we had between Tamai, Palse, and Porcia, villages, fences, an inundated soil, numerous canals, all strongly defended by the Austrians. In the middle, the ground, suddenly rising, formed a ridge which ran right before us, and along which lay the road from Sacile to Pordenone. We had in our possession upon this road the village of Fontana Fredda, opposite Pordenone, taken in the morning by the Austrians. Finally, to our left, at the dip of the

ridge, the country stretched in a plain to the foot of the Alps. On that plain stood two villages, that of Roveredo, occupied by the French, and that of Cordenons, where the Austrians were bivouacking. So then on the right, ground intersected and cut up and obstructed by obstacles of various kinds; in the centre, a broad road leading direct from our line to that of the enemy; to the left, a plain: such was the ground to be disputed. It is true there was one favourable circumstance which should have been inferred, had Eugène possessed Napoleon's faculty of surmising the truth from the smallest indications: this was the division of the Austrians into two masses, the one formed of the eighth corps, and stationed in the villages of Tamai, Porcia, and Palse, behind the obstructed ground on our right; the other formed of the ninth corps and of the cavalry, stationed on the plain to the left, at Cordenons. Now between Cordenons and Pordenone there was more than a league of ground, ill kept and ill defended. This circumstance once perceived, we should have set on the Seras and Severoli divisions to attack Tamai, Palse, and Porcia, on our right, so as to attract the Austrians thither; then with the Grenier and Barbou divisions, stationed in the centre upon the highroad, and the Broussier division stationed on the left on the plain, we should have formed a mass of 24,000 men, marched by the highroad through Fontana Fredda upon Pordenone, invested the last-named town, cut it off from Cordenons, where the ninth corps was stationed, and thus divided the Austrian army into two: this once accomplished, the struggle between the eighth corps and our right wing would have been soon ended, and the sooner the more that corps had entangled itself in the difficult ground which formed that portion of the battlefield.

Unfortunately Prince Eugène, with the chief officer of the staff, Vignolle, displayed the same want of reflection in planning the battle as in their determination to offer it, and ordered exactly the contrary of what the position of the enemy and the kind of ground seemed to require. Without even reconnoitring either the one or the other, they decided that on the next day, the 16th of April, at dawn, Generals Seras and Severoli should march from Tamai on Palse and Porcia, which they should endeavour to take at any risk; that in the centre, upon the highroad, the Grenier division should station itself in front of Fontana Fredda, but make no hostile demonstration until Generals Seras and Severoli should have overcome the numerous and difficult obstacles which they had to encounter; that to the left General Broussier, crossing the plain of Roveredo to join General Grenier, should likewise await that event; and lastly, that to the rear General Barbou should support the French line.

It was an ill-devised plan, which allowed the Austrians time to rectify their position, whilst our right wing was exhausting itself against mere physical obstacles, and whilst our centre, our left, and our rearguard were losing their time in doing nothing. Thus it is, and with such management, that the precious blood of the soldiery is often wasted and the fate of empires trifled with! Thus it is that kings and republics confide, the one to incompetent sons or brothers, the other to favourites of the multitude quite as incompetent, the lives of men and the welfare of States! Prince Eugène was a brave soldier, full of modesty and devotedness, suited some day to lead on a division with credit, but not to command an army, or above all, to direct a campaign.

Our soldiers, unconscious of whither they were being led, but well content to attack an enemy they had not accustomed themselves to dread, marched resolutely forward at daybreak on Sunday the 16th of April. The French under Seras, the Italians under Severoli, courageously assaulted Palse and Porcia, and overthrew the first obstacles which opposed them. The Archduke John was then at Mass with all his staff. This prince, although possessing more experience and at the same time more pretensions than the modest Prince Eugène, on this occasion displayed no more judgment than his adversary; for after having on the evening before surprised the French at Pordenone, he now exposed himself to be surprised on the same spot. He immediately mounted horse with his staff, rushed to the front of Pordenone, and beholding before him, upon the road to Fontana Fredda, General Grenier in our centre, and General Broussier to our left, forming masses which the open ground rendered still more apparent, he imagined that we were about to double our left upon our centre, our centre upon our right; could only conceive, from what he fancied he beheld, the design of withdrawing the ninth corps from Cordenons to Fontana Fredda, in order to prevent us from executing the movement he imagined we desired to make; left the space between Cordenons and Pordenone still open, and seemed to concern himself little about his eighth corps, occupied in skirmishing with Generals Seras and Severoli, in the midst of the broken grounds which lay between Tamai, Palse, and Porcia.

Here then took place, under the direction of two commanders-in-chief possessed of little discernment, and between soldiers of extreme bravery, a bloody and destructive conflict. The eighth corps of the Austrians, much more numerous than the Seras and Severoli divisions, had no intention of yielding up the ground of which the latter had conquered a portion. General Colleredo attacked them with an Austrian division, took from them under a destructive fire Porcia and Palse, and thus turned the fortunes of the conflict. General Seras, who had taken care

to keep back a reserve, now put himself at its head, led it forward, and entered once more into the lost villages, bringing back into them both the French and the Italians. They established themselves in these unhappy villages, the theatre of so many calamities. Then the Austrians, taking advantage of the smallest obstacles, defended themselves from house to house, from fence to fence, opposing to our soldiers a resistance of which they had given no similar example since Marengo. General Grenier, condemned to inaction upon the highroad from Fontana Fredda to Pordenone, detached two battalions to the right to aid towards the decisive conquest of Porcia. General Barbou also sent two from the rearguard upon the same point. These reinforcements doubtless compensated for the inferiority of our right wing in comparison with the eighth corps against which it fought; but upon such ground as that, ground obstacles which it was as difficult to lose as to win, nothing was decided by them, since our left and our centre remained motionless.

On both sides they fought with fury, when the ninth corps, advancing obliquely from Cordenons upon Fontana Fredda, came up with the Broussier division, which formed our left. The brave General Broussier had disposed in echelons the 9th, 84th, and 92nd of the line, superb regiments of four battalions, which composed his division. With perfect coolness he awaited the approach of the enemy's infantry, and closely firing upon it with extreme precision, overthrew almost a whole line. Then the magnificent Austrian cavalry having taken advantage of the plain to charge upon him, he received them by forming a square, covered the ground with the dead, and brave as they were, sent them back utterly disgusted with similar attempts. Meanwhile the ninth corps, very numerous, outflanked our left, and seemed to menace Sacile, a town behind Fontana Fredda, where was the principal bridge over the Livenza. Had this bridge been taken, our most important point of communication would have been lost, and no way of retreat would have been left us but by some wretched bridges over the lower part of the Livenza. Prince Eugène, who was resolute only when under fire, was alarmed for his means of communication, and while the issue was still undetermined, commanded a retreat, with as little reason as he had commanded a battle.

Our soldiers, after having killed as many as they had lost, retreated towards the Livenza, disheartened at the humiliating part which they were forced to play. Our right made for the bridge of Brugnera, which it was able to reach without disorder, pursuit being little to be feared over the rough and uneven ground on that side, as the Austrians were exhausted by the dreadful conflict they had sustained. All the attempts of the enemy during this retrograde movement were made upon our

left, which retreated over an open space. Broussier's division, by its superb conduct, saved the army; now awaiting the enemy's infantry to fire at point blank distance, now receiving in square the cavalry, whose progress it stopped with the bayonet. When our centre and our rearguard had defiled through Sacile, it entered it the last, leaving the enemy themselves full of admiration for its gallant conduct.

Up to this point we had lost only our dead, our wounded, some dismounted artillery, and few prisoners. But in the night, Prince Eugène, deeming it desirable to push the retreat as far as Conegliano, to shelter himself as soon as possible behind the Piave, the bad weather, the encumbrance of gun-carriages and baggage, and their mingling with the troops, produced a disastrous disorder. The soldiers, unrestrained by the strict surveillance of their officers, spread themselves through the houses at the risk of being taken prisoners. The army, which upon the battlefield had lost about 3000 and some hundred men, a loss nearly equal to that of the Austrians, lost 3000 more as stragglers and prisoners. The confusion being presently increased by the terrific weather, which made the rivers overflow their banks, and rendered the roads impracticable, they arrived at length behind the Piave, in a state little creditable to that army of Italy which had formerly been so admirable. Fortunately the Austrians, unaccustomed to vanquish, eager to enjoy their victory, and detained by the weather, which rendered pursuit to them as difficult as was retreat to us, remained several days without attacking Prince Eugène. They thus allowed him time to recover his defeat and to stay its consequences. He had been joined on his way, but too late, by the division of infantry under Lamarque, and by Grouchy's division of cavalry. But there came to him besides, what in such a moment was more valuable than a reinforcement, a general, namely, the famous Macdonald, one of the best officers of the Revolution, though he had lost the battle of Trebbia. His connection with Moreau had condemned him to live for several years in a kind of disgrace, and to languish in inactivity, whilst his equals in age or in length of service, some even his inferiors, were pursuing a brilliant career.

The great demand then existing for generals and officers, through the long continuance of the wars, caused many of those long neglected to be sought out. Not wishing to send Massena into Italy, on account of Prince Eugène, whom he feared to place in a secondary position, Napoleon consented to send General Macdonald to be his guide and support. Macdonald, one of the most intrepid men that ever graced our army, experienced, skilful, cool, with the power of making himself obeyed, was received with confidence by the soldiers, with displeasure by

some of the generals, who beheld with regret a firm hand about to be laid upon them, and who, moreover, believing him to be in disgrace, deemed they should derive little advantage from performing service under his orders. General Lamarque in particular, who was notorious in the army for his captious spirit, openly complained, saying that the emperor only sent General Macdonald in order to work his ruin, and that those who should serve under him would share his fate. Everything about the general, even to his military tenue, in which he adhered to the style of the early days of the Revolution, was made a subject of unbecoming raillery by the young officers, upon whom fashion had already asserted her power. But a man of General Macdonald's character was not to be trifled with, and he soon drew back to their allegiance such as had been tempted to stray from it. At the same time, Prince Eugène, not wishing to acknowledge too publicly a tutor in the person of this officer, did not make him the chief of his staff, but created a suitable post for him, and distributed his army under three commanders, one for the left, one for the centre, and one for the right. The right wing, the most considerable and most important of the three sections, composed of the Broussier and Lamarque divisions and Pully's dragoons, was given to General Macdonald. The centre was given to General Grenier, and was composed of the Grenier division, which passed under the command of General Pacthod, and the Durutte division, which contained part of the Barbou division. The remainder of this last-named division had been left as a garrison in Venice. The left was conferred on General Baraguay d'Hilliers, and was composed principally of Italians, with a few Frenchmen to set them an example.

With the Seras division, the Italian guard, and Grouchy's dragoons, Prince Eugène formed a reserve of 10,000 men. The whole of his army amounted to 60,000 men, out of whom General Macdonald alone had 17,000 under his command, and could thus exert considerable influence upon the course of events without at all bearing the semblance of commander-in-chief. But Prince Eugène, as modest as he was discreet, never failed to consult him on all important occasions, and always had reason to be satisfied with his counsels. General Macdonald advised a slow retreat, and that in marching towards the Adige, where they might recover strength to reassume the offensive, they should move in a more orderly manner. To the Adige accordingly they repaired, recruited their strength, put themselves in order, and soon became more worthy of the army of Italy, whose glorious name they had for an instant compromised.

Things were in a still worse state in the mountainous heights which overlooked the plains of Upper Italy; and the Austrians

obtained in the Tyrol still greater advantages than in the Friuli. General Chasteler had crossed the frontier a day sooner—that is to say, on the 9th of April—passing from Carinthia into the Tyrol, and advanced to Lintz. Although he had arranged with the secret leaders of the Tyrolese insurrection that they should wait for the 12th or 13th of April to commence operations, they had not been able to restrain themselves, and had broken out on the 11th. The motive, it is true, for this premature outbreak was very natural. The Bavarians, utterly incapable of disputing the Tyrol with the Austrian forces, now sought aid from local obstacles, by destroying the bridges. This the inhabitants would not allow, since they wished to preserve for their hills those indispensable means of communication with the plains. They had accordingly all risen at once, with a spontaneous ebullition which belongs alone to the most eager passion. In all the valleys of the Italian Tyrol, from Lintz to Brixen, from Meran to Brixen, and from Brixen to Rivoli, all over those stupendous and beautiful mountains, there had been but one impulse, but one cry. On the other side of the great chain of the Brenner, in German Tyrol, the rising had been equally prompt and general. In that country, as well as in Switzerland, the innkeepers, who derive a subsistence from their relations with strangers, being the richest and most enlightened of the population, a man of this profession, named Andrew Hofer, had obtained an irresistible ascendency over the minds of his countrymen. A few veterans brought up in the service of Austria were among the most active instigators of the revolt. Amongst them, one Major Teimer had particularly distinguished himself. France had required the assembly of the whole Bavarian army upon the Isar, and there remained in Tyrol only about 5000 Bavarians, spread over both sides of the Brenner, from Brixen to Inspruck. Of French troops there were, in two columns, a collection of about 4000 conscripts, marching from Italy to Germany, to recruit the Boudet and Molitor divisions, the Espagne cuirassiers, and the chasseurs of Marulaz. These soldiers had never stood fire; they had been formed into temporary marching regiments, and were commanded by depôt officers for the most part old and worn out. More than 20,000 enthusiastic and fearless mountaineers, all certain shots, joined to 12,000 Austrians, arrayed against 4000 or 5000 Bavarians, and 3000 or 4000 French conscripts, were certain of not meeting with any prolonged resistance.

Indeed, on the approach of the Austrian general Chasteler, all the Bavarian posts were taken from Lintz to Brunecken. Those that were able to escape having assembled upon the marshy plain of Sterzing, at the extreme point of the Italian Tyrol, near the foot of the Brenner, were there assailed by Andrew Hofer and a large muster from the Meran. Surrounded on all sides,

attacked with fury, they at length laid down their arms, and the war being a national one—nay, almost a war of races—scenes directly opposed to the law of nations soon multiplied to a most distressing degree. On both sides prisoners were slaughtered, and no one could tell which party gave the first provocation. The Tyrolese alleged, in their own defence, that their hamlets had been burnt, their wives, old men, and children killed. The Bavarians replied that their prisoners had been assassinated, and that they had only acted on the defensive. However this may be, the most atrocious scenes were perpetrated after the defeat of Sterzing. From that time the Italian Tyrol was set free as far as Roveredo, where the French general Baraguay d'Hilliers was stationed with an Italian division.

At this period the long line of French recruits, extending from Verona to Inspruck, found themselves separated in two by the insurrection. One part fell back upon Verona, where they were out of all danger, part crossed the Brenner, flattering themselves with the hope of meeting the advanced posts of the French at Inspruck. They were followed closely by Chasteler and Andrew Hofer, who were crossing the Brenner in order to accomplish the deliverance of the German Tyrol. But north as well as south of the Brenner, upon the Inn as well as upon the Adige, the insurrection was sudden and general. The Bavarian posts were assailed everywhere at the same moment; their occupants were some of them taken or slain, others driven back into Inspruck, and ultimately compelled to surrender that old centre of the Austrian dominions. The French, reaching Inspruck just at the moment when the town was passing into the hands of the enemy, pursued by the victorious bands of the Italian Tyrol, and by the little army of General Chasteler, were unable to defend themselves, formed and commanded as they were. They were accordingly compelled to capitulate, to the number of about 3000, which was the more vexatious, as besides the mere check thus received by our arms many corps were thereby deprived of most needful reinforcements. We had besides to deplore the barbarous treatment which some of these unfortunate Frenchmen, confounded with the Bavarians, received, and which excited Napoleon to fearful reprisals upon General Chasteler.

Chasteler, finding the German Tyrol delivered, thought it best to return with Andrew Hofer towards the Italian Tyrol, to assist in the operations of the Archduke John. Returning by the Brenner upon Trent, he presented himself there with the whole levy from the Tyrol, and 7000 or 8000 Austrians, in front of the position of General Baraguay d'Hilliers. The French general, having his position turned by lateral valleys, could not retain Trent, and fell back upon Roveredo. Again turned, he was compelled to fall back upon Rivoli, where,

backed by the army of Italy, which was being reorganised, he had no serious assault to fear. Thus in twenty days the two Tyrols as well as Friuli had passed into the hands of the enemy.

It was not only in Italy, in Tyrol, and Bavaria that contests were taking place, but all through Northern Europe, where the Austrian declaration of war had stirred every heart, inspired vain hopes, and awakened premature desires; premature, for that although Napoleon had already committed grand mistakes, he had not yet committed those destined to prove his ruin, and until now his masterly genius was more powerful than the hatred of the nations who had risen up to oppose his ambitious spirit. The whole of Germany, as it has already been shown, was full of indignation against the princes bound to his car by fear or interest, and although the French dominion bore, concealed in its bosom, the germs of a modern civilisation, benefits which presented themselves under cover of a foreign invasion were indignantly rejected.

In Bavaria a long-standing antipathy to Austria, arising out of their proximity to each other, had greatly weakened these sentiments; but in Swabia, in the provinces once Austrian, in Franconia, in the little States, snatched from the mild rule of the ecclesiastical princes, even in Saxony, where the addition of a Polish crown flattered only the reigning family, in Hesse, where Jerome Napoleon held sway, the long pent-up feelings of hatred burst forth at the news of the daring attempt of the Austrians. In proportion as the distance increased from the Rhine and from the reach of France, so did boldness augment until it passed into hostile demonstrations. Already had insurgent bands come down from the mountains of Hesse upon the banks of the Elbe, and had even shown themselves at the gates of Madgeburg, apparently awaiting some sudden apparition from Prussia, from whom they hoped for a vigorous and patriotic effort.

Indeed, throughout all Prussia exasperation was at its height. To the general sufferings of the Germans were added in that country other sufferings peculiarly painful to the Prussian nation. Those famous battles, in which the independence of Germany had perished, had been lost by her. She had beheld the monarchy of Frederick the Great dismembered, and for a while its glory eclipsed; and if she was as sensitive to physical as to moral calamities, she experienced, in the crushing military contributions she was compelled to pay, the agonising consciousness of a foreign dominion. Hence had audacity been pushed to greater lengths in Prussia than in any other country. A French convoy of artillery, on its way from the banks of the Vistula to Magdeburg, was assaulted, insulted, and grossly maltreated. At Berlin the Austrian war had been openly announced before it was declared; they had also predicted from

the outset its successful termination, that the whole world would join in it, that if King Frederick William was so dejected and dispirited as to refuse to take part in it, they would of their own accord march to the support of the Austrian army. To such a length had their audacity been carried, that on the first commencement of operations, without waiting for the result, the commandant of Berlin had given for watchwords to the garrison, Charles and Ratisbon.

There was at Berlin a well-known officer of the name of Major Schill, who, in 1806 and 1807, had successfully carried on a partisan warfare against us during the sieges of Dantzig, Colberg, and Stralsund. He was at the head of some cavalry, and formed part of the garrison at Berlin. His well-known bravery and his avowed hatred of the French had rendered him the idol of the people. He it was, they said, that ought to raise the standard of revolt in the name of German freedom, and lend a helping hand to a prince of the house of Brunswick, the Duke of Brunswick Oels, who at that time was going about in Saxony and Silesia, rousing all the inactive Prussian officers, and enticing them to Bohemia to form German guerillas. The fanaticism of the Spaniards was thus quickly shared by all, and it was deemed not impracticable to mould the slow and peaceful Germans into adventurers as active as the smugglers of the Peninsula. One night, in the midst of this general excitement, it was reported that Major Schill, who had been engaged for several days in reviewing his corps until a late hour of the night, had suddenly disappeared at the head of 500 horse, who constituted the cavalry of the garrison. It was said that he had marched towards the Elbe to join a vast assemblage from Hesse, and afterwards intended advancing to meet the Austrians, who were marching upon Saxony. This circumstance, as might naturally be expected, produced an extraordinary sensation. Every one persisted in believing that the Prussian government was an accomplice in the act. This, however, was a mistake; it was simply the national passion bursting forth in spite of itself. The ministers, utterly confounded, hastened to the French ambassador, making sincere protestations of regret, declaring they had been perfectly ignorant that conduct, as absurd as it was criminal, was contemplated; affirming with truth that the king had no hand in the matter, and promising that the severest punishment should be visited upon those who had thus compromised against its desire the government of their country. But whilst they were thus speaking, the infantry, following the example of the cavalry, gave similar proofs of insubordination, and whole companies escaped to follow Major Schill. Unfortunately it was impossible to pursue these insurgents without cavalry, and Major Schill had carried off all that was in Berlin.

It was necessary, therefore, to wait until troops were procured, well disposed and well disciplined enough to obey the orders of their government, whatever they might be, for it was not for the army to decide upon the foreign, any more than upon the domestic policy of the country. But in the meanwhile these extraordinary proceedings caused a universal sensation throughout Germany, which the brilliant successes of Napoleon could alone extinguish.

The banks of the Vistula were the scene of no less weighty events. The seventh Austrian corps, commanded by the Archduke Ferdinand, and 37,000 to 38,000 strong, marched down the valley of the Vistula upon Warsaw. Formed in Galicia, it had only a short distance to march before invading Poland; besides which, it started very early, like all the Austrian corps. Its operations, like those in Germany and Italy, began on the 10th of April. Prince Joseph Poniatowski—a hero who had long wasted his days on the lap of ease, and like many a Pole, had been kept inactive at the feet of his beautiful countrywomen—awoke at the clash of the French arms, and had espoused the cause of France, which he justly considered to be that of Poland, if ever Poland could be restored. He commanded the Polish army. Napoleon, entirely taken up with preparing the mighty blows which he intended to inflict with his own hand on the house of Austria, had had but little time to devote to that army. The whole amount of regular troops they had contrived to collect was but 15,000 men, and a small Saxon detachment left at Warsaw. Napoleon had troubled himself little about this inferiority of strength in Poland, thinking himself to decide everything at Vienna, and though he did not reckon on any great co-operation on the part of the Russians, believing, nevertheless, that their presence alone upon the frontiers of the Grand Duchy would suffice to paralyse the Austrian corps under the Archduke Ferdinand. But the Russian co-operation was even less than he expected. The Emperor Alexander had taken care, whilst observing as much as decency required the stipulations of the treaty of alliance, to send his principal forces to Finland and Moldavia to finish the conquest of the one and commence that of the other. He had only set aside for the Austrian war 60,000 men, who at this time were hardly gathered together, for various reasons, for the most part well founded, but liable enough to be misinterpreted. In the first place, Russia, like Napoleon himself, did not believe in the near approach of hostilities, and had therefore not been sufficiently rapid in its preparations. Again, its government, which had had so much trouble to assemble sufficient forces in Finland, in a cause pre-eminently Russian, knew not how to be more active in an interest exclusively French. The season, besides,

had been dreadful, and floods of rain had made the vast territories between the Niemen and the Vistula almost impracticable. Moreover, the emperor and M. de Romanzoff, both of them already a little cooled with regard to the French alliance, were nevertheless the only persons in Russia who desired it, and they had to combat the wishes of every one to make themselves obeyed when aid to Napoleon was required. Correspondences had even sprung up between the Russian and Austrian officers, wherein the former expressed all sorts of sympathy for the latter, and an earnest desire to march, not against them, but with them. It was, indeed, no easy task to persuade the Russians to march against the Austrians and with the French, in order to assist in the re-establishment of Poland. It was true that the reward of this assistance was to be Finland, Moldavia, and Wallachia, and that if the sacrifice was great, the reward was also great. However, the aid of the Russians was not of much moment so long as Napoleon remained victorious upon the Danube; and the worst consequence of their insufficient assistance was the mistrust thereby engendered between the two emperors and the two empires.

This explains how Prince Poniatowski, who had a right to count on the indirect, if not the direct assistance of 60,000 Russians (and it is certain that if they had marched on Galicia they would have detained the Austrians there), found himself on the 10th of April with Archduke Ferdinand upon his hands, as Napoleon had Archduke Charles, and Prince Eugène Archduke John. Archduke Ferdinand, marching down the course of the Vistula, which takes its rise between Silesia and Galicia, advanced along the left bank upon Warsaw, showering upon the inhabitants protestations of a most amicable nature. In the conventional language of his party, he declared that they came to deliver all nations, the Poles among others, from a dominion almost as irksome to its friends as to its enemies.

The Poles were not the people to be deceived by language such as this. They knew but too well that the old co-partitioners of their country could never become her deliverers, that France alone could be their friend—a friend not always able to protect them, but sincere, because it was impossible she should be otherwise. So Prince Poniatowski advanced steadily with 12,000 men to meet the Archduke Ferdinand. These were the same Poles who had first taken arms with us in 1807, and who, besides their own natural bravery and their ardent patriotism, possessed the germs of a military education received in our schools. Unfortunately they were so disproportioned in number to the Austrians that the most that could be expected of them was an honourable and energetic, but not victorious defence. Prince Poniatowski, after a few skirmishes with cavalry, resolved

to dispute the approaches to Warsaw with the bulk of his troops. The 19th, the same day on which Marshal Davout fought the battle of Tengen, the Polish prince halted at Raszyn, a position formed, like all those capable of an advantageous defence in his country, of wood interspersed with marshes. For eight hours he contested the possession of these woods and marshes with 12,000 or 15,000 Poles against 30,000 Austrians, lost about 1200 or 1500 men killed and wounded, but destroyed many more of the enemy, and fearing they might be beforehand in reaching Warsaw, retreated towards that capital.

Should he attempt to defend Warsaw, deprived as it was of all means of resistance, and thus expose it to infallible destruction? Or was it better to evacuate it in pursuance of a convention which should soften the conditions on which the enemy should occupy it, and which would leave him the opportunity of retreating unharmed into positions easier to maintain? Such was the serious and painful question which Prince Poniatowski had to solve after the conflict at Raszyn. The hottest spirits among the Poles were eager for an obstinate resistance, without concerning themselves about the consequences. The inoffensive mass of the inhabitants dreaded a catastrophe. The most enlightened patriots, and not the least brave, advised a retreat into the triangle of the Narew and the Vistula, between Modlin and Sierock, behind the strong works constructed by the command of Napoleon. Committing themselves to that impregnable fastness, with the secure retreat of the marshes of Pultusk, they might save the capital, though leaving it for awhile in the hands of the enemy. Seldom is such a sacrifice judicious; it was so, however, on this occasion, as the result proved. Prince Poniatowski sorrowfully yielded up Warsaw, after having stipulated for honourable conditions. He crossed to the right bank of the Vistula, between Modlin and Sierock, with the intention of attacking every corps that should dare to cross the river in sight of him, and firmly resolved to defend by petty conflicts the unfortunate country he could no longer defend by regular battles. The attitude he assumed, his noble language while making this sacrifice, were such as to fire rather than cool the zeal of the Poles. They flocked to him, therefore, to assist him in recovering the capital he had for a while yielded to the Austrians. Thus, then, in Italy we had fallen back upon the Adige; in Tyrol, we were assailed on all sides; in Germany, we were threatened and insulted by an indignant populace; in Poland, our allies were losing their capital, which the Treaty of Tilsit had restored to them.

Such was the news that came upon Napoleon in the flush of his victory at Ratisbon, and but slightly moved him. He had reckoned little on the assistance of the Russians, and cared only

to prove to Europe that they were on his side, and not on that of the Austrians; and of that fact the march of their armies, however slow, left no possible doubt. As to the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, he knew that at Vienna he should make or unmake anew all the States of his last creation, and that it mattered little whether they stood or fell during his victorious march upon the capital. But the occurrences in Italy somewhat affected him; because they uncovered his right flank, exposed his Italian dominions to the horrors of war, and tarnished the youthful reputation of his adopted son, whom he so tenderly loved. One circumstance in particular almost changed his displeasure into anger. Prince Eugène, fearing more his adopted father than the opinion of the world, had scarcely dared to give him an account of his reverses, and had contented himself with writing: "My father, I need your indulgence; fearing your censure if I retreated, I accepted the offer of battle, and I have lost it." Not a single explanation followed these brief words, to tell in what condition things actually were; and this silence had been prolonged for several days, which considerably embarrassed Napoleon, who knew not what his losses actually were, what progress the enemy had made in Italy, or what danger menaced his right flank during his march upon Vienna. "You have been beaten," Napoleon replied in several letters; "be it so. I ought to have known how it would be when I named as general a young man without experience; whereas I would not allow the princes of Bavaria, Saxony, and Wurtemberg to command the soldiers of their own nations. As for your losses, I will send you wherewith to repair them; the advantages gained by the enemy, I shall know how to neutralise; but to do this, I must be put in possession of every particular, and I know nothing! I am compelled to seek in foreign bulletins for the facts of which you ought to inform me. I am doing that which I have never before done, and what must, of all things, be most repugnant to a prudent general: I am marching with my wings in the air, unconscious of what is passing on my flanks. Fortunately I can brave all risks—thanks to the blows I have struck—but it is miserable to be kept in such a state of ignorance." Napoleon added these remarkable words, which we quote, because they concern the fame of one of the greatest of his lieutenants, Massena: "War is a serious game, in which are staked one's reputation, one's troops, and one's country. A man should reason and examine himself, in order to learn whether or not he is fitted by nature for the art. I know that in Italy you affect to despise Massena. If I had sent him, this would not have occurred. Massena possesses military talents before which you should all bow; and if he has faults, they must be forgotten, for every man has some. In confiding to you my army of Italy, I

have committed an error. I should have sent Massena, and have given you the command of the cavalry, under his orders. The Prince-Royal of Bavaria admirably commands a division under the Duke of Dantzig! I think that if circumstances become urgent, you should write to the King of Naples to join the army; you will give up the command to him, and put yourself under his orders. It is a matter of course that you should have less experience in war than a man whose occupation it has been for eighteen years. Burghausen, April 30, 1809."

Napoleon, knowing well that all the hope of his enemies and all their courage would vanish before the astounding news of the events at Ratisbon, resolved to push vigorously onward, and whilst so doing to stop first, and afterwards to drive back the forces that manœuvred on his flank or his rear. Then, as in 1805, to burst upon Vienna was the surest way to rupture all coalitions made or yet to be made.

Nevertheless, there suggested itself one of those serious questions on which the fate of empires depends, and which fall to the lot of great men such as Hannibal, Cæsar, Frederick, and Napoleon. Should he impetuously follow the broad way which led to Vienna, that of the Danube, leaving the Archduke Charles on his left in Bohemia, driving before him the scattered forces of General Hiller and the Archduke Louis, and forcing back Archduke John on his right by the impetus of a victorious march upon the capital? or should he leave to Bessières the task of scattering with his cavalry and the infantry of Molitor the remains of General Hiller and the Archduke Louis upon the Inn, whilst he himself pursued Archduke Charles in Bohemia, and struck at the Austrians through the person of that prince, and not through Vienna? Napoleon pondered this in his mind (as his correspondence evidences); but if it became a great captain like him to weigh every alternative, it no less became him not to hesitate after having duly deliberated, but to march at once to the real object he had in view, which was Vienna. It is very true that by instantly pursuing the Archduke Charles across Bohemia he would have had a chance of augmenting the disorganisation of the principal Austrian army, hastening its dissolution, and preventing it, after its losses had been repaired, from coming under cover of the Danube to dispute with him the possession of the Austrian empire on the bloody fields of Essling and Wagram. This is certain, and the panegyrists of the Archduke Charles have from this concluded that Napoleon sacrificed everything to the pride of entering Vienna. But this is a false decision arrived at without any regard to the actual facts. It is quite true that the Austrian main army, driven through Ratisbon beyond the Danube, was severely shaken, and that one more blow might have completed its destruction.

But Napoleon's young army, although elated by success, was worn out by five days' battle. The only corps capable of enduring this prolonged fatigue was that of Marshal Davout, and it too was exhausted, for upon it had fallen the main burden of those five days. The rest were completely worn out. It would be necessary then with 50,000 men to pursue the 80,000 under Archduke Charles, who, whatever could be done, would still be two days in advance, and would secure all the provisions still remaining in the exhausted villages of Bohemia, while the French would not find even a crumb of bread; who, moreover, though leaving behind on the road in his precipitate retreat his laggards and his wounded, would nevertheless save two-thirds of his men, and after having induced Napoleon to follow him, would infallibly return through Lintz to the Danube, cross that river, and reunite with the 40,000 men of the corps of Hiller and Archduke Louis, Chasteler's 10,000 or 12,000, and Archduke John's 40,000, and would thus have on the real line of communication the best 140,000 men in the Austrian army: a supposition by no means chimerical, since subsequently, though separated by Napoleon's presence on the Danube, the archdukes never ceased to aim at forming a junction with each other, the one purposing to come from Bohemia by way of Lintz, the other from Italy by Inspruck and Salzburg. It is evident, therefore, that if Napoleon had chosen to pursue the archduke into Bohemia, he would have left open the middle route, that of the Danube; that then the reunion of the archdukes would have been certain, and that those princes, by acting with a little boldness, might have returned to the Isar, or even to the Upper Danube, and have cut off the retreat of the French by bringing a combined force of 140,000 men against Napoleon, who no longer had that number. To march along the margin of the Danube, and thus take the shortest course to Vienna, for the roads from Bohemia describe by Ratisbon, Pilsen, Budweis, and Lintz a great arc, of which the Danube is the cord; to maintain himself on that road, which was not only the shorter but the more central; by occupying it to separate the archduke who was in Bohemia from the archdukes who were in Bavaria and Italy; lastly, by remaining on that route to take good care of what is most precious to a general, namely, his line of communication, that on which he has his sick, his ammunition, his provisions, his recruits, and by which it is possible for him to retreat in case of defeat—was then the only wise resolution, the only one worthy of the genius of Napoleon, and he adopted it without any hesitation.

Having resolved to take the Danube route and march straight on Vienna, Napoleon employed the most suitable means for the execution of his designs. The plan of the Austrians was not

known to him; all he knew was that the larger part of them, under Archduke Charles, were on the left of the Danube by Ratisbon; and the smaller, under General Hiller and Archduke Louis, were on the right of the river by Landshut, beyond the Isar. He concluded thence that whilst marching forward and sharply pursuing the latter portion, it would be necessary to take great precautions with regard to the former, which would be always on his flank or on his rear. Whilst guarding against whatever attempts it might make upon the safety of the army, he would have to move forward a mass sufficiently strong to overcome Hiller and Archduke Louis, and rapid enough to anticipate them at the several passages over the Danube, and thus hinder the two armies of the enemy from meeting before Vienna for its protection.

It was on the 23rd, the day he entered Ratisbon, and on the 24th that Napoleon made all his arrangements. Previously, on the 22nd, on quitting Landshut for Eckmühl, he had sent Marshal Bessières in pursuit of the two beaten corps of General Hiller and Archduke Louis, with such a force as ensured him against any forcible return of the fugitives. On the 23rd, during the cannonading of Ratisbon, he had directed that the line of the Danube should be so occupied as to prevent any junction between the archdukes, whether they attempted to pass from Bohemia into Bavaria or *vice versâ*. To this end Napoleon ordered Massena to descend to Straubing with the Boudet, Legrand, Carra St. Cyr, and Claparède divisions. Thus two columns were to pursue the Austrians on the right of the Danube: that of Marshal Bessières, which had orders to march by the centre of Bavaria, and to press hard on Hiller and Archduke Louis at the passage of all the affluents of the Danube; and that of Marshal Massena, which was to move along the river, and occupy before the archdukes the important passages of Straubing, Passau, and Lintz, which formed the points of communication between Bavaria and Bohemia.

Having taken these precautions on his front and his right, Napoleon disposed of Marshal Davout's corps to guard his left and his rear against any possible attack by Archduke Charles. Napoleon gave back to Davout the fine Gudin and Morand divisions, which he had borrowed for the affair of Abensberg, and took from him the St. Hilaire division, which, with Oudinot's two divisions, was to form the corps of Marshal Lannes. The Friant, Morand, and Gudin divisions, habituated to serve with Marshal Davout since the camp of Boulogne, and which had always remained out of France since that period, formed a real family, under the eyes of a father of inflexible character but devoted to his children, and were a finished model of infantry suited for war on a grand scale. They never pillaged,

and because they did not they never wanted anything; they never had a man behind, never retreated, and beat every enemy that came before them. With Montbrun's cavalry, they still counted, notwithstanding their losses, 29,000 or 30,000 men. Napoleon ordered Marshal Davout to quit Ratisbon on the 24th, march upon the tracks of Archduke Charles to the frontiers of Bohemia, try to know whether he had crossed them, and that being ascertained, return to the Danube, and march down along its right bank, whilst Montbrun, with his light cavalry, was moving parallel with him on the opposite side, constantly exploring the Böhmer Wald, a long chain of wooded mountains separating Bohemia from Bavaria. Marshal Davout then, after having fully informed himself respecting the movements of Archduke Charles, was to follow the general march of the army along the Danube, behind Marshal Massena, and to occupy Straubing when Massena marched on Passau, and Passau when he moved to Lintz. General Dupas, with a French division of 4000 or 5000 men, and the contingents of the minor princes, in all 10,000 men, had orders to repair immediately to Ratisbon, and replace Marshal Davout, whom he was to follow from thence, and replace successively at Straubing, Passau, and Lintz. Finally, Prince Bernadotte, with the Saxons, had orders to quit Dresden, which was not threatened by any enemy, cross the Upper Palatinate, and enter Ratisbon, to replace the Dupas division. In this way the Danube could not fail to be well guarded, since the two best corps in the army, those of Massena and Davout, escorted by two allied corps, were to follow its course; whilst through the centre of Bavaria a strong advanced guard, under Marshal Bessières, was to press on the heels of Hiller and Archduke Louis. Napoleon resolved to march himself with the St. Hilaire and Demont divisions, the disposable half of Oudinot's corps, the guard which had just arrived, and the fourteen regiments of cuirassiers, and to escort Bessières by Landshut, in order to support him if he met with any difficulty on the part of Hiller and Archduke Louis' corps, or to bear down upon the margin of the river if Archduke Charles attempted to recross it on our flank or our rear. To complete this series of precautions, Napoleon detached the Bavarians on his right, with orders to occupy Munich, bring back their king thither, drive away the Jellachich division—which, as the reader remembers, had been detached from Hiller's corps—force it from Munich on Salzburg, and then enter the Tyrol, and replace it under the dominion of the house of Bavaria. This last measure, by replacing the Bavarians at home, had the advantage of clearing the march of the army on the Italian side, and guarding it from any attack by Archduke John. The troops marching along the river-side had orders to stop the boats,

collect them on the right side, and form convoys of them for the transport of stores, invalids, and recruits; to prepare ovens, flour, and biscuits at all points; and to put Straubing, Passau, and Lintz in a state of defence, so as to be able to guard the river with small forces when the several echelons should have been passed.

Napoleon's next care was to procure the necessary reinforcements for the several corps, whether to repair their losses or to complete their proposed effective. In the recent engagements we had lost 12,000 or 15,000 men, a third of whom only were to reappear in the ranks; and the corps had entered into action before having received their full numbers. The old divisions had not received the conscripts due to them from the depôts, and in the new corps, like Oudinot's, formed of fourth battalions, several of these battalions had only two, three, or four companies, instead of six. Lastly, the recruits coming from Italy, for the corps which had their depôts in that country, had been stopped in the Tyrol, and had to be replaced with others. Napoleon gave orders that the necessary supplies of men should be promptly forwarded by the well-guarded route of Bavaria, and that the cavalry should receive the horses of which they stood in much need. Napoleon had just been joined by the grenadiers, chasseurs, fusiliers, and tirailleurs of his guard. He repeated his orders for the prompt organisation of the four regiments of conscripts of that guard, and of the new detachment of artillery, which was to raise its pieces to the number of sixty. He wrote to the kings of Bavaria, Saxony, and Wurtemberg, announcing to them his brilliant successes, and appealing to their zeal for the recruiting of their forces. To his brothers, Jerome and Louis, he wrote to urge the mustering of their forces, in order to provide for the security of Germany against the insurrectionary movements which were breaking out on all sides. He gave orders that the King of Prussia should be required to explain himself as to the strange adventure of Major Schill; and in announcing his victories to M. de Caulaincourt, he sent him no letter for the Emperor Alexander, wishing to signify to that monarch by such silence what he thought of the sincerity of his co-operation. He, moreover, forbade our ambassador to listen to a single word as to the future fate of Austria, or as to the conditions of peace, which might be the result of such rapid victories.

Whilst his troops were advancing before him, Napoleon remained at Ratisbon, to despatch the numerous orders requisite for the conduct of such great operations, and the government of the empire, which he did not neglect though absent. He stayed in Ratisbon from the evening of the 23rd April until the 26th, when he went to Landshut to rejoin the army and command it in person. Having met the guard and the cuirassiers on the way, he marched with those fine troops in the track of Bessières

and Lannes, who were advancing, as we have said, by the centre of Bavaria, whilst on the right the Bavarians were skirting along the foot of the Tyrolese Alps, and on the left, Massena, Davout, Dupas, and Bernadotte were moving down the margin of the Danube one after the other.

During this time the Austrian generals were adopting nearly the plan of retreat imputed to them by Napoleon. Archduke Charles, driven with about 24,000 men into the Upper Palatinate, had, in fact, no other course open to him than to retreat as fast as possible through Bohemia, recross the Danube at Lintz or at Krems, form a junction there with Hiller and Archduke Louis, and even, if possible, bring Archduke John to the same point through the insurgent Tyrol. General Hiller and Archduke Louis, on their part, had nothing better to do than to contest the lines of the Inn, the Traun, and the Ens, confluents of the Danube, and thus delay Napoleon's march, and give Archdukes Charles and John time to rejoin them, and cover Vienna with all the forces of the monarchy. This was, in fact, the plan which Archduke Charles adopted and prescribed to his brothers, thereby completely justifying Napoleon's march along the Danube, since it placed him on the direct road to Vienna, between all the archdukes, so as to isolate them from each other, and anticipate them at all points of concentration.

Conformably to the plan fixed, Archduke Charles, on quitting Ratisbon, took up a position at Cham, at the entrance of the defiles of Bohemia. He established himself between the two roads from Furth and Roetz to Pilsen, having Rosenberg's corps on his left, Hohenzollern's on his right, Kollowrath's in the middle, Prince John of Lichtenstein in the rear with the grenadiers and cuirassiers, and Bellegarde's corps detached to the convent of Schoenthal. The position at Cham was very strong, and was worth defending in case of a keen pursuit. Prince Charles waited there for the coming up of his matériel and of his laggards and missing men. Marshal Davout followed him thither by Nittenau, not with the intention of giving him battle, but with that of observing his march and ascertaining his projects. Wishing, however, to maintain the ascendency in arms, he drove in the advanced posts of the Austrians nearly to Cham, and assumed the attitude of an enemy ready to come to action. Whether it was that the archduke did not wish to run the risk of another battle, or that he thought he had waited long enough, he decamped, leaving Marshal Davout a great number of waggons and many wounded, whom the latter made prisoners. His purpose being to retreat, it would have been better to have done so sooner; for having quitted the environs of Ratisbon on the morning of the 24th, and remained in position at Cham until the 28th, he lost two days out of four, whereas it was of

the first importance to him to reach the bridge of Lintz, by which he might form a junction with the corps of Hiller and the Archduke Louis. His march through Bohemia, by Pilsen, Budweis, and Lintz, was a great round, whilst Napoleon went direct to the important point of Lintz by an excellent road, and with the help of the river for the transport of his heaviest baggage. The Austrian commander would therefore have done well to make haste, even at the risk of leaving many of his men behind him, for it was better to arrive at Lintz with diminished forces than not to arrive there at all.

Be this as it may, Archduke Charles retreated into Bohemia, determined to collect all the reinforcements he could by the way, and to regain the right bank of the Danube as soon as possible. Doubting, however, that he should be able to march fast enough, he sent forward General Klenau with nine battalions, and General Stutterheim with some light troops, to go by the shortest routes and destroy the bridges of Passau and Lintz on the Danube, if they could not occupy them. Having taken these precautions, and unable to help yielding to discouragement at sight of a war that began so badly, he proposed to the Emperor of Austria to make a pacific overture to Napoleon, under pretext of an exchange of prisoners. The Emperor Francis, who had consented to war without being impelled to it by any decided conviction, and who saw how much his brother was already discouraged, did not refuse to take this pacific step, only he made it a condition that there should not be too much weakness manifested at the very opening of hostilities. Archduke Charles, in consequence, made General Grünn, the chief officer of his staff, write a letter, in which, after congratulating the Emperor Napoleon on his arrival at the French headquarters —a fact, he modestly said, he had been enabled to discover by the turn of events—he proposed to him an exchange of prisoners to assuage the evils of war, and said how happy he should be if from the commencement of hostilities it were possible to give them a less harsh and violent character. He then continued his march through Bohemia, after having enjoined his brother John to pass into Bavaria, and his brother Louis and his lieutenant Hiller strongly to contest that country with the French, in order to give time to all the Austrian forces to effect their junction behind the Traun, in the environs of Lintz.

As soon as he had seen Archduke Charles strike off into Bohemia, Marshal Davout turned back to Ratisbon, recrossed the river, and proceeded along its course on the right bank, following Marshal Massena to Passau, and being followed to Ratisbon by General Dupas.

Meanwhile General Hiller and Archduke Louis, even before they had received orders to contest possession of the Bavarian

territory step by step, had, of their own accord, resolved so to do; and believing that Napoleon was intent on pursuing Archduke Charles, they had determined to make an offensive movement against the advanced guard of Marshal Bessières, in order to effect a diversion in favour of the commander-in-chief. This resolution was honourable and judicious, for they might surprise Bessières before he was joined by the reinforcement which Napoleon was sending him, and whilst he was in that state of imprudent confidence which victory often inspires.

The two Austrian generals had still about 50,000 men, including the remains of Kienmayer's reserve and Jellachich's division. General Jellachich was at Munich, with orders to retire on Salzburg. Deprived of his co-operation, and joined by a regiment of Mitrowski's and by some Stipsicz hussars, they had some 38,000 or 40,000 men. Marching against Marshal Bessières, who had barely 13,000 or 14,000, and who was advancing with extreme rashness, they might cut him to pieces. Accordingly, on the morning of the 24th, before Archduke Charles had finally effected his retreat into Bohemia, and whilst Marshal Bessières was advancing beyond the Isar, having Marulaz with his light cavalry at the head of his column, General Wrede's Bavarians in the centre, and Molitor's infantry in the rear, the two Austrian generals advanced with the intention of driving the vanguard of the French into the marshes of the Roth near Neumarkt. They presented themselves in three columns, and first encountered the cavalry of General Marulaz, which charged them several times with great gallantry, but could make no impression on a body of 30,000 resolute men. The cavalry being worsted, General de Wrede had his turn, and had, with 6000 or 7000 foot, to resist more than 30,000. The Bavarians were not unworthy to cope with the Austrians, though they were inferior to them; but it was impossible for them to contend against the mass which assailed them in front and on their flanks. Their only retreat over the moist and woody country that borders on the little river Roth was a weak and trembling wooden bridge, incapable of sustaining the heavy masses that traversed it with hurried steps. Behind was the town of Neumarkt, where Bessières was at table, whilst his advanced guard, driven back upon his centre, was in danger of being cut to pieces. Fortunately General Molitor, an infantry officer formed in the school of the Rhine, and the first of the lieutenant-generals of that time, arrived with his division. He recognised the danger, and imparted it to Marshal Bessières, who, looking upon it as an affair of infantry, had the discreet modesty to leave it in the hands of General Molitor. The latter instantly crossed the bridge of the Roth with his four regiments, and perceiving on the left a wooded height whence the retreat might be protected,

he hastened to occupy it with the 2nd of the line, precipitating from the top to the bottom an Austrian troop that was posted on it. He then ranged the 16th and 37th regiments on the right, in an advantageous position for using their fire. At that moment the light cavalry was retreating with loss across the Roth, and General de Wrede was engaged with the enemy, who were intent on destroying one of his battalions. But suddenly the attitude of the Molitor division cooled the ardour of the Austrians. The rolling and well-aimed volleys of the 16th and 37th, and the strong position of the 2nd, checked them, and they were forced to let the Bavarians repass the Roth in quiet. The 16th and 37th regiments then defiled, protected by the 2nd, which had a tremendous engagement with the Austrians. So obstinately bent on fighting was that brave regiment, that General Molitor had great difficulty in withdrawing it. Before recrossing the bridge it charged several times with the bayonet, and thus forced the Austrians to let it operate its retreat, which it effected last of all with an aplomb that extorted the admiration of the enemy themselves.

This affair cost the Bavarians some hundreds of men, and General Marulaz some horses. It might have been disastrous for the whole advanced guard but for Napoleon's forethought in affording Marshal Bessières the support of General Molitor. However, though checked on the banks of the Roth, General Hiller and Archduke Louis would not have renounced their offensive movement if they had not learned in the night the whole extent of the commander-in-chief's disasters, and his retreat into Bohemia, and if they had not recognised the necessity of themselves retreating, for Napoleon could not fail to fall soon upon them with irresistible masses. They resolved therefore to fall back upon the Inn, and thence upon the Traun, which they hoped to defend better than the Inn, because they should have more time to strengthen their position on it; besides that they had some chance of finding one of the archdukes there—either Charles or John.

Things were in this state when Napoleon came up with the guard and the cuirassiers, preceded by Lannes, with the troops of Generals St. Hilaire, Demont, and Oudinot. He sent Marshal Bessières forward, and gave the pursuit the force of a torrent which had burst its dykes. The whole mass, from right to left, marched on the Inn—the Bavarians, by Munich and Wasserburg, on Salzburg; Marshal Lannes, by Muhldorf, on Burghausen; Marshal Bessières, by Neumarkt, on Braunau. Supporting this movement along the Danube, Marshal Massena entered Passau, which he took by a *coup de main* from the Austrians, who, no more than the Bavarians, had had the forethought to consolidate their position there.

On the 28th and 29th of April the French had arrived on all points at the line of the Inn, and were busy on every road in reconstructing the bridges which the Austrians had broken down or burnt to the water's edge whenever they had had time.

Napoleon having entered Burghausen on the 28th, was obliged to wait two days for the rebuilding of the bridge, which was of great importance, and which had been completely burnt. Having received the pacific letter of the Archduke Charles, he sent it to M. de Champagny, who was at head-quarters, and desired him not to reply to it. Full of confidence in the result of the campaign—not foreseeing the difficulties he might subsequently encounter—he fancied he held in his hand the destiny of the house of Austria, and would not be stayed in his ambitious designs by any hasty impulse of generosity. He therefore enjoined silence—at all events for the moment—reserving it to himself to reply subsequently, according to circumstances.

Marshal Massena having entered Passau, and Marshal Davout following close after him, whilst the whole army was stationed upon the Inn from Braunau to Salzburg, it was necessary to march upon the Traun without delay. This was the line it was most essential to secure, for it corresponded to the débouche of Lintz, by which Archduke Charles might join General Hiller and Archduke Louis. This line being preoccupied, there remained for the Austrian commander a second and last chance of a junction in front of Vienna, which was to reach in time the bridge of Krems, and occupy St. Polten to protect the capital. Napoleon resolved to deprive him at once of the first of these two chances, by eagerly pressing forward to Lintz. Having reached the Inn with all his corps, and having rebuilt the bridges on the 30th of April, he commanded a general movement to be made on the 1st of May. He desired Massena to march rapidly from Passau upon Efferding, from Efferding upon Lintz, and on arriving here to seize first upon the town of Lintz, then upon the bridge over the Danube if it was not destroyed, and Lintz once occupied, to go straight to the river Traun, which flows two leagues below. The Traun, which is one of the most important lines the Austrians have to defend when they want to arrest the progress of an army marching upon Vienna, flows, like the Ens, from the Northern Alps, and falls into the Danube a little below Lintz. It flows along the foot of a plateau which extends as far as the Danube, and upon which an army could advantageously post itself to oppose the progress of an invasion. Hence the bridge over the Danube, that which served as a military communication between Bohemia and Upper Austria, was situated not at Lintz itself,

but at Mauthausen, below the confluence of the Traun with the Danube. It was thus sheltered by the Traun and by the plateau of which we have above spoken, on the summit of which stood the town and castle of Ebersberg.

Massena then received orders on the 1st of May to pass quickly from Passau to Lintz, from Lintz to Ebersberg. But as the difficulty might be considerable if the 36,000 men yet remaining to the two Austrian generals took up their quarters at Ebersberg, Napoleon thought proper to approach the Traun at several points at the same time—at Ebersberg, at Wels, and at Lambach. He consequently directed all his columns upon the Traun, so as to arrive there on the morning of the 3rd of May. General de Wrede having with his division traversed Salzburg, and having been replaced there by the rest of the Bavarians, was to proceed by Straswalchen to Lambach, on the Traun. Marshal Lannes, with the troops of General Oudinot, St. Hilaire, and Demont, was to proceed to Wels, to cross the Traun there just above Ebersberg. Lastly, Marshal Bessières, with the guard, the cuirassiers, and light infantry, was either to cross at Wels, or to turn towards Ebersberg, if he heard such a cannonade as indicated a serious opposition in that direction. Major-General Berthier had orders to inform Massena that if the obstacles he encountered were too great, the passage of the Traun effected above him, either at Wels or Lambach, would afford him aid towards overcoming them. He was, however, enjoined in these new orders, as in the preceding ones, to neglect nothing that should bring about the speedy capture not only of the town of Lintz and its bridge over the Danube, but also the bridge of Mauthausen, situated, as we have said, at the confluence of the Traun, under protection of the castle of Ebersberg.

Our columns advanced in the order indicated. They were all, on the 1st of May, beyond the Inn, after having rebuilt the bridges over it, Massena crossing from Passau to Efferding, Lannes and Bessières from Burghausen and Braunau upon Ried. They collected on their route a considerable number of carriages, and about three thousand prisoners. Massena, who was marching with the Danube on his left, met all along his road with the rearguard of General Hiller and Archduke Louis, and could discern on the other side of the river the troops of the Archduke Charles coming through the defiles of Bohemia to occupy or destroy the bridge of Lintz. He felt, therefore, at every step the importance of anticipating the Austrian commander-in-chief either at Lintz or at Ebersberg, not so much for the purpose of availing himself of those points of transit as in order to keep them from the enemy, and to prevent the union behind the Traun of all the forces of the Austrian monarchy.

On the evening of the 2nd of May, Massena exchanged some musket-shots before Efferding with the rearguard of General Hiller, took some prisoners, and prepared to march the next day upon Lintz. On the morning of the 3rd he set out, preceded by the Marulaz light horse, and followed by the Claparède division of Oudinot's corps. He appeared before Lintz at the dawn of day. To enter, rout a few posts that hastily retreated, and take possession of the town, was but the work of a moment. The detachments of Klenau and Stutterheim, despatched by Archduke Charles to occupy the passage, had succeeded only in destroying the bridge of Lintz and bringing the boats to the left bank. Being in possession of Lintz, Massena was certain that the junction of the archdukes could not be effected by the bridge at that spot. But the bridge in reality the most favourable for the junction was that of Mauthausen, situated two leagues further down, and protected, as we have before said, by the Traun. As long as we were not masters of that, it was possible for the Archduke Charles to make use of it to unite with General Hiller and Archduke Louis; and it was uncertain whether the detachments seen beyond the Danube were the outposts of the great Austrian army, or mere detachments without support. It was ten o'clock in the morning. Massena did not hesitate a moment; traversed Lintz at double quick step, and advanced to the Traun opposite Ebersberg, a position which suddenly presented itself under a formidable aspect.

In front was the Traun, flowing from right to left to where it projected itself between wood-covered islands into the immense bed of the Danube. Over it was a bridge more than 400 yards long, and beyond it an escarped plateau, above which rose the little town of Ebersberg, and higher still the castle of Ebersberg, bristling with artillery; and lastly, in front of the bridge and on the escarpment of the plateau, a mass of troops amounting probably to between 36,000 and 40,000 men. Such a sight would have made a serious impression on any but a man of Massena's temperament, and would have induced him to wait, especially if he made the very obvious reflection that a few leagues above Ebersberg many French columns were that day or the next to force their passage and turn the position. But this certainty did not do away with the possibility that in the course of the day the archdukes might effect a junction by the bridge of Mauthausen if it was left in their power. There was then a real advantage in taking it from them at once by seizing upon the town and castle of Ebersberg. Besides, it is by the impulses of a man's temperament, still more than by his reason, that his decisions are shaped in war; and Massena, on meeting with the enemy, with whom he had not yet had an opportunity of having a hand-to-hand encounter, felt but one desire—that

of throwing himself upon him and seizing a position considered decisive. From these motives he commanded an instantaneous attack.

In front of the bridge of Ebersberg, around the village of Klein Munchen, were stationed some Austrian sharpshooters and a few troops of light cavalry. General Marulaz charged and dispersed both. The horsemen recrossed the bridge, the sharpshooters placed themselves in the gardens and houses of Klein Munchen. Claparède's first brigade, commanded by the intrepid Cohorn, marched behind the light cavalry of Marulaz. General Cohorn, of whom we have already had occasion to speak, was descended from the famous Dutch engineer of the same name, and carried within a puny body one of the most impetuous and energetic souls which God ever gave to a warrior. He was well fitted to execute the impetuous will of Massena. No sooner was he arrived at the spot than he placed himself at the head of the voltigeurs of his brigade, attacked the village of Klein Munchen, seized first upon the gardens, then threw himself into the houses, killed or took prisoners all their occupants, pushed on beyond the villages, gained the entrance of the bridge, which was at least 400 yards long, loaded with faggots for burning, and riddled by the shots of the enemy. Any other than Cohorn would have halted and waited for orders from Massena; but the daring general, sword in hand, rushed foremost on the bridge, crossed it at double quick step, killed or captured all who stood in his way, left indeed many of his own men dead or dying on the planks of the bridge, but finally cleared it, and led on his attacking columns against the plateau, which was covered with the masses of the Austrian infantry. Cohorn, under a shower of balls, climbed with the same impetuosity the steep ascent to Ebersberg, penetrated into the town, debouched on a large open space commanded by the castle, and at last compelled the Austrians to fall back upon the heights behind. Unfortunately they retained possession of the castle, and poured from its walls a destructive fire upon the little town now become our prize.

During this series of daring deeds, Massena, who had remained at the foot of the position, took his measures to support Cohorn, who had hitherto had to do only with the advanced guard of the Austrians, but who would soon have to deal with their whole force. In order to oppose the formidable artillery of the plateau, he brought up the guns of the whole *corps d'armée*, and placed them as advantageously as possible. Our artillery officers, as skilful as intrepid, sought to compensate by the precision of their fire and the judicious planting of their guns for the disadvantage of their position. A fearful cannonade then took place from one side to the other of the Traun. This

done, Massena despatched across the long defile of the bridge Claparède's two other brigades, those of Lesuire and Ficatier, ordering them to ascend the plateau and make their way into Ebersberg to the assistance of General Cohorn. Then he despatched a crowd of aides-de-camp, in order to hasten the arrival of the Legrand, Carra St. Cyr, and Boudet divisions, whose assistance was greatly needed in order to a happy issue out of this formidable encounter. He himself remained in the midst of flying balls and bullets, giving his orders and providing for everything.

Lesuire and Ficatier, with their two brigades, arrived opportunely, for General Hiller, again marching forward, had attacked Cohorn with a considerable force, and had compelled him to re-enter Ebersberg, and afterwards to evacuate the great square. The French once more took possession of it, drove off the Austrians, and endeavoured to seize the castle, which they approached without being able to enter. But the Austrians, who felt the importance of the post, returned in greater numbers (which they could easily do, since they were 36,000 against 7000 or 8000), bore down en masse upon the castle, from which they repelled the French, entered the town, passed through it, and once more emerged upon the great square. The brave Claparède, with his lieutenants, then sought refuge in the houses which surround it on three sides, established themselves there, and from the windows poured forth a shower of balls upon the enemy. The possession of these houses was furiously contested, the artillery of the castle firing upon the Austrians as well as upon the French. The unfortunate little town was set on fire by shells, and the conflagration soon became so great that it was almost impossible to breathe.

This frightful massacre continued, and fury having equalled the courage of the combatants on either side, victory seemed on the point of being decided by superior numbers. The French were about to be driven into the Traun and punished for their audacity, when fortunately the Legrand division came in sight, led on by its intrepid general. At the head of his two veteran regiments, the 26th light infantry and the 18th of the line, he reached the bridge, encumbered with dead and wounded. To cross it, a heap of corpses, some perhaps of the wounded still breathing, had to be thrown into the Traun. At length it was traversed, and beyond it fresh impediments were encountered, in the shape of combatants driven back in confusion, and wounded men being carried off. An officer was endeavouring to explain the position to General Legrand, when the latter cut him short, saying, "I do not want advice, but room for my men." Room was made, and he advanced with one of his regiments to the right to outflank the Austrians, who had sur-

rounded Ebersberg; another to the centre, through the main street of the town. Whilst several of his battalions, formed into attacking columns, repelled the Austrians who surrounded the town, the others passed through the middle of it, and succeeded in debouching upon the great square, cleared it at the point of the bayonet, and thus rescued Claparède, who was reduced to the last extremity. Legrand then attacked the castle under a murderous fire. The gates being barred, he forced them open with the axe, penetrated into the castle, and killed all within it. From that moment Ebersberg was ours, but it was only a heap of smoking ruins, from which arose an intolerable stench of burning corpses. Our men hastened to leave behind them a spot as frightful to behold as it was hard to win, and marched against the Austrians, who were drawn up in order of battle upon a line of hills in the background, and who, perceiving afar off on the plain between Lintz and Ebersberg the approach of the long files belonging to the division of Carra St. Cyr and Boudet; perceiving, besides, to their right, a mass of French cavalry, who had crossed the Traun at Wels, thought it not prudent to prolong the furious contest, and then retired, thus abandoning to us the confluence of the Traun and the important pass of Mauthausen. But the bridge had disappeared at that place as well as at Lintz, the outposts of Archduke Charles having destroyed it and sent the boats to Krems.

The cavalry which had been perceived was a thousand horse, which Lannes, after having passed the Traun without difficulty, had despatched under General Durosnel to turn the position of the Austrians. It is certain, then, that if Massena had been able to guess that Archduke Charles would not be at Mauthausen with his army, and that passages already effected a little higher up would have supplied means for compelling the surrender of Ebersberg, he ought to have spared the blood shed in this terrible attack. The field of carnage was hideous, and the town of Ebersberg was so much in flames that the wounded could not be withdrawn. To prevent the fire from reaching the bridge, it had been necessary to cut off the approach at either end, so that the communication was interrupted for several hours between the troops who had already crossed and those coming to their aid. This conflict cost us 1700 killed, drowned, burnt, or wounded. The Austrians lost 3000 put hors de combat, 4000 prisoners, and many flags and cannon, and went away appalled at so much daring. We had therefore much to compensate for our losses on this terrible day, and its effect was great no less morally than physically.

Napoleon had galloped up on hearing the loud cannonade. Though well inured to the horrors of war, all his senses were

shocked at that abominable spectacle, which was not sufficiently justified by necessity; and but for the admiration he felt for Massena's warlike genius, and the value he always set on energy, he would perhaps have expressed blame for what had occurred. He did nothing of the kind, however, but would not remain in Ebersberg, and took up his quarters outside it amongst his guard.

The Archduke Charles, in spite of his settled purpose to come to a junction with his brothers behind the Traun, by Lintz or Mauthausen, had neither marched quickly enough nor had sufficiently calculated his movements to arrive at Lintz in serviceable time. He had only reached Budweis, in Bohemia, when Massena was so impetuously advancing beyond Lintz and Ebersberg, and the only crossing-place left open to him was that of Krems. General Hiller and the Archduke Louis were proceeding thither by Enns, Amstetten, and St. Polten, destroying in their progress all the bridges on the rivers which flow from the Noric Alps to the Danube. As to the Archduke John, it was still less likely that he could arrive soon enough, or that he should even venture into the Alps, leaving Prince Eugène on his left, and exposing himself on his right to the risk of encountering the army of Napoleon, into which he would have fallen as into an abyss. He was therefore not to be reckoned on. But it would be enough to create some favourable chance were Archduke Charles to combine, through Krems, with General Hiller and Archduke Louis, who were retreating along the Danube; for after having employed considerable time in collecting stragglers, assembling the landwehr, and incorporating the third battalions of the Galician regiments, he had with him more than 80,000 men, and could, united with his two lieutenants, who possessed at least 30,000, bring 110,000 fighting men into the field at St. Polten. It would then be possible to dispute the victory with Napoleon; and if it were gained, the French empire, instead of being overthrown in 1814, would have been destroyed in 1809.

Napoleon, delighted at having taken from the archdukes their principal chances of a junction, by occupying Lintz and Mauthausen, hastened to march upon Krems, to take from them their last resource, and to reach Vienna before any obstacle could prevent his entry.

After the Traun, our forces came upon the Ens, which runs parallel with that river, washing in its course the other side of the plateau which had just been crossed. But all the bridges were completely destroyed upon the Ens, and not less than four-and-twenty or forty-eight hours were required to rebuild them. This was an unfortunate circumstance, but perfectly inevitable. Although on the morning of the 4th of May Lannes was at Steyer, upon the Ens, with the Demont and St. Hilaire divisions,

and Bessières occupied the town of Enns with the light cavalry, Oudinot's corps, and one of Massena's divisions, they were compelled to wait the whole day of the 5th for the reconstruction of the bridges, which had been burnt down to the water's edge. It was not until the morning of the 6th that they were able to cross the Ens and march on Amstetten. Bessières, with the cavalry and Oudinot's infantry, passed first, soon followed by Massena and by Lannes, who joined the principal column, since only one road remained from that point for the army between the foot of the Alps and the Danube. In the evening they entered Amstetten without firing a shot.

Next day the army continued its march to Mölk, a fine position on the Danube, crowned by the magnificent abbey of the same name, where Napoleon established his headquarters. There remained only one day's march to reach Krems, where stands the bridge of Mautern, the last by which Archduke Charles could effect a junction with General Hiller and Archduke Louis. There was already a certainty of reaching it without impediment, for no indications could be seen of the presence of a great army. On the 8th our advanced guard moved to St. Polten, an important and well-known position of the flanks of the Kahlenberg, which is an offset of the Alps extending to the Danube, and behind which is situated Vienna. There it was that the great muster of the Austrians should have taken place if the archdukes had had time to come together, for at St. Polten, protected by an excellent military position, are found the point of junction of the roads to Bohemia, Italy, Upper and Lower Austria, and the pass leading to Vienna through the gorges of the Kahlenberg. But the only force seen was rearguards in retreat, some on our left falling back towards the bridge at Krems to shelter themselves behind the Danube, others in front of us falling back through the Kahlenberg on Vienna. It was evident then that there was no great battle to be fought in front of the capital, and the only difficulties remaining to be encountered were those of an assault on Vienna if it was defended. These difficulties might, indeed, become very embarrassing, if Archduke Charles arrived in sight of Vienna before us by the left bank of the Danube, crossed the river by the Thabor bridge, and offered us battle under the walls of that great city. Fortunately what had occurred gave little reason to fear this.

In fact, Archduke Charles, having lost at least two days at Cham, and some others again on the road from Cham to Budweis, for the sake of rallying and reinforcing his army, had not reached Budweis until the morning of the 3rd of May, just when Massena was taking Ebersberg. In the vain hope of a junction at Lintz, for which, however, there was very little

warrant, he had advanced from Budweis to Freystadt, near the Danube, instead of marching straightway on Krems, which would have spared him a fresh detour and a fresh loss of time. On approaching the Danube he had become aware of the occupation of Lintz and the Traun, and the consequent impossibility of effecting the desired junction in that direction. He had therefore resumed the route through the interior of Bohemia by Zwoeltel, still cherishing the false hope of reaching Krems and St. Polten before us. In case, however, of his not arriving there, he had authorised the two generals who had the defence of the right bank of the river to pass over to the left, should they find themselves too hardly pressed upon; only they were to detach to Vienna the forces requisite for securing the capital from a *coup de main*. These instructions they had carried into effect on arriving at St. Polten. Fearing that they should be attacked by superior forces before reaching Vienna, and suffer a fresh defeat as at Ebersberg, they had recrossed the Danube, as in 1805, by the bridge at Krems, destroyed that bridge, removed all the boats to the left bank, and sent a strong detachment by the direct road to Vienna.

Such had been the proceedings of the Austrian generals, which the mere aspect of things sufficed to reveal, for, as we have said, on the left were seen large bodies of troops passing the Danube at Krems, and in front were columns moving towards Vienna through the gorges of the Kahlenberg. Bent on arriving forthwith at the Austrian capital, Napoleon issued orders to the following effect from his headquarters at the abbey of Mölk.

Marshal Lannes was to march to Vienna on the 9th of May with the infantry of Generals Oudinot and Demont. Marshal Massena was to follow them immediately, whilst the bulk of the cavalry was to line the bank of the Danube, in order to baffle any attempt of the enemy to cross it. The light cavalry was distributed between Mautern, Tulln, and Klosterneuburg, along the windings of the river round the foot of the Kahlenberg. The cuirassiers were cantoned in the rear between St. Polten and Siegardskirchen. These precautions taken on our left, General Bruyère, on our right, was, with his light cavalry and a thousand German infantry, to go up the road to Italy by Lilienfeld, to disarm the mountains of Styria, and watch the operations of the Archduke John. Napoleon followed Lannes and Massena with the guard and a part of the cuirassiers. Marshal Davout, already arrived from Passau at Lintz, was ordered to proceed from Lintz to Mölk, from Mölk to St. Polten, so as to resist any attempts that might be made to cross the river at Krems, in our rear, or else to march upon Vienna, if a general battle were to be fought under the walls of that capital. Nevertheless, as Passau and Lintz were nearly equal

in importance to Krems, General Dupas was to remain at the former awaiting the arrival of Marshal Bernadotte; and General Vandamme, with the troops of Wurtemberg, was charged with the defence of Lintz. Napoleon, at the same time, took the utmost precautions to secure the arrival of his convoys by the Danube. All along the shore we occupied he provided for them ports for repose, where they might shelter themselves and receive intelligence. These convoys, composed of boats collected on the Danube and its tributaries, were laden with biscuits, stores, and fatigued men. Besides Passau and Lintz, points already occupied, Napoleon fortified Ips, Waldsee, Mölk, and Mautern. Thence his convoys were to take the land route by St. Polten, since that was the shortest and the only safe one, for beyond that point the Danube ran too near the Austrians and too far from the French. Lastly, not judging it enough for his protection to forbid the passage of the river, but believing, on the contrary, that the best means of securing his rear was to have the means of passing the Danube so as to occasion the enemy the same apprehension as we felt for ourselves, and thus compel him to divide his forces, Napoleon ordered the construction of two bridges of boats, one at Lintz, the other at Krems, with whatever materials could be found.

Having relieved himself of these cares, on the 9th Napoleon gave the word to march upon Vienna by way of Siegardskirchen and Schönbrunn. Lannes and Bessières advanced in the foremost line, Massena second, the guard and the cuirassiers third. Marshal Davout brought up the rear, leaving behind the posts we have mentioned to the left on the Danube, and to the right on the roads to Italy.

On the evening of the 9th General Oudinot halted at Siegardskirchen. At dawn on the 10th the Conroux brigade belonging to his corps debouched by the Schönbrunn road before the suburb of Maria Hilf, just a month after the commencement of hostilities. This offensive march, at once so skilful and so rapid, was worthy of comparison to that upon the same field in 1805, and to that across Prussia in 1811. Nothing in history was superior to it. It was now ten o'clock, and Napoleon rode up to direct in person the operations against the capital of Austria, which he desired to take forthwith, but to take without destroying it. Here, as at Madrid, he had a thousand motives for procuring the opening of the gates by other means than by fire and sword.

The Archduke Charles had lost time in useless manœuvres, and was not at hand on the morning of the 10th to relieve Vienna. Nevertheless, that capital was capable of defence. We have already described it and its fortifications, and shall now only recapitulate some principal points of that description. The centre of Vienna, that is to say, the old city, is encircled by

a fine regular line of fortifications, which in 1683 resisted the assault of the Turkish arms. Since that period, the unremitting increase of population had called into existence several magnificent suburbs, each no less extensive than the ancient town. These were protected by a terraced wall of no great height, zigzag, without advanced works, yet equal to resist an attack of several days. Lastly, there was at Vienna what Napoleon had always considered the most potent means of defence—prodigious quantities of wood supplied by the Alps and the Danube. The Viennese could therefore entrench themselves, and among a people violently animated as they were against their enemy, there would be no lack of workmen. The arsenal of Vienna contained 500 pieces of artillery. Hungary could contribute immense supplies of provisions, and thanks to this combination of means, it was possible to prolong the defence until the archdukes arrived with reinforcements. It is inconceivable, therefore, why the Austrians, having to do with Napoleon—that renowned conqueror of capitals—had not thought of putting Vienna in a state of defence.

Much has been said of the faults committed by the Archduke Charles in the course of this campaign. That of having neglected to put Vienna in a state of defence was certainly the most serious. General Hiller and the Archduke Louis, shut up in the heart of this capital, behind all the fortifications which might have been repaired or erected, would have rendered it impregnable. The armies of Italy and Bohemia, afterwards assembled under its walls, would not have been easy to subdue. To gain a great victory over Napoleon in the open field would certainly have been a rash hope, especially if that decisive action was to be come at by means of bold and skilful manœuvres; but to accept a decisive battle at the head of the whole imperial army of Austria, and under the walls of the capital, would have been to prepare for Napoleon the only check which could then have endangered his triumphant fortunes.

Instead of that, no preparations for defence had been made at Vienna; whether from negligence, from reluctance to adopt such precautions, or fear of converting the capital into a field of battle, they had not thought of protecting the suburbs by means of the terraced wall which hemmed them round, and were contented with mounting guns on the ramparts of the old central fortress, which could make no use of them without firing on the suburbs. The only additional defenders provided were some of the mob, who had muskets put into their hands, and who only increased the garrison by some 2000 or 3000 brawlers. The garrison itself was commanded by Archduke Maximilian, and consisted of some battalions of landwehr, some depôts, and a detachment of Hiller's corps—altogether, 11,000 or 12,000

men. Their ardent but inexperienced young commandant had not studied the strong or the weak points of the important post he had to defend, and all his patriotism was exhaled in proclamations as violent as they were idle.

No sooner had Colbert's infantry and the cavalry under General Conroux (Tharreau division) appeared at the entrance of the Maria Hilf faubourg, which was closed by an iron gate, than a sort of popular tumult broke out in the adjacent streets. The populace had been deceived with assurances that the French were beaten, the archduke was victorious, and his prolonged stay in Bohemia was only part of a system of skilful manœuvres; that, no doubt, Napoleon might detach a division to Vienna to menace the capital; but that any such attempt would be speedily punished by the return of the victorious archduke; and that therefore if any demonstration of the kind was made, the Viennese should resist it as a mere insolent bravado on the part of the enemy. Accordingly, the populace took to running about the streets with yells of rage, more alarming to the peaceable inhabitants than to the invaders. The houses and the shops were immediately shut. A flag of truce having been sent to headquarters, the bearer of it was assailed and wounded. His horse was taken, and employed in bearing about in triumph a butcher's boy who had committed this violation of the law of nations. During this time General Tharreau's column had halted before the gate of the faubourg, waiting for it to be opened. Suddenly a French officer, Captain Roidot, climbed over the gate, and sword in hand, compelled the keeper to give up the keys. Our columns then entered, the cavalry at a gallop, the infantry at double quick step, driving the garrison back on the old central town. No sooner had they reached the esplanade that lies between the faubourgs and the ramparts of the old city than the guns on the latter discharged volleys of grape that wounded some of our men, and among them General Tharreau. The French invested the place on all points, summoned it to surrender, and received in reply a discharge of cannon-balls that only did mischief to the handsome houses of the faubourgs.

Seeing, after all, that however vigorously the attack was prosecuted, the affair could not be terminated in one day, Napoleon went and took up his quarters at Schönbrunn, to wait for the coming up of the main body of his army. He nominated as governor of Vienna General Andréossy, who had been his ambassador to Austria, and both knew that capital and was known to its inhabitants. Napoleon meant to show by this appointment that it was not his intention to have recourse to harsh measures, for he would not have selected for their instrument a man who had lived several years among the Viennese.

He also issued a proclamation reminding the inhabitants of the excellent conduct of the French army in 1805, and promising them as good treatment if they behaved towards the French in a manner to deserve it.

General Andréossy immediately proceeded to the faubourgs, and in each of them organised municipalities composed of the principal inhabitants, formed a burgher guard for the maintenance of order, and endeavoured to establish communications with the old town, with a view to put an end to a defence which could only be disastrous to the Viennese themselves. The fire having continued and caused some damage, the faubourgs proposed to send a deputation to Archduke Maximilian to call for a cessation of his imprudent resistance. Before proceeding on its mission the deputation waited on Napoleon, to hear from his own lips what words of promise they were to convey to the inhabitants of the fortified town. It then entered the interior of Vienna on the morning of the 11th of May. The reply to this conciliatory overture was a fresh cannonade. Napoleon's patience was now exhausted, and he resolved to employ fire and sword, but in a way as much as possible to spare the unfortunate faubourgs the consequences of a combat which was about to take place between the old and the new town.

Our troops had arrived by Siegardskirchen and Schönbrunn before the faubourg of Maria Hilf. Napoleon rode round the southern portion of the fortifications with Massena in search of another point to assail, and found one to the east, at the spot where they join the Danube. There a secondary branch, detached from the great arm of the river, flows along the walls, supplying the ditches, and dividing the old city from the celebrated promenade of the Prater. Batteries erected in that quarter against the fortified town would be answered with a fire that would tell only upon very thinly-scattered dwellings and on the islands of the river. Besides, by crossing that arm the assailants would get possession of the Prater, and by going up a little to the north-east they would cut off Vienna from the great Thabor bridge, which leads to the left bank. In this way the city would be severed from all outward aid; Archduke Charles would lose all possible chance of entering it, and its defenders, especially Archduke Maximilian, the courage to shut themselves up in it, for they would be sure of being taken to the last man within forty-eight hours.

Napoleon immediately ordered some swimmers of the Boudet division to plunge into the branch of the Danube which was to be crossed, and fetch some boats from the left bank. They did so under the command of General Boudet's brave aide-de-camp Sigaldi, and brought back, under fire of the enemy's advanced posts, boats enough to enable two companies of

voltigeurs to cross to the opposite bank. They took the small building in the Prater called the Lusthaus, which might serve as an entrenched post, and made it the *tête de pont* of the bridge that was speedily formed with boats collected in the neighbourhood. At the same time Napoleon had fifteen pieces of artillery planted on the bank we occupied, which battered the opposite one, and enfiladed the avenue leading up to the Lusthaus. By this means the two companies of voltigeurs could be supported until the completion of the bridge enabled more numerous forces to join them. A battery of twenty howitzers was at the same time set up at the extremity of the faubourg of Landstrass, near the branch of the river which had just been crossed.

At nine in the evening, after a fresh summons to surrender, and whilst the operation of crossing the water was still in progress, a destructive fire was opened on the fortified town. In some hours 1800 shells were discharged upon it. The streets are narrow, the houses lofty, the population densely accumulated, as in all fortified enclosures in which space is wanting, and conflagrations soon broke out in all quarters. The populace vociferated in the streets, and the opulent classes, distracted between their dread of the mob and of the foreigners, knew not what to desire. To hinder the French from crossing the small arm of the Danube, two battalions of Austrian grenadiers were sent by night to the Lusthaus, to seize that point d'appui for the bridge made by our men. But Boudet's voltigeurs were on their guard. Posted in the Lusthaus, under cover of felled timber, they received the two battalions with volleys of musketry at point blank distance, whilst our artillery poured grape on their flank and put them to the rout. They retreated to the upper part of the Prater.

From that moment the passage of the river branch and the investiture of Vienna were ensured. Archduke Maximilian, frightened at the prospect of being made a prisoner, quitted the capital on the morning of the 12th, taking with him the best part of the garrison, leaving to General O'Reilly, his second in command, only a handful of indifferent troops and some of the armed populace. After having crossed the Danube, he broke down the Thabor bridge. General O'Reilly had but one course to pursue, if he would not have the city burned to no purpose—that was to capitulate. On the morning of the 12th he asked for a suspension of the firing, which was granted, and he signed a capitulation which guaranteed for person and property a respect which Napoleon piqued himself on observing, and from which he would not have deviated even though the town had made no conditions. On the following day, May 13, the French entered Vienna.

Thus in thirty-three days Napoleon, surprised by sudden hostilities, had with one stroke of his trenchant sword cut in two the mass of the Austrian armies at Ratisbon, and with a second burst open the gates of Vienna. He was now established in that capital, and master of the main resources of the monarchy; but his work was far from being yet done either in Austria or in Germany. A great difficulty remained to be overcome—one of the greatest that can be encountered in war—namely, to cross a vast river in the face of the enemy, and to give battle with that river behind him. This difficulty Napoleon had been unable to prevent, and it resulted inevitably from the nature of things. On leaving Ratisbon he had been obliged to take the route which was shortest, which kept the archdukes separated from each other, and put himself in a position to succour Prince Eugène in case of fresh disasters in Italy. He was consequently obliged to march along the right bank of the Danube, abandoning the left bank to the Austrians, but securing to himself exclusively the means of crossing from the one to the other.

Having now arrived at Vienna, he was about to have the Archduke Charles before him, reinforced by the remains of Hiller and Archduke Louis' *corps d'armée*, but weakened by the necessity of leaving forces in his rear; yet able, nevertheless, to bring 100,000 men into action whenever the French should cross the Danube against him. In 1805, after the events of Ulm, the Austrians arrived at Vienna with only the wreck of their force, and they had the Russian grand army at Olmutz. Under those circumstances it was natural that they should go to a distance of forty leagues from their capital to join the Russians, and try the fortune of war at Austerlitz. But on the present occasion, having the bulk of their forces opposite Vienna, and no aid to look for at a distance, they had but one course to pursue, namely, to force Napoleon to violate the laws of war, by crossing the river before them, and giving battle with that river at his back. It was now not at Austerlitz; it was there, opposite Vienna, on the left bank of the Danube, between Essling, Aspern, and Wagram, names of immortal renown, that the fate of one of the greatest wars of modern times was to be decided. We shall see by-and-by what efforts Napoleon made to conquer the difficulties of this gigantic operation; for the laws to be violated had been laid down in times when belligerents had to cross rivers 200 or 300 yards wide with armies of 30,000 or 40,000 men. But the problem now to be solved related to a river 1000 yards wide, and to an army of 150,000 men, crossing with 500 or 600 guns in the teeth of an equal force. But the genius that had conquered the Alps could conquer the Danube too, wide

and impetuous though it was. Many important matters, however, were to be attended to before such an operation could be attempted.

Napoleon had to establish himself firmly in Vienna, in such a manner as to avail himself of the great resources of that capital, to have no uneasiness as to his means of communication, and to cause both the belligerent armies in Italy to approach Vienna; securing the junction of the one with himself, and hindering that of the other with Archduke Charles. This was a difficult problem, and it was admirably solved.

Napoleon had entered Vienna with the troops of Generals St. Hilaire, Demont, and Oudinot, under Marshal Lannes; the Boudet, Carra St. Cyr, Molitor, and Legrand divisions, under Massena; the guard and the cavalry reserve. Being obliged to make head against the enemy, whether before Vienna, when in the act of passing the Danube, or higher up, at Krems, for instance, should the archduke present himself there for the purpose of assailing our rear, he so stationed Davout's corps that in one day it could be moved wholly either to Krems or Vienna. With this view he made St. Polten its headquarters, where two divisions were to be concentrated, whilst the third was spread from Mautern to Mölk. In this way, by mustering towards one or other of these places on the Danube, Marshal Davout's 30,000 men might resist any attempt to force the passage of the river, and give time, if necessary, for the army to come down from Vienna on the threatened point. They might likewise, by marching to Vienna in one day, raise the main army to at least 90,000 men—a force sufficient for a decisive battle with Archduke Charles.

It was possible, however, that the danger should present itself further in the rear—at Lintz or even at Passau. Though this was less probable, on account of the distance, Napoleon left General Vandamme at Lintz with 10,000 Wurtembergers, and with instructions to reconstruct the bridge at that town, form *têtes de pont*, and make continual reconnaissances in Bohemia. He, moreover, stationed Marshal Bernadotte, just arrived with the Saxons, at the important point of Passau. Though created Prince of Ponte Corvo, on the ground of his relationship to the emperor (he had married a sister of the Queen of Spain), Bernadotte was a discontented man; he thought his station at the head of the Saxons unworthy of him, and sent in extremely unfavourable and even unjust reports of those troops; for though they were not equal to French troops, and though they experienced the feelings that were already moving in the hearts of all Germans, it was not the less true that they were capable of standing their ground against the Austrians, and doing their duty as well as the Bavarians and Wurtembergers. With some

Frenchmen to support them and set them an example, they might have almost equalled their instructors themselves. So to satisfy Prince Bernadotte, whose complaints annoyed him, Napoleon made two parts of the Dupas division, and leaving the German troops of the minor princes at Ratisbon, under General Rouyer, he sent the French brigade to Passau, under General Dupas. Bernadotte had therefore at that point 4000 French and 15,000 to 16,000 Saxons, making together an excellent corps of about 20,000 men. Thus with 6000 Germans at Ratisbon, 20,000 Saxons and French at Passau, 10,000 Wurtembergers at Lintz, and 30,000 French veterans at St. Polten, Napoleon was guarded in an infallible manner on his rear, whilst at the same time he retained the means of giving battle in front of him.

It was not, however, his intention always to employ so many troops in guarding his communications, and he proposed, when the Bavarians should have subdued the Tyrol, and when the Austrians should have evacuated Italy, to bring still more forces to the decisive point, namely, Vienna. To this end he gave orders for immense works, such as might be defended for several successive days by very small bodies of men with much artillery, to be constructed at Ratisbon, Passau, Lintz, Mölk, and the abbey of Gottweit, near Mautern. At Ratisbon there was little to be done, since there was a stone bridge there, and it was only requisite to put the town wall in a better state of defence. But at Passau, situated at the confluence of the Inn and the Danube, he ordered very important works, which were to be the commencement of those which he intended subsequently to require of Bavaria, in order that she might have a fortress of the first class in that place against Austria. He decided that bridges should be built there over the Danube and the Inn, with a *tête de pont* on each river, with an entrenched camp for 80,000 men, ovens for 100,000 rations a day, a considerable store of victuals and ammunition, and very spacious hospitals. The object of these precautions at Passau was to procure, in case of a retrograde movement, a strong point d'appui for the army behind the two lines of the Danube and the Inn; for this captain, who in politics had the imprudence never to admit a supposition of adverse fortune, always supposed it in war, and took admirable precautions against it. At Lintz, another point of transit from Bohemia, he also ordered a bridge with a double *tête de pont*, ovens, stores, and hospitals. At the fine abbey of Mölk, which was not one of the issues from Bohemia, but which advantageously commanded the Danube and contained vast buildings, he gave orders to construct with wood and earthwork a small fort mounting sixteen guns, and which might very well be defended by 1200 men.

It was also to contain a hospital for several thousand invalids. A similar post was to be erected at the abbey of Gottweit, opposite Krems, on an elevated position, whence might be descried everything that presented itself within a range of several leagues on both banks of the Danube. Lastly, at Krems a bridge was to be established by means of boats collected along the river, with a double *tête de pont*, so that the passage might be closed against the enemy whilst it was kept free for our own use. In this way Napoleon had all the approaches to the Danube guarded both defensively and offensively, and in such a manner that the enemy could be kept in continual alarm. Moreover, in case of retreat, there was a series of echelons on a road dotted with magazines and hospitals to which the sick and wounded might be sent on in advance. Lastly, there was a series of ports for the convoys by water, and a body of works on the line of communication, which might be defended by small numbers of men, so as to provide for the possibility of a rapid concentration upon occasion of a great battle. So much can the vigilance of genius accomplish towards assuring the most difficult and delicate operations.

Precautions were also requisite to the right in the mountains against the agitation which was spreading from the Tyrol to Styria. Napoleon had ordered Marshal Lefebvre to put down the insurrection in Tyrol with 24,000 Bavarians, after having left 6000 in Munich. That work done, the Bavarians were to proceed to Passau to replace the Saxons, who might then move to Vienna. Nearer to him in Styria, Napoleon had already sent out General Bruyère with a thousand horse on the Italian road by Lilienfeld. He directed his aide-de-camp Lauriston to observe that route, giving him for that purpose, besides General Bruyère's thousand horse, 2000 or 3000 Badenese infantry, good soldiers, who, as they spoke German, might soothe the people of the country as well as intimidate them, and quiet them with promises of good treatment. General Lauriston was to advance as far as Mariazell, and return to Vienna by Neustadt.

Another advantage of this movement was that of reconnoitring the Italian roads by which Archduke John was to be expected soon. That prince, not having joined Archduke Charles either at Lintz or at Krems, could only meet him in the vicinity of Vienna, marching thither through Carinthia, Styria, and Hungary by Klagenfurth, Grätz, and Œdenburg. Napoleon had two things to do with respect to him: the first was to hinder him from falling suddenly on Vienna by the Leoben and Neustadt road; the second was to constrain him to make the widest possible detour to join Archduke Charles; to oblige him, for instance, to pass by Güns, Raab, and Komorn, rather than by

Œdenburg and Presburg, for the longer the road he took the more chances Napoleon would have of rallying his Italian army to him, and of hindering Archduke Charles from rallying his on the day of the decisive battle. It was by skilfully extending his posts around him by means of his numerous cavalry that Napoleon attained this twofold end.

Thus whilst General Lauriston was to come by Mariazell and establish himself at Neustadt, on the direct road to Italy, General Montbrun was taken from Marshal Davout, who had no longer need of him, and placed in reconnaissance with two brigades of light cavalry at Bruck, several marches beyond Neustadt, on the same road. General Colbert, with the troops of the same arm, was cantoned from Neustadt to Œdenburg, and General Marulaz along the Danube to Presburg and below it, both having orders to be always in reconnaissance round the lake of Neusiedel, in the direction of Hungary. Behind them the heavy cavalry was cantoned from Hamburg to Baden, with orders to support them at need. In consequence of this well-stretched net, nothing could appear of which immediate warning would not be given, and at the same time the archduke was forced to describe a very wide circle, and to strike the Danube at Komorn rather than at Presburg, which diminished his chances of co-operating at the great battle to be fought under the walls of Vienna.

Whilst Napoleon was making every arrangement for ensuring victory in that battle, his armies in Italy and Poland were, like him, occupied in marching and fighting. The Austrians, who had arrived so full of spirit, though so slowly, at the Adige, had halted before that line, not daring to attack it, first on account of its natural strength, then on account of the army of Italy, which had been reorganised and reinforced, and lastly, on account of the uncertainty which prevailed at that period respecting the events in Germany. It was quite natural that before attempting an extremely hazardous operation beyond the Adige, Archduke John should desire to know whether or not his brother, the commander-in-chief, had been successful on the Danube. Prince Eugène, advised by General Macdonald, had made use of this delay to familiarise with the sight of the enemy, not his soldiers, who had no need of this, but himself and his lieutenants, intimidated by the defeat of Sacile. To this end he had made frequent reconnaissances on the Upper Adige, which had often turned into real battles. In one of these reconnaissances on the 1st of May, General Macdonald perceived on the horizon a vast number of waggons, apparently retrograding towards Friuli. At that time nothing was yet known at Prince Eugène's headquarters about the events at Ratisbon, and uneasiness was felt for Germany as well as for Italy. But

General Macdonald, concluding that such a movement could only be attributed to defeats sustained by the Austrians in Bavaria, galloped up to Prince Eugène, and grasping his hand, cried out, "Victory in Germany; the time is come to march!" The prince returned the pressure of the general's hand with joy. Both galloped to the advanced posts, saw with their own eyes, and soon learned by all the reports that the Austrians were retreating. Thus did Napoleon's potent impulse make itself felt at a distance. His victorious march in Bavaria obliged Archduke John to wheel round and retrace his steps to Friuli. The Austrian prince would willingly have crossed the Alps to aid his brothers on the Danube, but durst not, for though he might possibly have taken Napoleon in flank, which would have been a great advantage in case of the convergence of all the archdukes to the same point, he also ran the risk of falling alone into his hands and being stifled in his grasp. Under these circumstances Archduke John made haste to retreat, with the intention at most of appearing in time under the walls of Vienna, and more probably with that of joining his brother below that capital by way of Styria and Hungary. Be that as it may, the Austrian army began its retreat on the 1st of May, and was immediately pursued by Prince Eugène. The spirits of the French rose as that of the Austrians fell. The latter having now no other object than to evacuate the country, but languidly contested the ground, whilst the French attacked with the vivacity of men who had to avenge former defeats. Every evening many prisoners and quantities of baggage were brought into the lines of the French, whilst none were brought into those of the Austrians.

Prince Eugène marched in the order we have described, with three corps and a reserve; Macdonald on the right in the plain, Grenier in the centre on the main road of Friuli, Baraguay d'Hilliers on the left along the mountains, the reserve in the rear; the whole amounting to about 60,000 men. Grouchy and Pully's dragoons galloped on in front, to take such detachments or convoys as were ill guarded. The roads were still bad, the bridges destroyed, and the march less rapid than could have been desired.

The prince advanced on the southern side of the Alps, from the Adige to the Brenta, from the Brenta to the Piave, as Napoleon did on the northern side from the Isar to the Inn, and from the Inn to the Traun, and nearly at the same time. On the evening of May 7 he reached the Piave, all the bridges of which had been broken down by the enemy. It was resolved to ford it, and to fall upon the Austrians, who seemed to make a halt, apparently for the purpose of giving their baggage time to defile. The next day Grouchy and Pully's dragoons crossed,

with an advanced guard of infantry, and charged the Austrians. The latter gave way at first; but as they had their baggage to defend, they rallied, and bore down en masse on the advanced guard of Prince Eugène, who, being himself at the advanced posts, beheld with dismay his cavalry and infantry driven back in disorder on the Piave. Fortunately the right, under Macdonald, came up in all haste, dashed boldly into the water, and took up a position beyond it. Then came General Grenier, and both marched together against the Austrians, who were quickly routed, and left in our hands a quantity of cannons and baggage, 2500 killed or wounded, and a nearly equal number of prisoners. Two thousand had already been taken between the Adige and the Piave. This made nearly 7000 soldiers lost by Archduke John in a few days.

On the 9th of May the prince entered Conegliano; on the 10th he arrived at the Tagliamento, which was forded at Valvassone. The cavalry was sent to the right to Udine, to raise the blockade of Palma Nova; the main body marched to the left, up the course of the Tagliamento, towards San Daniele and Osopo. On arriving at the passes of the Carnic Alps, by which they had debouched, the Austrians were again compelled to make a stand in order to save their baggage, and they incurred a further loss of 1500 men, killed, wounded, or taken prisoners. On the 11th and 12th of May, when Napoleon was taking possession of Vienna, there was no enemy left in Italy. Archduke John, who had entered that country with about 48,000 men, quitted it with 30,000 at most.

On the other side of the Alps the Austrian prince made a new division of his forces. He despatched from Villach to Laybach, by the cross-road from Carinthia to Carniola, Ignatius Giulay, ban of Croatia, with some battalions of the line, eighteen squadrons, and several batteries, with orders to call out the Croat rising, and then to support General Stoïchovich, who was acting against General Marmont, and thus to cover Laybach against the French armies of Italy and Dalmatia. Having sent off this detachment, Archduke John had only about 20,000 men left. His purpose was either to proceed by Villach to Lilienfeld and St. Polten, in order to co-operate in the long-projected junction of the archdukes, or if there was no longer time for that, to recall Chasteler and Jellachich by way of Leoben, and march thence with them on Grätz, in order to effect his junction with the Austrian grand army in Hungary. But he was keenly pursued by the victorious Prince Eugène, and he was about to fall upon the network of cavalry stretched by Napoleon from Bruck to Presburg.

Archduke John's march dictated that of Prince Eugène. The latter was obliged to watch simultaneously over the move-

ments of Archduke John and of the ban of Croatia, in order that the junction of the former with Archduke Charles might take place as late, and with the least forces possible; and that the latter might not hinder the junction of General Marmont with the French army of Italy. It was difficult to accomplish these ends if the march were continued in a single mass, for, however rapidly and well the prince manœuvred, it was possible that if he marched immediately to Vienna to reinforce Napoleon, the Archduke John and the ban might fall on Marmont with their combined forces; and that if, on the other hand, he made a detour to Laybach in order to support General Marmont, Archduke John would seize the opportunity to hasten to Presburg, and throw into the balance the decisive weight of the Austrian army of Italy. Under these considerations, Prince Eugène adopted a course very suitable to the circumstances. He gave General Macdonald 15,000 or 16,000 men, excellent troops, which were to take the road to Laybach, raise the blockade of Palma Nova, occupy Trieste, combine with Marmont, and return, thus increased to 26,000 or 27,000 men, to join the army of Italy at Grätz, on the road to Vienna. He himself, with from 30,000 to 32,000, took the road which would lead more directly to Napoleon. There were disadvantages, nevertheless, in this plan, for had Archduke John been a real general, he might, by manœuvring between those two bodies, have beaten them one after the other. But that clever prince conceived a multitude of ideas in war, and followed out none of them perseveringly. Besides, his troops were dispirited, and incapable of those rapid movements which require, on the part of the soldiers, as much confidence in the general as obedience to his designs. Prince Eugène's plan was therefore not so objectionable as it might have been in face of a different adversary. The two portions of the army of Italy separated on the 14th of May, not to unite again until they met on the plains of Wagram.

At that moment General Marmont, with 10,000 or 11,000 veteran soldiers, sent into Illyria after the battle of Austerlitz, was traversing the hilly regions of Croatia, on his way to Carniola and Styria to join the grand army. Between his columns he had a convoy of provisions carried on horses of the country, which were to convey his sick and wounded when the grain with which they were loaded had been consumed by the army. After having dispersed the bands of General Stoïchevich, he advanced cautiously, not knowing when or where he might suddenly fall in with greatly superior numbers either of friends or foes. Both he and General Macdonald were eagerly seeking news of each other, which neither succeeded in obtaining.

The events in Italy had induced similar events in Tyrol.

General Chasteler, drawn from the Italian into the German Tyrol by the danger of the Austrians on the Danube, had hastened to Inspruck, and from thence to Kufstein. He had pushed forward some advanced posts on the Salzburg road by Lofen and Reichenthal. Another Austrian corps, that of Jellachich, which in the beginning of the campaign had marched parallel to Hiller's corps, had pursued in its retreat, as well as in its advance, the road along the foot of the mountains. It had fallen back on Salzburg, and thence on Leoben, after having defended the posts of Luegpass and Obtenau against de Wrede's division. The combined forces of Jellachich and Chasteler amounted to 16,000 or 17,000 men, exclusive of the Tyrolese; and if well commanded, and resolved to shut themselves up in the mountains, they might have created a disagreeable diversion on our right and in our rear. But they had received instructions to join the acting masses. They were divided into several corps independent of each other, were on bad terms with the Tyrolese, and could not therefore become very formidable. After having driven back Jellachich's corps into the valley of the Upper Ens by means of de Wrede's division, Marshal Lefebvre recalled that division, returned to the fort of Kufstein, which was well defended by a Bavarian garrison, raised the blockade, and being joined by Deroy's division from Rosenheim, advanced with both divisions into German Tyrol, which he had orders to bring under subjection. Though hardly capable of conducting a grand operation, the old marshal was admirably fitted for carrying on a series of small engagements with spirit and intelligence. He everywhere repulsed the Austrian advanced posts, and at last on the 13th of May he encountered General Chasteler in the position of Worgel. The latter was entrenched on some heights, having the Austrian troops behind the works, and in the distance, on his wings, the Tyrolese insurgents, who plied their rifles with great accuracy of aim, and rolled down enormous rocks. The old marshal, after disadvantageously sustaining a combat of sharpshooters on his two wings, attacked the enemy in front, carried Chasteler's position under a tremendous fire, took about 3000 prisoners, dispersed the cloud of insurgents, and completely routed the Austrians. Then, burning some Tyrolese villages on his way, he marched to Inspruck, which offered to surrender on certain conditions; but he succeeded in entering the town without granting any terms, in consequence of the disagreement of the Tyrolese, some of whom were for surrendering, others for resisting to the utmost. Master of Inspruck, he might consider himself secure of the submission of the Tyrol; but Hofer, the innkeeper, and Major Teimer withdrew to the inaccessible summits that divide German from Italian Tyrol, ready to descend thence again if a favour-

able opportunity recurred. Generals Chasteler and Jellachich, with greatly diminished forces, set out on a furtive retreat to Hungary across the road from Friuli to Vienna, at the risk of meeting in that perilous course either the van or the rear of Prince Eugène's army.

Thus, after a first misfortune in Italy and a lively commotion in Tyrol, everything was succeeding to the satisfaction of the conqueror, whose fortunes, for a moment shaken, were revived by the potency of his genius. Matters were no less improved in Poland, where Prince Joseph Poniatowski had been acting with equal skill and good fortune. Having surrendered Warsaw and the left bank of the Vistula to the Austrians, he had promised himself that he would make them pay for that advantage as soon as they attempted to pass over to the right bank, of which he held possession. Some Austrian corps did attempt to cross the Vistula, and these he surprised and destroyed. Then, whilst Archduke Ferdinand, eager to seize fresh triumphs, continued to march down the left side of the river from Warsaw to Thorn, and ineffectually assailed the latter fortress, Prince Poniatowski marched up the right bank to Cracow, to conquer that ancient metropolis of Polish nationality, and raised the standard of insurrection in Galicia. There, too, men's hearts beat secretly for the independence of Poland; and had the Russians seconded the brave Poniatowski by crossing the Vistula at Sandomir or Cracow, they would have cut off Archduke Ferdinand's retreat, and he would never have recrossed the frontier he had so rashly invaded.

Such were the events in Italy, Austria, and Poland, up to the 15th or 18th of May. The occupation of Vienna, after the tremendous operations at Ratisbon, had restored Napoleon's fortunes to their full ascendency. Germany, though secretly fermenting, controlled herself better than at the beginning of the war. Major Schill, who had been forced to abandon the Upper Elbe and retreat to the Baltic coast, met everywhere with friendly hearts, but nowhere with hands ready to second him. Prussia, intimidated by the news from the Danube, at first denied, then admitted, sent pursuers after Major Schill, and addressed protestations of friendship and devotedness to the French cabinet. Napoleon, having well secured his establishment at Vienna, and skilfully staked out his route by the presence of the Germans of the minor principalities at Ratisbon, of the Saxons at Passau, the Wurtembergers at Lintz, and Davout's corps at St. Polten, resolved to bring things to a conclusion by crossing the Danube and falling on Archduke Charles, who had placed himself in face of him with his main army. Being able to avail himself of Marshal Davout's force, and thus to command 90,000 fighting men, he had it in his power to

terminate the war without waiting either for Prince Eugène, or for General Macdonald, or for General Marmont. His adversary's force, including some battalions collected in Bohemia, and the remains of Hiller and Archduke Louis' corps, did not exceed 100,000 men, There was nothing in that to intimidate Napoleon. To cross the Danube, then, in the face of that army, was still the difficulty to be overcome towards terminating the war.

But how was such a river to be crossed in such a season, with such great masses, and in defiance of masses no less considerable? This was the problem on which Napoleon meditated incessantly. In the first place, should he cross under the walls of Vienna? That first question was solved in his mind. To fall back to Krems, for instance, in order to conceal the operation of crossing from the enemy, was impossible, for Vienna would instantly have called up Archduke Charles, unless it had been kept down by a force which would have been missed on the day of battle. Napoleon would therefore have incurred the risk of losing the capital, the resources it contained, his means of communication with Prince Eugène, and his moral ascendency in arms. To descend lower was still less practicable, for to the danger of departing from Vienna would be added the still graver one of elongating his line of operation, creating for himself, in consequence, a point the more to guard, and depriving himself of 25,000 or 30,000 men, who were indispensable if a battle was to be fought. Vienna was therefore the point of passage. The two adversaries were attached to it: Napoleon, for the reasons we have stated; Archduke Charles, because of the presence of Napoleon.

But the passage might be effected a league higher or lower without violating the important considerations above mentioned. The engineer officers had surveyed the river from Klosterneuburg, the point where it issues from the mountains and flows into the magnificent plain of Vienna to the environs of Presburg, and they ascertained that the difficulty of the passage varied greatly in different parts. Before and a little below Vienna the Danube divided into a multitude of arms, and became broader, but less rapid and deep. Lower than Ebersdorf, towards Presburg, the channel again contracted and became less broken, deeper, and more rapid, and confined between steep banks, which was a serious impediment to the establishment of bridges.

Napoleon chose for his operation the part of the Danube nearest Vienna, preferring to deal with the river where it was wide rather than rapid and deep, and especially where it was divided into several arms and studded with islands, whereby the difficulty was diminished, as a burden is rendered more

manageable by dividing it. He thought especially how he might make use of the islands forming the partition between the branches of the river. If, for instance, there was one such large enough to contain a numerous army, where it might be safe from the view and from the cannon-balls of the Austrians, and beyond which there would be a narrow arm to cross, in order to debouch before the enemy, the difficulty of the passage would be thereby greatly diminished. Even though to reach it it were necessary to cross the largest mass of the waters of the Danube, the attempt was worth making, because the most perilous part of the operation of crossing to the enemy's side would be executed under the protection of the island, its woods and its depth. There were two islands which answered to the required conditions: that of Schwarze Laken, opposite Nussdorf, above Vienna, and that of Lobau, two leagues below, opposite Enzersdorf. Napoleon wished to double the chances of success by using both of them. But the attempt made upon the first named, rather as a demonstration than as a serious enterprise, failed for want of sufficient strength and sufficient care. General St. Hilaire sent thither 500 men and a field-officer, without having noticed a jetty which connected the island of Schwarze Laken with the left bank, which was occupied by the Austrians. Our 500 men, carried over in boats, and thinking themselves covered by the small branch on the other side of the island, kept their ground against the fire of musketry and cannon, but were presently assailed unexpectedly by several battalions which had passed over the small jetty. After a heroic resistance, not being able to recross the broad arm, they were killed or taken prisoners. For this misfortune there was some compensation, inasmuch as it drew the attention of the enemy in the direction of Nussdorf and away from the island of Lobau, by which Napoleon was resolved to make his main effort to cross the river.

The island of Lobau, for ever celebrated for the prodigious events of which it became the theatre, was most admirably adapted to Napoleon's purposes. It was partly wooded, and presented in the direction of its length a continuous screen of fine trees between the enemy and us. It was very spacious, for it was a league long and a league and a half wide, so that even in the middle of it one was safe from the Austrian cannon-balls. Once arrived in the island of Lobau, there was no more to be crossed than an arm of the river sixty fathoms wide—a matter of great but by no means extraordinary difficulty. To reach the island it was necessary to cross the great Danube, formed of two vast arms, one of them 240 fathoms wide, the other 120, separated by a sandbank. To throw a bridge over such a mass of water was an exceedingly difficult operation, but it was practi-

cable, since it was not to be effected in presence of the enemy. It was only the last bridge over the sixty fathom branch, separating Lobau from the left bank, that was to be so set up. The operation, thus divided, had a chance of success. There remained but one really serious difficulty, that of collecting materials. There were requisite from seventy to eighty boats of large size, several thousand planks, and powerful cables to hold the bridge fast against an extremely rapid current. Now, the Austrians, who had readily foreseen that the crossing of the Danube would be the main operation of the war, had, on quitting Vienna, manifested forethought on this matter alone. They had burnt or sunk most of the large boats, and sent down to Presburg those they had not destroyed. There was abundance of wood, but ropes were scarce. In a word, means for mooring were almost entirely wanting. The bridges previously existing before Vienna were on piles, and consequently had never required moorage like bridges of boats. It would have been necessary either to drive piles for fastening the boats to, which would have occupied a long time, and would have been perceived by the enemy, or to procure strong anchors. Now, strong anchors were not used in the navigation of that part of the Danube, and none could be procured but with great difficulty. It was only at Presburg or Komorn that a sufficient supply could be had. Napoleon, however, strove to supply by various means what he lacked in materials, and was greatly aided in his efforts by Generals Bertrand and Pernetti, the former of the engineers, the latter of the artillery.

As for boats, some were discovered in Vienna; for those which descended the Danube in convoys were in general of an unsuitable build, or they had been retained for the bridges of Passau, Lintz, and Krems. A certain number were raised from the bottom of the river, and were carefully repaired. In this way about ninety were obtained, some of which were to bear the bridge, and others to be employed in carrying materials. With much search, some cordage was discovered in that city; for the navigation of a river like the Danube necessarily inferred the constant existence of a considerable stock. Planks were procured by cutting and sawing the timber with which the country abounded. As for anchors, they might have been forged in the ironworks of Styria, not far from Vienna; but as that would have occasioned a great loss of time, Napoleon proposed to supply the place of anchors by sinking very heavy weights in the river, such as cannons of large calibre, found in the arsenals of Vienna, or chests filled with cannon-balls. If the river did not rise suddenly, as happens when the hot season begins very early, that expedient might suffice. He trusted to it, and the weights which were to serve instead of anchors were arranged

beforehand, so that at the last moment there should be nothing to do but to throw them into the river.

Everything being ready at Vienna towards the 16th and 17th of May, the materials were brought down the river to the island of Lobau, opposite Ebersdorf. At the same time orders to concentrate were given to the troops which were to fight beyond the Danube. The whole cavalry, except a division of chasseurs left on the look-out upon the Hungarian frontier, was recalled from Presburg and Œdenburg to Vienna. Among the regiments recalled were the fourteen regiments of cuirassiers. Marshal Davout, who was at first to have come with his whole corps to Vienna, received orders to bring only two divisions thither—those of Friant and Gudin—and to distribute the Morand division between Mölk, Mautern, and St. Polten, to withstand the attempts of Kollowrath's corps, which Archduke Charles had stationed at Lintz. With the corps of Lannes and Massena, the guard, the cavalry reserve, and two-thirds of Davout's corps, Napoleon could bring about 80,000 men into the field against the Austrians; and that was enough, for the archduke was not in a condition to muster more than 90,000.

The materials and the troops arrived on the 18th and 19th of May at the little town of Ebersdorf. Massena's corps was the first moved to that point, and especially its best division—that of Molitor. On the 18th the operation began under the eyes of Napoleon, who had removed his headquarters from Schönbrunn to Ebersdorf. The Molitor division was ferried in boats over the two great branches of the Danube to the island of Lobau. Some Austrian advanced posts occupied the front of the island opposite Ebersdorf. General Molitor drove them back, and did not pass beyond the middle of the island, in order not to give the enemy to suppose that there was a serious enterprise in hand. He contented himself with ranging his troops behind a small channel, not more than twelve or fifteen fathoms wide, easily fordable, and which flows through the island only when the waters are extremely high. Whilst he was thus operating, General Pernetti's artillerymen were labouring at the construction of the great bridge. There were used for it nearly seventy large boats; and it was only after repeated efforts that they could be moored, being continually swept down by the current, which was unfortunately increasing, in consequence of a somewhat alarming rise in the waters. At last the boats were fixed in their places, and the workmen could proceed to form the roadway of the bridge with planks. The whole day of the 19th and half the 20th were spent on that great work, which being accomplished, the passage to the island of Lobau was ensured, extraordinary accidents apart. A wooden bridge was thrown over the small channel running through the middle of

the island, which, though usually dry, was now beginning to fill, in consequence of the flood. The Boudet division (one of Massena's four) immediately crossed over, and joined Molitor's. Then came L salle's division of light cavalry and several trains of artillery. This was enough to sweep the island, which Molitor promptly did. He made some prisoners. Our men crossed the whole breadth of the island, and arrived at the last branch, which was sixty fathoms wide, much like the average breadth of the Seine in Paris. The remainder of the operation was quite practicable, even in face of an enemy, unless, indeed, he fell en masse on the troops who were executing it. But the Archduke Charles evidently was not yet aware of what was doing, and nothing had yet been encountered but an advanced guard.

General Molitor found a most favourable spot for the passage, and pointed it out to the emperor, who quite approved of it. It was a re-entrant angle, formed towards us by the branch of the river that was to be crossed, so that by planting artillery right and left of it, the ground on which we had to land might be so swept with grape that it would be impossible for the enemy to remain there. This was immediately done, but it was not even necessary, for there were only some sharpshooters on the tongue of land on which we had to debouch. Lieutenant-Colonel Aubrey, belonging to the artillery, was ordered to establish the second bridge on the afternoon of this day, the 20th. The pontoon equipage taken at Landshut had been kept for that purpose. M. de Sainte Croix, aide-de-camp to Massena, and M. Baudru, aide-de-camp to Bessières, embarked in boats, with 200 voltigeurs, drove off the Austrian sharpshooters, and fastened the cable on which the bridge was to rest. Fifteen pontoons were enough, the breadth of water at that point not being more than fifty-four fathoms, and in three hours the communication was established. Immediately after, General Lasalle passed over to the left bank with four regiments of cavalry, and was followed by the voltigeurs of the Molitor and Boudet divisions. After crossing the bridge they found a small wood extending from left to right, and terminating at the two sides of the angle formed by the river. The wood was beaten, and some Austrian detachments that occupied it were driven out. Beyond the wood the ground expanded, and there was seen on the left the village of Aspern, on the right that of Essling—places immortal in history. A sort of shallow ditch, filled with water only when the river overflows, stretched from one of these villages to the other. The cavalry could cross it, for it was rather a depression of the soil than an actual ditch. General Lasalle galloped over it with his cavalry, scattered the enemy's advanced posts, and swept the plain of Marchfeld, which, by a gentle slope of two or three leagues, rises insensibly

to heights bearing other immortal names—those of Neusiedel and Wagram.

It was a warm clear spring day, but drawing to its close, and nothing could be perceived in the fading light but a strong advanced guard of cavalry. It seemed disposed to fall upon General Lasalle, who retired behind the ditch above mentioned, and thus avoided a useless engagement. Some hundreds of our voltigeurs, lying in ambush in the hollow of the ground, received the Austrian cavalry with a point blank fire, covered the field with their wounded, and obliged them to retire. Thus began, on the evening of the 20th of May, the bloody battle of Essling!

The Danube was crossed, and if the Austrians, whose advanced guards had been seen, presented themselves on the following day, there was a reasonable assurance that the French would have time to debouch and deploy before the enemy could attempt to throw them into the river. An accident, however, was not impossible. In fact, that afternoon of the 20th, whilst our men were crossing the small arm of the river, the great bridge over the two principal arms was broken, some of the boats having yielded to the violence of the current. A sudden rise of three feet, produced by the melting of the Alpine snows, had caused this accident, and might cause it again. The light cavalry of General Marulaz was cut in two by the rupture of the bridge: one portion reached the island, whilst the other remained at Ebersdorf. Fortunately Generals Bertrand and Pernetti set to work with extreme activity, and the great bridge was repaired in the course of the night.

Without being quite resolved to give battle with such uncertain means of passage as he possessed, Napoleon did not wish to abandon the result of the operation commenced; and it was decided that this important communication should be retained, and should subsequently be rendered safer and less intermittent. The tongue of land formed by the small arm of the river was a most convenient ground on which to debouch, and the two villages, Aspern on the left, and Essling on the right, connected by a sort of ditch, were valuable points d'appui for the deployment of an army. Such a position was therefore worth the pains of keeping, whether the battle was postponed or not. The Molitor division consequently passed the night at Aspern, the Boudet division at Essling. Lasalle's cavalry bivouacked between the two villages in front of the little wood. Napoleon took up his quarters with his guard at the same place, and as usual with him, slept soundly without undressing. Several officers sent out to reconnoitre during the night brought in contradictory reports. Some alleged that the Austrians were in Marchfeld quite ready for battle; others maintained that

we had no enemy's army before us, and that what was seen was at most a strong advanced guard of cavalry. In this state of uncertainty the French awaited the morning, everything being prepared for battle if the army succeeded in crossing, or for retreat into the island of Lobau if the Danube could not be crossed with sufficient forces.

The great bridge having been repaired in the night, the cavalry of General Marulaz, General Espagne's cuirassiers, the Legrand division of infantry, and a part of the artillery, were enabled to pass over on the morning of the 21st. But the existence of only one bridge over each arm, and the breadth of the island of Lobau, made the operation very tedious. Towards noon, Major-General Berthier, having ascended the steeple of Essling, clearly discerned the army of Archduke Charles descending the inclined plain of Marchfeld, and describing a vast semicircle round Aspern and Essling. Berthier surpassed all men of his day in judging by the eye the extent of a tract of ground and the number of men that covered it. He estimated the Austrian army at about 90,000 men, and saw plainly that it was coming with the intention of overwhelming the French whilst engaged in passing the river. Having been informed on the 19th of the apparition of the French in the island of Lobau, it was not until the next day that Archduke Charles had thought of making a reconnaissance at the head of his cavalry. Having then satisfied himself as to their intentions, he had not put his men in motion until the morning of the 21st, so as to get them into line in the afternoon of the same day. Had he appeared on the evening of the 20th or on the morning of the 21st between Aspern and Essling, that portion of the French army which had already crossed the river would have been in immense danger.

The major-general immediately sent his report to the emperor, who saw in it only the fulfilment of what he had himself wished for—namely, an opportunity of once more beating the Austrian army, and having done with it. But suddenly news was brought him of a fresh rupture of the great bridge, caused by the hourly increasing flood. The Danube, which had risen three feet on the preceding day, had now risen four more. All the moorings were giving way to the current. At that moment (the afternoon of the 21st) Napoleon had with him only the three infantry divisions—Molitor, Boudet, and Legrand—the light cavalry divisions of Lasalle and Marulaz, Espagne's division of cuirassiers, and part of the artillery, altogether about 22,000 or 23,000 men; all excellent troops, it is true, but not numerous enough to give battle to an army of 90,000 men. He therefore gave orders to abandon Aspern and Essling, and to recross the bridge over the smaller arm, but not destroy it, since the angle in the river

made it easy to protect the bridge with a formidable mass of artillery. Protected by a watercourse sixty fathoms wide, and now become very rapid and very deep, the French might remain on the island until the consolidation of the bridge and the subsidence of the waters made it possible to prepare for a sure and decisive operation. This order was beginning to be executed, when the generals of division raised very natural objections to the abandonment of such points as Essling and Aspern. General Molitor pointed out to the emperor that the village of Aspern, in which his division had passed the night, was of immense importance; that to recover it would cost torrents of blood, whereas an inconsiderable force would be sufficient to defend it for a long time against great efforts, and that he ought to reflect well upon it before he resolved on such a sacrifice. The case was just the same as to Essling. If those two posts were abandoned, the intention of crossing the river at that most favourable point must be given up, the urgent operation of the passage must be postponed for an indefinite period, the works already executed must be forsaken, and in a word, the most serious inconveniences must be incurred. Whilst Napoleon was weighing these observations, word was brought him that the great bridge was completely repaired, the waters were subsiding, the ammunition waggons were beginning to defile, and he might feel assured of having all his resources at hand in a few hours. Provided he had another score thousand men, especially the cuirassiers, and his ammunition-chests well filled, Napoleon feared nothing, and he joyfully seized the opportunity, which he had been on the point of losing, of shattering the Austrian grand army. In consequence, he ordered General Boudet, who had not quitted Essling, to defend it vigorously; and he authorised General Molitor, whose division had already quitted Aspern, to re-enter it by force before the enemy had time to secure his position there. Marshal Lannes, though his corps had not yet crossed the Danube, took the command of the right wing, that is to say, of Essling, and of the troops that were to arrive there. The cavalry was put under his orders, whereby Marshal Bessières, its commander, became subordinate to him. Massena had charge of the left wing, that is to say, of Aspern, which the Molitor division was about to reoccupy. The Legrand division was to be stationed in the rear of Aspern, with the Marulaz light cavalry. Lasalle's division of light cavalry, and Espagne's division of cuirassiers, filled the space between Aspern and Essling. All the artillery was placed in the intervals. A swarm of tirailleurs was spread over the sort of ditch before mentioned, which was the dry bed of a watercourse that formerly flowed from Aspern to Essling, and there waited until the Austrians should come within musket-shot.

Thus from 22,000 to 23,000 men were about to give battle to 90,000.

Archduke Charles had divided his army into five columns. The first, under General Hiller, was to advance along the Danube by Stadlau, attack Aspern, and try to carry it in concert with the second column; the latter, commanded by Lieutenant-General Bellegarde, was to march by Kagran and Hirschstatten on Aspern; the third, commanded by Hohenzollern, marching by Breitenlee on the same point, was also to attack it, for the more certainty of taking it; the fourth and fifth columns, formed by Rosenberg's corps, were to complete the semicircle traced round the French army, and were to attack, one of them Essling, the other the little village of Enzersdorf situated beyond it. As Enzersdorf was not strongly occupied by the French, and seemed unlikely to require any great efforts to take it, the two columns had orders to exert their combined strength on Essling. To connect his three columns on the right with his two on the left, the archduke had placed Prince Lichtenstein's reserve of cavalry in order of battle between those two masses. Much further in the rear, at Breitenlee, the grenadiers *d'élite* were stationed as a second reserve. The remains of Archduke Louis' corps, much weakened by the detachments left on the Upper Danube, were stationed on the look-out at Stamersdorf, opposite Vienna. Kollowrath's corps, as we have seen, was at Lintz. The five acting columns, with Lichtenstein's cavalry and the grenadiers, might amount to about 90,000 men, with nearly three hundred pieces of cannon.

Though the archduke had brought large forces together against Aspern, the point which it was essential to carry, since it covered the little bridge, nevertheless the semicircle drawn round Aspern, Essling, and Enzersdorf was weak in the middle, and might be broken by a charge of our cuirassiers. The Austrian army, being then cut in two, would have the chances turned against it. Napoleon saw this at the first glance, and resolved to profit by it as soon as his principal forces should have crossed the Danube. For the moment he thought only of taking good care of his débouche, by vigorously defending Aspern on his left, Essling on his right, and protecting the space between with his cavalry.

No sooner had Napoleon authorised General Molitor to re-occupy Aspern and General Boudet to keep Essling, than the conflict began about three o'clock with extreme violence. Hiller's advanced guard under General Nordmann had marched to Aspern, and had entered it after the retreat of Molitor's division. What was worse, it had entered a wooded meadow to the left of Aspern, which extended from that village to the Danube, and was embraced by a small branch of the river so

as to form a sort of isle. Having possession of that island, the enemy might pass between Aspern and the Danube, turn our left, and make for the little bridge, the only issue we had by which we could advance or retreat. General Molitor, at the head of the 16th and 67th of the line, first-rate regiments, commanded by two of the best colonels in the army, Marin and Petit, charged into the high street of Aspern to dislodge the Austrians. The street was very wide, for the Austrian villages are large and solidly built. They drove all before them, and cleared the environs of the church at the end of the street. General Molitor then placed his two regiments behind an earthen breastwork which surrounded Aspern, and waited for Hiller's column, which was coming to the aid of his advanced guard. He let it come up within point blank distance, then opened a fire that brought down a considerable number of men in its ranks, and charging it at the point of the bayonet, put it to the rout, and completely cleared the ground. General Molitor then made a skilful use of the two other regiments of his division. With the 37th he retook the island before mentioned on the left, and availed himself of all the accidents of the ground to make it inaccessible. He placed the 2nd to the right at the entrance of the village, to hinder the position from being turned. To aid these operations, Massena ranged the Legrand division to the right and the rear of Aspern, ready to charge when necessary. The four French and two German regiments of horse under General Marulaz formed the connection with the cavalry of Generals Lasalle and Espagne towards Essling. In that direction the Boudet division had as yet had to do only with Rosenberg's advanced guards, which were on the march to Enzersdorf.

But this was only the prelude of this frightful day. Hiller soon returned to the charge, aided by Bellegarde's column, and both together attacked the village on the side next the Danube and on the centre. The 16th and the 67th of the line, posted in advance of Aspern, kept up an uninterrupted fire at a very short distance, and laid thousands of enemies low at the foot of the breastwork. But the Austrian columns, continually repairing their losses, advanced up to the breastwork, and rushed over it in spite of Molitor's two regiments, which they forced to retreat into the village. General Vacquant even succeeded in getting possession of the end of the high street in which the church was situated. Seeing this, the intrepid Molitor made a dash at General Vacquant with the 2nd, and a horrible mêlée began. The Austrians and the French alternately beating and beaten, swept up and down the long street of Aspern from one end to the other. Fresh troops were approaching from without, for Hiller and Bellegarde's columns amounted together

to at least 36,000 men, against whom General Molitor had to contend with 7000. To keep them off, Massena sent against them the six regiments of light cavalry commanded by General Marulaz, one of the ablest cavalry officers formed in our long wars. Marulaz broke several of the squares formed by the Austrian infantry to receive him, but was stopped by deep masses beyond them, and forced to return to his position, taking with him some pieces of cannon he had captured. But though he was unable to drive the enemy off the ground, he held him in check and hindered him from throwing all his force into Aspern. Meanwhile General Molitor, barricaded in the houses with three of his regiments, made use of everything that came to hand to aid his resistance—waggons, ploughs, and other implements, and defended his post with a fury as great as that with which the Austrians assailed it.

During this fierce conflict at Aspern, Lannes was making the most skilful arrangements for the defence of Essling, which was attacked feebly at first, and afterwards with great violence, when the fourth and fifth columns of Rosenberg's corps had come together. The fifth, which formed the Austrian extreme left opposite our extreme right at Enzersdorf, after carrying that scarcely defended position, debouched from it to assail Essling. The fourth then put itself in motion, and both together began their attack on our second point d'appui. Lannes received them as had been done at Aspern, covering himself with an earthen breastwork that surrounded Essling, whence he mowed down the assailants with musketry and grape, and stopped them at the foot of the breastwork.

But the battle was about to become more terrible, for Hohenzollern's column, which was the third, and formed the middle of the Austrian line, was coming at last into action, supported by the cavalry reserve under Prince John de Lichtenstein. It was marching on our centre, and might, by passing between Aspern and Essling, sever the communication between those two points, ensure their conquest, and render our defeat inevitable. Seeing this, Lannes resolved to make a powerful effort with his cavalry. He had at his command Espagne's four regiments of cuirassiers and Lasalle's four of chasseurs, all under the orders of Marshal Bessières. Without heeding the latter's rank, he sent him an imperious order to charge, and *charge home*. Though hurt by this expression, for he was not used, he said, to charge otherwise, Bessières advanced with Espagne, the first officer of heavy cavalry in the army, leaving Lasalle in reserve to second him. At the head of sixteen squadrons of cuirassiers, Bessières and Espagne took the enemy's artillery, putting the men who served it to the sword, and then fell upon the infantry and broke several of its squares. But

after driving in the first line they found a second, on which they could make no impression, and they were themselves suddenly attacked by the Austrian cavalry sent against them by Archduke Charles. Surprised during the disorder of the charge they had just executed, our cuirassiers were put to flight, when Lasalle, with that rapid perception and action which distinguished him, pushed forward the 16th chasseurs to their support so opportunely that the Austrians, intent upon the pursuit of our cuirassiers, were themselves borne down, and a good number of them put to the sword. In the tumult the brave Espagne was killed by a Biscayan. Bessières, with his aide-de-camp Baudru, was surrounded by the Hulans, and after firing off his two pistols, was defending himself with his sword, when he was rescued by Lasalle's chasseurs. The cuirassiers rallied and charged again and again, still supported by Lasalle. The Austrian infantry was stopped, and Hohenzollern was hindered from breaking our centre between Essling and Aspern, and sending a reinforcement to the two columns assailing the latter.

But those two columns were of themselves sufficient to overwhelm the 7000 men of Molitor's division, half of whom were already hors de combat. The rest were only enabled to hold their ground by the heroism of Colonels Petit and Marin, and of General Molitor himself, who incessantly set the example to their soldiers, and put themselves at the head of every onset. At last General Vacquant, being well seconded, succeeded in penetrating into Aspern, and getting possession of it almost entirely after a conflict of five hours. General Molitor was about to be driven out of that village, which it was of such moment to keep, for if we had lost it we would have been driven back upon the bridge over the small arm, and perhaps into the Danube. Fortunately the restoration of the great bridge enabled a brigade of Nansouty's cuirassiers and the Carra St. Cyr division of infantry to cross over towards the close of the day. With these resources against unforeseen contingencies, Massena could bring into action the Legrand division, which he had stationed as a reserve behind Aspern. Placing Carra St. Cyr in the rear, with orders to watch the bridge, he entered Aspern at the head of the Legrand division. The heroic Legrand, with the 26th light infantry and the 18th of the line, the same regiments with which he had taken Ebersberg, charged through the main street of Aspern, drove Bellegarde's troops to the other end of the village, and obliged Vacquant to shut himself up in the church. In the centre, Lannes ordered fresh charges of cavalry. The Espagne division had lost a fourth of its effective; but Nansouty with the St. Germain brigade of cuirassiers took its place, and prolonged

the resistance, which in that place could only be maintained with cavalry. The Austrian infantry was again broken by the charge of our cavalry, but the latter was again assailed by that of the enemy, and Marulaz, relieving Lasalle, repeated with the 23rd chasseurs what the other had done two hours before with the 16th. He supported our cuirassiers, repulsed those of the enemy, and then charged several squares. Having broken into one of these, he was unhorsed, and was on the point of being killed or made prisoner, when his chasseurs, hearing his shouts, rescued him, gave him a horse, and returned, passing over the bodies of a line of infantry.

The battle had lasted six hours: at Aspern and Essling foot soldiers were obstinately contending for the possession of burning ruins; between the two villages masses of cavalry were disputing the plain with their swords. Archduke Charles, thinking he had done enough in stopping the French army at the débouche of the bridge, and flattering himself that he should hurl it into the Danube on the following day, determined to suspend the firing, in order to give his men time to rest, draw his masses together, and bring into line the reserve of grenadiers left at Breitenlee.

Napoleon was present in person at this first battle, under the fire between Aspern and Essling, and his confidence remained unabated. Though half the Molitor division lay dead in the houses and streets of Aspern, and though a fourth part of Espagne's cuirassiers and of the chasseurs of Lasalle and Marulaz had fallen by the cannonade, he had no fear for the result if he could have another 20,000 men and his ammunition brought over the Danube. The waters were still rising, and the flood swept down enormous trees torn up by the roots, boats that had been left high and dry on the banks, and large burning mills, which the enemy had set on fire in hopes of destroying our only means of passage. Every moment it was necessary to turn aside these floating masses, or to repair the breaches they caused in our bridges. The latter were further weakened by the continual passage over them, and sometimes the boats were almost sunk under the weight of the artillery waggons, and our soldiers had to cross the river with their feet in the water, which added to the tediousness of the operation. Generals Pernetti and Bertrand, however, were still confident they should maintain the passage, and that the requisite forces should be across the river by the following day. Napoleon therefore ordered that the troops which had been engaged should take the rest of which they had so much need. He bivouacked behind the wood in advance of the small bridge, in order to be present at the passage of his forces, which were to employ the whole night in defiling. Just as he was himself about to rest

he was interrupted by a violent altercation between two of his chief lieutenants, Bessières and Lannes, the former of whom complained of the language in which the latter had signified his orders. Massena, who was on the spot, was obliged to interpose between those gallant men, who, after having braved for a whole day the cross-fire of 300 pieces of cannon, were ready to draw their swords for the sake of their offended pride. Napoleon allayed their quarrel, which was to be terminated next day by the enemy in the saddest way for themselves and for the army.

The passage of the troops continued during part of the night with frequent interruptions; but about midnight the great bridge broke again for the third time. An additional rise of seven feet had taken place, making a total rise of fourteen feet. Fortune then seemed again to desert Napoleon, or rather the nature of things, which will not bend to the will of mighty conquerors, seemed to give him fresh warning. But if it was a fault to attempt the passage of the river in the season of sudden floods, and with an insufficient matériel, it was now no time to draw back. Before daybreak the bridge was repaired, and over it passed St. Hilaire's fine division and Oudinot's two (the three together forming Lannes' corps), the infantry of the guard, a second brigade of Nansouty's cuirassiers, the whole artillery of Lannes and Massena's corps, a reserve of artillery belonging to the cuirassiers, two divisions of light cavalry, and the little Demont division, formed of Davout's fourth battalions. Thus the 23,000 men with whom the battle had begun on the preceding day were increased on the morning of the 22nd to 60,000—a number sufficient for victory. Unfortunately the artillery was not sufficient; for Lannes, Massena, and the heavy cavalry had together no more than 144 pieces of cannon, and the Austrians had 300. However, some 30,000 of our men, with 50 pieces of cannon, had maintained their ground against the Austrians on the preceding day; 60,000, with 150 guns, ought this day to beat them. The thing was certain if ammunition did not fail, and supplies of this continued to arrive, the bridge being maintained in a practicable condition.

At daybreak both armies were on foot, and the sharpshooters began to exchange shots at four o'clock in the morning. Napoleon, who had scarcely slept, was on horseback, surrounded by his marshals, and giving them orders, with full confidence that he should terminate the war that day. Massena was to occupy Aspern entirely, and dislodge General Vacquant from the church. Lannes was to repulse all assaults that might be made on Essling, and then, taking advantage of the form of the enemy's line, which was that of a vast semicircle, he was to break it by a sudden and vigorous

effort of our right; Marshal Davout, two of whose divisions were at Ebersdorf, being shortly expected to follow Lannes, and cover him on the right during that operation.

With these instructions, Massena and Lannes proceeded to their respective posts. Feeling the necessity of well connecting Aspern with the Danube, Massena had posted the whole Molitor division in the little island on the left, where, though reduced from 7000 men to 4000, its own valour would enable it to maintain its ground with such feeble defences as that post possessed, including a small canal, some trees, and a breastwork of earth which Lazowski the engineer had thrown up in the night. The Legrand division, which had fought in Aspern towards the close of the preceding day, remained there still. Massena gave it the support of Carra St. Cyr's division, which was relieved in its guard of the little bridge by Demont's division. Napoleon also sent to Aspern the tirailleurs of the imperial guard, with four pieces of cannon, in order that the young soldiers of that recently formed troop might first see fire under the intrepid Massena.

At Essling, leaving General Boudet to the task of defending the interior of the village, Lannes stationed to the left and in advance, in the interval between Essling and Aspern, first St. Hilaire's division, then more on the left, towards the centre, Oudinot's two divisions, the cuirassiers, the hussars, and the chasseurs. The latter served as a link of connection with Massena's corps at Aspern. In the rear, at the centre, the fusiliers of the guard and the old guard itself remained as a reserve, but formed a bend towards Essling, to close the open space between that village and the Danube, by which the enemy might be tempted to penetrate, since he was master of the little town of Enzersdorf. This danger was further provided for by a strong battery of twelve-pounders, which was placed on the other side of the small arm of the river, and raked the ground in question. The artillery was planted in the intervals of this line of battle, to second the efforts of every arm.

It was in this order that the battle began again in the morning. Massena having ordered General Legrand to dislodge General Vacquant from the church at the western extremity of Aspern, and having sent him two regiments of the Carra St. Cyr division, the 24th light and the 4th of the line, Colonel Pourailly, an excellent officer, marched as fast as he could for the dead bodies heaped together in the main street of Aspern. Hiller and Bellegarde, who still had orders to act against Aspern, were on the ground at an early hour. Whilst the 24th was engaged with them, it was taken in flank from a side street by a column which was traversing the

village in an opposite direction. The 4th, commanded by the brave Colonel Boyeldieu, making a detour to the right, broke the enemy's column, and took its two battalions prisoners. The 24th and the 4th, led by Legrand, then drove the Austrians out of the church and the cemetery. Meanwhile the Molitor division, from its covert in the little isle, shot down all the Austrian sharpshooters that ventured within range of its musketry.

The moment was come for executing the offensive movement designed against the Austrian centre; for whilst Hiller and Bellegarde were repulsed from Aspern, Rosenberg's two columns were kept at a distance from Essling by the fire of the Boudet division; and in the middle of the semicircle of the Austrian army there was only Hohenzollern's corps, feebly connected with that of Rosenberg by Lichtenstein's cavalry, and supported at a great distance by the reserve of grenadiers. It was doubtful that the Austrian centre could withstand a mass of 20,000 infantry and 6000 horse which Lannes was going to throw upon it.

At the signal given by Napoleon, Lannes advanced with his right foremost against the centre of the Austrians, leaving Boudet in Essling. St. Hilaire's division marched first, regiment by regiment, in close columns, an arrangement which has the disadvantage of giving more prise to the cannon-ball, but which presents a solidity that defies all shocks. More to the left, and a little in the rear, Claparède and Tharreau's two divisions came next, in the same order, and presenting successive echelons. Still more to the left and the rear, the cavalry formed the last of these echelons directed against the enemy's centre.

Lannes put them in motion with the vigour he displayed in all his attacks. The 57th of the line of St. Hilaire's division, on our extreme right, charged the Austrian infantry, and forced it to give way. The whole division supported the 57th, and as the other regiments, formed in so many close columns, came each within range of the enemy, they halted and fired, and then advanced again, gaining ground from the troops opposed to them. Oudinot's two divisions, in their turn, took part in this offensive movement, and presently the Austrians, being assailed by the whole line, began to retire in disorder. At this sight, Archduke Charles, like many another captain, wavering in council but brave on the field of battle, hastened forward in person to prevent the catastrophe that threatened his centre. He ordered up the grenadiers that were at Breitenlee, and sent word to Bellegarde to fall back from Aspern towards Essling, in order to strengthen the middle of his line. Whilst awaiting the execution of these orders, he seized the flag of Bach's

regiment, and led it back under fire. His bravest officers were struck down by his side; among the rest, Count Colloredo.

Lannes, who, like him, headed his soldiers in person, seeing the Austrian infantry disordered, let loose upon them Bessières and his cuirassiers, who, charging Hohenzollern's corps, broke several squares, and took prisoners, cannons, and flags. We were now all but arrived at Breitenlee, where Archduke Charles had placed his reserve of grenadiers. Success now seeming certain, Lannes sent a staff-officer, César de Laville, to acquaint Napoleon of his progress, and ask him to cover his rear whilst he was advancing in the plain, and leaving so large a space between him and Essling.

Laville found Napoleon at a place called the Tuilerie, between Essling and Aspern, coolly regarding the grand spectacle of which he was the director. He did not express anything like the satisfaction he might have been expected to feel at such a communication. The fact was, an unfortunate accident had occurred. After incredible efforts on the part of Bertrand and Pernetti to keep open the passage across the Danube, the flood had at last completely broken the great bridge between Ebersdorf and the island of Lobau, just at the moment when six fine regiments of artillery, Davout's two divisions, and the artillery waggons were preparing to cross. A squadron of cuirassiers were severed in two, and swept with the boats down the stream; some to the right, others to the left. The want of troops, however, was not the worst consequence of the rupture of the bridge, for the 60,000 already passed over were enough to beat the Austrians. What was most to be regretted was the want of ammunition, a prodigious quantity of which had already been consumed, and of which there would soon be a scarcity.

At this sad news, brought by M. de Mortemart, Napoleon became too prudent, perhaps, after having been too rash. He feared he should be left on that vast field of battle with no other means of offence against the enemy besides bayonets and swords; and also that having sent all his troops into action, excepting the foot guard and the fusiliers, who were covering Lannes' rear, he should have no resource against a sudden turn of fortune, which, with the river behind him, could not but be disastrous. He therefore resolved upon a painful sacrifice, and renounced an almost certain victory, in order not to expose himself to risks which prudence forbade him to brave. Having formed this resolution in an instant, with the firmness of a thorough soldier, Napoleon ordered M. de Laville to return as fast as possible, and tell Marshal Lannes to suspend his movement, and fall back gradually, without too much emboldening the enemy, on the Essling and Aspern line. He was also to recommend the marshal to be sparing of his ammunition.

On receiving this order, Lannes and Bessières were compelled, to their deep regret, to halt in the midst of the vast field of Marchfeld, inundated with fire. The archduke, just before so hard pressed towards Breitenlee, saw our columns suddenly become stationary, without being able to divine the cause. He took advantage of that respite to move from his right to his left a part of Bellegarde's corps, and to draw up in line behind Hohenzollern's corps the sixteen battalions of grenadiers that formed his reserve, besides an enormous mass of artillery, for he had nearly 300 guns, and could bring together 200 of them upon that threatened point. Relieved, then, from his first confusion, he opened a tremendous cannonade upon Lannes. The St. Hilaire division, the most advanced of the three, received a continual fire of grape in front and flank. It retreated slowly, with the steadiness becoming the veteran regiments composing it and the chivalric St. Hilaire who commanded it. Unfortunately that brave officer, one of Napoleon's old friends, fell mortally wounded by a Biscayan. His division, though struck with grief, still remained steady, Lannes hastened to take the place of St. Hilaire, and bring back his division to less exposed ground. He continued the retreat, but like a lion whom it was dangerous to pursue. The corps that ventured to press upon him too nearly were fiercely charged, and driven back at the point of the bayonet. Passing from St. Hilaire's division to Oudinot's two, Lannes led them with the same vigour in presence of an enemy whom our retreat filled with confidence. Unfortunately Oudinot's soldiers suffered more than the rest, because it was thought too hazardous to make such young troops deploy in face of the enemy. Being ranged in deep columns, whole files of them were mowed down with cannon-balls.

Gradually Lannes brought back his line as far as the ditch running from Essling to Aspern, which formed a sort of shelter, behind which his infantry could be covered. His artillery, though inferior in number to the enemy's, and worse supplied, was left alone on the salient part of the ditch to stop the advance of the Austrian columns. Hiller's corps and part of Bellegarde's were now moving on Aspern, Rosenberg's two columns were again approaching Essling, and Hohenzollern's, reinforced by part of Bellegarde's, the grenadiers and Lichtenstein's cavalry, were preparing to make an effort against our centre, similar to that which Napoleon had essayed against the centre of the Austrians.

The latter design being simultaneously perceived by Napoleon and by Lannes, they asked the St. Hilaire and Oudinot divisions and the cavalry to devote themselves once more for the safety of the army. Having stationed the St. Hilaire, Claparède, and Tharreau divisions in the first line, the cuirassiers in the second,

and the old guard in the third, Lannes allowed the dense mass of Hohenzollern's corps and the grenadiers to approach within half-musket shot, and then poured in upon them such a fire of grape and musketry as soon thinned their ranks. He then launched the cavalry against the Austrian infantry, which gave way in several places, and opened like a breach in a wall. The brave Prince John de Lichtenstein made a counter-charge with his cavalry against that of Bessières. But Lasalle and Marulaz came with their chasseurs and hussars to the aid of our cuirassiers, and presently nothing was to be seen on the broad plain but a confused mass of 15,000 French and Austrian cavalry furiously charging each other—united when they dashed forward, disunited when they returned, and rallying incessantly to charge again.

After this long mêlée the enemy's movement against our centre seemed suspended, and Hohenzollern's corps halted as if paralysed before the breastwork running from Essling to Aspern. Our artillery, partly dismounted, remained on the further side of the ditch firing with precision, but slowly, on account of the scarcity of ammunition, and exposed to the fire of more than 200 pieces of cannon. Our infantry sheltered in the ditch, our cavalry forming a screen in the rear, and filling the space between Essling and Aspern, sustained an incessant cannonade with wonderful impassibility. An imperious necessity commanded this; for it was only by holding out to the close of the day that our men could escape being driven into the swollen Danube. At this moment a dreadful calamity befell the army. Whilst Lannes was galloping from one corps to the other, encouraging his soldiers, an officer, who was alarmed at seeing him exposed to so much danger, entreated him to dismount for the greater safety. He followed the advice, though it was far from his habit to be careful of his life, and as if destiny were a master whom there was no escaping, he was that instant struck by a cannon-ball that shattered both his knees. Bessières and the chef-d'éscadron César de Laville raised him up bathed in blood, and almost senseless. Bessières, whom he had used very ill on the preceding day, pressed his weak hand, but with averted face, for fear of offending him by his presence. He was laid on a cuirassier's cloak and carried half a league to the little bridge where an ambulance was stationed. The news soon spread through the whole army, and filled it with deep sorrow. But it was no time for tears, for the danger was every moment increasing.

The enemy's efforts, baffled in the centre, turned with fury upon the wings against Aspern and Essling. Hiller and Vacquant now make reiterated attacks on the unfortunate village of Aspern, which is but a mass of ruins and corpses. The tirailleurs of the guard, notwithstanding their youthful ardour and the

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MARSHAL LANNES

efforts of their veteran officers, are driven out of the village. Immediately Legrand with the wreck of his division, and Carra St. Cyr with the half of his, retake that heap of smoking ruins under the eyes of Massena, who stands amongst them broken down with fatigue, but elevated above the weaknesses of human nature by the force of his soul. Legrand, who is charged with the execution of his orders, appears everywhere, with the point of his hat cut off by a cannon-ball, and often obliged to use his sword to parry the thrusts of the enemy's bayonets. On the left, Molitor flings into the branch of the river, behind which he is posted, the Austrians who attempt to gain a footing on the little island. Thanks to this heroic resistance, Aspern remains ours. But the archduke cherishes a last hope, that of taking Essling. He surrounds that position with Rosenberg's columns, and commands in person a furious attack of the grenadiers upon the centre of the village. Bessières, who has taken the place of Lannes, sees this new danger, and prepares to ward it off. Napoleon, to aid him, sends him the fusiliers of the guard, a superb body of men, formed during the campaign in Poland and Spain, and near attaining that perfection which is found between the extreme youth and the extreme age of the soldier. Their commander was General Mouton. "Brave Mouton," said the emperor, "make one more effort to save the army; but make a finish of it, for after these fusiliers I have nothing left but the grenadiers and chasseurs of the old guard, a last resource, to be expended only in case of a disaster." Mouton obeys, and sets out in the direction of Essling, where the attack of the Austrian grenadiers seems most to be apprehended. Bessières, who is nearer the spot, sees the danger on the right between Essling and the Danube, and does not hesitate to change the direction given by the emperor. He sends part of Mouton's four battalions into Essling, and part to the right between the village and the river. This succour was urgently needed, for in front Essling was threatened by the grenadiers, and on the right by Rosenberg's columns, which were ready to pass between Essling and the Danube. It was General Boudet who still defended Essling. Five times had the grenadiers returned to the attack, led by Field-Marshal d'Aspre, and five times had they been repulsed by musketry and the bayonet. Nevertheless, on the right of the village, which was not numerously defended, Boudet was outflanked by one of Rosenberg's columns, and obliged to retreat into a granary, a large building battlemented like a fortress. There he kept his position with indomitable tenacity; but being assailed on all sides, he was on the point of succumbing, when Mouton came up with the fusiliers of the guard. Those gallant youths wrested part of the village from Aspre's grenadiers, and stopped Rosenberg's soldiers along the space extending to the

Danube. But this one act of energy was not enough against an enemy four times more numerous, and resolved to make the utmost efforts to succeed. Rapp, however, comes up with two more battalions of these same fusiliers, and proposes to General Mouton to make a general charge with the bayonet. With a mutual grasp of the hand they agree on this final effort, and rush headlong on the Austrians, sweep them back in an instant from one end of the village to the other, drive Aspre's soldiers in confusion upon Rosenberg's, and clear Essling of them all. At the same moment the artillery at Lobau pours a raking fire of grape on the masses that had passed between the village and the river. Thus Essling was delivered.

The conflict had now lasted thirty hours, and Archduke Charles, despairing of the possibility of forcing us into the Danube, and finding his own ammunition also beginning to fail, determined to suspend this bloody battle, one of the most frightful of the age, and to close the day by discharging his remaining shells and balls on the troops stationed between Aspern and Essling. So whilst in Aspern Generals Hiller and Bellegarde were still pertinaciously contesting some ruined remains of that unhappy village, Archduke Charles put an end to the attacks on our right and our centre, and only moved his artillery forward to cannonade our lines. A danger of this kind could only be met with passive coolness. Our artillery, in a great measure dismounted, remained, as before, on the bank of the ditch, firing from time to time. Behind it was the infantry, partly covered by the form of the ground, and further in the rear our fine cavalry deployed, presenting two fronts: one from Essling to Aspern, to cover the centre of the position; the other at right angles to this, to cover the space between Essling and the river. Lastly, the imperial guard, presenting two fronts parallel to those of the cavalry, remained motionless under the cannonade, and nothing was heard amidst the thundering of the artillery but this word of command given by the officers, "Close up!" In fact, there was nothing to be done but to repeat that manœuvre until night, for it was impossible either to drive off the enemy or to escape by the bridge leading to the island of Lobau. Such a retreat by a single issue could only be effected under favour of darkness, and in the month of May there were many hours yet to wait for that friendly obscurity. During the whole day Napoleon had not quitted the angle formed by our lines from Aspern to Essling, and from Essling to the river, a space swept by so many cannon-balls. So long as there was any reason to apprehend a fresh attack, he had been deaf to all entreaties to shelter a life on which the lives of all depended. But now that the exhausted enemy did nothing but cannonade, he resolved to make a per-

sonal inspection of the island of Lobau, in order to choose the best site there for the encampment of his army, and make all other necessary arrangements for retreat. Secure of the possession of Essling, which was occupied by the remains of the Boudet division and by the fusiliers, he sent to Massena to inquire if he could rely on the possession of Aspern; for so long as those two points remained to us, the retreat of the army was ensured. The staff-officer, César de Laville, who took the message, found Massena seated on a heap of rubbish, harassed with fatigue, with bloodshot eyes, but with unabated energy of spirit. On receiving the message, he stood up and replied, with extraordinary emphasis, "Go tell the emperor I will hold out two hours—six—twenty-four—so long as it is necessary for the safety of the army."

Satisfied as to these two points, Napoleon immediately proceeded towards the island of Lobau, after sending orders to Massena, Bessières, and Berthier to join him as soon as they could quit their posts, in order to make arrangements for the retreat, which was to be effected that night. The little arm of the Danube was now become a great river, and the mills thrown in by the enemy had several times endangered the bridge by which it was crossed. The aspect of its banks was of a nature to wring the heart. Long files of wounded men, some dragging themselves along as they could, others carried on the arms of soldiers, or laid on the ground until they could be removed to the island; dismounted horse soldiers throwing off their cuirasses to march more at ease; wounded horses flocking instinctively to the river to quench their thirst, and entangling themselves in the cordage of the bridge so as to endanger its safety; hundreds of artillery waggons half broken, an indescribable confusion and piteous groans, such was the scene that presented itself to Napoleon. He dismounted, took some water in his hands to cool his face, and then perceiving a litter made of branches of trees, on which Lannes lay with his legs amputated, he ran to him, pressed him in his arms, spoke hopefully of his recovery, and found him, though heroic as ever, yet keenly affected at seeing himself so soon stopped in that career of glory. "You are going to lose," said Lannes, "him who was your best friend and your faithful companion in arms. May you live and save the army." The malevolence which Napoleon had but too much provoked at that time propagated a report of reproaches which Lannes was said to have cast upon him in his last moments. Nothing of the kind, however, took place. Lannes received his master's embrace with a sort of convulsive satisfaction, and mingled no word of bitterness with the expression of his grief. There was no need he should do so. A single look of his recalling all he had so often

said as to the danger of incessant wars, the sight of his two shattered limbs, the death of another hero of Italy, St. Hilaire, struck down on that day, the horrible hecatomb of forty or fifty thousand men laid low, were not these so many reproaches, keen enough and easy enough to understand? After pressing Lannes in his arms, and saying surely to himself what the dying hero had not said—for the genius that has committed faults is its own severest judge—Napoleon mounted his horse again, and rode to the island of Lobau. After exploring it in all directions, he satisfied himself that the army would find in it an entrenched camp in which it would be unassailable, and might take shelter for two or three days until the great bridge was repaired. The Austrians could not cross the small branch of the river in defiance of Massena, who would be there to dispute the passage; and the breadth of the island was too great to allow of their cannon-balls reaching our soldiers. And then by employing all the boats that were on the right bank the army might be supplied with all necessaries for subsistence and defence.

These matters having been promptly settled in his own mind, Napoleon returned at night to the small branch, where, with Massena, Bessières, Berthier, some general officers, and Davout, who had arrived in a boat, he held a council of war. Napoleon was not in the habit of assembling that sort of council in which a vacillating mind seeks, but finds not, resolutions which he is unable of himself to arrive at. On this occasion he wanted not to ask advice of his lieutenants, but to give it them; to fill them with his own thought, and revive the spirits of those that desponded; and it is certain that although their soldierly courage was unshakable, their minds did not sufficiently embrace the difficulties and the resources of the situation to escape being in some degree surprised, confused, and depressed. The fortitude that supports disasters is rarer than the heroism that braves death. Napoleon, calm and confident, because he saw in what had occurred a mere accident, by no means irreparable, called on the officers present to express their opinion. From the language held before him, he could infer that those two days had made a deep impression, and that some of his lieutenants were for recrossing forthwith not only the small branch, but the island and the large branch also, in order to join the rest of the army as soon as possible, at the risk of losing all the cannon, all the artillery and cavalry horses, 12,000 or 15,000 wounded men, and the honour of our arms. No sooner had such a thought been suggested than Napoleon interposed with the authority that belonged to him; and with the unfeigned confidence he derived from the extent of his resources, thus expounded his own views. The day had been a severe one, he

said, but it could not be considered a defeat, since we remained masters of the field of battle; and it was doing wonders to retire safe and sound after such a conflict, sustained with a huge river at our back and with our bridges destroyed. As for our loss in killed and wounded, it was great—greater than any we had before suffered in our long wars—but that of the enemy must have been a third greater. It might therefore, Napoleon thought, be assumed for certain that the Austrians would be quiet for a long time, and leave him leisure to wait the arrival of the army of Italy, which was approaching victoriously through Styria; to bring back to the ranks three-fourths of his wounded; to receive the numerous reinforcements that were on the march from France, and to build wooden bridges over the Danube as solid as structures of stone, and which would make the passage of the river an ordinary operation. Napoleon went on to say, that after all, when the wounded should have returned to the ranks, it would be only 10,000 men less on our side to set off against 15,000 on the adversary's, and two months more in the duration of the campaign; that at 500 leagues from Paris, maintaining a great war in the heart of a conquered monarchy, in its very capital, there was nothing in an accident of that kind that ought to astound men of courage —nothing but what was very natural, nay, even fortunate, if one took account of the difficulties of the enterprise, which was no less than crossing in the teeth of a hostile army the largest river in Europe to go and give battle beyond it. There was no reason, therefore, he maintained, for alarm or discouragement. There was a retrograde movement which was proper and necessary, namely, to recross the small arm of the Danube to the island of Lobau, there to wait for the subsidence of the waters and the reconstruction of the bridges over the large branch—an easy movement, which would be performed by night without inconvenience, without losing a single wounded man, a single horse, or a single cannon; above all, without losing honour. But there was another retrograde movement, both dishonouring and disastrous; that was, to repass not only the small but the great arm, scrambling over the latter how they could, with boats which could carry only sound men, without one cannon, one horse, one wounded man, and abandoning the island of Lobau, which was a precious conquest, and the true ground for ultimately effecting a passage. If they acted in that way—if, instead of 60,000, which they numbered at their departure, they went back 40,000, without artillery or horses, and leaving behind them 10,000 wounded men, who might be capable of service in a month, they would do well not to show themselves to the Viennese, who would overwhelm their vanquishers with scorn, and soon summon the Archduke Charles

to expel the French from a capital where they were no longer worthy to remain. And in that case, it was for a retreat not to Vienna but to Strasburg that they should have to prepare. Prince Eugène, now on his march to Vienna, would find the enemy there instead of the French army, and would perish in that trap; our dismayed allies, made treacherous by weakness, would turn against us; the fortune of the empire would be annihilated, and the grandeur of France destroyed in a few weeks. In a word, Napoleon foresaw, and distinctly foretold, as certain to be realised in a fortnight, all that his policy brought upon him five years later, if, instead of retiring with dignity into Lobau, the French were weak enough to make a precipitate retreat over the Danube, leaving behind their wounded comrades, their matériel, and their honour. Besides, to act as he advised, would cost but little efforts. Massena would hold out at Aspern until midnight, would then defile with the army over the small bridge, defend Lobau next day against the attempts of the enemy, and wait behind the small arm of the Danube for the victuals and ammunition which would be sent to him in boats. During this time the large bridge would be reconstructed, and if, contrary to all probability, Archduke Charles dared to make an attempt to cross the river at Presburg or Krems, and dispute possession of Vienna with us, Marshal Davout would confront him with his 30,000 men, who were as good as 60,000 Austrians, with the remainder of the cuirassiers, the cavalry of the guard, who had not crossed the river, the Wurtembergers, the Bavarians, and the Saxons. "So, Massena and Davout," said he to them, "you live, and you will save the army, and show yourselves worthy of what you have already done." Massena, who was often a grumbler, and who even bitterly blamed the haste with which the Danube had been crossed, was now delighted with such a display of good sense and fortitude, and grasping Napoleon's hand, he exclaimed, "You are a man of courage, sir, and worthy to command us! No, we must not fly like cravens who have been beaten. Fortune has not been kind to us, but we are victorious, nevertheless; for the enemy, who ought to have driven us into the Danube, has bitten the dust before our positions. Let us not lose our victorious attitude; let us only cross the small branch of the Danube, and I pledge myself to drown in it every Austrian who shall attempt to cross it in pursuit of us." Davout, on his part, promised to defend Vienna from any attack by way of Presburg or Krems during the renovation of the bridges, after which the army, combined on one bank, would no longer have anything to fear from Archduke Charles.

Every man felt his heart rise within him after this council. Massena, who was to take the command-in-chief of the army,

returned to Aspern, whilst Napoleon proceeded to cross the main branch between eleven and twelve at night. The danger was great by reason of the darkness and the enormous floating masses rolled along by the flood. But with the confidence of Cæsar amidst the billows, Napoleon embarked in a small boat with Berthier and Savary, and arrived safely at Ebersdorf on the opposite shore. Immediately he gave orders to collect there all the barges that could be had, and send them off to Lobau, freighted with biscuits, wine, brandy, cannon and musket cartridges, and dressing materials for the wounded. The boats detached from the large bridge sufficed for the occasion.

Meanwhile Massena was taking measures at Essling and Aspern for the retreat. The direct attack on those points had ceased. The Austrian cannonade grew slower as the night advanced, and only did occasional mischief here and there. Our weary adversaries sank down overpowered on that field of carnage, whilst our critical position compelled us to maintain all our vigilance, though our fatigue was as great as that of the Austrians. At midnight Massena began the retreat with the imperial guard, which was nearest to the river. Every corps was to defile by the small bridge, carrying off its wounded and its cannons, and leaving behind only its dead, the number of which was unhappily great. After the guard came the heavy cavalry; and as many of the men had thrown off their cuirasses, Massena had them picked up by the dismounted soldiers, wishing to leave the enemy but as few trophies as possible. Part of the light cavalry remained in line with the voltigeurs, in order to make a feint of resistance in front of Aspern and Essling. Next in order were the St. Hilaire, Oudinot, Legrand, and Carra St. Cyr divisions; and at last, at daybreak, Generals Boudet and Molitor, quitting Essling and Aspern, plunged into the wood which covered the bend of the river, escorted by a swarm of their tirailleurs. The harassed enemy did not perceive the retrograde movement of our troops. It was not till towards five or six in the morning, that, seeing our advanced posts gradually disappear, he conceived a suspicion of our retreat, and thought of pursuing us. He did this slowly, and without giving us much trouble. As soon, however, as he had entered Essling, and reached the edge of the river, he caught sight of the little bridge over which our last columns were passing, and he immediately turned the fire of his cannon and his sharpshooters in that direction. Massena remained on the left bank with some of his staff, resolved to be the last man to cross the bridge. It was pointed out to him that our posts were beginning to be sharply pressed, that he might be suddenly assailed, and that it was time to unmoor the bridge, and

put an end to this unparalleled resistance. He would listen to nothing as long as he saw any relic to be saved on the river-side. Going about in all directions, he assured himself with his own eyes that he was not leaving behind one wounded man, one cannon, or a single object of any value to gratify the pride of the enemy. He had search made again for any muskets or cuirasses that might be lying about; and he had all the wounded and straggling horses driven into the river and forced to swim across it. At last, when there was no further duty to be performed, and the bullets of the enemy's sharp-shooters were whistling round him, he embarked, last of all, as gallantly as when he quitted Genoa in an open boat under the fire of the English squadron. He ordered the cables to be cut. The bridge was soon swept by the stream to the other bank, and in a few minutes he was in Lobau, the Austrians contenting themselves with watching the voluntary retreat of their adversaries.

Thus ended this battle of two days—one of the bloodiest of the age, and the first in the series of those abominable carnages of the latter times of the empire, in which numbers equal to the population of a great city were destroyed in one day. The amount of killed and wounded cannot easily be determined with accuracy; but it may be estimated at 26,000 or 27,000 on the side of the Austrians, and 15,000 or 16,000 on that of the French. The want of surgical appliances in the island of Lobau necessarily rendered the wounds of our men extremely dangerous. What accounted for the enormous difference in the losses sustained on either side was that the Austrians had always fought without cover, whereas we had been sheltered during part of the two days by the conformation of the ground. As for prisoners, none were made on either side, except a few hundreds taken in Aspern and Essling and sent to Lobau. It was a battle without other result than an abominable effusion of blood, greater on the enemy's side than on ours, and which left us all our means of passage, since the island of Lobau remained ours. The worst consequences of those days at Essling were what the world would say of them. Our enemies would not fail to publish in Germany and all over Europe that the French were beaten, cut to pieces, and in full retreat. Now Napoleon, fighting in the midst of the continent, which was ready to rise against him, obliged to maintain himself in the enemy's capital where 400,000 inhabitants were only awaiting the signal for insurrection, and needing secure roads in his rear for the arrival of his reinforcements, could not dispense with the prestige of his invincibility. Physically he was the stronger, since he had lost less than his adversary, and had steeled the courage of his young army in a formidable trial; morally he was weaker, since his enemies were

about to boast over his alleged defeat, which was in reality a victory. As for his conduct as a general, it was impossible not to admire his choice of Lobau, which rendered possible an operation in any other case impracticable, and enabled him to come off by the easiest of retreats from a position from which the only probable issue seemed to be drowning or captivity. But Napoleon deserved blame for his haste to cross the river in such a season before he had got together adequate means. Still there were so many motives to prompt his impatience to occupy both banks of the Danube, that he may be pardoned for having relied too much on fortune in his wish to save time. His real fault, his stupendous fault, was that unbridled policy which, after having carried him to the Niemen, whence he had only returned by dint of miracles, had next carried him to the Ebro and the Tagus, whence he had returned in person, leaving his best armies behind him, now hurried him to the Danube, where he contrived to maintain himself only by other miracles, the series of which might cease at any moment and give place to disasters. This, we say, was his capital fault, for the general committed no errors except under the constraint exercised over him by the most imprudent of politicians.

As for Archduke Charles, whose conduct has since been severely criticised, and especially by his countrymen, he displayed great energy, whatever may have been said to the contrary; and if it is thought strange that he did not hurl the French army into the river, those who thus talk forget the strength of the positions chosen by his adversary, and the impossibility of wresting Aspern and Essling from 60,000 Frenchmen, commanded by Lannes and Massena, and reduced to the necessity of conquering or perishing; and they forget the advantages of Lobau, to which retreat was easy whilst Aspern and Essling remained to us, and which then became an inviolable asylum. To attempt to force the small arm of the Danube, in face of Massena, without a bridge, or even with one, would have been a rash enterprise, for not venturing upon which the Austrian commander has been blamed by men who would have been incapable of executing it. What has been alleged against the archduke with more reason by certain impartial judges is, that during the battle he extended a great deal too much the semicircle round the French, so as to expose himself to the risk of having his line broken; and that by greater concentration on his right, and by employing all his forces to cut his way through at Aspern, he might perhaps have had more chance of cutting us off from the Danube. On the other hand, it must be observed, that if he had acted in this way, he would probably have been met at Aspern by all the forces which in that case would not have been required elsewhere. After so tremendous a battle

and such heroic efforts, we must admire such gallantry and be silent, whatever may have been the result, before deeds of such energy as men have rarely equalled.

It was during the days following the battle that Archduke Charles might have executed things he did not even attempt. The French army was then in a critical position, being partly in the island of Lobau, partly on the right bank of the Danube, with the principal stream dividing its two positions. This was an opportunity such as Napoleon would not have failed to seize. Admitting that it was impossible for the archduke to cross over to the island of Lobau in the teeth of Massena and his 45,000 men, there was infinitely less reason why he should not attempt one of those passages above or below Vienna which Napoleon regarded with so much apprehension, and against which he took so many ingenious precautions.

Had Archduke Charles marched to Presburg, crossed the Danube there, and gone up the right bank to attack Marshal Davout, who had not 40,000 men to act against him, he would no doubt have had a fair chance of doing us a mischief. But he would also have run some risk, for he would have needed not less than two days to go down the Danube, and two to go up on the opposite side, and there was much probability that in those four days the temporary repair of the great bridge would have enabled the French army to return to the right bank. In that case Archduke Charles would have had 80,000 men to fight, with but 70,000 at the most on his side, for the battle of Essling had cost him 26,000 or 27,000. He might therefore have been cut to pieces or driven with great loss into Hungary. There remained another operation to be tried, as hazardous as this one, but still more decisive, had it succeeded. This was to go up the course of the Danube, fall in with Kollowrath's 25,000 men, and with a force thus raised to 95,000, cross the river at one of the points between Krems and Lintz, forcing a passage against Bernadotte's Saxons or Vandamme's Wurtembergers, and debouch on Napoleon's rear. In this case the passage would be less certain, since it would be disputed, but by troops whom there was a great chance of beating; it would be effected with an additional 25,000 men; it would bring about a concentration superior to any Napoleon could at that moment accomplish; it required only a space of two or three days; it afforded opportunity for beating in detail before their junction the Saxons, the Wurtembergers, and Davout's divisions, dispersed between St. Polten, Vienna, and Ebersdorf; lastly, in case of success, it would place Napoleon in the position of General Melas after the battle of Marengo. But also, by placing such an adversary and such an army in such an extremity, it would provoke them to extraordinary efforts, and be consequently attended with im-

mense danger. This plan, then, the more decisive but the more hazardous of the two, was the less likely to be adopted by the archduke.

The archduke adopted neither of these courses. It was not until the 23rd of May that he knew whether he was victorious or not; and though he sent off despatches in all directions declaring that he was so, his conviction of that fact was by no means well assured. His army, diminished by one-third, was exhausted with fatigue. For himself, he was not disposed to recommence the conflict. For the first time in his life he had stood before Napoleon without being beaten, and quite astonished at this unusual triumph, he wished to enjoy it before he ran fresh risks. His losses, the insufficiency of his remaining forces, and the entire consumption of his ammunition, were motives for waiting and enjoying in quiet the pleasure of an unexpected success. It must be owned, too, that there were some weighty considerations in favour of this line of conduct. It might, in fact, be argued that his advantage lay in gaining time, that not to perish was a positive success for an army fighting in its own country within reach of all its resources, and surrounded by all the sympathies of Germany, which waited only an opportunity to declare themselves. It might be argued that Napoleon, on the contrary, at a distance of several hundred leagues from his frontiers, living in the midst of a hostile population, in a conquered and exasperated capital, and maintaining himself there only by the prestige of his invincibility, had need of a constant succession of dazzling exploits, and of hastening matters to a close; that to pass the Danube was for him an indispensable condition towards any ultimate success, and that to have failed therein was a moral as well as a physical check; consequently that it was better to persist in opposing to him the only sort of obstacle which had stopped him until then, and to persevere in a system of tactics which had succeeded, than to go and offer oneself to his blows, and risk the dubious chance of battle by attempting a hazardous passage above or below Vienna. Thus argued Archduke Charles with much reason; and he would have done wisely if, in adopting such a plan, he had followed it out to all its consequences, and employed the time afforded him in reinforcing the Austrian army, rendering the Danube more and more difficult to cross, and raising up around Napoleon the resistances of all kinds which an advantage gained over him would naturally provoke. This, at least, is what he seemed at first bent on doing, applying himself to increase the strength of his position opposite Vienna, striving to augment the difficulties of any future attempts to cross the Danube, concentrating all the forces he could at that point, sending orders to Archduke John to join him as soon as

possible, and above all, singing pæans in Germany, and writing word everywhere that the French had been beaten, destroyed; talking of 30,000 or 40,000 killed and wounded, and as many prisoners, so that, had all these stories been true, Napoleon would not have had one soldier left; talking, moreover, of an inevitable retreat of the French on Lintz, Passau, and even Strasburg, and promising to all a general and sure deliverance of Europe, and particularly if Germany would second Austria with a single effort. Fortunately for Napoleon, what the archduke could do best towards turning his victory to account was to boast of the success he had achieved; and, vanity apart, it was something useful, as we shall soon see, to boast a great deal, and even beyond all bounds of truth or probability.

In fact, Napoleon had much less reason to be concerned about the physical than the moral consequences of the battle of Essling. He did not, however, make himself more uneasy than was needful about the matter; only he wrote everywhere to set opinion right with regard to the two days' engagement at Essling; and above all, he took vigorous measures to repair that apparent or real check, so as even to derive from it unexpected and decisive results at no distant day.

The first danger to be provided against was an attempt on the part of Archduke Charles to force a passage into the island of Lobau. Napoleon did not fear this much, provided the 45,000 men there under Massena had victuals, ammunition, and hospital supplies. His first care, as we have seen, was to send them these on the night of the 22nd and the following day; and in thirty-six hours Massena had plenty of cartridges for large and small arms, and biscuit enough to keep his soldiers from hunger. The deer which abounded in the island would furnish them with meat; and thus they had all that was necessary for defence and subsistence.

The second danger to which he had to direct his immediate attention was the possibility of a passage at Presburg, the only one which Napoleon regarded as at all probable, as being that which required least boldness. But to provide against this, it was necessary to have previously overcome a great difficulty; for unless the bridge over the main arm was re-established, at least in a temporary manner, Marshal Davout might have to resist Archduke Charles with only two of his divisions and that part of the guard and the heavy cavalry which had not crossed the river. Davout's third division, stationed between St. Polten and Vienna, would evidently be indispensable to keep the capital in awe whilst the other two were fighting. It is true that Davout had pledged his head for it that with 25,000 to 30,000 men he would stop any force coming from Presburg, and the fulfilment of this promise might be confidently expected of the

stubborn victor of Auerstädt; but the position was a very critical one, and it was of vast importance to have the means of promptly assembling the whole army if necessary on the right bank. Napoleon applied himself to this task without ceasing. Fortunately the seamen of the guard had arrived from Strasburg. They were employed to accelerate the re-establishment of communications between the island and the right bank, a service which they performed with their usual zeal and ability. Part of the infantry of the guard was carried over in boats from the island to Ebersdorf. On the 25th, by means of the pontoons which had served for the passage of the small branch, and of the boats picked up in the river, a bridge was constructed, which would not have served for offensive operations, but was solid enough for the purpose of a retreat to be effected at successive intervals. Every detachment conveyed to the right bank put Marshal Davout in a condition the better to resist an attack from Presburg; and as for that which might have been directed against the island of Lobau, it was manifestly not to be feared, since it had not been attempted on the 23rd or 24th.

After the guard, the Demont division crossed over to the mainland; then the light cavalry, which was to be sent to reconnoitre round Presburg; then the heavy cavalry; and lastly, Lannes' whole corps, which since his death had been put under the command of General Oudinot, and could not be in better hands. This business having been effected on the 27th of May, all cause for uneasiness was removed, for Davout had at least 60,000 men at his disposal, and no attempt of Archduke Charles upon the right bank could have had any chance of success. Napoleon ordered Lasalle and Marulaz to Haimburg, with nine regiments of cavalry, to check anything that might come from Presburg, whether it were the army of Archduke Charles, or merely the Hungarian rising, which was beginning to muster. He ordered Montbrun to Œdenburg, on the other side of the lake of Neusiedel, to watch the roads from Hungary and Italy by which Archduke John might present himself in his retreat before Prince Eugène. General Lauriston continued as before at Bruck, with the Badeners and General Bruyère's cavalry, to support Prince Eugène on his march through Styria. Napoleon stationed the heavy cavalry in the rear, as he had done before, to support the light cavalry. Lastly, Davout, with the Friant, Gudin, and Demont divisions, Oudinot's whole corps, and the guard, 50,000 or 60,000 men in all, was at Ebersdorf, ready to fall upon Archduke Charles from whatever side he came.

Napoleon resolved to bring some more forces still to Vienna. Thinking that the Bavarians might suffice to defend their own

country, not only on the Tyrolese side, but towards the Danube, he ordered Marshal Lefebvre to send a Bavarian division to Lintz to relieve the Dupas division and the Saxons stationed there under Bernadotte. General Vandamme was to remain with the Wurtembergers at Krems, whilst Bernadotte, with his 18,000 men, was to advance to Vienna to augment the forces accumulated there. Massena's corps, which we have not mentioned in this enumeration, was left entirely in the island of Lobau, to guard that spot, which, notwithstanding the use that had been made of it, still remained the most suitable for the passage of the Danube. Napoleon had already devised a means of using it in so novel a manner, that although warned by a previous attempt, the enemy would be surely deceived by it. He had calculated that a month would be necessary to collect and employ the requisite matériel, and to let the flood season elapse, and that he should not be able to strike the blow that should end the war until the end of June or the beginning of July. The same space of time was also requisite to enable him to receive his reinforcements, organise his line of operation more completely, and bring Prince Eugène's army under the walls of Vienna. He set himself therefore to prepare the accomplishment of these several designs with imperturbable coolness, incredible activity, and as proud a bearing as he could have displayed on the day following a great victory.

His first business was to prepare materials everywhere. Vienna was full of timber, which he ordered to be sorted and conveyed to Ebersdorf. The workmen of Vienna wanted work: he resolved to employ them, and to pay them with the Austrian paper-money, of which there was abundance in the public coffers which had been seized. He had boat-builders sent to Lobau, and had others even brought by post from France, whom he employed in making boats of all forms and sizes, according to a plan we shall describe in its proper place. Lastly, without losing a single day, he gave the following orders for the recruitment of the army. As he had taken care to fill the depôts by anticipating the conscription of 1810, or by a fresh call upon the anterior classes, he could now draw from them the men previously levied, with a certainty that their places would be filled up by the men last called out. In consequence of this, he had all the ready-trained conscripts put en route for Strasburg in marching battalions, bearing the numbers of the military divisions in which the depôts were situated. But he had a still surer means of procuring trained men, namely, to take them from the provisional demi-brigades which had been organised in the north, on the frontiers of the Rhine, and even in Italy, and consisted of fourth and fifth battalions. From these he ordered numerous recruits to be taken for Massena, Oudinot,

and Davout's corps, some of them being sent directly to their regiments, and others incorporated in regiments to which they did not originally belong. Napoleon had already had recourse to this last measure; he now persisted in employing it in consideration of the urgency of the circumstances, and he applied to three regiments which had returned a year before from Portugal, and since remained on the coast of Bretagne, where they had been largely supplied with young soldiers. He drew from them 3000 or 4000 men fully trained, who, being incorporated in other regiments, might serve to recruit those whose depôts lacked conscripts. In this way he marked out from 20,000 to 25,000 conscripts to be furnished by the depôts in France, and 6000 or 8000 by those in Italy. He adopted the same measures for the cavalry, which had considerable resources in its depôts, seeing that they had not yet been much drawn upon; and he had numerous marching squadrons sent from the Rhine to the Danube. He took special pains to remount the cavalry, for it had lost still more horses than men. He ordered the formation of two depôts—one in Bavaria, for the purchase of German horses for heavy and medium cavalry; the other in Hungary, for the purchase of light cavalry horses. He directed particular attention to the augmentation of his artillery. That of the enemy had done him so much mischief at Essling, that to increase his own he had recourse to a device which experience did not justify—which was giving the infantry regiments cannons, to be worked by men from their own ranks expressly drilled for that service. The difficulty of procuring a sufficient number of artillerymen in good time from the depôts had induced him to adopt this expedient, which his superior tact would have rejected under any other circumstances; for it was easy to foresee that with regard to special arms, nothing could make amends for the want of long training, and that the infantry could never take such care of the matériel as a corps exclusively destined to that service. Napoleon resolved to give 200 guns to the infantry, at the rate of four to a regiment, employing for this purpose pieces of small calibre, such as three and four pounders. He determined also to raise the guard's reserve of artillery from the number of sixty pieces to eighty, by drawing the requisite companies of artillerymen from Italy and Strasburg. In this way he calculated on procuring 700 pieces of cannon—an overwhelming mass of artillery, equivalent to about four pieces for every thousand men, and surpassing all proportions previously admitted. These various calls would bring about 40,000 men from France and Italy within a month or two; a reinforcement more than equivalent to all the losses of the campaign—one which was not absolutely necessary in order to fight a decisive battle, for the recruitment called for after Ratisbon was now

coming in—but which at any rate would enable Napoleon to continue the war, happen what might.

As to the imperial guard, Napoleon had with him the grenadiers and the chasseurs forming the old guard, and the fusiliers and tirailleurs forming the new. There were two regiments of conscripts of this force at Augsburg, one of grenadiers and one of chasseurs, undergoing instruction, and at the same time serving as a reserve against the movements in Tyrol and Swabia. Napoleon ordered these two regiments to be marched to Vienna, and to be replaced at Augsburg by two which were in the act of formation at Strasburg, so that the reserve at Augsburg might not be diminished. This reserve was of much interest to Napoleon, with a view to what might happen in his rear in consequence of the commotion caused by the battle of Essling. It consisted of the detachments sent to recruit the army which halted in succession at Augsburg; of the 65th, reorganised, since its misadventure at Ratisbon, both with conscripts and with prisoners of that corps recovered by exchange; and of six provisional regiments of dragoons, formed of the third squadrons of the regiments serving in Spain. Such of the provisional demi-brigades as were not to be dissolved and drafted into the army assembled with the same view at Wurzburg, Hanau, and Mayence. The 35th, surprised at Pordenone, and which had behaved so gallantly on that unfortunate occasion, was recomposed in the same way as the 65th. Counting on 7000 or 8000 men, with their matériel, to be furnished by the depôts in Italy, Napoleon sent General Lemarois to Osopo to superintend their movements, knowing that for want of some responsible individual to have special charge of them the most essential matters often fail to receive due attention, and that the neglect of a single detail sometimes leads to grievous catastrophes. A column of conscripts having been already taken prisoners in Tyrol, he directed that fresh columns, at least 4000 men strong, should be sent, under a general of brigade, to meet Prince Eugène on his march to Vienna.

The viceroy had taken the road through Carinthia in pursuit of Archduke John, and General Macdonald had taken that through Carniola in pursuit of the ban of Croatia. This pursuit had continued during the days immediately preceding and following the battle of Essling, with the same advantage for the French and the same losses for the Austrians. On the 16th of May, Prince Eugène arrived at the entry of the gorges of the Carnic Alps, before the fort of Malborghetto, which barred all passage of his artillery, whilst Archduke John encamped on the other side, in the position of Tarvis. Our troops entered the village of Malborghetto at the point of the bayonet, and contented themselves with blockading the fort which barred

the highroad. The infantry and cavalry went on to Tarvis, where they arrived without artillery in presence of the Austrians, who had a great deal. Out of this awkward situation Prince Eugène extricated himself by a bold stroke. After a careful search round Malborghetto, a position was discovered in which it was found possible to erect a battery of several guns. After the fort had been well battered, it was stormed, our men gallantly scaling its regular fortifications under grape, with a loss of not more than one or two hundred men. Irritated by the difficulty they encountered, our soldiers put part of the unfortunate garrison to the sword, took the rest prisoners, and planted the French flag on the summit of the Carnic Alps on the 17th of May. The prince marched the same day against Tarvis with his artillery. The Austrians, thinking us without cannon, attempted to defend the escarped banks of the Schlitza; but they were soon undeceived by the showers of grape that fell upon them; and being impetuously attacked by our troops, who were flushed by their recent successes, they lost 3000 men and fifteen pieces of cannon. At the same time General Seras, who had been detached on the route to Cividale, took the fort of Predel in the same vigorous style.

Thus pursued, Archduke John could not throw himself into Upper Austria, as he had intended, and as he had been ordered to do when there had been hopes of a junction of the brothers at Lintz or St. Polten. The rapid march of the French left him no choice but to retreat into Hungary, where he might possibly do good service, either by reinforcing Archduke Charles, or by hindering the junction of the army of Germany with Prince Eugène, Macdonald, and Marmont. The latter course was the one which better suited his inclination to isolate himself, and acquire a glory apart in this war. But his brother, the commander-in-chief, who wished to make all things concur towards the main action, was of a different opinion, and desired him to take up his position behind the Danube, at Presburg, leaving the Hungarian rising and the ban Giulay to deal with Prince Eugène, Macdonald, and Marmont. Thus placed between his own desires and his brother's instructions, Archduke John retired to Grätz, to await the fresh orders he had solicited. Having lost nearly 15,000 men in the campaign, and given 10,000 or 12,000 to the ban, he had hardly more than 15,000 left when he marched to Grätz; but he relied on various junctions to furnish him again with an army. Thinking there was not much to be expected of the Tyrolese after the battle of Worgel, he had deemed it right to withdraw Chasteler, with his 9000 or 10,000 men, and Jellachich, with his 8000 or 9000, from the Tyrol, ordering them both to cut their way through the army of Prince Eugène by falling unexpectedly on his van

or his rear, so as to debouch by Leoben on Grätz. Supposing these two generals to leave some detachments in Tyrol, to serve as a support to the insurgents, they could bring some 15,000 men into Hungary; and these, added to the remains of his own force, would form for him an excellent corps of about 30,000 men. With Giulay's 10,000 or 12,000, the Hungarian and Croat risings, and some battalions of landwehr, he hoped to procure a further muster of 50,000 or 60,000, and to keep the field against all the French forces of Italy and Dalmatia.

This was a dream like all the rest with which Archduke John had continually beguiled himself during this campaign; and it took no account of all the difficulties to be overcome in order to effect so many junctions in presence of the forces of Prince Eugène, Macdonald, and Marmont. In obedience to orders, General Jellachich quitted the Tyrol in all haste, and on the 25th of May, three days after the battle of Essling, he arrived at the position of St. Michel, in advance of Leoben, whilst Prince Eugène was a little to the right, in the direction of Grätz, observing Archduke John's march towards Hungary. The cavalry patrols on either side soon discovered each other, and Jellachich had no means of avoiding battle. He took up a position on the heights of St. Michel, near Leoben, hoping that the nature of the ground would enable him successfully to resist much superior forces. But Prince Eugène's army of 32,000 or 33,000 men, all in high spirits, were not to be stopped by a force not equal to a third of their own numbers. They had to cross a river and climb mountains to reach Jellachich's 9000 men. This was done with extraordinary boldness, in spite of grape and musketry, and in a few hours Jellachich lost about 2000 killed and wounded, and 4000 prisoners. It was with great difficulty that, by dispersing his men in all directions through a country devoted to Austria, he saved 3000, whom he led to Grätz to Archduke John.

The chances were still less in favour of a junction with General Chasteler, who could only bring with him 5000 or 6000 men, after leaving detachments in Tyrol, and was to find the route through Carinthia and Styria in the occupation of the French. Archduke John then found his forces raised at the most to but 18,000 men by his junction with the wreck of Jellachich's corps, and knew not yet what would become of the ban Giulay, who, with his detachment and the Croat levies, had to do with Macdonald and Marmont. Thinking it prudent to approach Hungary, he stationed a garrison in the fortress of Grätz, and moved in the direction of Raab, still waiting for orders from his brother, and leaving Prince Eugène to march victoriously to Vienna, whither no obstacle could hinder his arrival, since General Lauriston's detachment was waiting for

him at Bruck. In the environs of that town the two French advance guards met and embraced, and the important fact of the junction of the armies of Italy and Germany was consummated.

General Macdonald's march from Udine to Laybach with his 16,000 or 17,000 men had been not less happily accomplished. He had crossed the Izonzo, turned and taken the fort of Prevald, and debouched on Laybach, taking prisoners a whole battalion encountered on his route. During this time one of his detachments occupied Trieste. On arriving at Laybach he found there a vast entrenched camp, constructed at great cost, and defended by a strong body of troops, that rendered its capture almost impossible. Macdonald hesitated to attack it with such a force as he possessed, fearing lest he should weaken himself by a fruitless attempt, and be afterwards unable to keep the field. He was therefore about to pass on, when he received from the panic-stricken commandant an offer to capitulate. He accepted the offer; and thus he had made, *en passant*, between 4000 and 5000 prisoners, got possession of the fine works of Laybach, and regained the road to Grätz, where he hoped to fall in with the main body of the army of Italy. He arrived there on the 30th of May, having prosperously traversed a large extent of country, and increased the number of his prisoners to 7000. He halted at Grätz to wait the viceroy's orders, and sent out patrols along the roads of Carniola, to procure news of General Marmont, who, however, having with him 10,000 of the best soldiers, had no reason to fear the troops of the ban, or the insurgent musters scattered along his line of march.

This junction, which yielded Napoleon a reinforcement of 45,000 to 50,000, and to the enemy not more than 15,000 to 18,000, supplied him with a sure means of revenging himself for the battle of Essling. Wishing to indemnify his adopted son for the hurt done to his reputation at Sacile, and to recompense him for his victorious march from Verona to Leoben, and deeming it of much importance to proclaim the vast advantages that would result from the junction of all the French armies, he published a glowing order of the day, in which he paid a just tribute of praise to the army of Italy, and set forth its exploits with a certain exaggeration which was not, after all, very far from the truth; for since their departure from Verona, the prince and Macdonald had taken from the enemy, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, not less than 20,000 men, against 4000 or 5000 fatigued or wounded whom they had left behind on their route.

Supposing that Prince Eugène could furnish 30,000 men present under arms, and General Macdonald 15,000, this would be (without counting General Marmont, who might be left, if

needful, in Styria or Hungary) a force of 45,000 men, and of 40,000 at least added to the French army at Vienna. Adding to these the 100,000 which would be made up by the junction of Davout, Massena, Oudinot, the cavalry reserve, the imperial guard, and the Saxons, Napoleon would have at hand, even before the arrival of his reinforcements, the enormous mass of 140,000 men—quite sufficient for a decisive battle beyond the Danube. Archduke Charles was not in a condition to bring together an equal number of troops, or of as good quality, even had he Napoleon's art of concentrating his forces on the day of battle. Napoleon had then the means of finishing the war as soon as his immense preparations for crossing the Danube should have been completed. However, as he was resolved this time to make sure work, he was unwilling to come to a last decisive action until the Danube should have been surmounted with works of infallible solidity, and until Prince Eugène, Macdonald, and Marmont were ready to co-operate, directly or indirectly, in the operations before Vienna.

To this end were directed all his instructions to Prince Eugène, whom, now that he had him within reach, he guided as a son and a pupil, whose talents he was as anxious to display in the best light as to secure his co-operation in the great events impending. "You have now," he said to him, in a series of admirable letters, "various ends to propose to yourself; first, to finish the pursuit of Archduke John, so that there may remain on the right bank of the Danube and on the frontier of Hungary no gathering capable of annoying us during our manœuvres round Vienna; secondly, whilst forcing the archduke back against the Danube, to compel him to cross the river at Komorn rather than Presburg, so that the arc he shall describe being the longest possible, he may have less chance than you of being present at the approaching battle; thirdly, to separate Archduke John from Chasteler, Giulay, and all those who might increase his strength, whilst you, on the other hand, will be joined by Macdonald and Marmont; fourthly and lastly, to occupy the river Raab, which, falling into the Danube near Komorn, forms a barrier, with which you may cover yourself against Hungary; and for that purpose to secure the fortress of Raab, which commands the river at its mouth, and that of Grätz, which commands it at its source, so that this line may be defended by a few detachments, whilst the army of Italy is arriving by a stolen march under the walls of Vienna to form one of the wings of the grand army." Such were Napoleon's chief instructions to Prince Eugène. He also recommended him to make good use for himself and for the grand army of the vast resources of Hungary, in grain, forage, cattle, horses, and materials for navigation.

For the execution of these designs, Napoleon directed him,

after allowing his troops some rest, to leave detachments at Klagenfurth and Leoben, and proceed to Œdenburg, west of the lake of Neusiedel, where he would find General Lauriston with 3000 men of the Baden infantry, and 4000 cavalry under Colbert and Montbrun; to proceed thence to the Raab, and push his reconnaissances beyond that river, in order to ascertain what route Archduke John was taking, and once clear on that point, to manœuvre continually, so as to place that prince between Marshal Davout, who was at Presburg, and the army of Italy, in order to hinder his falling upon Macdonald or Marmont; to keep his forces together so as to have 30,000 men at hand (36,000 with Lauriston) when he again encountered Archduke John; to expedite the taking of the citadel of Grätz, and the junction with Macdonald and Marmont; to keep a careful look-out in his rear, so as to catch Chasteler as he had caught Jellachich; to send on to Vienna or back to Osopo all his wounded and invalids, and others incapable of active service; to lay up vast stores of provisions, and send his empty ammunition waggons half-way to Vienna to be filled; and in fine, to be always ready, either to fight another battle with Archduke John, or to co-operate along with Macdonald and Marmont in the grand final battle which was to be fought on the banks of the Danube against all the forces of the Austrian monarchy. Napoleon enjoined Prince Eugène to treat the Hungarians well if they were peaceable and well-disposed to the French, but otherwise to subject them to the ordinary consequences of war; that is to say, to live at their expense, but in any case to deal more tenderly by them than by the Austrians. The Hungarians, indeed, deserved this difference of treatment, for they did not display the same animosity against the French as did the other subjects of the house of Austria. Though they had given many proofs of attachment to that house, they were yet opposed to its direct authority, and they beheld in Napoleon the representative of the French Revolution, which had excited much sympathy among them. A rumour had soon spread all over the country that Napoleon contemplated the enfranchisement of Hungary as well as of Poland, and those among the Hungarians who were inclined to the new order of things manifested a sort of liking for him, distinct from the admiration excited by his prodigious career. Nevertheless, the urgent efforts of the Archduke Palatine, the presence of the court and its influence with the higher nobility, had counterbalanced the opposite influences, and Hungary had risen in response to the call of the archdukes, but rather, as many reports alleged, from interested motives than from enthusiasm for the imperial cause. Under pretext of the levy en masse, it was said Hungary sought to exempt herself from the regular contributions in men and

horses she would have had to make had she been treated like the other provinces of the monarchy. It must be owned she had not furnished by the levy en masse more than a score thousands of men, 7000 or 8000 of whom were gentlemen cavalry, and 12,000 indifferent infantry, composed of Germans, whom the nobles paid as substitutes for themselves in the rising.

Aware of these doubtful dispositions of the Hungarians, Napoleon addressed to them friendly proclamations, promising them independence at the peace, and exemption from all charges during the war, if they forbore to take up arms against him. The effect of these proclamations had not been to detach them from the house of Austria, but to cool their zeal for the Austrian government, and to dispose them to receive the French with less hostility. Napoleon's instructions to Prince Eugène with respect to Hungary had reference to this state of things. The prince followed those instructions to the best of his ability, and almost as well as Napoleon could desire for the general result of the campaign.

The prince, having learned that Archduke John was at Kormond, on the Upper Raab, waiting for orders, marched to Güns, and then to Stein am Anger, to give him battle, at the same time sending word to General Macdonald to join him. The latter had halted at Grätz to wait for Marmont, and was endeavouring to take the fortress which commanded the town, and, through it, the district. But the fortress was well armed, advantageously situated, and could only be besieged with heavy artillery, of which Macdonald was entirely destitute. He tried to batter the walls with shells, and then to intimidate the commandant, but all in vain. He was master, then, of the town of Grätz, and obliged to blockade the citadel, which formed its chief strength. On receiving Prince Eugène's despatches, Macdonald set out to join him with the Lamarque division, Pully's dragoons, two battalions of the Broussier division, and the greater part of the artillery. He left General Broussier before Grätz with eight battalions only, two regiments of light cavalry, and ten field-pieces, leaving him to do the work that ought to have been done by the whole corps, namely, to take the citadel of Grätz, effect a junction with the army of Dalmatia, and hinder Chasteler from escaping from Tyrol into Hungary. Fortunately the troops were excellent, and soon showed that they could resist vastly superior forces.

General Macdonald arrived on the 8th of June at Kormond, where he and Prince Eugène were delighted to meet once more safe and sound, after a month of divergent and perilous movements through hostile countries. Their most natural course would have been to hold together thenceforth until they had finally beaten Archduke John. But Prince Eugène, feeling

confusedly the impropriety of leaving General Broussier alone at Grätz, thought to make up for it by leaving General Macdonald alone at Papa, that he might be within reach of Broussier and Marmont; an arrangement which aggravated the fault committed, since the force was now about to be broken up into four detachments, viz., Marmont, with 10,000 men; Broussier, with 7000; Macdonald, with 8000; Prince Eugène, with 30,000. General Macdonald was sent to Papa, whilst Prince Eugène marched down the valley of the Raab in pursuit of Archduke John.

The latter, who had been meanwhile moving about between the Muhr and the Raab, had at last returned towards the Danube, in obedience to the reiterated orders of his commander-in-chief that he should leave to General Stoïchevich, ban Giulay, and Chasteler, the task of harassing the French in Hungary, throw a garrison into Presburg, and then post himself with the best part of the troops from Italy behind the Danube, in order to take part in the battle that was again to be fought there sooner or later. In accordance with these orders he had marched along the Raab, by Kormond, Sarvar, Papa, and the town of Raab, situated not far from the confluence of the river with the Danube, between Komorn and Presburg. Raab was a fortified town, but had been long neglected, and was then in but an indifferent state of defence. There was an entrenched camp connected with it, which afforded a good position on the river. Archduke John was joined there by his brother, the Archduke Palatine, and the Hungarian rising; and the two princes, with their combined force of 40,000 men, resolved to give battle to Prince Eugène before they abandoned the right bank of the Danube.

On the 12th and 13th of June they had been closely followed up by Prince Eugène's advanced guards, and on the evening of the 13th they were posted round Raab, with a certainty of a very hot engagement on the following day if they did not consent to retreat. As the position seemed to them advantageous, they established themselves on a plateau, with their right resting on the Raab, their backs to the Danube, which flowed at the distance of some leagues in the rear, and their left to marshes of considerable extent. They employed the evening of the 13th and the morning of the 14th in rectifying their position, and in mingling the regular troops with those of the rising, in order to impart some of the firmness of the former to the latter. In this respect they acted upon a specific order from Archduke Charles—an order which was very judicious, but which made them lose much time on the present occasion. They were not ready for battle before eleven in the forenoon of the 14th.

Fortunately for them Prince Eugène, though he had pursued

them with right good-will, was himself not prepared to attack them before eleven or twelve o'clock.

He had marched, like the Austrian princes, along the banks of the Raab, with his left to the river, where the Austrians had their right, and his right to the marshy plain, where they had their left. He marched in several echelons, the Seras division forming the first on the right, the Durutte division the second on the centre, and Severoli's Italian division the third on the left. The Pacthod division and the Italian guard formed a double reserve in the rear. The cavalry was distributed on the wings. This arrangement was dictated by the nature of the ground and the distribution of the enemy's forces on the plateau about to be attacked. In the marshy plain on our right was seen the Hungarian cavalry, 7000 or 8000 strong, making a very brilliant appearance, but not so formidable as they were handsome to behold. They were supported by regular hussars of less brilliant aspect, but proved in the Italian campaign; the whole being under the orders of General Mecszery. A little less to the right, inclining towards the centre, behind a muddy stream, was seen the infantry under Jellachich and Colloredo, occupying the very solid buildings of the large farm of Kismegyer and the village of Szabadhegy. Lastly, from that village to the Raab, that is to say, towards our left, was Frimont's infantry, forming the right of the Austrians towards the river and the entrenched camp. The latter was defended by 4000 or 5000 of the least serviceable troops, and blockaded by General Lauriston with the Badeners.

After conferring with Generals Grouchy, Montbrun, Grenier, Seras, and Durutte, Prince Eugène made the following arrangements. Whilst Montbrun's cavalry deployed so as to mask the movements of our infantry, the Seras, Durutte, and Severoli divisions, advancing in echelons, were to attack the farm of Kismegyer and the village of Szabadhegy successively on both sides. The Pacthod division and the Italian guard, stationed as a reserve, were to support whichever of the three echelons had need of aid. Grouchy and Montbrun on the right were to assail the enemy's cavalry, whilst on the left Sahuc was to connect the army with Lauriston's detachment. Perceiving then, but rather late, the wisdom of Napoleon's principles, Prince Eugène sent aide-de-camp after aide-de-camp to General Macdonald to bring him from Papa the 8000 men who would be so welcome to him at that moment, for he had only 36,000 against 40,000 established in a strong position. Fortunately Macdonald, foreseeing that he might be useful at Raab, whilst at Papa he was doing nothing either for Broussier or Marmont, had set out of his own accord, and was already visible in the distance, preceded by Pully's dragoons.

Towards noon the army was put in motion to attack the enemy's position. Montbrun deployed his four regiments of light cavalry, and executed his evolutions under a violent fire of artillery, and with admirable coolness, just as if he was exercising on a parade-ground. Then when the Seras division, forming the first echelon, was in line, he put his regiments to the gallop and dashed in upon the noble cavaliers that had come hesitatingly to the aid of the house of Austria. However brave a nation may be, nothing can supply in it the want of experience in war. In an instant the glittering force dispersed before Montbrun's light horse, which was accustomed to cross swords even with cuirassiers, and left the left of the Austrians uncovered. There remained the regular hussars, which were worthy of measuring their strength with ours. They charged Montbrun, who immediately returned the brunt, and forced them to fall back on their *corps de bataille.*

During this time Seras' infantry, formed in two lines, had attacked the farm of Kismegyer. Before arriving at it the muddy stream had to be crossed, and this was more difficult than had been expected; for the stream was deep, and defended by brave and skilful sharpshooters. They succeeded, however, in crossing it, and marched against the large square farmhouse of Kismegyer, the walls of which were loopholed, and defended by 1200 of the best infantry. Meanwhile the second echelon, under Durutte, having also crossed the stream, attacked the village of Szabadhegy on the right, whilst the Severoli division assailed it on the left. The action was now going on along the whole line, and the Austrian artillery and musketry poured a most destructive downhill fire on our troops. Prince Eugène rushed from one end of the field of battle to the other, prodigal of his life, like a valiant officer who panted to compensate by his bravery for his deficiencies as a commander.

General Seras encountered such a tremendous fire of musketry from all the openings of the farmhouse that in a few minutes he had 700 or 800 men laid low, sixty of whom were officers. He made the first line fall back on the second, to enable his men to recover themselves; and when his brave soldiers had taken breath, he led them back, sword in hand, burst open the doors with the axes of his sappers, and rushing in with bayonets lowered, put to death some hundreds of the defenders of the farm, and took the rest prisoners. He then marched against the left of the Austrian line, which, falling back on the summit of the plateau, still maintained a bold bearing. All this time the fighting had been equally obstinate at the village of Szabadhegy. The Austrians defended themselves stoutly behind the houses, and made us pay dearly for our conquest of the village. They fell back for a while, but to return to the charge. The

bulk of the troops composing their centre and their right charged into the village, and drove out Durutte on the one side, and Severoli's Italians on the other, towards the stream. The first line of these two divisions retreated through the intervals of their second line, which, far from giving way, advanced against the village, bringing back the first line with it, and with the help of the Pacthod division, finally drove the Austrians out of Szabadhegy. Our army now advanced right and left beyond the two points d'appui of the enemy's line which we had taken. It was the moment for the cavalry to act. Montbrun, Grouchy, and Colbert dashed after the Austrians to cut off their retreat. Montbrun broke several squares and made many prisoners, but was stopped by the firm bearing of the Austrian army, which retired in good order. On the left, the 8th regiment of chasseurs of Sahuc's division, being more in advance than the rest, rushed with extraordinary impetuosity on the Austrian right wing, just when it was withdrawing from Raab, and bore down all before it. It had already made several thousand of the enemy's infantry lay down their arms, and taken a great deal of artillery, when the Austrians, perceiving it was not supported, recovered from their confusion, fired upon it, and would have handled it severely, if the rest of the division, brought tardily up by its general, had not rescued it. This brave regiment retained, nevertheless, 1500 prisoners, and some cannons and flags.

The archdukes, seeing that the battle was totally lost, at last ordered a retreat, which, under favour of the ground and of the night, was not so disastrous as they might have feared, and was effected by St. Yrany towards the inundated lands of the Danube. This battle, which gloriously for Prince Eugène and the army of Italy repaired the defeat of Sacile, cost us 2000 killed and wounded, and the Austrians about 3000 men hors de combat, 2500 prisoners, and 2000 soldiers missing. It extinguished the Archduke John and the Archduke Palatine, secured the junction of Generals Broussier and Marmont, and left us no longer exposed on the left bank to anything more formidable than some incursions of hussars, which might be sufficiently counteracted by a few detachments of cavalry. General Macdonald arrived on the field of battle towards the close of the day to embrace the young prince, in whose success he was strongly interested.

Whilst at this point Napoleon's plan was executed, with the exception of some slight faults of detail, in a manner so conformable to his intentions, the junction between Marmont and Broussier was also taking place. The latter general, left alone at Grätz, would have suffered severely if his troops had not been of the steadiest kind. After having begun by cannonad-

ing the citadel of Grätz with howitzers without avail, he had made several excursions into Croatia to distances of twelve or fifteen leagues in the direction by which Marmont was approaching, and each time, with 5000 or 6000 men, he had fought little battles with ban Giulay, in which he had completely beaten him. But in these frequent departures from Grätz he had not been able sufficiently to guard the roads from Tyrol, and General Chasteler had passed between the posts of the army of Italy and reached Hungary much more fortunately than General Jellachich. Just then General Marmont had advanced to the vicinity of Grätz, and sent word of his approach to General Broussier, who immediately proceeded down the valley of the Muhr in hopes of meeting him at Kalsdorf, leaving two battalions of the 84th in a faubourg of Grätz to guard the town. But whilst he was marching down the right bank of the Muhr, the ban Giulay marched up the left bank at the head of 15,000 men, half regular troops, half belonging to the Croat rising, and suddenly fell upon the two battalions left in Grätz. Though attacked by a whole army, the two battalions held out for nineteen hours with heroic courage under Colonel Gambin. They killed 1200 of the enemy, made 400 or 500 prisoners, and gave General Broussier time to come to their succour. That general, hearing of Giulay's movement, returned in all haste, fell upon the ban's troops, routed them, and rescued the two battalions. Marmont's advanced guards at last appeared at a distance of one or two marches. So that corps of 10,000 men, the best in the army after Davout's, was come to join the belligerent masses; all the forces of Italy and Dalmatia were now available for Napoleon; the corps of Stoïchevich and Giulay were entirely dispersed; and the two archdukes (John and the Palatine) were finally driven beyond the Danube.

There was enough in this to indemnify Napoleon for the battle of Essling; and he had need of it, for encouraged by that famous battle, his enemies were busier than ever, and were again striving to raise the Tyrol, Swabia, Saxony, Westphalia, and Prussia. On hearing of the alleged defeat of the French at Essling, Hofer, the Tyrolese, and Major Teimer had descended from the summits of the Brenner, although they were much incensed against the Austrian government, which had taken from them the two corps of Jellachich and Chasteler. Their hatred to the house of Bavaria made up for what their love for the house of Austria had lost in warmth. The Bavarian general Deroy having been left alone to defend Inspruck, had found himself attacked from all the neighbouring heights by a swarm of mountaineers—bad soldiers in the plain, but excellent sharpshooters in the mountains, and very formidable adversaries for one who was forced to retreat. Having been obliged to make

head against them for several days, General Deroy had exhausted nearly all his ammunition, and fearing, moreover, that he should be deprived of provisions in consequence of the strict blockade of Inspruck, he had retired with his division to the fort of Kufstein, abandoning the capital of Tyrol for the second time. This event, of slight importance in itself, had made a deep impression throughout Bavaria, and especially upon the court, which was greatly afraid of being compelled again to evacuate Munich. The inhabitants of the Vorarlberg were also very much aroused. On the banks of Lake Constance, on the Upper Danube, and throughout all Swabia, the agitation was manifest; and it was evident that if we sustained a defeat more real than that of Essling, our rear would be seriously threatened.

The Austrians, who had produced this state of things, had recently aggravated it by a measure extremely dangerous for us. They had given the Duke of Brunswick Oels, son of the famous Duke of Brunswick, the means of raising a corps composed of refugees from all the German provinces, particularly Prussians; besides which, they had given him some regular troops and some landwehr, the whole forming about 8000 men, and had despatched him from Bohemia towards Saxony, sending on before him the most unfounded rumours about the alleged victory over the French at Essling. They had at the same time sent another corps of about 4000 men, half regular troops, half landwehr, towards Franconia, and heralded its march with the same tales. The first corps marched from Prague, and entered Dresden without a blow, the court flying before it to Leipsic. The second marched from Egra to Bareuth, taking advantage of the unguarded state in which the war on the Danube had left our allies of Bavaria and Wurtemberg. Their plan was to push on to Thuringia, combine there in one body under General Kienmayer, and enter Westphalia to drive out King Jerome. The latter, terrified at the impending danger, urgently applied at Paris for means of help which did not exist there, and by his cries of distress produced at last a sort of panic in the French capital.

The apparition of these columns excited a lively agitation in Germany, but called forth no insurrectional movement there, notwithstanding all the hopes of the kind with which the Austrians had flattered themselves, because Napoleon's prestige was still entire, and those even who spread the news of his defeat were not so very well assured of it as to venture to take arms against him. Major Schill's fate was no encouraging example. That bold partisan, thinking that in disobeying the open orders of his government he obeyed its secret wishes, left Berlin, as we have seen, with a corps of Prussian cavalry, and took to scouring the country, in hopes of being seconded by

the army and the people. Welcomed by everybody, but followed by none, and disconcerted even by the severe declarations issued from Königsberg, he fled to Mecklenburg, and thence to Pomerania, and surprised the ill-guarded fortress of Stralsund, with the intention of sustaining a siege there. But soon assailed by a Dutch corps, and even by a Danish corps that volunteered to give Napoleon this proof of its attachment to him, he was unable to defend the fortress with cavalry, and endeavouring to escape by one gate whilst the assailants were entering by another, he was cut down by a Dutch horseman, and his troop was taken, destroyed, or dispersed. As yet this had been the sole fruit of the German insurrections. Great was the exasperation against us, nevertheless, and there needed but one defeat, not fictive but real, to cause an explosion of the nations against us from one end of the continent to the other.

In Poland, Prince Poniatowski's able management of the campaign had produced unexpected but not very decisive results. The Archduke Ferdinand was forced by Prince Poniatowski's operations to make a rapid retreat, which might be interrupted and rendered disastrous by crossing over to the left bank of the river. A Polish corps of 5000 men, under General Dombrowski, proposed to adopt this plan, but was unable to execute it alone; the Russians, however, who had arrived in line towards the end of June, whereas they should have arrived in April, might execute this manœuvre, and not allow a single Austrian to return into Galicia. Prince Poniatowski entreated them to do so, but found in them a manifest want of alacrity, which was not to be accounted for either by the weather or the overflow of the rivers, or by the imperfections of Russian administration. The true reason of their inaction was, that their aversion to destroy the Austrians for the benefit of the Poles was such as to make them even disobey the orders of their own government. Prince Gallitzen was severely reprimanded by Alexander, and showed somewhat less coldness to Prince Poniatowski, but did nothing to overcome the resistance of his lieutenants, one of whom, Prince Gortschakoff, even stated in a letter that he came with the hope of joining the Austrians, not the Poles. The latter having intercepted the letter, sent it to St. Petersburg with many others. Wherever the Russian and Austrian advanced posts met, they shook hands, and promised each other that they should soon be serving together. In short, the Russians seemed to have entered Galicia only for the purpose of putting down the insurrection there. Under pretext of taking possession of the country, they everywhere suppressed the new Polish, and reinstated the old Austrian authorities.

Whilst the Russians were thus breaking their word, probably against the will of their sovereign, the Poles, on their part, were

likewise, against the will of Napoleon, violating the pledge which had been given to the Russians, and were announcing in all their proclamations the approaching restoration of Poland. Yet Napoleon had strictly enjoined them to speak only of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and not to alienate the Russians from him by imprudent language. He had told them again and again that the day would come when, without breaking his engagements or bringing down upon himself more enemies than he could fight at once, he would complete their reconstitution by gradually enlarging the Duchy of Warsaw; that he could not do everything at a blow; that he must have time and opportunity for the accomplishment of his work; and that to manifest their hopes prematurely at that moment would be uselessly exposing themselves and him to danger. In giving this advice, Napoleon was no more hearkened to by the Poles than Alexander was by the Russians. It must be owned, however, that had Alexander applied himself sincerely to command the obedience of his subjects, he might have been much more successful with them than Napoleon could have been with the Poles. But he was himself a Russian, and to work for the re-establishment of Poland, by helping the Poles against the Austrians, was almost as repugnant to him as to his soldiers. He was himself unconsciously the ringleader of the revolt against his own policy.

Such were the perplexities of all Europe whilst the Archduke Charles and Napoleon were contending under the walls of Vienna. But the latter gave little heed to them, and cared only for what was passing around him between Lintz, Leoben, Raab, Presburg, and Lobau. For all the rest he contented himself with a few well-devised precautions. He sent General Cafarelli, war minister of the kingdom of Italy, to Milan, to fill the place left vacant by the absence of Prince Eugène, and ordered him to employ all the detachments that could be spared for the purpose in blockading the Tyrol, by occupying the passes of the mountains. He directed Prince Eugène to leave the Rusca division at Klagenfurth to effect the same blockade on the Carinthian side. The Bavarian general Deroy was to do the same on the Bavarian side, by occupying Rosenheim and Kufstein, so as to hem in the fire, as it were, and prevent its spreading, leaving it for a future day to take more active measures against the Tyrolese, when he should have finished with the Austrian grand army. As for Swabia and the Vorarlberg, he had the means of keeping them down in the forces stationed at Augsburg. He ordered General Beaumont to post himself with some of these troops at Kempten, Lindau, and along Lake Constance, in order to drive back any force that might attempt to issue from the mountain passes.

General Bourcier commanded the general depôt of the cavalry

at Passau. He had there all the dismounted men, the detachments of recruits, the saddlery workshops, and a market for the purchase of horses; and he took charge of the fatigued men and invalids until they were again fit for service. Napoleon ordered him to leave the depôt for a while to a competent deputy and advance to Bareuth, taking with him two regiments of dragoons, 2000 strong, the horse regiment of Berg, and 2000 or 3000 Bavarians, drafted from the fortresses of the Palatinate. General Rivaud, stationed at Wurzburg, at the head of two provisional demi-brigades, was to join General Bourcier at Bareuth, and march with him against the small force which had issued from Bohemia. After finishing that short expedition, General Bourcier was to return to Passau and resume the command of the cavalry depôt. General Rivaud was to join four demi-brigades at Hanau, under Marshal Kellermann, and proceed to Saxony to act against the Austrians who had entered Dresden. Napoleon wrote to Paris to Clarke, the minister of war, and to Fouché, the minister of police, severely reproaching them for the fears they had too easily conceived on the occasion of the events in Dresden and Bareuth. "If some insignificant incursions alarm you to this degree," said Napoleon, "what would you do should serious events occur—such events as may occur in war without one being beaten? I am very far from pleased to see men in my service display so little force of character, and themselves setting the example of the most ridiculous terrors. There can be no serious events except on the theatre where I am operating, and there I am present to control them."

Prince Eugène being victorious at Raab, Archduke John and the Archduke Palatine being driven beyond the Danube, and the junction of the armies of Italy in Dalmatia being secured, Napoleon had but one object to engage his attention before his last battle, and that was to hinder the two archdukes from recrossing the Danube at Presburg or Komorn, and following the French armies of Italy and Dalmatia when the latter came to fight under the walls of Vienna. To this end it was necessary to hinder the Austrians from using the bridge at Presburg, and to occupy the line of the Raab, so that it might stop the Austrians for three or four days, which would be quite time enough for the armies of Italy and Dalmatia to move to Vienna. The Austrians had a bridge at Presburg, and a *tête de pont* at the village of Engerau; and they had retained the fortress of Raab after Prince Eugène's victory on the river of that name.

Napoleon assigned to Marshal Davout, who was before Presburg with one of his divisions, the task of taking Engerau, destroying Presburg bridge, and even if possible that of Komorn, situated much lower down. To Prince Eugène he prescribed

the taking of the fortress of Raab, which he regarded as the true consummation of his recent victory. He had all the artillery horses that were not employed on the works in the island of Lobau echeloned on the road to Presburg and Raab to convey heavy cannon thither, and bring back the corn with which Hungary abounded. Though no general was less cruel than Napoleon, he was nevertheless inexorable in the accomplishment of his designs, and he ordered all the means of war to be used with the utmost rigour against Presburg and Raab, in order to get possession of those two points. The means prescribed were terrible, but the safety of the army and of the empire required them.

Towards the end of May, Marshal Davout began by attacking with the Gudin division the entrenchments of Engerau, which served to cover a bridge of boats thrown across the river before Presburg, and resting on several islands. These entrenchments consisted of earthworks connected with the village of Engerau, and defended with many pieces of artillery. Marshal Davout attacked them with the vigour which his soldiers displayed on all occasions; but the Austrians, who appreciated the importance of the position, defended it with equal energy. They lost 1500 or 1800 men, and we 800, before that mere *tête de pont.* The works being carried, Marshal Davout found himself on the margin of the river. The portion of bridge which abutted on one side was drawn back, but the remaining portions were fixed between entrenched islands, which it would have been necessary to take one after the other by an exceedingly difficult and tedious operation. All imaginable means were employed to destroy those portions of the bridge. Boats loaded with stones were sent down stream against them, and burning mills, as the Austrians had done at Lobau. But the Presburg bridge, which was no hasty structure, and which was guarded by boatmen who stopped the floating bodies carried down by the current, resisted all these attempts. Marshal Davout then, by order of the emperor, set up batteries of howitzers and mortars, and let fall on the islands a horrible rain of fire and iron, in spite of which the Austrian soldiers remained at their posts with singular fortitude. Driven to extremities by this resistance, Napoleon gave orders that the town of Presburg should be summoned to surrender, and if it refused to do so, or at least to destroy its bridge, it should be ruined to its foundations. Marshal Davout, who was a perfectly honourable man, but a pitiless soldier, began this cruel execution without hesitation. After a summons to General Bianchi, the commandant of Presburg, he gave the word to fire, and in a few hours cast innumerable bombs into the unfortunate town. After having set it on fire in several places, he again summoned the

commandant, requiring from him what he was bound to insist upon—the destruction of the bridge. General Bianchi replied that the preservation of the bridge being necessary for the defence of the Austrian monarchy, the town of Presburg would endure the last extremities rather than consent to the conditions proposed. Marshal Davout recommenced his fire, but seeing that it would remain ineffectual, for the Austrian general persevered in his resistance, he yielded at last to an impulse of humanity, and had recourse to other means in order to annul the communications between one bank and the other. After all, what was requisite in order to attain the end in view? To stop any Austrian corps which should appear in those parts for three or four days—a space of time sufficient for the concentration of the French troops under the walls of Vienna. The marshal therefore threw up a series of entrenchments connected with the fortified castle of Kittsee, the very extensive isle of Schutt, and the river and fortress of Raab. A few thousand men, with light cavalry to scour for them the isle of Schutt and the banks of the Raab, defending the entrenchments of Engerau, and falling back if these were forced on the castle of Kittsee, whilst the fortress of Raab likewise defended itself, might detain the enemy for the necessary number of days, and delay his arrival until all was decided under the walls of Vienna. These measures, approved of by Napoleon, were adopted, and rendered it unnecessary to continue the destruction of Presburg.

Meanwhile, General Lauriston, seconded by General Lasalle, had begun the siege of Raab, being covered by the army of Italy, which was thus enabled to rest from its fatigues. There was a want of large cannons, but Napoleon sent some from Vienna, with howitzers and twelve-pounders. Fortunately, the places being in bad condition, and garrisoned by not more than 2000 men, could not long hold out. Immediately after the battle of the 14th the works were begun. The trenches were opened, besieging batteries built, and a breaching fire begun. In a few days the garrison offered to capitulate, and were granted easy terms, and the besiegers entered Raab on the 22nd of June, without having damaged its works, or spent much ammunition, or lost many men in taking it.

The fortress of Raab was put in a better state of defence, in accordance with Napoleon's precise and very detailed orders. War stores and victuals were laid up in it; a garrison was formed for it of all the fatigued men and invalids of the army of Italy; the necessary repairs were made in the works, and Napoleon bestowed on it an illustrious commandant. This was the Count de Narbonne, formerly minister of war under Louis XVI., one of the last survivors of the old French nobility,

and distinguished alike for his courage, his wit, and the elegance of his manners.

Napoleon had all the artillery that was useless at Presburg and Raab brought back to Vienna, and despatched the wounded men of the armies of Italy and Dalmatia to the hospitals of Lombardy and Upper Austria, not choosing to leave a single cannon or man as a prize for the enemy. He ordered Prince Eugène, and Generals Macdonald, Broussier, and Marmont, to prepare to march at the first signal, to retain in the ranks no maimed or sick men, to have their artillery well horsed and well supplied, to spend a week in making biscuits for their troops, to procure cattle to accompany their march for the supply of meat; and in short, to make all arrangements for reaching Vienna in three days at the utmost. Generals Marmont, Broussier, and Macdonald were echeloned so as to accomplish the distance in the same space of time. Marshal Davout had but two days' march to make. It was settled that Prince Eugène should leave General Baraguay d'Hilliers with an Italian division before Engerau, to guard the approaches to Presburg, whilst the army of Italy moved bodily to Vienna. Napoleon, not choosing to employ such troops as those of Montbrun and Lasalle on a mere surveillance of distant posts, echeloned them so that he might have them by him in forty-eight hours, and placed instead of them on the line of the Raab 1200 or 1500 horse belonging to the marching regiments recently arrived. General Lasalle, who during the month of June had been incessantly inspecting the line from Presburg to Raab, and who knew its most minute details, had orders before he marched to place the posts himself, and give their commandants the requisite instructions for guarding themselves well.

Everything being thus prepared on this line, Napoleon took his measures on the Upper Danube. He had already drawn to him Marshal Davout's corps, spread out at that moment from Vienna to Presburg, the Saxon corps of Prince Bernadotte, and the French division of Dupas. He had left on the Upper Danube, to occupy St. Polten, Mautern, Mölk, Amstetten, Enns, and Lintz, only the Wurtembergers and Bavarians, both greatly reduced by this short but active campaign. The Wurtembergers under Vandamme were distributed between Tulln, Mautern, St. Polten, and Mölk. The Bavarians commissioned to defend Bavaria were General Deroy's division at Munich, Rosenheim, and Kufstein, and the two divisions of General de Wrede and the prince-royal at Lintz. Though this force was not too much to guard Bavaria under existing circumstances, it was rather a strong muster at the particular point of Lintz, since Archduke Charles, wishing on his part also to concentrate his troops, had brought Count Kollowrath

before Vienna, leaving only 6000 or 7000 men upon the Danube between Passau, Lintz, Krems, Tulln, and Klosterneuburg. Suspecting this circumstance from several reconnaissances made beyond the Danube by General Vandamme, Napoleon ordered Marshal Lefebvre to keep de Wrede's excellent division in readiness to march with four-and-twenty guns. The divisions of General Deroy and the prince-royal and the Wurtembergers, together with all the troops en route, and all those remaining in Augsburg, Passau, and Ratisbon, would be enough to maintain the security of our rear for some days. At Ratisbon was the Rouyer division, composed of the contingents of the minor German princes. There was evidently nothing to be feared on that side if the last battle was gained. If, contrary to all probability, it was lost, precautions were tolerably well taken at St. Polten, Mölk, Amstetten, Lintz, and Passau, that our sick and wounded might not be endangered, and that the army should find everywhere in its retreat provisions, ammunition, and perfectly solid points d'appui.

Besides devoting the month of June to preparing the concentration of his troops on Vienna, Napoleon employed it also in preparing the passage of the Danube, and rendering it this time so sure that the accident which had happened to his bridges during the battle of Essling could not possibly occur again. This is the place to make known by what gigantic works he had almost annulled the difficulty of crossing a vast body of running water, in presence of the enemy, with masses of men such as till then no commander, ancient or modern, had ever had to move.

The bridge of boats over the principal arm of the river, and serving to communicate with the isle of Lobau, had been re-established some days after the battle of Essling, and had been consolidated with fresh boats picked up on the banks of the river by the seamen of the guard, and fixed with better moorings. It had, however, been again broken two or three times by the June floods, and it was not with uncertain, though much better established means of communication, that Napoleon chose to venture beyond the Danube. He resolved then to connect the isle of Lobau with the mainland, so that it should make one piece with the right bank, which was to be our point of departure. This could only be effected by erecting a bridge on piles, which Napoleon resolved to do, however laborious such an operation would be on a river like the Danube below Vienna. Cæsar had executed a similar work eighteen hundred years before on the Rhine, but the difficulties were greater in our age, in consequence of the increased means of destruction possessed by the enemy. The engineer service

was employed on this work, whilst the artillery had the construction of all the bridges of boats. There were in Vienna large accumulations of timber, carried down from the summits of the Alps by the confluents of the Danube. All the engineer soldiers, all the carpenters out of work, and all the artillery horses left idle by the cessation of fighting, were employed in preparing or carrying this timber to the river to be floated down to Ebersdorf. There were numerous pile-driving machines in Vienna, river works being frequently executed there. These also were taken to Ebersdorf, and after three weeks' work sixty wooden piles were seen rearing themselves above the highest flood-mark, and on them lay a broad platform capable of giving passage to any quantity of artillery and cavalry. Twenty fathoms below this fixed bridge was the old bridge of boats, much strengthened, and intended for the infantry, so that the passage of the several arms might be effected simultaneously, and the communications with the isle of Lobau might be so much the more prompt.

Though these two works protected each other, Napoleon desired to secure them entirely from the shock of floating bodies, and he tried all sorts of means to that end. His first expedient had been to take from the arsenal of Vienna a huge chain which the Turks had used in the siege of 1683, and which had been preserved as one of the triumphal spoils. Now that our vessels are furnished with these enormous chains, we should not be so much astonished at the dimensions of that which the Turks left at Vienna; but at that time it was regarded as one of the most wonderful works of its kind. It was resolved then to stretch it across the large arm in order to stop the bodies thrown in by the enemy for the purpose of damaging our bridges. But this scheme had to be given up for want of machines to stretch the chain sufficiently. Napoleon then conceived the idea of constructing a vast wear, consisting of a series of large piles deeply imbedded, and planted obliquely to the stream, so as to give less prise to the force of the current. This work, not less extraordinary than the fixed bridge, was executed almost as quickly. But its efficacy did not appear to be certain, for it happened several times that the line of piles was forced by boats laden with materials which had escaped from the hands of the workmen. Napoleon then had recourse to another system, and established a constant look-out by means of the seamen of the guard, who, moving about continually in wherries above the wear, hooked the boats that floated down and drew them to the shore. By means of this combination of precautions the communications between the right bank and the isle of Lobau were rendered certain and infallible.

But it was not enough in Napoleon's eyes to have put his bridges out of the reach of all danger from the river. A surprise by the enemy, a sudden incursion into the isle of Lobau, a retreat, it might be, in disorder after the loss of a battle, might expose them to unforeseen and inevitable destruction, Napoleon resolved to protect them by a vast *tête de pont* erected on the isle of Lobau, so that if that isle were taken from us, some battalions might defend them, and the army might thus retain the means of retiring in safety to the other side of the river.

This series of works indissolubly connected the isle of Lobau with the right bank and with the little town of Ebersdorf, now become our base of operations. There were works also to be executed in the island in order to make of it an entrenched camp, spacious, secure, commodious, salubrious, and provided with everything necessary for living there some days.

There were in the isle of Lobau low and marshy grounds often exposed to inundation. There were also small channels which were dry when the waters were low, and became real rivers when they were high. We had had an example of this during the great floods of May 21st, 22nd, and 23rd. Napoleon had raised causeways made in the low parts of the isle to enable the troops to move about in all weathers, and he had several wooden bridges thrown over each dry watercourse, so that there might be no difficulty in passing them in any state of the waters. Intending that the isle should become a grand depôt which should suffice for itself, happen what might, he had a powder magazine built on it, and supplied from the arsenals of Vienna. Ovens were erected by his orders, stores of Hungarian flour were laid in, and several thousand oxen from the same country were turned out to pasture. He sent wine also in abundance, and of such quality as the French army had never drunk anywhere but in Spain. The Austrian aristocracy and the convents of Vienna, which possessed the best cellars in Europe, supplied that choice beverage. Desiring that the isle should be as easy to traverse by night as by day, Napoleon had all the roads lighted by lamps, hung on posts, just as in the streets of a great town.

The last and most difficult preparatory measure was to provide for the passage of the small branch, which was to be effected by force in the face of a powerful enemy, kept on the alert by our presence in the isle of Lobau. Whatever advantages were presented by the site of the old passage, it was not likely it could be used again. Indeed, the Austrians had in a manner walled up that door by erecting a line of entrenchments, thickly planted with artillery, from Essling to Aspern. Another objection to the old landing-place was, that it was not

spacious enough for the deployment of a considerable army. The enemy was so well aware that it was by the isle of Lobau we should make our descent on the left bank, that we might expect to find him drawn up in order of battle immediately before us; whereas on the former occasion our several corps had time to defile one after the other, and to deploy without impediment. This could not be expected to happen again, so that now we had to prepare to debouch almost en masse, and to fight at the very moment we touched the ground.

For these reasons Napoleon looked about for a new passage, only making a feint of still preferring the old one. The small arm of the river, on reaching the extremity of the island, turned off at a right angle, and ran 4000 yards in a straight line along the right flank of the island to meet the main stream. If a point on that line was chosen for the crossing-place, the descent would be upon a smooth plain, very commodious for the deployment of a numerous army. On that plain, then, Napoleon resolved to debouch. It is true there was nothing in the conformation of the ground to afford the army any protection; but if it passed over en masse, it would be protected by that very circumstance; besides, it was not impossible to make up for the exposed character of the ground by a judicious arrangement of artillery.

On the left bank, just at the abrupt bend of the small branch, was situated the inconsiderable town of Enzersdorf, covered with defensive works and artillery like Essling and Aspern; then a little lower down was the open plain just mentioned; and lastly, thick woods covering the ground to the confluence of the two arms of the river. It was between Enzersdorf and these woods that Napoleon determined to cross the stream.

But he took all possible pains to convince the enemy that he would cross at the old place on the left of the island, where he erected numerous works, not only for that reason, but also because he deemed it expedient to have bridges in all directions, so as to increase his facilities for crossing the river and deploying rapidly. But the most important works were accumulated on the right side of the island, along the line from Enzersdorf to the junction of the two branches of the river. Some islets in the small branch, to which the army gave names of their own choosing, such as Isle Massena, Isle des Moulins, Isle Espagne, Isle Pouzet, Isle Lannes, Isle Alexandre, were joined to Lobau by fixed bridges, and covered with batteries of large calibre. These batteries, mounting 109 pieces of ordnance, including 24-pounders, howitzers, and mortars, were intended to cast projectiles to a great distance, and cover every spot at which the enemy presented themselves. Those of the Isle

Massena, Isle des Moulins, and Isle Espagne were to fire upon Aspern, Essling, and the works raised in that direction. Those of the Isle Pouzet were in two hours to reduce the unfortunate town of Enzersdorf to ashes. Lastly, those of the Isle Alexandre were to sweep the plain chosen for the deployment of the French, and were to pour upon it such a mass of grape that no hostile force should be able to remain on it. As there was no want of time, they were planted with the utmost care, and provided with earthworks, platforms, and small powder magazines. The heavy guns, which an army never takes with it, had been procured from the arsenal of Vienna, and the carriages had been constructed by the workmen there.

In order to render the passage of his troops simultaneous and crushing, Napoleon had recourse to arrangements unknown before. It was his design that in some minutes several thousand men should have crossed the small branch, and surprised and taken the Austrian advanced posts; that in two hours 50,000 others should have deployed on the enemy's side of the river to fight a first battle; and that in four or five, 150,000 soldiers, 40,000 horses, and 600 guns should have passed over in order to decide the fate of the Austrian monarchy. Never had such operations been projected or executed on such a scale.

When a river is to be crossed, the operation is begun by suddenly conveying some determined men to the opposite side in boats. These men proceed to disarm or kill the enemy's advanced posts, and to fix the moorings to which the boats are to be attached that are to carry the bridge. The army then passes over as quickly as possible; for a bridge is a long narrow defile, which masses of infantry, cavalry, and artillery cannot traverse without greatly extending their length.

The first of these operations was the most difficult in presence of an enemy so numerous and so well prepared as were the Austrians. To facilitate it, Napoleon had large flat boats constructed, capable of carrying 300 men each, and having a movable gunwale to protect the men from musketry, which being let down would serve instead of planks for landing. Every *corps d'armée* was provided with five of these flat boats, which made an advanced guard of 1500 men carried over at once and unexpectedly at each point of passage. Now it was not likely that the enemy, who did not know exactly where the operation was to be performed, could confront us with advanced posts so considerable as these. A hawser was to be immediately attached to a tree and stretched across the stream, and the boats were to ply along it to and fro. The construction of the bridges was then to begin. All the boats being prepared, all the tackle arranged, the places selected, and the men instructed as to what they had to do, there was reason to believe that two hours

would suffice for the completion of a bridge sixty fathoms long —an operation which used formerly to occupy twelve or fifteen hours if everything was ready, from twenty-four to forty-eight if it was not so. Napoleon decided that four bridges at least should be formed—two of boats, one of pontoons, and one of large rafts for the cavalry and artillery, so that three *corps d'armée* might debouch simultaneously—those, namely, of Massena, Oudinot, and Davout. Thus several thousand men, ferried over in boats in a few minutes, would suffice to overwhelm the enemy's advanced posts. Fifty to sixty thousand debouching in two hours under the protection of formidable batteries would make head against the forces which the enemy might bring together on becoming aware of the passage. Lastly, in four or five hours the whole army would have debouched, ready to give battle, and provided with means of retreat as secure as if it had not a great river behind it. It was probable, even, that the operation would be ended before the enemy could disturb it, for the fire of powerful batteries and the simultaneous passage of our troops would naturally throw it into extreme confusion.

Another contrivance of Napoleon's was to enable a column of infantry to debouch on the instant, and as quickly as the advanced guards carried over in the flat boats. To this end he invented a bridge of a novel description, the construction of which he entrusted to Captain Dessales, a very intelligent officer. The common way of bridge-making is to moor a series of boats side by side, one after the other. Napoleon conceived the idea of having a bridge in one single piece, composed of boats fastened together beforehand. It was to be floated down the stream to the spot chosen for it; one end was then to be made fast to the shore; the other, being left free, would be carried by the force of the current to the opposite bank, to which it was to be fixed by men who were to run along it for that purpose. This being accomplished, no more would be requisite than to drop some anchors, in order to steady it in the middle. It had been calculated, and rightly, as the result showed, that some minutes would be sufficient for this prodigious operation.

Lest the place where this bridge was constructed might betray the secret of its destined site, the following precaution was taken. The isle of Lobau was covered with yards and docks for boat-building, as though it had been one of the great ports of France. The docks were connected by canals with the small branch of the river, and there the numerous boats, pontoons, and rafts to be used in constructing the bridges were built without indicating the place where the passage was to be effected. There was behind the Isle Alexandre, on the right flank of the large island of Lobau, a long, wide, and rather deep channel, in which each

piece of work was to receive the last finish. In that channel the bridge in one piece was stowed away, ready to be floated into the small branch of the river at the last moment. But as this channel formed a bend at its extremity, Napoleon took the precaution of having several joints made in the bridge, so that it might accommodate itself to all the sinuosities of the channel.

Clearly foreseeing that at the actual moment of the operation the need of rapid communications between the two banks would be strongly felt, and wishing to repair even to excess the imprudence of his first passage of the Danube, Napoleon had timber, rafts, and pontoons laid ready in those interior channels, so that four or five additional bridges might be thrown across to hasten the deployment of the army as much as possible, and render retreat as easy in case of defeat as on an ordinary field of battle.

Whilst thousands of workmen of all kinds were labouring with incredible activity in the isle of Lobau, the seamen of the guard were incessantly cruising about in boats armed with howitzers to protect those immense works, and to explore the islands and every nook of the river, so as to acquire a knowledge of the localities that would be very useful on the day of the grand operation. Napoleon had recovered a valuable remnant of General Dupont's army; this was the brave Captain Baste, commander of the marines of the guard in the Andalusian campaign, alike able as an infantry and a naval officer, and the only man whom Napoleon had pardoned for the Baylen catastrophe; for he had given him promotion whilst he was implacable towards his companions in misfortune. Captain Baste, now a colonel, still commanded the marines of the guard, and was to be present everywhere at the hour of peril.

Napoleon galloped every day from Schönbrunn to Ebersdorf to see to the progress of the works, and at every visit some new idea occurred to him. The Viennese, under whose eyes and with whose aid in some instances this prodigious enterprise was performed, thrilled with indignation in secret, and would have revolted but for the powerful army that kept them down. But Napoleon took extreme pains to quiet them. Discipline was rigorously observed. Not one offensive act or expression was allowed, and every breach of good conduct was punished on the spot. Provisions failing, Napoleon had considerable quantities of grain and herds of cattle brought from Hungary, so that the cost of living was not extravagantly high at Vienna. He consented to employ the bourgeoisie for the maintenance of order, because our troops were not so well adapted for that service, being foreigners and enemies. But he limited the numbers of the burgher force to 6000, and he allowed them only 1500 muskets, a number equal to that of the men who

mounted guard every day. He exercised, moreover, a strict surveillance over the inhabitants. Knowing that many soldiers of the old garrison were concealed in the city in plain clothes, ready to second the first popular outbreak, he dictated some acts of severity, confining himself, however, to what was indispensable. As for the lower classes that wanted work, he furnished it to them at a reasonable rate of wages, and not always for the service of the army, but often, on the contrary, for the use or embellishment of Vienna, so that the bread he afforded them might not seem too bitter.

Such was the aspect of the isle of Lobau during the month of June. On the 1st of July, everything being ready, Napoleon gave orders that the troops should begin to assemble in the isle on the 3rd of July, that they should be all there on the 4th, and cross the small branch that night, in order to give battle on the 5th if they met the enemy immediately on landing, or on the 6th if he did not present himself immediately. On the 1st of July he quitted Schönbrunn, and established his headquarters in Lobau. Marshal Massena's corps being there already, Napoleon ordered into it successively General Oudinot's corps, the guard, Marshal Davout's corps, the light cavalry, the heavy cavalry, and the immense mass of field artillery. The defiling of the troops was under the superintendence of General Mathieu Dumas. The position of each *corps d'armée* was marked out with stakes. Orders had been forwarded that the army of Italy should arrive at four in the morning, the army of Dalmatia and the Bavarians at five at the latest. The Saxons, who had been some days at Vienna, and Dupas' French division, passed over with the first troops. The several corps were rested, well fed, and in the best spirits. Their losses had been partly repaired by some marching battalions and squadrons which had arrived in June, and by the return of a great many men from the hospitals. The guard was superb, complete in all arms, but especially in artillery. Adding together the troops of Massena, Oudinot, Davout, Bernadotte, Prince Eugène, Macdonald, Marmont, de Wrede, and the guard, there appeared to be 150,000 men; of whom 26,000 were cavalry, and 12,000 artillerymen serving 550 guns—an enormous force, such as Napoleon had never yet mustered on a field of battle; and indeed, if we rightly consult the history of the world, we shall find that such a host had never been brought into action by any leader. Besides this vast force, Napoleon had with him the invincible Massena, who was suffering from a fall from his horse, but was capable of mastering all physical sufferings on a day of battle; the stubborn Davout, the impetuous Oudinot, the intrepid Macdonald, and a multitude of others who were ready to purchase the triumph of our arms with their blood. The heroic

Lannes, mortally wounded at Ebersdorf, was the only man missing. Fate had forbidden him to witness a victory to which he had powerfully contributed by his conduct in this campaign; but his death was happy, since he fell in the course of the last of our triumphs.

When arrived in the isle of Lobau, Napoleon was seized with a sudden uneasiness: some indications made him fearful that the Archduke Charles had given him the slip by descending the Danube to Presburg. It is certain that the archduke might have had recourse to that manœuvre, and the proof that it would have been well conceived on his part was that his adversary was very apprehensive of it. It is true that by quitting the position he occupied opposite Vienna, on the heights of Wagram, he would have left the French free to cross the Danube without a battle; but with the means contrived by Napoleon there was but little chance of hindering that passage, and by advancing into the heart of Hungary, he would have obliged the French to weaken themselves by lengthening out their line of operation, and to leave a corps to guard Vienna, whilst the Austrians would have been reinforced by Archduke John and the Hungarian rising. There were grounds, therefore, for suspecting such a design; and Napoleon, to end his doubts, made a bold feint, which, whilst enlightening him as to the designs of the Austrian commander, would deceive the latter as to the real point fixed on for the passage of the river.

The Legrand division of Massena's corps was stationed near the site of the former passage, and Captain Baillot, a brave and able officer of pontonniers, was ordered to form a bridge of boats there. Towards night the artillery was planted right and left of the bend of the river, the voltigeurs of the Legrand division embarked in boats under the command of Massena's aide-de-camp Sainte Croix, crossed the small branch, and secured a landing in spite of the Austrian advanced posts. In less than two hours the bridge was complete, the Legrand division crossed it, then traversed the little wood beyond it, and debouched between Essling and Aspern. After having taken some prisoners and killed some men, it drew down upon it a brisk cannonade from the enemy's redoubts, and when day broke it perceived a display of forces which left no doubt as to the presence of the main Austrian army in those parts. Napoleon thus became assured that he had the enemy before him, and that he might soon terminate the war on the vast plain of Marchfeld.

Archduke Charles was, in fact, on the opposite heights of Wagram, vacillating between a multitude of projects, not knowing which to choose, and as usual, not applying himself to execute any of them. He had spent the days immediately

succeeding the battle of Essling in receiving congratulations on his victory, but he had done nothing to secure an incontestable triumph after that doubtful one. Certainly it was not for having abstained from invading Lobau that he desired blame, nor for not having tried above or below Vienna a passage which might have brought about the deliverance of Austria, but also its total ruin; but without imposing complicated and hazardous plans on the Austrian commander. Why, since he was so well pleased with the battle of Essling—why did he not profit by that lesson, and derive from it another battle of Essling more complete and more decisive? That event, so much vaunted by the Austrians, was the expression of the military difficulty Napoleon had to overcome, and which consisted in crossing a great river to give battle with that river at his back. The archduke should therefore have left nothing undone to increase that difficulty, and even to render it insurmountable if possible. This was a simple, safe, and tried course, and without performing any prodigy, it would have been enough to stop Napoleon once more on the banks of the Danube, in order to ensure his speedy expulsion from Austria. There were two very simple measures to be taken towards that end; first, to give to the battle-ground, which was known beforehand, all the strength which a defensive position could receive from the efforts of art; secondly, to concentrate there all the armies of the monarchy. Of these two measures the archduke fortunately had adopted neither.

Napoleon had accumulated redoubts over the whole extent of the isle of Lobau in order to debouch under the protection of a powerful artillery of large calibre: was it not natural, then, to erect redoubts on the opposite bank which should render it inaccessible? A power which was fighting on its own soil, and which was one of the best provided with matériel in Europe, could not be in want of heavy artillery. Now the archduke had entrenched Aspern, Essling, and Enzersdorf, because there had been fighting at those three points; but from Enzersdorf to the confluence of the two arms along the whole right side of Lobau on the plain which Napoleon selected to debouch upon, he had contented himself with constructing only a single redoubt mounted with six cannons, near a place called Maison Blanche, and posting some troops in the little castle of Sachsengang, situated in the wood. The possibility of our debouching on our right, which Napoleon had pondered during a space of forty days, had never once occurred to Archduke Charles, and it was only from Aspern to Essling, and from Essling to Enzersdorf, that he had constructed really formidable works; and even these were not of a strength sufficient to resist soldiers so impetuous as the French.

The archduke's next care, after having rendered the passage

of the Danube as difficult as possible, should have been to form for himself a defensive position the most favourable possible on the plain of Marchfeld. Now, supposing the enemy had succeeded in crossing the Danube, if he was beaten in a defensive battle, the archduke might have passed from the defensive to the offensive on the following day, or even on the same day, and tried, with a great probability of succeeding, to throw him into the river. The ground presented many advantages in that respect. The plain of Marchfeld rose with a gentle inclination for two leagues up to a small chain of hills, extending from Neusiedel to Wagram, and washed by the Russbach, a large, deep, and marshy stream, behind which the archduke had encamped his chief forces. He had stationed there three of his *corps d'armée*—the first under Bellegarde, the second under Hohenzollern,* the fourth under Rosenberg, making together about 75,000 men. It would have been easy, by taking advantage of the hills and the stream, to erect formidable works against which no impetuosity, even of Frenchmen, could have prevailed. This position was connected with the Danube by a second line of hills, of a semicircular form, passing by Aderklaa, Gerarsdorf, and Stamersdorf, the approach to which was not obstructed by a deep stream, but which did not require that protection, since it was on that side the Austrians ought to have assumed the offensive, whilst on the other they should have stood obstinately and invincibly on the defence. The archduke had still 65,000 or 70,000 men, consisting of the third corps under Kollowrath,† the fifth under the Prince de Reuss,‡ and the sixth under Klenau.§ This last guarded the banks of the stream. The reserve of cavalry and grenadiers cantoned between Wagram and Gerarsdorf connected the two masses of the Austrian army. That on the left, encamped between Neusiedel and Wagram, might have obstinately defended the hills, and during that time the mass on the right, which extended from Gerarsdorf to Stamersdorf, should have assumed the offensive, taken the French in flank, cut them off from the Danube or thrown them into the river. The archduke did actually think of proceeding in this manner, but without having constructed any of the works which would have rendered the position between Wagram and Neusiedel unassailable.

The last precaution which the Austrian commander ought to have taken was to concentrate his forces so as to be superior in number to his adversary on the field of battle. The concentrating movements which brought the French corps one after the

* It was Kollowrath who commanded it in the beginning of the war.
† Previously commanded by Hohenzollern.
‡ Previously commanded by Prince Louis.
§ Previously commanded by General Hiller.

other under the walls of Vienna were partly known to the Austrian commander, although the principal manœuvre, by which the army of Italy was to be made to take part in the great battle, was skilfully concealed from him. This manner of acting ought to have served him as a lesson, and have induced him to muster between Lobau and Wagram all the troops that were not indispensable elsewhere. But he had very imperfectly followed the instructive example of his adversary. He had, indeed, called from Lintz to Wagram Kollowrath's corps, which had reinforced him by a score thousand men; but he had left on the Upper Danube at least 12,000, part of whom he might have called up to him, the French having evidently no project in that direction. He thought of sending for Archduke John, whereas he ought already to have had him by him, since the town of Presburg could defend itself with 3000 or 4000 men for garrison. He might have made General Chasteler join him with 7000 or 8000 men, ban Giulay sufficing to contend with the French posts left on the Raab; and this would have raised the reinforcement brought him by Archduke John from 12,000 to 20,000. Lastly, Archduke Ferdinand was making a useless campaign in Poland, and was employing from 30,000 to 35,000 excellent soldiers in ridiculous expeditions from Thorn to Sandomir. Had 15,000 men been left in that part of the theatre of war, another 20,000 men might have co-operated towards saving the monarchy under the walls of Vienna.

Thus, had he manœuvred like Napoleon with the art which consists in leaving in each place only what is there indispensable, and accumulating on the decisive point all that can be spared elsewhere, Archduke Charles might have brought 20,000 men from Presburg, 9000 or 10,000 from Lintz, and 20,000 from Cracow, which would have added 50,000 men to his forces, and perhaps have decided the question in his favour. What, indeed, would have been the result if the French, debouching with 140,000 or 150,000 men, had encountered 200,000, 80,000 of these being in an impregnable position, and 120,000 assailing them in flank whilst they were attacking that position? It is probable that in that case, in spite of all his genius, the term of Napoleon's grandeur would have arrived three or four years sooner on that plain of Marchfeld.

The archduke, who surmised but did not foresee with certainty that all would be decided between Wagram and the isle of Lobau, did none of those things we have just mentioned. He encamped his troops on the heights from Neusiedel to Wagram, made them manœuvre in order to train his recruits, fed them plentifully enough with bread and meat supplied by the Jews, but let them want straw, fodder, and water (except the corps stationed near the Russbach), although he was in his own country and backed

by the patriotism of the whole population. He had scarcely done anything towards remounting the cavalry, though Austria abounded in horses, and he did not obtain from a devoted country what Napoleon drew from it, who was abhorred as a foreign conqueror. His six corps, with the two reserves of grenadiers and cuirassiers, might be estimated at about 140,000 men, with 400 pieces of artillery; and he reckoned besides on Archduke John's 12,000, which would give him a total of about 150,000, whereas he might have brought together nearly 200,000. His troops were very much attached to him, but though they esteemed his courage and military knowledge, and preferred him to his brother, they had not sufficient confidence in his genius, and they dreaded seeing him confronted with Napoleon almost as much as he dreaded it himself.

Archduke Charles, who had been kept on the alert by the successive accumulation of French troops towards Ebersdorf, put his troops in motion on hearing the cannonade provoked by the Legrand division, in the belief that the passage was about to be repeated at the same point as before. An advanced guard, under General Nordmann, already occupied Enzersdorf, the plain on the right of the island, the little redoubt of Maison Blanche, and the wood at the confluence of the two branches of the Danube. Whilst this, the most menaced point, was protected merely by an advanced guard, General Klenau, with the whole sixth corps, occupied the works between Aspern and Essling, before which it was supposed the French army would again offer battle. Archduke Charles descended from the hills of Wagram to the plain of Marchfeld with Bellegarde, Hohenzollern, and Rosenberg's corps (the 1st, 2nd, and 4th), to support Nordmann and Klenau. He also made Kollowrath's corps (the 3rd) descend from the semicircle of hills, which formed his right, from Wagram to the Danube, leaving the Prince de Reuss in position at Stamersdorf, opposite Vienna, to observe if the French made any attempt on that side. The reserve of infantry and cavalry remained behind in the environs of Gerarsdorf. He remained thus in position on the 1st and 2nd of July; then seeing no signs of the French, imagining that the passage would not take place immediately, and disliking to remain in the plain with his army exposed to a suffocating heat and to all sorts of privations, he led it back to its usual camping-ground on the hills.

On the 3rd, Napoleon did nothing but continue in secret behind the screen of the woods to perfect his means of passage, whilst his troops were incessantly arriving in the island by the great bridges. Their constantly increasing agglomeration could even be discerned at a distance, and on the 4th, Archduke Charles ordered the artillery at Aspern, Essling, and Enzersdorf to fire upon Lobau, where it seemed likely that every ball would

tell upon such an accumulation of men. Never before, indeed, had there been packed together in a space of one league in diameter and three leagues in circumference 150,000 soldiers, 550 guns, and 40,000 horses. Fortunately the island was too broad to allow of the shots doing mischief. This would have required guns of large calibre like those which Napoleon had had the foresight to mount on his batteries, whilst the archduke had only field-pieces in his works. Massena's troops, however, that were nearest to the enemy, lost some men.

On the 4th, at the close of day, Massena, Davout, and Oudinot, screened by the woods, approached the right of the island and took their stations, Massena opposite Enzersdorf, Davout a little lower down, opposite Maison Blanche, Oudinot lower still, facing the coppice wood at the confluence. Colonel Baste of the marines moored near the latter place with his armed boats ready to convoy the troops. At nine o'clock Oudinot's corps began its passage. The Conroux brigade of the Tharreau division embarked on board the flat boats before mentioned, and escorted by Colonel Baste's flotilla, quitted the ports of the isle of Lobau, and proceeded towards the wood at the confluence. It was a dark night, and heavy clouds portended a tempest, which could not but favour our enterprise. The small arm was crossed in a few minutes, though it widened as it approached the large one. Our men landed on the opposite bank, took the enemy's sentinels belonging to General Nordmann's advanced guard, then seized the redoubt of Maison Blanche, all within a quarter of an hour, and with the loss of only a few men. The hawser was immediately fastened to the tree previously fixed upon, and the rafts, plying to and fro, rapidly transported the rest of the Tharreau division. At the same time Captain Larue, seconded by Colonel Baste, brought into position the materials of the bridge which was to be established at the confluence of the small branch with the large one, and completed his task in two hours. During this time the Tharreau division kept up an irregular fire in the dark against the Austrian advanced posts, which it repulsed without difficulty, and the Grandjean (late St. Hilaire) and Frère (late Claparède) divisions, which completed Oudinot's corps, were drawn up in close columns waiting for the bridge to be thrown over to enable them to cross the stream and join the Tharreau division.

Marshal Massena had orders not to begin his passage until General Oudinot should have already set foot on the enemy's side of the river. At eleven o'clock he put himself in motion with the Boudet, Carra St. Cyr, and Molitor divisions, Legrand's having already crossed over between Aspern and Essling. Fifteen hundred voltigeurs led by the brave aide-de-camp Sainte Croix, and escorted by Colonel Baste, crossed in five

flat boats from the channel of the Isle Alexandre, and landed on the opposite bank under the fire of the Austrian advanced posts, whom Oudinot's fusilade had put upon the alert. As the rafts could not easily reach the shore, the soldiers jumped into the water up to their middle, some to fight hand-to-hand with the enemy's sharpshooters, others to drag the rafts to land. The hawser being made fast to a tree, the rafts began to ply, and the voltigeurs engaged with the enemy were succoured. Meanwhile the bridge in one piece issued from the same channel, under the direction of the commandant Dessales, and was floated a hundred yards down the current in order to leave a clear passage for the materials of the other bridges. Some intrepid pontonniers, advancing in a wherry under the enemy's fire, dropped an anchor, and brought up the bridge to its position. Whilst they were firmly securing one end of it on our side of the stream, the troops of Boudet's division ran along it to fasten it at the other end. Fifteen or twenty minutes sufficed for this fine operation. The rest of Massena's troops immediately passed over and took possession of the left bank before the Austrians had time to bring down their masses to oppose the deployment of the French army.

The pontoon bridge, and then the bridge of rafts, next issued from the channel of the Isle Alexandre, but in separate pieces, and were fixed above the bridge in one piece, at two hundred yards from each other. The pontoon bridge was intended for Davout's infantry, the raft bridge for Davout and Massena's artillery and cavalry. The former was to be completed in less than two hours and a half, the second in four or five. The pontonniers worked at them without intermission under a continual fire.

His project being unmasked, Napoleon ordered the artillery of the redoubts to open their fire, first in order to demolish the little town of Enzersdorf, so that it might not serve as a point d'appui for the enemy, and then to sweep the plain below with such a deluge of grape that it would be impossible for Nordmann's troops to remain there. He gave the same order not only to the batteries on the right side of the isle, but also to those on the left towards the old passage, in order to bewilder the Austrians by these simultaneous attacks. At once 900 guns of the largest bore rent the air with their detonations. Colonel Baste, cruising with his armed boats both above and below the isle of Lobau, directed a cannonade against every point where firing was perceived, in a manner sufficient to distract the coolest and most determined enemy. The heavens soon mingled their thunder with that of Napoleon's artillery, and poured down torrents of rain and hail on both armies. The forked lightnings flashed, and when their glare had ceased it was succeeded by

that of thousands of bombs and shells falling on the unfortunate town of Enzersdorf. Never had war in its mightiest furies presented so fearful a spectacle. Napoleon, riding up and down the bank on which the prodigious enterprise was being executed, directed everything with the calmness and security which accompany projects long meditated. His officers, all of them prepared like himself, felt that night neither confusion nor embarrassment. Everything proceeded with perfect regularity, in spite of the hail, the rain, the bullets, the balls, and the rolling of the thunder and the cannonade. Vienna, awakened by these sinister sounds, learned at last that its fate was in the balance, and that Napoleon's design, so long threateningly impending, was near being accomplished.

At two o'clock in the morning the army had already three bridges—that at the confluence, that in one piece below the Isle Alexandre, and the pontoon bridge opposite that island. Oudinot passed over the first, Massena over the second, and immediately after him Davout. The troops defiled rapidly and in close columns. On the right, General Oudinot soon carried the wood at the confluence, repulsed some of Nordmann's posts, crossed a small branch, that of Steigbieghl, on planks, and carried his left to the Maison Blanche, his right to the little hamlet of Muhlleiten. In these various engagements he took three pieces of cannon and some hundreds of prisoners. A little to his right was the fortified castle of Sachsengang, garrisoned by an Austrian battalion. He surrounded it and riddled it with shells. During this time Massena had defiled with his whole infantry; but not yet having his cannons, he kept near the margin of the river in order to be covered by the artillery of the redoubts, under the long range of which, the plain having become untenable, Nordmann's troops gradually retired.

When day dawned on the banks of the river about four o'clock in the morning, a most imposing spectacle presented itself to the eyes of both armies. The storm had cleared away, and the rising sun glittered on thousands of bayonets and helmets. To the right, General Oudinot was marching up the plain, while his rearguard was bombarding the castle of Sachsengang. To the left, Massena was bearing on the town of Enzersdorf, which continued burning without being able to return the fire that was poured upon it, its artillery having been silenced in a few minutes. The interval between these two corps was filled up by that of Davout, the whole of which had passed over. Part of the artillery and cavalry had crossed the pontoon bridge; the rest was thronging to the bridge of rafts, followed by the imperial guard. Seventy thousand men were already in line of battle on the enemy's side of the river, capable by themselves of making head against the forces of

Archduke Charles. Bernadotte with the Saxons was making ready to defile after the imperial guard. The armies of Italy and Dalmatia and the Bavarian division, which had all been moved into Lobau during the night, were advancing on their side. The whole mass marched with admirable and irresistible ensemble. The soldiers, who had been forbidden to light fires during the night in order not to present a mark to the enemy's artillerymen, and who were dripping from the rain, warmed themselves in the first rays of a July sun. Some quitted the ranks to embrace relations and friends whom they had not seen for years; for corps which had come, some from the heart of Dalmatia, others from the confines of Poland and Spain, met together on this new battlefield after having separated at Austerlitz to repair to the opposite extremities of the continent. Bavarians, Badeners, Saxons, Poles, Portuguese were mingled with French in this rendezvous of nations, ready to fight for a policy which concerned them not. The joyous spirit of our soldiers broke out in all directions, though before evening very many of them would have ceased to exist. The sunshine, their confidence in victory, and the hope of signal rewards, enlivened their spirits. They were, above all, delighted to see the Danube overcome, and they admired the resources of the genius that had transported them so rapidly and in such imposing masses from the one bank to the other. Seeing Napoleon ride along the front of the lines, they raised their shakos on the points of their bayonets and saluted him with shouts of *Vive l'Empereur!*

By Napoleon's orders possession was to be taken of the town of Enzersdorf on the left and the castle of Sachsengang on the right, that no enemy might be left in his rear when he deployed on the plain. Some trifling field-works covered the gates of the little town, now half reduced to ashes. An Austrian battalion defended it, but had almost exhausted its ammunition, and was about to be relieved by another when Massena ordered the attack. His two aides-de-camp, Sainte Croix and Pelet, assailed one of the gates of Enzersdorf with the 46th, whilst Lasalle, enclosing the town with his cavalry, prevented any succour from reaching it. The infantry carried the gate-works at the point of the bayonet, entered the burning streets, and captured all that remained alive of the Austrian battalion. The men who endeavoured to escape from the town were cut down by Lasalle's cavalry.

General Oudinot, after cannonading the castle of Sachsengang, summoned it to surrender; and the commandant yielded without resistance, seeing himself drowned, as it were, in a flood of a hundred and fifty thousand men. The army had nothing now to molest it on its wings. It could deploy in the plain opposite Archduke Charles, and offer him battle at the foot of the hills of

Wagram. That prince at that moment beheld all his anticipations miserably deceived. After such a mistake as he had made in the disposal of his advanced guards, they had no alternative but to retreat, for if they held out, Klenau would inevitably be taken aback in the redoubts of Essling and Aspern. After all, the Archduke was not aware that matters were so serious as they really were. He supposed that the passage had been effected only in part, that the French army would employ at least four-and-twenty hours in crossing the river and deploying, and that he should have time to assail it before it was in a condition to defend itself. Standing on a hill beside his brother, the emperor, who was questioning him as to the state of affairs, he told him that the French indeed had forced the Danube, but that he was letting them pass over in order to throw them into the river. "Very good," said the emperor shrewdly; "but do not let too many of them pass over." * Archduke Charles, who had no choice left, directed Klenau to fall back in good order on the main body.

Napoleon, having three-fourths of his army beyond the river, now thought only of gaining ground in order that he might put himself in order of battle. Marching always with extreme prudence, he ordered several precautions before he advanced further. Though he had bridges enough to convey his troops from one bank to the other, he wished to receive his matériel more rapidly, and above all, to have numerous means of retreat in case of ill success. In consequence, he had three more bridges laid down, which, with the four established in the night, made seven. All the materials being ready, his commands would be obeyed in a few hours. He likewise gave orders for an equal number of *têtes de pont*—some made of fascines, others of bags of earth prepared beforehand, so that in its retreat the army might not be deprived of its means of passage by a sudden irruption upon its rear. Lastly, he entrusted to General Regnier, an excellent officer, very skilful in defensive war, the keeping of the isle of Lobau. He left him seven battalions; two of which were to guard the large bridges, one the bridge at the confluence, one the bridges over the small branch, and three were to form a reserve in the centre of the isle of Lobau. Orders were given to let no one pass from the other side of the river except the wounded.

These precautions taken, Napoleon began to deploy on the plain, his left remaining stationary near Enzersdorf and the Danube, his right marching towards the heights of Wagram, performing, consequently, a movement of conversion. He had formed in two lines: in the first line were Massena on the left,

* This remarkable saying remained traditional among the military men of the time.

Oudinot in the centre, Davout on the right; in the second line were Bernadotte on the left, Marmont and de Wrede in the centre, and the army of Italy on the right. The guard and the cuirassiers formed a superb reserve in the rear. The artillery advanced on the front of the several corps, mingled with some detachments of cavalry. The bulk of the cavalry, hussars, chasseurs, and dragoons was spread along the wings. Napoleon was in the centre, counting on a certain and decisive victory.

He continued to gain ground, pivoting constantly on his left, the corps in the first line separating from each other to make room successively for those in the second, and the whole army thus deploying after the manner of a fan before the enemy, who fell back on the hills of Wagram. Our artillery fired as it marched. Our cavalry charged the Austrian cavalry when it could come up with it, or the rearguards of infantry when they remained within its reach. Davout's corps, finding on its way the village of Rutzendorf, against which cavalry could not be employed, attacked and carried it with the infantry. Dupas' French division, marching with Bernadotte's Saxons, in like manner took the village of Raschdorf. At that point, the Austrian cavalry having attempted to support its infantry, was sharply repulsed by the Saxon cuirassiers, who behaved gallantly under aide-de-camp (afterwards Marshal) Gerard. Massena, slowly moving up the bank of the Danube, encountered first Essling, then Aspern in his movement, took them reversely, and entered without resistance. Klenau's sixth corps retired by Leopoldau on Stamersdorf and Gerarsdorf. At six o'clock on the evening of the 5th we lined the chain of the Wagram hills in its whole extent, after having lost in executing this magnificent operation only some hundreds of our soldiers, whilst we had put nearly 2000 Austrians hors de combat, and made about 3000 prisoners at Sachsengang, Enzersdorf, Raschdorf, and Rutzendorf.

The French army, which had deployed in marching, now formed but one long line of about three leagues, parallel to that of the Austrians, which was almost straight from Neusiedel to Wagram, but curved at the centre towards Aderklaa, and continued in a semicircle by Gerarsdorf and Stamersdorf to the margin of the Danube. From Neusiedel, a village commanded by a square tower, to Wagram, ran the gently sloping hills on which was encamped the left wing of the Austrian army to the number of about 75,000, protected by the swampy stream of the Russbach. It was there, as we have said, that invincible entrenchments might have been made with the help of art, but fortunately, nothing was seen there but the camp barracks. At Neusiedel, that is to say, at the extreme left of the Austrians, was Prince Rosenberg with Nordmann's advanced guard and

a numerous cavalry; less to the left, towards Baumersdorf, was Hohenzollern's corps; and towards the centre, at Wagram, Bellegarde's corps, with Archduke Charles' headquarters. It was about this point that the line of battle began to bend back to meet the Danube, and that the useful protection of the Russbach ceased. The Austrians had in their very centre the reserve of grenadiers and cuirassiers, extending in a semicircle from Wagram to Gerarsdorf. They had on their right the third corps under General Kollowrath, the sixth under General Klenau, which had just retreated from Essling and Aspern, and the fifth under Prince de Reuss, between Gerarsdorf, Stamersdorf, and the Danube.

The French line followed exactly the contour of the enemy's line. Before the Austrian left wing we had our right, that is to say, Davout, established in the village of Glinzendorf, facing Rosenberg's corps, and Oudinot, established in the village of Grosshofen, facing Hohenzollern's corps. In the centre was the army of Italy confronting Bellegarde. Bearing to the left, opposite Wagram, was Bernadotte with the Saxons, over against the reserve of grenadiers and cuirassiers; and quite to the left, from Süssenbrunn to Kagran, were Massena's four divisions, appointed to act against Kollowrath, Klenau, and de Reuss. In the centre, behind the army of Italy and the Saxons, Napoleon had kept in reserve Marmont's corps, the imperial guard. the Bavarians, and the cuirassiers. Thus in this vast line of battle, straight, as we have said, from Neusiedel to Wagram, and curved from thence to Stamersdorf, the Austrians had their greatest strength in their wings, and their least at their centre, since the reserve of grenadiers and cuirassiers formed the sole connection between the two principal masses. We, on the contrary, possessed a sufficient force on our right wing from Glinzendorf to Grosshofen, where Davout and Oudinot were, a very moderate one from Süssenbrunn and Kagran, where was Massena alone, but a considerable one between Grosshofen and Aderklaa, since in that place, besides the army of Italy and the Saxons, there was the army of Dalmatia, the imperial guard, the Bavarians, and all the heavy cavalry. This arrangement was assuredly the best: the one which allowed of the most rapid measures to meet the various chances of the battle by moving right or left as occasion might require, and which also made it possible to strike the Austrian army in its weak place, namely, the centre of the line. In fact, on this occasion, as at Essling, wishing to envelop the French army so as to hinder it from debouching, Archduke Charles had weakened his centre, and made himself vulnerable at that point by the sword of his potent adversary.

This state of things, which could not escape so practised an

eye as Napoleon's, tempted him to bring matters to an end that very night by a decisive act, which would have dispensed him from shedding torrents of blood on the following day. All reports agreed in stating that the enemy nowhere stood his ground, but retreated with singular readiness. Surprised, in fact, by the sudden apparition of the French army, Archduke Charles had made no arrangements for attacking, and had only instructed his advanced guards to fall back. Trusting too easily to the report of some officers, Napoleon hoped that by making an abrupt attack at nightfall on the plateau of Wagram he should break the enemy's centre before the latter had sufficiently provided for his defence, and that the Austrian army, being thus severed, would retreat of its own accord, so that nothing would remain for the end of the campaign but an active and destructive pursuit of its two moieties. In this instance was manifested the inconvenience of acting with enormous masses of men and over immense spaces. The commander-in-chief, being unable to see or direct everything in person, was obliged to rely on lieutenants, who observed with too little accuracy, and often even acted without concert.

Napoleon then, with an imprudence that did not correspond to the admirable forethought displayed on these days, gave orders to storm the plateau of Wagram. Those who could act against it were Oudinot, by attacking Baumersdorf; the army of Italy, by passing the Russbach between Baumersdorf and Wagram; and Bernadotte, by assailing Wagram itself through Aderklaa. Accordingly, Bernadotte with the Saxons and the Dupas division, Macdonald and Grenier with two divisions of the army of Italy, and Oudinot with his whole corps, advanced at nightfall against the Austrian position. Oudinot marched against Baumersdorf, cannonaded it, set fire to it with shells, and endeavoured to take it from Hohenzollern's advanced guards, who had in the Russbach a potent means of resistance. On the opposite side, Bernadotte and the Saxons fell upon Wagram, which was defended by a detachment from Bellegarde's corps, and nearly mastered it, but not enough to advance beyond it. Whilst Oudinot and Bernadotte were thus prosecuting the attack at the two extremities, in order to seize the enemy's two points d'appui, Dupas and Macdonald, in the middle, proceeded to cross the Russbach. The stream was not wide, but it was deep, and formed an impediment not very easily overcome. Dupas, with the 5th light infantry and the 19th of the line, dashed into it, shouting *Vive l'Empereur!* Some soldiers, who in their haste had rushed into the part where the water was deepest, were drowned; the rest got safe over, rallied, and ascended the hillside under a fire of grape and musketry. The Austrians, thus suddenly attacked, had formed in square behind

the camp barracks, under cover of which their sharpshooters kept up a very brisk fire. Dupas' two brave French regiments dislodged the sharpshooters, of whom they captured about 300, passed the line of the barracks, and fell upon the squares. The 5th, which headed the column, broke one of these squares, took its flag, and made it prisoner. The 19th seconded this vigorous exploit, as did also the Rudlof and Melsch grenadiers, two Saxon battalions under Dupas. The Austrian line was just on the point of being broken when the assailants received a volley in their rear, which extremely surprised and disconcerted them. The two columns of the army of Italy, the one commanded by Macdonald, the other by Grenier, after having crossed the Russbach, were ascending the plateau to join Dupas, when, perceiving the latter's Saxons, and taking them for enemies, they fired upon them. The Saxons, thus unexpectedly attacked in the rear, returned the fire, and the troops of Macdonald and Grenier, believing themselves charged in front, whilst at the same time they were attacked in flank from Baumersdorf, which was still occupied by Hohenzollern's corps, were thrown into a state of confusion, which the night soon converted into a panic. They rushed down from the plateau, followed by the dismayed Saxons, and took to flight in incredible disorder. Dupas, left alone with his two French regiments, and assailed on all sides by Bellegarde's corps, which Archduke Charles himself had rallied, was obliged to give way and quit the plateau under reiterated charges of horse and foot. Oudinot broke off the attack on Baumersdorf, and Bernadotte, abandoning Wagram, which he had almost conquered, fell back on Aderklaa.

This panic cost the Dupas division a thousand men by the dispersion of its two Saxon battalions, which had been in too great haste to surrender to the Austrians, and the army of Italy some thousands strayed and missing. Fortunately the cavalry being sent out in all directions soon brought back the scattered soldiers to their respective corps. Our army, though still as brave, was yet less experienced than that of Austerlitz or Friedland, and too numerous, compounded of too many various elements, to be as firm, solid, and apt at manœuvres as formerly. After all, this was a check of little moment, between the marvellous passage which had just been accomplished, and the victory which there was reason to look for on the morrow.

Napoleon directed that every corps should bivouac on the position it had occupied during the day, his centre being still in great force, and capable of affording aid to whichever of his wings might require it. There was no wood on the plain, and the soldiers could make no fires, which was a painful privation, for though it was July the night was very cold. Every man lay down in his cloak. The soldiers had biscuits and brandy.

Napoleon had only a fire fed with a few trusses of straw to warm him in his bivouac. Having spent several hours in conference with his marshals, that they might be well acquainted with his intentions, he sent them all away before day except Davout, whom he kept with him until dawn. It was the third night he had passed on foot or on horseback.

During this time Archduke Charles had at last arranged his plan of battle. He had always entertained the thought, suggested by very old study of that field of battle, to oppose the offensive movement of the French with his left wing, encamped on the heights from Neusiedel to Wagram, and whilst the French were busied before that sort of entrenched camp, to assume in his turn the offensive against them with his right wing bent forward, fall upon them in flank, separate them from the Danube, and once he had reduced them to stand on the defensive, to bring down his left upon them from the hills of Wagram, in order to drive them into the river with all his combined forces. He hoped, moreover, that whilst his left was defending the banks of the Russbach, and his right was attacking the French in flank, Archduke John would come up from Presburg and assail them in the rear, and that they would be unable to withstand such a combination of efforts. All this would have been possible, nay, probable, if, manœuvring like Napoleon, the archduke had brought to the field 30,000 or 40,000 more men; if he had notified Archduke John in good time; and if, availing himself of the fact that the field of battle was known beforehand, he had accumulated between Neusiedel and Wagram works which would have rendered that entrenched camp impregnable. In that case an attack in flank upon the French, already exhausted by a fruitless effort, would have produced infallible results. But Archduke Charles had done none of these things, as we have seen; he had erected on the ground he had to defend only barracks for his troops, and it was not until the evening of the preceding day, the 4th, that he had sent orders to his brother to join him. The obstacle which those barracks presented in the night affair and on the following day sufficiently showed what might have happened if considerable works had been added to the configuration of the ground.

Be that as it may, in one of the half-burnt houses of the village of Wagram, evacuated by Bernadotte, Archduke Charles dictated his orders. He directed his left not to enter into action until his right, put in motion that very night, should have begun to make the French waver by the attack in flank it was to make upon them. That wing, consisting of Klenau and Kollowrath's corps, was to march immediately—that is to say, at one or two o'clock in the morning—fall upon our left, which consisted only of Massena's corps, and drive it from Kagran to

Aspern, and from Süssenbrunn to Breitenlee. Immediately afterwards the reserves of grenadiers and cuirassiers, connecting the right wing with the centre between Gerarsdorf and Wagram, were to advance on Aderklaa, and there combine with part of Bellegarde's corps, come down for that purpose from the plateau of Wagram. This movement having been effected, the left wing, composed of the corps of Hohenzollern and Rosenberg, was to descend on Baumersdorf and Neusiedel, cross the Russbach, take the villages of Grosshofen and Glenzendorf, occupied by Marshal Davout, and thus complete this double manœuvre in flank and front, which, in the opinion of the commander-in-chief, was to bring about the sweeping of the French into the Danube.

As regards this plan, we cannot tell why the corps of the Prince de Reuss, which was nearer the Danube than Klenau's corps, and which terminated the right wing of the Austrians near Stamersdorf, had not orders to take part in the operations of that wing, and thus render more irresistible the attack it was appointed to make. The need of observing the road from Vienna was not great enough to paralyse a whole corps, for it was evident, from the passage of the French across the isle of Lobau, that they did not contemplate another elsewhere. Moreover, the orders issued ought to have been calculated with reference to distance and time, so as to make each corps act at the fit moment.

The commander-in-chief's orders, despatched from Wagram in the night, arrived in less than an hour at the left wing, which was at the distance of a league, and required more than two hours to reach the right wing, which was more than two leagues off, and which had to be sought for in the midst of extreme confusion. As ill-luck would have it, in the retreat effected that evening, Klenau's corps had approached too near Gerarsdorf, and had taken up the ground intended for that of Kollowrath. More time, therefore, than had been calculated at headquarters was requisite to combine in the dark the corps composing the right wing, and to make them take up their position in order of battle, and it was near four o'clock when they were barely beginning their movement. On the other hand, at that very moment the left wing, which had had earlier notice, and was not obliged to lose time in seeking its position, was about to come first into action, whereas it ought not to have done so until long after the right.

Whilst all was movement in the Austrian camp, and the troops, instead of going to rest, were fatiguing themselves in rectifying positions wrongly taken, deep stillness prevailed amongst the French. They lay asleep on the ground they had occupied on the preceding day, for Napoleon, having well

reinforced his right on account of the possibility of Archduke John's arrival, but still more his centre, where he had accumulated considerable forces, had nothing more to do but to keep quiet until the enemy should have unmasked his designs. He had therefore ordered his marshals to be under arms by daybreak, but to let the Austrians declare themselves before they moved, in order that they might ascertain with certainty the point where their blows would be mortal. He inclined, however, to have the heights from Neusiedel to Wagram carried by Davout and Oudinot, and at the same time to make an irruption through the centre with the army of Italy, the Saxons, and Marmont's corps, whilst Massena with his four divisions should only act against the Austrian right wing from Aderklaa to the Danube. Napoleon reserved to himself the Bavarians, the imperial guard, and the heavy cavalry, to meet unforeseen contingencies. These designs were subject to the control of events.

At four o'clock on the morning of the 6th of July, a day for ever memorable, the fire began first on the left of the Austrians and the right of the French. Prince Rosenberg, in consequence of erroneous instructions naming four o'clock as the hour for entering into action, descended from the heights of Neusiedel, crossed the Russbach at the village of Neusiedel, and moved in two columns on Grosshofen and Glinzendorf, which he attacked with extreme vigour. Marshal Davout had at his disposal his three ordinary divisions—Morand, Friant, and Gudin—the small Puthod division (formerly Demont), six regiments of light cavalry under General Montbrun, three of dragoons under General Grouchy, and the four Espagne regiments of cuirassiers under General Arrighi (since Duke of Padua). General Friant's left and General Gudin's right sent detachments to the defence of the village of Glinzendorf, whilst the Puthod division undertook the defence of the village of Grosshofen, behind which it had bivouacked. Large banks of earth extended from the one to the other of these villages. Our soldiers, judiciously placed behind this natural entrenchment, kept up a well-sustained fire of musketry, which did vast mischief to the Austrians, without the latter doing us much in return. On hearing the firing, Napoleon sent General Mathieu Dumas with orders to his lieutenants not to hazard any offensive movement, but to content themselves with firmly keeping their ground, until he should have given them his final instructions; and he galloped to the right wing, where Marshal Davout was stationed. On his way he saw very distinctly the two Austrian columns attacking the villages of Glinzendorf and Grosshofen. He was accompanied by a brigade of Nansouty's cuirassiers, with some batteries of light

artillery, and he directed them to take the attacking column at Grosshofen in flank. This diversion came very àpropos, for it enabled General Puthod to recover possession of the village which the Austrians had taken at the point of the bayonet. The latter were forced to retreat to the Russbach. The same thing happened to the column which, having debouched from Neusiedel on Glinzendorf, found in front of them Gudin's right and Friant's left, and on their flank the light artillery of General Arrighi's cuirassiers. This column, too, was compelled to fall back on the Russbach. Prince Rosenberg was about to renew these attacks, when Archduke Charles countermanded the movement, seeing that his left wing was beginning the battle prematurely.

The fire of musketry and cannon was now general on that vast front of three leagues, along which 300,000 men and 1100 pieces of cannon were arrayed against each other. Napoleon, who saw everywhere a sort of simultaneous attack on the enemy's part, without any clearly defined plan, deemed it necessary, nevertheless, in any case to seize the hills of Neusiedel, in order to occupy the point at which the Archdukes Charles and John might come to a junction. The aspect of the ground pointed out the way in which this was to be done. The heights forming the plateau of Wagram ran parallel with the Russbach as far as Neusiedel and the square tower, where they make a bend backwards, and presented a much gentler slope of very easy access. All that was requisite, then, was to cross the Russbach a little more to the right, away from the enemy's fire, in order to take the Austrian position in flank. Montbrun's light cavalry and Grouchy's dragoons were ordered rapidly to prepare the means of crossing the stream. Then the Morand and Friant divisions had orders to cross the Russbach and advance at right angles to the Gudin and Puthod divisions, and attack the plateau on the side whilst the latter were attacking it in front. As soon as the angle, of which the square tower formed the apex, was taken, Napoleon proposed to have Baumersdorf assailed by Oudinot, and Wagram by the army of Italy. When these several points had been carried, Archduke John might appear on the field of battle, but it would be only to witness a disaster.

Napoleon had but just made these arrangements with Marshal Davout, when several aides-de-camp arrived from Massena and Bernadotte announcing a bad beginning of the day on the left and the centre, and requesting his presence and aid.

The events in question were serious, but quite reparable. Bernadotte, who had been obliged to evacuate Wagram on the preceding night, and fall back on Aderklaa, remained in that

position in the morning, presenting a point to the concavity of the curved line described by the Austrians. He saw on his right Bellegarde descending on Aderklaa with the most considerable part of his corps, and on his left the reserve of grenadiers and cuirassiers advancing on Süssenbrunn. He resolved therefore to fall back on a small plateau behind Aderklaa, in order to be nearer the army of Italy on the one side, and Massena on the other. No sooner had he executed this movement than Bellegarde's advanced guards fell upon him. The Saxons were unable long to resist such an assault, and he was driven back to a considerable distance.

At the same time Massena's four weak divisions, amounting to but 18,000 men against the 60,000 of Klenau, Kollowrath, and Lichtenstein, had been obliged to retrograde, in order to take up a less extended position on our left. Massena, though suffering from a recent fall from his horse, was present at the battle, as he had promised Napoleon, and gave his orders from an open carriage, in which he lay all swathed in compresses.

It appeared to Massena that if a vigorous stand was not made at the point which Bernadotte had just quitted, not only the left wing but even the centre would be endangered. He therefore ordered the Carra St. Cyr division, consisting of the 24th light and 4th of the line, to march on Aderklaa. These two brave regiments dashed headlong into the village, and took it in spite of the impediments offered by the garden-walls and houses. But instead of halting there and securing their position, they too impetuously advanced beyond it, and placed themselves uncovered in the position in which Bernadotte had with reason declined to remain, and received Bellegarde's fire on their right flank and front, and that of the grenadier reserve on their left. After a heroic resistance, they were constrained to yield to numbers and fall back on Aderklaa, deprived of their two colonels. General Molitor then came to the support of Carra St. Cyr; but Legrand and Boudet, left alone with 10,000 men against Klenau and Kollowrath with 15,000, were constrained to retreat to the left, and abandon a considerable extent of ground.

Such was the state of things reported to Napoleon at 9 A.M. Satisfied as to his right wing, where he left Davout thoroughly instructed as to what he had to do, he galloped off, followed by his staff, to go to a distance of nearly two leagues, and repair the mischief. He found Bernadotte greatly agitated, tranquillised him, and rode on to Massena's carriage, round which the cannon-balls were raining. At that moment the Aspre grenadiers, excited by the presence of Archduke Charles, who had put himself at their head, were advancing victoriously

through Aderklaa, from which they had driven out the Carra St. Cyr division.

Little moved by that spectacle, and relying on the vast resources at his command, Napoleon conversed for a while with Massena, and settled with him his plan of conduct. Already it might be inferred from the direction of the firing that Boudet had been forced back a long way, and that the archduke was in contact with the Danube on his right. Some officers even brought intelligence that Boudet had been driven back to Aspern after losing all his artillery. With troops as steady as those of Austerlitz, and who had not the recollection of Essling so fresh in their minds, Napoleon might have allowed his left to be forced, provided his centre stood fast, and have victoriously assumed the offensive on his right. As Davout was soon to carry the plateau of Wagram, and as Aderklaa could not fail to be retaken, it would have been altogether for our advantage to have the right wing of the Austrians between us and the Danube. We should have taken it wholly, and the house of Austria would perhaps have fallen that day. Napoleon thought of adopting that strategy, as he made known some days after. But with young troops, who had not forgotten Essling, it would have been running a great risk. The news that the enemy was at the bridges might alone throw them into a state of consternation. He rejected this idea, therefore, and thought only how he might put a direct stop to the progress of the Austrians towards the centre and the left by a prompt disposal of the troops he had in reserve.

And here he reaped the fruit of his profound foresight. It was a principle of his, that it was by concentrating on one point the action of certain special arms that grand effects were to be produced, and therefore it was that he had bestowed an immense reserve of artillery on the guard, and had kept under his hand a reserve of fourteen regiments of cuirassiers. So he ordered the whole of the artillery of the guard, together with all that could be spared by the several corps, to advance at a gallop. Just then General de Wrede arrived on the ground with twenty-five pieces of excellent artillery, and solicited the honour of taking part in that decisive movement, to which Napoleon consented. He sent also for General Macdonald, with three divisions of the army of Italy, the fusiliers and mounted grenadiers of the guard, and General Nansouty's six regiments of cuirassiers. His design was to shake the Austrian centre with a hundred guns, and then to pierce it with Macdonald's bayonets and Nansouty's sabres. He decided at the same time that Massena, with the Carra St. Cyr, Molitor, and Legrand divisions, formed in close columns, should

wheel to the right, and then move forward perpendicularly to the Danube to the aid of Boudet, thus performing a flank movement under the fire of Kollowrath and Klenau. After all, the numerous *têtes de pont* he had constructed afforded him a sufficient security, and in this instance, again, his forethought was rewarded. But he did not choose that his young troops should hear the cannon in their rear, and be rendered uneasy about the communications of the army with the Danube.

These orders were obeyed on the instant. Massena's three divisions defiled in one long column towards the Danube, receiving in flank, with heroic impassibility, the fire of Klenau and Kollowrath. Lasalle and Marulaz covered them during their march, charging and repulsing the Austrian cavalry. Meanwhile Napoleon, impatient for the arrival of Macdonald and Lauriston, sent officer after officer to hasten them, and mounted on a Persian horse of dazzling whiteness, rode under a hail of cannon-balls about the ground quitted by Massena. The cannonade had by this time acquired the frequency of musket-firing, and everybody shuddered at the thought of seeing the man, on whose life so many destinies depended, struck by one of those blind messengers of death. But up came at last at a gallop, making the earth tremble beneath them, the sixty pieces of artillery belonging to the guard, and forty others, French and Bavarian, all directed by the illustrious Drouot. The hundred guns were ranged in a line, and instantly began the most tremendous cannonade ever known in our long wars. From Wagram to Aderklaa, and from Aderklaa to Süssenbrunn, the Austrian line presented an open angle, one side of which was formed by Bellegarde, the other by the grenadiers and the cuirassiers. The hundred cannons, firing incessantly on that double line, pierced it with balls, and soon dismounted the enemy's artillery. Napoleon observed with his glass the effect of that formidable battery, and was satisfied with the correctness of his own conceptions. But artillery was not sufficient to break the Austrian centre; bayonets, too, were requisite, and the army of Italy came up at double quick step. The intrepid Macdonald, recently recalled from disfavour, marches at the head of his corps, astonishing those who did not know him by his costume of the fashion of the Republic, and preparing to astonish them still more by his behaviour under fire. He deploys part of the Broussier division and a brigade of the Seras division in a single line, and ranges in close columns on the left wing the remains of the Broussier division, on the right Lamarque's division, and thus presents to the enemy an oblong square, which he closes with the twenty-four squadrons of Nansouty's cuirassiers. As a support to him, Napoleon places in his rear the fusiliers and tirailleurs of the

imperial guard, to the number of eight battalions, under General Reille. To these he adds the cavalry of the guard, to fall at the right moment upon the enemy's infantry, and then, with his eyes fixed on that grand spectacle, he awaits the success of the manœuvres he has ordered.

Macdonald advances under a deluge of fire, leaving the ground covered at every step with his dead and wounded, still closing his ranks without wavering, and communicating his own gallant bearing to his soldiers. "What a brave man!" Napoleon exclaims several times, seeing him march thus under grape and bullets. Suddenly Prince John de Lichtenstein advances to the charge with his heavy cavalry. Macdonald halts, and orders the two columns which form the sides of his square to face the enemy, who is thus met with three lines of fire. The ground shakes under the gallop of the Austrian cuirassiers, but they are received with such volleys of musketry, that they are forced to halt and retreat upon their infantry, whom their flight throws into great disorder. It is now the moment for our cavalry to charge and make thousands of prisoners in this confusion. Macdonald gives the order to Nansouty, but the latter, being obliged to bring up his troops from the rear to the front, unavoidably loses some precious time. When he is ready, the disorder of the Austrian infantry is partly repaired. He charges, however, and breaks several squares. Macdonald, in his impatience, addresses himself to the cavalry of the guard which was near him, and was commanded by General Walther. But the latter could only receive orders of Marshal Bessières, and he had just been struck by a cannon-ball. Macdonald was sorely vexed at seeing the fruit of his victory thus escape him; but though he made few prisoners, he had at least forced the Austrian army to retrograde, and frustrated their attempt on our centre and left. The archduke's troops gradually withdrew from Aderklaa on the one side, and Süssenbrunn on the other.

The serious danger that had threatened the army was now removed. Massena's column had arrived near the river towards Aspern, had faced to the right, and preceded by its cavalry, had resumed the offensive against Kollowrath and Klenau. Boudet was brought back into line, and all marching forward, drove the Austrians back upon Breitenlee and Hirschstatten. Lasalle and Marulaz made brilliant charges at the head of their cavalry; but the former was struck by a musket-ball, and ended his glorious career in seeing the enemy fly.

Thus the archduke's centre, shaken by the fire of a hundred pieces of ordnance, and arrested by Macdonald, retreats, as does also his right. If Marshal Davout, in accordance with his orders, carries the position of Neusiedel on the left wing of the Austrians, it is all over with them. That position being taken,

the line of heights from Neusiedel to Wagram will be no longer tenable, and Archduke Charles will be cut off from the route to Hungary, separated from Archduke John, and forced into Bohemia. Accordingly, Napoleon's gaze is now constantly turned to the right, towards the square tower which commands the village of Neusiedel, and he waits only the progress of the fire on that side to let loose Oudinot's corps on Wagram. He has still left, in case Archduke John should come up, half the army of Italy, Marmont's corps, the old guard, and the Bavarians. Happen then what may, he has resources to meet every chance of the day.

The confidence Napoleon placed in Marshal Davout was fully justified on this as on all other occasions. Montbrun and Grouchy prepared the passage of the Russbach on our extreme right for themselves and the infantry. The Morand and Friant divisions crossed the stream after the cavalry, and ranging themselves on the flank of the position of Neusiedel, formed a right angle with Gudin and Puthod's divisions, which remained before the Russbach from Neusiedel to Baumersdorf. When the signal to attack was given, Morand, who was on the extreme right, where the ascent was easiest, advanced first. Friant, placed between Morand and Neusiedel, where he formed the apex of the angle, waited until Morand should have gained ground upon the extremity of the enemy's line to attack the hill in his turn. For the present he confined himself to a violent cannonade, which he maintained with sixty pieces detached from several divisions. Morand, seconded on the left by this cannonade, and on the right by Montbrun's cavalry charges, coolly ascended the rising ground. In order to face this attack in flank, Rosenberg makes his line fall back. Morand continues his ascent under a plunging fire of the whole of that part of the Austrian line, and then attacks the enemy in column. Rosenberg assails his left, formed by the 17th of the line, and compels it to give way for a moment, until Friant sends to its aid Gilly's brigade, consisting of the 15th light and 33rd of the line, which charge up the hill, and drive back Rosenberg's troops at the point of the bayonet. Puthod and Gudin's divisions now come into action. Puthod forces his way into the village of Neusiedel, and after a severe conflict with the Austrian troops, compels them to retire upon the hill in the rear. At the same moment Gudin daringly scales the plateau under a murderous fire, whilst Friant has already gained ground in Rosenberg's rear. The square tower is at this moment passed by both Friant and Gudin. All is not ended, however. Hitherto they had had to fight only Rosenberg, favoured by the position; but Hohenzollern, who had remained stationary above Baumersdorf, opposite Oudinot, who had not yet been engaged, moved half

his troops towards the square tower, to assail Gudin's right and plunge it in the Russbach. Vainly did Arrighi's cuirassiers endeavour to defile between the camp barracks, in order to charge the hill which terminates in the plateau. Assailed in the narrow lanes of the camp by a most vehement fire, they could not charge with advantage, and retreated in disorder. The 85th of the line of Gudin's division was nearly brought to a halt by the violence of the fire. The other regiments of the same division came to its aid, and the whole body gradually succeeded in repulsing Hohenzollern, whilst Morand and Friant gained ground on the rear of the plateau in closely pursuing Rosenberg's troops.

Whilst Marshal Davout thus accomplished his task, Napoleon, seeing his fires passing beyond the square tower, no longer had any doubt of the day's success. "The battle is won!" he exclaimed; and he sent the news to Marshal Massena, Prince Eugène, and General Macdonald. Then he ordered Oudinot's corps to march on Baumersdorf and Wagram, and carry that portion of the heights. Oudinot's troops dashed into the village, which they had been unable to carry on the preceding evening, traversed it, ascended the plateau, and joined Gudin's division on their right. The impulse then became general. The Austrian line was everywhere driven back; and Gudin's division ranging evenly at that moment with those of Friant and Morand, Davout's whole corps formed one long oblique line which swept the whole extent of the plateau of Wagram.

The Tharreau division of Oudinot's corps marched on Wagram, charged several battalions, took two and the village, in which it made several prisoners. The Frère division (Oudinot's second) passed the village on the right. The Grandjean division (formerly St. Hilaire) followed that movement, repulsed the Austrian infantry, and sharply assailed them when they attempted to make a stand. The 10th light infantry fell upon a battalion which had formed in square and took it. Napoleon, seeing the Austrian army retreating in all quarters, and our line extending and even weakening itself in some points as it advanced, sent succours where they were needed, and particularly to General Macdonald, who was separated from Massena on his left, and Bernadotte on his right. He ordered to his aid de Wrede's Bavarian infantry and the cavalry of the guard. On arriving at Süssenbrunn he found the enemy's infantry still in possession of the village, which he took, and charging with his light cavalry, he made 4000 or 5000 prisoners at one stroke.

It was now three o'clock. Our left had driven back Klenau on Jedlersdorf; our centre had forced Bellegarde on Helmhof; our right had made Hohenzollern and Rosenberg fall back upon Bockflüss. Archduke Charles then gave orders for a retreat,

fearing that he should lose the road to Moravia, and be forced towards Bohemia, far away from the centre of the monarchy. One hundred and twenty thousand Frenchmen pursued the same number of Austrians, engaging with them here and there in a multitude of partial conflicts, and collecting at every step prisoners, cannons, and colours.

Such was that celebrated battle of Wagram, begun at four in the morning, and terminated at four in the afternoon. Napoleon had still in reserve Marmont's corps, part of the army of Italy, and the old guard—in all, 30,000 men—in case Archduke John should come and take part in the battle. That prince did at last approach the plain of Marchfeld, and showed himself to the right on our rear towards Siebenbrunn. His scouts encountering ours produced a sort of panic. The vivandières, and the long files of soldiers carrying off the wounded, thought that a second army was coming to recommence the fight, and they ran away uttering cries of terror. Among these fugitives were many young soldiers, exhausted by the heat of the day, and who, as usual, quitted the ground under the pretext of picking up the wounded. Such was the tumult that the reserved corps had to stand to their arms, and Napoleon, who had dismounted and was resting in the shade of a pyramid made of drums, was obliged to get into the saddle again. He believed that Archduke John was debouching in good earnest, and he was preparing to receive him with the forces he had kept intact for that purpose, when he saw the danger passing away, and the heads of the column which had shown themselves for a while disappearing below the horizon. The order to repair to Wagram had been despatched to Archduke John on the evening of the 4th; he received it on the morning of the 5th, started that day at noon, passed the night at Marchegg, marched again rather late on the morning of the 6th, and arrived when the battle was ended. He had certainly not intended to betray his brother, but he marched as might have been expected of a man of undecided character, who knew not the value of time. Had he come sooner on the ground, he would have added to the effusion of blood without changing the fortune of the day, since, to meet the 12,000 men he brought with him, there were Marmont's 10,000, the 10,000 remaining with Prince Eugène, and if necessary, the old guard. He had badly obeyed a chief who had badly commanded.

The results of the battle of Wagram, without being as extraordinary as those of Austerlitz, Jena, or Friedland, were very great nevertheless. The Austrians had lost in killed or wounded about 24,000 men, among whom were Generals Nordmann, d'Aspre, Wukassovich, Vecsay, Rouvroy, Nostiz, Hesse Homburg, Vacquant, Motzen, Stutterheim, Homberg, and Merville.

We had taken from them 9000 prisoners, who, with those of the preceding day, made a total of 12,000, and a score pieces of cannon. We had thus weakened the Austrian force by 36,000 men. On our part we had lost from 15,000 to 18,000 men, 7000 of whom were mortally wounded. It was, then, a memorable battle, the greatest in respect to numbers which Napoleon had fought, and one of the most important in its consequences. Its most wonderful characteristic was not, as on former occasions, the prodigious quantity of prisoners, flags, and cannons taken during the day; it was, that one of the broadest rivers in Europe had been crossed in face of the enemy with admirable precision, concert, and security; it was, twenty-four hours fighting along a line three leagues long and backed against that river, with all the perils of such a situation annulled; it was, that the position by which the commander-in-chief held the French in check was carried, and the army that defended the Austrian monarchy was beaten, and put out of condition to keep the field! These results were immense, since they terminated the war. In a military point of view, Napoleon had, in the passage of the Danube, outdone anything ever before achieved in that way. On the field of battle he had with rare promptitude moved from the centre to the left the reserve he had skilfully made, and had solved the question by one of those decisive movements which belong only to great captains; and if he had deprived himself of one important result by too soon stopping the Austrians when about to place themselves between him and the river, he had done so from highly prudential motives, which deserve to be admired. If there was anything to object to in what related to these prodigious events, it was certain consequences of Napoleon's policy, such as the extreme youth of his troops, the immoderate extent of the operations, the mistakes arising from the assemblage of men of so many different nations, and an incipient confusion imputable not to the mind of the commander, but to the diversity and the quantity of the elements he was obliged to use. His genius was ever extraordinary, and the more extraordinary for that he strove against the nature of things; but it was already visible, that if that strife were prolonged, it was not the nature of things that would be vanquished.

As to the adversary, he had been brave, devoted to his cause, ingenious, but undecided. Without considering all the plans more or less specious which he had been blamed for not having adopted, such as assailing the isle of Lobau after the battle of Essling, or crossing the Danube above or below Vienna, it is unquestionable that there were certain simple things of infallible effect which he ought to have done, and which fortunately for us he did not do, such as multiplying the impediments to the

passage of the river all about the isle of Lobau; entrenching the camp which was to be the field of battle, which would have enabled him, after making head against the French, to take them in flank and drive them back upon the river; giving his orders with precision enough not to have the left wing entering into action before the right; and gathering together for that decisive day all the disposable forces of the monarchy, whereof 40,000 men at least remained idle in Hungary, Bohemia, and Galicia. It is commonly simple things, dictated by good sense and imprudently omitted, which decide the fate of the most important operations, especially in war. There seem grounds, too, for saying that the Austrian prince gave the word to retreat a little too soon, for he was still capable of making a stand against the French, and had he done so, Archduke John's appearance on the field of battle would not have been too late. On the other hand, it must be owned that longer resistance might have rendered the defeat so complete, that nothing would have remained of an army on the preservation of which depended the weal of the monarchy. Further resistance would have increased the chances of victory, but also greatly increased the chances of perishing beyond recovery. But whatever we may think of those various judgments which have been pronounced on these memorable events by all historians during the last half century, it is not the less true that there is glory even in being mistaken when one fights heroically for one's country, and takes part in such grand things. The war, besides, was drawing to an end, for it was not with Archduke John's 12,000 men, and the 80,000 men remaining to Archduke Charles, that it was possible to save the monarchy. Though the latter had lost in action only thirty and some odd thousands, an equal number belonging to the landwehr had quitted the ranks and were returning home. To retire into one of the provinces of the monarchy, recruit the army as far as it was possible, and by holding out threats of indefinitely prolonging the war obtain better conditions of peace, was the only hopeful course yet remaining.

It was thus Napoleon appraised the result of the battle of Wagram, and whilst he regarded the end of hostilities as at hand, he would have that end be such that the peace should depend absolutely upon himself. If instead of sending the old army of Boulogne into Spain, to perish uselessly against natural obstacles, he had kept it between the Rhine and the Danube, he might have overwhelmed Austria with it, and expunged that power from the map of Europe for the remainder of his own reign. But obliged to contend with hastily collected forces against the immense armaments of Austria, he had done wonders in subjugating her in three months; and if he succeeded in

imposing peace upon her and punishing her for this fourth war by fresh sacrifices of territory, population, and money, that was enough for his personal glory and for the maintenance of his greatness. He had already, therefore, abandoned the idea of dethroning the house of Hapsburg, which he had conceived in the first impulse of his anger, and after the prodigious triumphs of Ratisbon. To punish that house by lowering it still more, and by the same blow to extinguish the resistances that had threatened to break out in Europe, was to be the sole, but great and brilliant enough prize of that last campaign—a campaign not less extraordinary than the others, especially if the means were compared with the results.

Napoleon, then, had no other intention in pursuing the Austrians than to bring them finally to submission. But it was no longer possible for him to act as he used to do in former days; that is to say, after having fought a whole day, to resume his march immediately, so as to reap all the consequences of victory. His army was too numerous, he had too many points to look to, he had too many newly officered regiments, and too many young soldiers in the regiments with old officers, to be able to march again the same evening or the following morning, without caring about what he left behind him. There were regiments, in fact, in which a multitude of the soldiers were either marauding or occupied in the transport of the wounded. Some there were of 2500 men that had 500 men hors de combat, 1000 detached, and only 1000 present under arms. The heat was excessive, wine was plentiful in the villages, the soldier was somewhat disorderly in the enjoyment of victory, and it needed Napoleon's immense ascendency over him to maintain obedience, presence with the colours, and attachment to duty. Already everything was become more difficult at this period, and Napoleon knew it without owning it.

The next day, July 7, he repaired to the imperial residence of Wolkersdorf, from which the Emperor Francis had watched the battle of Wagram, and established his headquarters there. He granted that day to the several corps to convey their wounded to the ambulances in the isle of Lobau, rally the detached or missing soldiers, revictual themselves, renew their stock of ammunition, and put themselves in a condition to perform a long and rapid march. Meanwhile he despatched the troops that had not been brought into action on the route on which it was probable they would find the enemy. Moravia seemed the most likely place of retreat to be chosen by the Austrian commanders, because, being situated between Bohemia and Hungary, it allowed of communication with either, of drawing from them what resources they could, and of choosing the one or other as the theatre of a prolonged resistance. Napoleon

first despatched Montbrun's cavalry along the Nikolsburg road, and sent after it, on the evening of the 7th, Marmont's fine corps and the Bavarian troops of General de Wrede, whose artillery alone had been engaged. Assigning to them Moravia as their common destination, he left them free to turn right or left, into Hungary or Bohemia, as Montbrun's reconnaissances should indicate the one or the other as the direction in which the enemy had retreated. He directed Massena to rally his forces as soon as possible, and with such of his divisions as had suffered least, particularly those of Legrand and Molitor, to march along the Danube and observe the route to Bohemia by Korneuburg, Stockerau, and Znaïm. He left him the St. Sulpice cuirassiers and Lasalle's cavalry, which after that general's death had been commanded by Marulaz, and the latter having been wounded, by General Bruyère.

The next day, the 8th, Napoleon being as yet very imperfectly informed as to the march of the Austrians, whom the light cavalry discovered on both roads, the Moravian and the Bohemian, and still judging that of Moravia as the most naturally indicated, he sent Davout, whose *corps d'armée* was quite recovered from the fatigues of the 6th, to Nikolsburg, after Marmont. He had left him Grouchy's dragoons and Arrighi's cuirassiers. These troops, with Marmont's, made a total of at least 45,000 men, capable of making head against the whole army of Archduke Charles. At the same time Napoleon sent the Saxons to the March, to watch Archduke John, and compel him to remain beyond that line. He left Prince Eugène under the walls of Vienna with part of his army, to quell the capital if it stirred, and to stop Archduke John, if, quitting the left bank of the Danube, which he had just conquered, he made an attempt on the unguarded right bank, to which Chasteler and Giulay might possibly lend their aid. General Vandamme was also moved to Vienna with the Wurtembergers. Napoleon sent Macdonald after Massena, and he himself remained twenty-four hours longer at Wolkersdorf with the whole guard, Nansouty's cuirassiers, and Oudinot's young troops, in order to learn on which of the two routes, that to Moravia or that to Bohemia, he should be certain of finding the enemy.

Though he did not believe in the possibility of a prolonged resistance on the part of the Austrians, yet not wishing to leave anything to chance during his absence from Vienna, Napoleon took measures for putting it in a state of defence. He ordered the hundred and nine guns of large calibre which had protected the passage of the army to be carried back to the capital and planted on the walls; to close all the bastions, so that the garrison might be safe against foes within or without; to collect provisions and ammunition for 10,000 men for three months;

to send up to the capital the boats that had been employed in the various operations of the isle of Lobau; to establish a temporary bridge of boats on the site of the Thabor bridge, until it could be reconstructed on piles, and to protect it on both banks with vast *têtes de pont*. The isle of Lobau might thenceforth suffice for itself with the bridges on piles over both branches of the river, since it was become only a place of depôt, and a receptacle for prisoners and wounded men. With an assured communication at Vienna, and another at the isle of Lobau, Napoleon had means of passage sufficient for all imaginable contingencies of war. He gave orders at the same time to complete the arming of Raab, and to finish the works at Mölk, Lintz, and Passau, which were still intended to secure his line of operation. Lastly, having taken all these precautions in case of a prolonged struggle, he resolved to derive from the victory of Wagram one of its most essential consequences—an immediate increase of his financial resources—and he imposed on the provinces of the monarchy a war contribution of 200 millions, which being once decreed could not be brought in question in any subsequent negotiation for peace. In this way he employed the 7th, 8th, and part of the 9th of July at Wolkersdorf, whilst waiting the result of the reconnaissances prosecuted in all directions.

Archduke Charles, there is no telling why, had adopted Bohemia as the place of retreat. Whether fearing that he should not reach the road to Moravia in time, or wishing to preserve the important province of Bohemia to the monarchy, and to remain in communication with the centre of Germany, which was still expected to rise, he had retreated on the Znaïm road, which leads to Prague by Iglau. This was a strange resolution on his part, for except the satisfaction of separating from his brother the Archduke John, and leaving it to him to raise Hungary, whilst he himself proceeded to turn to account all the resources of Bohemia, it is hard to know what advantages he hoped to derive from it. By entering Bohemia he shut himself up in a sort of close field, which his adversary might traverse entirely in a few marches, and without moving far from the Danube, and thus everything was made to depend on a final encounter, which would take place soon, and the issue of which could not be doubtful. On the contrary, had he marched into Hungary, he would have rallied all the forces left to the house of Austria, drawn his adversary into the heart of the monarchy, where the Austrian army would have gone on continually increasing and the French army diminishing; where he would, perhaps, have found opportunity to fight another battle less unfortunate than Wagram, and raised up against Napoleon the only difficulty by which he could be beaten—the

only one by which he was beaten subsequently—that of distances. The inconvenience of losing the resources of Bohemia was not very considerable, for on the one hand, that province had scarcely anything left to supply, and on the other, Napoleon had not forces to devote to its occupation. The archduke's choice, then, can only be explained by the trouble and perplexity attendant on defeat, which almost always leads to the worst measures, and makes one misfortune engender others still greater and more irreparable.

Well, then, the archduke had taken the road to Prague by Znaïm, having with him Bellegarde, Kollowrath, and Klenau's corps, and the grenadier and cavalry reserves—altogether not more than 60,000 men. The corps of Prince de Reuss, which had wasted the day of the 6th in observing the Vienna road, not having suffered in the battle, brought up the rear. On the way to Moravia, by Wilfersdorf and Nikolsburg, Archduke Charles allowed Hohenzollern and Rosenberg's corps to retire, to flank the main army—a fact which suggests that there was in this circumstance something worse than a bad resolution, namely, absence of resolution, and that each corps took the route on which the lost battle had cast it. The left, in fact, composed of Hohenzollern and Rosenberg's forces, had been forced upon the route to Moravia; whilst the centre and the right had been driven on that to Bohemia. Thus it is, that frequently where history exhausts itself in search of motives, there have been none at all.

The double march, however, which removed from Archduke Charles some 20,000 or 25,000 of his best forces, had one momentary advantage. It left Napoleon in complete uncertainty as to the enemy's route, and exposed him to mistake the direction in which he should send his columns. Thus, along the Moravian road, by Wolkersdorf and Nikolsburg, he had sent Montbrun, Marmont, de Wrede, and Davout (that is to say, 45,000 men against 25,000), and on the route by Znaïm, Massena, Macdonald, Marulaz, and St. Sulpice (28,000 men against 60,000). It is true that as he himself kept in the middle with the guard, Nansouty, and Oudinot, he could in a few hours afford the aid of 30,000 men to whichever of his lieutenants had need of it.

Massena on the one side, and Marmont on the other, pursued their respective routes. On the 8th of July, Marmont was close upon Rosenberg's rearguard, and picked up many of its wounded and fatigued soldiers, most of them belonging to the landwehr. Arrived at Wilfersdorf on the 9th, he learned, through Montbrun's skilful and daring reconnaissances, that Rosenberg had turned off to the left. The fact was, the two lieutenants of Archduke Charles had quitted the road to

Moravia, and were making again for Bohemia, to join the main body of the army; therein obeying a will, the strange vacillations of which will be presently seen. General Marmont, having been left free by Napoleon to act according to circumstances, turned off likewise, and marched by Mistelbach and Laa, in the direction of Znaïm. But not knowing whether the body he was pursuing was the main army or a detachment, he only informed Marshal Davout of his detour to the left, without doing anything to hinder the latter from continuing his march to Nikolsburg and Moravia.

On the 9th, when half-way to Laa, he came up with 1200 horse and two infantry battalions of Rosenberg's, routed them, and took some hundreds of prisoners. He arrived in the evening at Laa, on the Taya—a stream which, after passing through the heart of Moravia, falls into the Morava. The heat was stifling, that province being sheltered on the north by the mountains of Bohemia, Upper Silesia, and Hungary. The wine-cellars of the country were well stocked, and Marmont's troops, tired, heated, and too confident from recent victory, took to straggling, so that when he arrived at Laa he had not a fourth of his effective in the ranks. He assembled the officers, pointed out to them the danger of endangering the result of a grand campaign by culpable negligence, shot two of the soldiers by way of example, and was able to rally his men, and march by daybreak against Znaïm. Again another detour of the enemy went near to perplex him. Rosenberg's corps, which had turned off to the left to reach the road to Znaïm, now turned to the right to get back to that to Brünn. Hohenzollern's corps still continued its march to Bohemia, but Archduke Charles sent Rosenberg's back towards Moravia; there is no telling why, for that corps was not strong enough to defend the province if the French cared to occupy it. This was a further proof that these two corps had been left, without reflection, on the route to Moravia, and that they had been, again without reflection, ordered now towards Znaïm, now towards Brünn. Puzzling as were these divagations of the Austrian forces, Marmont, with remarkable military sagacity, persisted in his march on Znaïm, leaving Rosenberg to make a fresh detour to the right, whilst he himself continued in the direction which led, as he rightly surmised, to the enemy.

Towards the middle of the same day, Marmont, having reached a position in which he had the Taya on his left, and in front a deep ravine falling into the Taya, saw beyond the ravine the basin in which the town of Znaïm was situated, in the form of an amphitheatre. The Austrians were crowding on the bridge over the Taya, and hastily traversing the town to reach the Bohemian road in time. Far from being in a condition to place himself across that road and bar it, he was himself in great

danger, having but 10,000 men against 60,000. The Austrians occupied the banks of the ravine, which he took from them by a vigorous attack of the 8th and 23rd of the line. He also seized the village of Teswitz, situated below, from which point he could cannonade the bridge, besides two farms on his right, to serve him as points d'appui; and a wood further still to the right, which he filled with his tirailleurs. Having his front thus covered by the ravine of which he was master, his left by the Taya, and his right by farms and a wood, both strongly occupied, he could harass the Austrians with his cannon during their passage over the bridge, without too much exposing himself to their reprisals. Meanwhile he despatched aides-de-camp to inform Napoleon of the singular position in which he was placed.

To relieve themselves from Marmont's severe and perilous cannonade, the Austrians made a determined attack on the village of Teswitz. Seeing their preparations for this attack, Marmont sent Bavarian troops to baffle it. As the assailants redoubled their efforts, it was necessary to employ against them the whole of de Wrede's division, and at last the 81st of the line. That French regiment put an end to the conflict, and kept the Austrians at a great distance. The day ended without any other event. Towards the close of it a distant cannonade on the left announced Massena's march on the Bohemian road. Napoleon, too, could not fail to arrive soon on the right. Marmont therefore passed the night quietly, in full confidence in his position. Another circumstance tended to increase his sense of security. M. de Fresnel, a Frenchman in the service of Austria, presented himself, on the part of General the Count de Bellegarde, to request an armistice. General Marmont, not having power to conclude such an act, and hoping, too, that it would be possible to surround the Austrian army on the following day, despatched the envoy to the emperor's headquarters, without taking upon himself to suspend hostilities.

The French were now coming up by both roads with the Austrians. Massena had been constantly on the heels of Prince de Reuss' rearguard, and had taken from it many prisoners. On the 9th he came up with it at the foot of the Mallebern hills, and on the 10th at Hollabrünn, where he fought, whilst Marmont was establishing his position before Znaïm. Archduke Charles, on hearing of the presence of a French corps at Laa, had sent the grenadiers and the cavalry reserve to take possession of the bridge over the Taya, and had followed them himself with Bellegarde, Kollowrath, and Klenau's corps, leaving Reuss to hold out at Hollabrünn as long as he could. He it was, then, with the corps we have mentioned, whom Marmont saw crossing the Schallersdorf bridge, as that over the Taya before Znaïm was

called. Whilst these things were taking place on the right, Napoleon marched to Laa on the 10th, hoping to have the guard at Znaïm on the 11th. About the middle of that day he arrived before his troops at Marmont's headquarters.

On the morning of the 11th the Austrians continued to defile in sight of Marmont, who cannonaded them from the village of Teswitz as they passed the river; and Massena, pursuing Prince de Reuss, drove them in the middle of the day on the Taya, after a sharp engagement. On coming up to the Schallersdorf bridge, which was barricaded, Massena made the gallant Legrand division attack it. Its commander, leading his soldiers under fire with his usual bravery, assailed the bridge in front, whilst Massena's artillery played on it obliquely. Scaling the barricades, he made himself master of the bridge, and after that act of daring, he marched his division into the little plain which formed the basin of the Taya, in presence of the troops of Prince de Reuss and the Austrian grenadiers backed against the town of Znaïm. From the summit of the hills to the right, on the other side of the Taya, General Marmont watched this spectacle, impatient to second Massena effectually.

The latter, not content with one act of hardihood, resolved to attack the Austrians, drive them into Znaïm, follow them through it, and chase them beyond it, in hopes that Marmont's troops would bar the way against them to Bohemia. But he had with him only Legrand's division, the Carra St. Cyr division, the same which had been so imprudently heroic at Aderklaa, not having yet come up. Yet with his one division he assailed de Reuss' troops and the grenadiers, his artillery seconding him from the hither side of the Taya. Having crossed the bridge, he entered the long village of Schallersdorf, took it, seized a large convent on the left called Kloster Bruck, and launched his cuirassiers into the plain on the right, where they made several vigorous charges against the Austrians. Massena, with 7000 or 8000 men, was then engaged with more than 30,000, without reckoning the 30,000 others drawn up beyond Znaïm, in the plains through which lay the road to Bohemia. A frightful storm having come on, the battle was almost suspended by the impossibility of firing. Availing themselves of this circumstance, the Austrian grenadiers advanced in silence through the village of Schallersdorf, surprised our soldiers, who could not use their muskets, and for a while made themselves masters of the bridge. Massena thought to set the cuirassiers at them, but the ground had become too slippery to support them. Matters were assuming an alarming aspect, when fortunately the Carra St. Cyr division came up, recaptured the bridge, cut its way through the whole length of the column of grenadiers, took 800 of them prisoners,

and debouched victoriously on the plain of Znaïm. At that moment Marmont had debouched from Teswitz, and joined Massena in driving the Austrians on Znaïm, whence they would soon be constrained to retreat in disorder; but the guard not having yet come up, there was no hope of surrounding them. Three thousand horse of that corps had indeed already appeared, and these, with Montbrun's cavalry and St. Sulpice's cuirassiers, might make the retreat of the Austrians singularly calamitous.

But Napoleon, who had meanwhile arrived, had met Bellegarde's envoy and received Prince John de Lichtenstein himself, who came to ask for a suspension of arms, and promise, in the name of military honour, the opening of a negotiation for the immediate conclusion of peace. Napoleon conferred a while with Major-General Berthier, M. Maret, Duke of Bassano, and the Grand-Marshal Duroc, as to the course to be taken. He might, if he kept the Austrians engaged for some hours longer by an obstinate combat, have gained time enough perhaps to turn them, or, at the very least, to let loose after them 10,000 horse, who would have thrown them into horrible disorder. But without having recourse to that measure, there was a certainty of obtaining the most advantageous conditions of peace, and his pride being gratified at seeing the most brilliant and most noble officer in the Austrian army come and humbly implore him to put an end to the war, he was inclined to stop in his victorious march. Opinions differed on this subject. Some were for extinguishing the house of Austria and all coalitions with it, so that they might not be revived when we turned to Spain to finish the war there. Others alleged the danger of prolonging a struggle begun with extemporised means and ended in three months by a miracle of genius, but which, if continued, might provoke a rising in Germany, rouse even the Russians, who were not disposed to see the house of Austria destroyed, and thus set the whole continent in flames. Napoleon, feeling confusedly that he had already greatly abused fortune, and hoping that this fresh lesson would for the future hinder Austria from molesting him in his struggle with Spain and England, exclaimed, "Enough blood has been shed! Let us make peace!"

He exacted from Prince John de Lichtenstein a promise that plenipotentiaries should be sent forth with power to negotiate, and left Berthier on the part of France, and M. de Wimpffen on that of Austria, to stipulate the conditions of an armistice.

Whilst they were thus engaged, Colonel Marbot and General d'Aspre were despatched to the advanced posts to put an end to hostilities. They arrived between Schallersdorf and Znaïm whilst Massena's troops were engaged with the Austrian

grenadiers. Such was the eagerness of the combatants that the cry of "*Peace! peace! Stop firing!*" repeated a thousand times, was not enough to separate them. Colonel Marbot and General d'Aspre were even slightly wounded in their endeavours to put an end to the fight. They succeeded at last, and a profound silence, broken only by the joyous acclamations of the victors, succeeded to a frightful cannonade. The day cost us about 2000 killed and wounded, and the Austrians more than 3000, with 5000 or 6000 prisoners. It was a final victory, that worthily closed this grand campaign.

Taking the field at the end of April, with troops hardly formed and still scattered, against Archduke Charles, who marched with an army long organised and already brought together, Napoleon succeeded in some days in completing his own, concentrating it in presence of the enemy, cutting in two that of Archduke Charles, and casting one moiety into Bohemia, the other into Lower Austria. Such had been the first act of the campaign which ended at Ratisbon. Next, pursuing the Austrians dispersed over both sides of the Danube, Napoleon marched so rapidly and so surely that he never allowed them to rally before Vienna, and entered that capital a month after the opening of the campaign, thus repairing the defeat of the army of Italy, and stopping at their source all schemes for stirring up the continent against France. Wishing to cross the Danube to end the war by a decisive battle, and having been interrupted in that operation by a sudden flood, he sustained, by prodigies of energy in the two days of Essling, the very dangerous enterprise of fighting with a river at his back, thanks to the admirable choice of the isle of Lobau as a ground of passage. Having returned to the right bank, he devised magnificent works to annul almost entirely the obstacle that separated him from the Austrians, brought up the armies of Italy and Dalmatia, thus concentrated all his forces for a decisive battle, and then performing in a few hours the miracle of crossing a broad river in presence of the enemy, with 150,000 men and 500 pieces of artillery, he terminated, in one of the greatest battles in the history of the world, that fourth Austrian war—a war not less memorable than all those he had directed, and one in which his genius, surmounting its own faults, had made up by marvels of industry and perseverance for all the deficiencies which an insensate policy had accumulated around him; a war in which the warnings of fortune were once more renewed, as if to put the great captain on his guard against the errors of the imprudent and wildly ambitious politician.

In stipulating the terms of the armistice, Napoleon was most careful to ensure his military position in case of a

renewal of hostilities, should it be found impossible to agree on the conditions of peace. He insisted, in the first place, that he should be allowed to occupy in a permanent manner all the provinces he had only traversed with his troops: these were Upper and Lower Austria, half Moravia, consisting of the districts of Znaïm and Brünn, the part of Hungary extending from the Raab to Vienna, Styria, Carinthia, and a portion of Carniola necessary for communicating with Italy and Dalmatia. In this way the line of separation between the belligerent armies was to pass through Lintz, Krems, Znaïm, Brünn, Göding, Presburg, Raab, Grätz, Laybach, and Trieste. Moreover, as supports to this line, the citadel of Brünn, the town of Presburg, and the fortresses of Raab, Grätz, and Laybach, were to be left to him, or delivered to him immediately. He thus occupied more than a third of the Austrian empire. Established in its centre, supported by the capital and the principal fortresses, he might, in case of prolonged hostilities, take Vienna for his basis of operations, and push his conquests into the most remote provinces. He allowed a month for the duration of the armistice, and stipulated for a fortnight's previous notice in case of rupture. A month would suffice for the negotiations if there was a real desire to come to terms, and for the arrival of reinforcements from France if there was not. Hard as were the conditions of this armistice, the archduke's troops were in a situation that made anything preferable to the continuance of hostilities. It was agreed unanimously at headquarters that the armistice should be accepted, and it was signed by M. de Wimpffen in the name of the generalissimo, and by Major-General Berthier in the name of Napoleon. The Austrian grand army had fought bravely, and in spite of its misfortunes it might say that it rather raised up the Austrian power than suffered it to fall, though painful sacrifices must be made if peace was to be obtained from a victor justly elated with his advantages.

The armistice was signed at Znaïm on the 11th, at midnight, and was dated the 12th. After exchanging complimentary messages with Archduke Charles, Napoleon set off for Schönbrunn, to use every means either to have peace or to end the war by a last brief and decisive effort. In the course of the month of August negotiations might have been concluded, or all the means might have been collected for recommencing in September a last campaign, which should put an end to the existence of the house of Austria. Napoleon therefore ordered fresh preparations, as though he had done nothing yet, and as though he had not victories to be turned to profit diplomatically, but defeats to repair.

In the first place, he distributed his troops between Vienna and the circle traced by the armistice, so that they had ample room, and yet could be rapidly concentrated on any one point of the circle. He stationed General Marmont at Krems, whence he could pass by St. Polten into Carinthia when he had to return to Dalmatia; Marshal Massena at Znaïm, the scene of his late victory; Marshal Davout at Brünn, the point towards which his march tended; the Saxons on the line on which they were already, between Marchegg and Presburg; Prince Eugène on the Raab, where he had been victorious. General Grenier was also to occupy the Raab; General Macdonald, Grätz and Laybach. General Oudinot was to station himself with his own corps and the young guard on the plain of Vienna. The old guard bivouacked in the fine imperial residence of Schönbrunn. As one of the advantages of the armistice was to allow of employing July and August in bringing the Tyrol to submission, the whole Bavarian contingent was sent into German Tyrol, and Prince Eugène's Italian troops were marched into Italian Tyrol. Fresh forces were sent into the Vorarlberg and Franconia.

Having a large proportion of young soldiers, who might suffer in their health from a town life, and in their military spirit from the inactivity of an armistice, he ordered them to be encamped. The weather was fine, the country beautiful; wine, meat, and bread were in plenty. The contributions levied on the Austrian provinces, and payable either in paper or in kind, furnished means of payment for whatever was taken without ruining anybody, and burdening only the finances of the State. Workshops were established at Vienna, Lintz, Znaïm, Brünn, Presburg, and Grätz, to make clothes, shoes, linen, and clothing appurtenances, materials and workmanship being always paid for. In a month the army, well fed, clothed, rested, and trained, would be again in excellent condition. Its numbers, too, were to be augmented. A reinforcement of 30,000 men was on its way from Strasburg. This was more than the losses of the campaign, particularly after the slightly wounded (those curable within three or four weeks) should have returned to the ranks. Napoleon gave orders for 50,000 men in addition to these, so as to raise to the number of 250,000 Frenchmen and 50,000 allies the army acting at the heart of the Austrian monarchy—a force double what Austria could raise on the most favourable hypothesis. To arrive at this result, Napoleon adopted a means singularly well adapted for recruiting the corps. Many regiments in the army wanted men, whereas in the depôts there was an abundance of conscripts, and even more than could be officered. Napoleon sent to their respective regiments under Davout, Marmont, and

Massena, the soldiers of the third and fourth battalions that formed Puthod and Barbou's divisions and Oudinot's corps, and sent the officers to Strasburg to reconstruct their battalions with ready-drilled soldiers, and then return with them to the army. At the same time they were to perform another service, by conducting to Strasburg 20,000 prisoners, whom it was not thought advisable to leave in the isle of Lobau, lest hostilities should be renewed.

Napoleon, as we have often said, had created provisional demi-brigades with the fifth and fourth battalions of certain regiments which were in a more advanced state of organisation than the rest. He dissolved eleven of these demi-brigades, comprising at least 20,000 men, who had orders to proceed to Strasburg, where they were to be used in reconstructing the fourth battalions. He made a fresh review of the depôts that had not drafted off all their men into the demi-brigades, and he required them all to furnish marching battalions, distinguished by the numbers of the regiments to which they belonged. On arriving at Ratisbon they would be conveyed thence to Vienna by the Danube. Napoleon, moreover, made a demand on Italy for 10,000 men. He had not much need of additional cavalry soldiers, for, as usual, he had lost few men of that arm, but many horses, to replace which he established new horse-markets at Passau, Lintz, Vienna, and Raab. Lastly, satisfied with the services of the artillery, he resolved further to reinforce it, and to raise it from 550 to 700 guns by augmenting, not the regimental artillery (a return to old practices which experience had not justified), but that of the several corps, and particularly that of the imperial guard. The latter had done excellent service at Wagram, where it counted for 60 pieces. He resolved to raise it to 120. Eighteen companies of artillery taken from the depôts—those of Italy especially—supplied the personnel of this augmentation. All the calibres were raised. The naval artillery was to relieve the land artillery in the guard of the coasts, and the companies of the latter were to take the places of those sent from the depôts to the army. The defensive works at Raab, Vienna, Mölk, Lintz, and Passau were pushed forward with increased activity. The wounded were divided into three categories: those who had undergone amputation were sent to Strasburg; the severely wounded were distributed between Mölk, Lintz, and Passau, so that they might rejoin their regiments in two or three months; the slightly wounded were sent to each camp. By this arrangement the movements of the army were secured from any embarrassment in case hostilities were resumed.

Rewards were duly distributed, beginning, as usual, with the leaders of the army. General Oudinot, who had well replaced

Marshal Lannes at the head of the second corps; General Marmont, who had made a bold and judicious march from Dalmatia to the middle of Moravia; and General Macdonald, who had displayed throughout the Italian campaign profound experience in war, and the rarest intrepidity at Wagram, were named marshals. Presents were bestowed on the several corps, and especially on the wounded. One act of severity was mingled with these manifestations of gratitude and munificence. Marshal Bernadotte, who, through his own fault or that of his corps, had been unable to keep the post assigned to him between Wagram and Aderklaa, nevertheless published an order of the day addressed to the Saxons, in which he thanked them for their conduct on the 5th and 6th of July, and attributed to them, as it were, the winning of the battle. This manner of distributing to himself and his soldiers praises which he ought to have waited to receive from Napoleon, greatly offended the latter, because it offended the army and its leaders. To punish it, Napoleon wrote a most severe order of the day, which was communicated to the marshals only, but which was a sufficient reprimand for such an extravagance of vanity, for being addressed to rivals it was not probable it should remain secret.

Lastly, Napoleon went in person to visit his camps in Upper Austria, Moravia, and Hungary, knowing that by such significant vigilance he better ensured the conclusion of a peace than by all the efforts of his negotiators. The town of Altenberg was appointed for their meeting-place. Thus was the time employed during the armistice of Znaïm by that indefatigable genius, who comprehended everything except this simple truth, that the world was not so indefatigable as himself.

# BOOK XXXVI.

## TALAVERA AND WALCHEREN.

IT was not alone on the banks of the Drave, the Raab, the Danube, and the Vistula that the French shed their blood during this year of 1809, but also on the Ebro, the Tagus, the Douro, the Scheldt, and on most of the seas of the globe. Everywhere, and almost simultaneously, they were seen lavishing their lives in this terrible conflict between the most ambitious of men and the most vindictive of nations. Whilst with soldiers scarcely beyond the age of boyhood Napoleon terminated the Austrian war in three months, his generals, left without his guidance, or obtaining from him only a partial attention, and unhappily, at discord among themselves, could not with the first-rate soldiers get the better of some undisciplined bands and a handful of well-led English. Thus the Spanish war was endlessly protracted to the detriment of our power, and sometimes even of our glory, and to the confusion of the imperial dynasty.

After having made his troops in Spain perform a winter campaign, and fight in December and January the battles of Espinosa, Burgos, Tudela, Molins del Rey, Coruña, and Ucles, Napoleon resolved to grant them one or two months' rest, as necessary for the health of the men and the repairs of matériel, after which they should march from the points they had won to the south of the Peninsula, to complete its subjugation from Lisbon to Cadiz, and from Cadiz to Valencia. The plan he left behind him when he left Valladolid on his way to Austria, and which, however well conceived, could not supply the place of a good general, has been already described; but a brief repetition of it in this place is requisite for the understanding of the operations of 1809.

Marshal Soult, with the Merle, Mermet, Delaborde, and Heudelet divisions, the Lorge and Lahoussaye dragoons, and Franceschi's light horse, making together seventeen regiments of infantry, ten of cavalry, and fifty-eight pieces of artillery, was, after resting in Galicia from the fatigues endured in the pursuit of the English, to put himself again in motion, cross the Minho at Tuy, advance by Braga to the Douro, take Oporto,

and proceed thence to the conquest of Lisbon. Napoleon had hoped that this *corps d'armée*, the nominal strength of which was 46,000, would actually furnish about 36,000 fighting men. This calculation was, unfortunately, erroneous; for in consequence of losses in wounded, sick, and fatigued, and numerous detachments, it was impossible to bring together more than from 23,000 to 24,000. The orders were to march in February, and arrive at Lisbon in March, so as to take advantage of the mild weather of the early springtide of those regions. Behind Marshal Soult was Marshal Ney with the brave Marchand and Morice Mathieu divisions, reckoning only 16,000 fighting men out of a nominal effective of 33,000. His instructions were to remain in Galicia, complete its subjugation, and thus cover the communications of the expeditionary corps in Portugal.

Whilst Marshal Soult was invading Portugal, Marshal Victor, vanquisher at Espinosa and Ucles, was to quit Madrid with the first corps, consisting of the fine Villatte, Ruffin, and Lapisse divisions, and with twelve regiments of cavalry, and was to advance by a movement to his right, from Talavera to Merida, from the Tagus to the Guadiana, in order to execute in Estramadura and Andalusia a march corresponding to that of Marshal Soult in Portugal. As soon as he was assured of Soult's entry into Lisbon, he was to march to Seville, where he would, if necessary, obtain the support of one of Soult's divisions. A besieging apparatus, consisting of short 24-pounders, was prepared for him in Madrid, in order that he might batter the walls of Seville and Cadiz if those capitals were defended. At that time Marshal Victor had at hand only two of his three divisions, that of General Lapisse having remained at Salamanca since the concentration of troops which Napoleon had effected in the north against General Moore. Whilst Soult was moving from Tuy to Lisbon, Lapisse had orders to move from Salamanca to Alcantara, join his superior at Merida, and accompany him into Andalusia. It was supposed that this corps, reinforced by Leval's excellent German division, and nominally amounting to 40,000 men, would bring 30,000 into the field, and would be sufficient, with such reinforcements as could be sent to it from Madrid, to command the south of the Peninsula.

King Joseph, having Marshal Jourdan for his chief of the staff, was authorised to retain under his immediate orders the five French divisions of Dessoles and Sebastiani, Valence's Polish division, Melhaud's dragoons, and some brigades of light cavalry, forming altogether eleven regiments of foot, seven of horse, and an actual force of 36,000 men for a nominal one of 50,000. In this total were included King Joseph's bodyguard, the general park, and a multitude of depôts. With this central force the king was to keep Madrid in subjection, afford aid at need to

Marshal Victor, and in short, provide for all unforeseen contingencies. General Junot's corps, which had terminated the siege of Saragossa, and was then under the orders of General Suchet, having only 16,000 men available out of 30,000, was to remain at rest in Aragon, keep watch over that province, and finally, if events took a favourable turn, quit it, and advance by way of Cuença to Valencia. There remained behind, to support it or to guard Aragon, the corps of Marshal Mortier, which had not suffered much during the siege of Saragossa, and which, out of 23,000 men, numbered 18,000 fit for service. Not having been able to foresee from the very outset what course the war in Germany would run, Napoleon had forbidden that Mortier's corps should be actively employed, and had ordered that it should be kept intact at the foot of the Pyrenees, between Saragossa and Tudela, ready to move to the south of Spain, or back to the Rhine, according to circumstances. General St. Cyr, victorious over the Spaniards at Cardedeu and Molins del Rey, was, with a nominal force of 48,000 men, 40,000 in reality, to complete the conquest of Catalonia by besieging its fortresses. Lastly, the north of Spain, constituting our line of operations, was entrusted to a body of cavalry and a multitude of separate corps, which formed the garrisons of Burgos, Vittoria, Pampeluna, St. Sebastian, Bilbao, and Santander, and which might, in case of need, furnish some movable columns. Since the departure of General Bessières, it was General Kellermann and General Bonnet who commanded these corps, the one in Castille, the other in Biscay. This medley of soldiers of all arms, borrowed from every corps, appointed to do duty in our rear, amounted to 33,000 or 34,000 men, from 15,000 to 18,000 of whom were capable of full service, and completed a total of 200,000 fighting men out of the enormous mass of 300,000 devoted to the war in the Peninsula. They were, in a great measure, the best troops of France, those that had made the campaigns of the Revolution and the empire, and had vanquished Italy, Egypt, Germany, and Russia! To such a pass as this had we been brought by this conquest of Spain, which had been regarded in the beginning as a thing to be settled by a mere *coup de main*. It had lost us our reputation for fair dealing, the prestige of our invincibility, and we were sending to it to perish man by man admirable armies formed by eighteen years of wars and victories.

Napoleon calculated that these 300,000 men, whom he did not suppose so much diminished as they really were by fatigue, sickness, and dispersions, would be more than sufficient to subjugate Spain, even though reduced to 200,000, since the English would naturally have lost all relish for aiding the Spaniards since the campaign of Coruña. Under vigorous command, these 200,000 would certainly have been sufficient, although the

passion of a whole people in arms against the foreigner is capable of working many miracles; but the authority left by Napoleon at Madrid to interpret his instructions, and cause them to be executed, could not supply the place of his genius, or of his will, or of his ascendency over men; and the most powerful means were destined to be wrecked, not by the resistance of the Spaniards, but by the military anarchy resulting from his absence.

King Joseph, in fact, though good-tempered, rational, and of tolerably well-regulated habits, possessed, as we have said, none of the qualities of a commander, though he had a strong ambition for military glory as a family patrimony. But he had neither activity nor vigour, nor any experience in war, nor, in lieu of experience, any of those superior qualities of mind which make up for the want of it. He had, as we have also said, taken for his mentor the worthy and discreet Marshal Jourdan, to whose judgment he submitted his military plans, but most frequently without hearkening to his advice; and after long oscillating between the marshal and his familiar councillors, he would make up his mind as he could according to the impressions of the moment.

Napoleon, who had discerned his brother's pretensions during the last campaign, derided them at Madrid, and still derided them at Schönbrunn, with those who were going to Spain, or who had arrived from it. He did not like Marshal Jourdan, on account of his past opinions, and his present ones too, erroneously suspecting him of being the instigator of the somewhat severe judgments passed upon him in the new court of Spain. He saw in the sadness and coldness of that grave person an entire censure upon his reign; and whilst he jeered at his brother, but could not jeer at Marshal Jourdan, who offered no mark for the shafts of ridicule, he openly depreciated him. Jourdan was the only officer of his own rank and length of service on whom Napoleon had not bestowed one of those opulent recompenses which he lavished on his servants. Sarcasms cast upon the king, and a visible aversion for his major-general, were not the means to raise either in the eyes of the generals who were to obey them. How, indeed, was it to be expected that marshals, accustomed only to obey Napoleon, in whom they recognised a genius equal to his power, should obey a brother whom he himself declared to be no soldier, and an old marshal in disgrace whose talents he denied?

The arrangements made for ensuring the gradation of command were themselves very ill conceived. Napoleon had certainly stated in his instructions that King Joseph should fill his own place at the head of the armies in Spain; but each of the leaders of corps, marshals or generals, was to correspond

directly with Clarke, the minister of war, and receive the orders of the latter for all their operations, so that they considered the authority of King Joseph as purely nominal, and that which had its seat in Paris as alone real. Napoleon, usually so precise in all things, had not been able to bring himself to entrust the effective command to a brother whom he did not deem capable of exercising it, and had therefore given him only the form of command, retaining the substance for himself. And however likely it might appear that a command prompted by himself would be preferable to any other, it is not the less true that Joseph's orders, though given without knowledge of war, and without vigour, yet, inasmuch as they were given on the spot, and were better adapted to the actual circumstances of the war, would have produced better results than Napoleon's orders given at a distance of 600 leagues, and no longer answering, when they arrived, to the actual state of things. The best course would have been for the emperor to have himself determined the general plan of the campaign, which he alone was capable of conceiving, and then to have left to Joseph's staff the task of commanding, with sovereign authority, the details of the execution. But mild, indulgent, fatherly, and confiding as he showed himself towards Prince Eugène, whom he found modest, submissive, and grateful, he was stern, sarcastic, and distrustful towards his brothers, who manifested vanity, indocility, and very little gratitude. He had delegated then only a nominal authority to Joseph, and had thus unintentionally laid the foundation for a pernicious military anarchy in the Peninsula.

Besides these causes of discord there were others equally injurious. The Spanish war, besides being ruinous in men, was so likewise in money. Napoleon, having found that he could not meet the cost, had decided that the army should live upon the country occupied by it. Now Joseph, like King Louis in Holland, and King Murat in Naples, would gladly have made himself popular with his new subjects; and in order to gain their affections he defended them against the French army, which was engaged in the task of conquering them for him. That army, conscious that it had made kings of its general's commonplace brothers, was astonished and indignant to see one of these prefer revolted subjects to soldiers to whom he owed his crown, and who besides were his own countrymen. Generals, officers, soldiers, and all talked in the freest manner of the royalties created by their hands; and on the other hand, Joseph's courtiers talked of the French army and its leaders in such terms as the Spaniards themselves might have used. Napoleon had for his representatives at Madrid, M. de Laforêt, ambassador of France; General Belliard, governor of Madrid;

and M. de Tréville, agent of the treasury for the management of the confiscated wealth of the proscribed families. These several authorities lived in a state of perpetual conflict with the agents of King Joseph. Napoleon, for example, had ordered the incarceration of all the members of the old Council of Castille: Joseph had released them, saying that they were prosecuted only in order to get hold of their property. Napoleon had appropriated, by way of war indemnity, the possessions of ten of the greatest families in Spain, as we have seen elsewhere, and had, moreover, seized the wools belonging to the highest grandees in the conquered provinces. The total value of these confiscations did not fall far short of 200 millions of francs. "As for the ten great families," said Joseph, "I must abandon their properties to the emperor, who has assigned them to himself; but as for the other more numerous families prosecuted for revolt, their property ought to be left to me, either to restore it to their former owners if they submit, or if they do not, that I may reward with it those who shall attach themselves to me." As for the wools, Joseph laid claim to a portion of these also, on grounds more or less disputable, alleging, moreover, that he had nothing to give to anybody, that he could not even pay the officers of his household, and that there were in Madrid six thousand domestics of the old grandeza and of the old court, part of whom he might attach to him, and who, for want of the means of subsistence, were exciting the population of the capital against him.

His distress, indeed, was extreme. The French armies in the provinces which they occupied, and the insurrection in those of which it had remained in possession, absorbed the whole produce of the taxes. What the French armies took directly was not sufficient, however, for their support; for if they managed to victual and clothe themselves by taking everything in the conquered provinces, there remained the general services of the artillery and engineers, both very costly and very important, which could not be provided for without seizing the cattle or the standing crops. Money should have been forthcoming for these services, and none entered the treasury but what was raised in Madrid. By laying hand on all the resources which proscription or confiscation might furnish, Joseph was deprived, as he alleged, of the means of making partisans and of providing for the most indispensable services. He asked that he should at least be allowed to complete a loan begun in Holland on his own account, which promised 15 or 20 millions for the Spanish treasury. On this point alone Napoleon granted his request; but on every other point he replied to him with refusals, bitterly reproaching him for some acts of munificence to favourites who had not merited anything;

computing, with manifest regret that he had undertaken it, all that the war in Spain had already cost him, and was to cost him further; for though the French soldiers were maintained in that country, he had to send them thither clothed, armed, and organised, and to provide them, moreover, with matériel, which could not be done without great expense, independently of that incurred for the war in Austria, which was the sequel of that in Spain, and was destined to entail many other burdens on the finances of the empire. Napoleon therefore declared he was ruined by his brothers, and reduced to the necessity of availing himself of every possible resource. Besides all this, having other wars to occupy him at a distance of six hundred leagues from Madrid, he left the task of settling these disputes to his agents, who behaved with unparalleled insolence, believing themselves, as representatives of the Emperor Napoleon, vastly superior to the mere representatives of King Joseph. Things had been carried to such a pitch as regarded the sequestered estates that M. de Fréville, having got hold of the keys of the palaces in dispute, refused to allow the agents of the Spanish treasury to enter them, declaring that he was ready to have recourse, if necessary, to the French army to support him in that refusal. To this arrogant declaration King Joseph replied that he would have M. de Fréville put into a post-chaise and sent back to France. It may be conceived how much discredit must have been brought upon the new royalty by squabbles such as these, known to everybody in Madrid. Hated by the Spaniards and despised by the French, it was very difficult for it to make itself obeyed by either, and scarcely could the best plans prove successful when executed under the direction of an authority so feeble and so contested.

Though the French forces were immense both in quantity and quality, the resistance was daily becoming more serious. Nowhere had the Spaniards stood their ground in line. At Espinosa, Tudela, Burgos, Molins del Rey, and Ucles, they had thrown away their arms in their flight. The English themselves, orderly and steady soldiers as they were, had been involved in the common defeat, and had been obliged to abandon the Spanish soil in all haste and seek a refuge in their vessels. But neither nation desponded in consequence of the disasters they had sustained. The Spaniards, in their inordinate pride, were incapable of appreciating all the power of the French army, and their ignorance saved them from discouragement. Running away almost without fighting, they suffered little, for it is only defeats in strongly contested engagements that are deeply felt, and they were ready to recommence indefinitely a war which was disastrous only to the towns, which gratified their intense activity, and corresponded with all their religious

and patriotic sentiments. Besides, if they had been for a moment discouraged by their numerous defeats, they had taken heart again on becoming aware of Napoleon's departure and the war in Austria. The junta having retired to Seville, where it was more deeply immersed in the ignorance and fanaticism of the nation, continued to fan the flames of the popular fury. Composed of a mixture of old statesmen incapable of understanding the new circumstances, and of young fanatics incapable of understanding any, and thwarted in countless ways, it directed the war in such fashion as is possible in times of disorder. But it animated exertion, and urged to arms the populations of Valencia, Murcia, Andalusia, and Estramadura, corresponded with the English, and sent incessantly fresh recruits to the armies of the insurrection. England supplied it largely with arms, ammunition, and subsidies. It had reformed the army of the centre, commanded since the battle of Tudela by the Duke del Infantado, and since the battle of Ucles by General Cartojal. The army of Estramadura, beaten at Burgos, Somosierra, and Madrid, and having avenged itself by the murder of the unfortunate Don Juan Benito, had been recruited and put under the command of old Gregorio de la Cuesta, who seemed to have resumed a certain ascendency among the Spanish generals, solely because not having yet fought a battle he had not lost one. These two armies, echeloned, the one on the roads to La Mancha, from Oraña to Val de Peñas, the other along the roads of Estramadura, from the bridge of Almaraz to Merida, were to harass Madrid, and withstand the French troops that should attempt to march southwards. In the north of Spain, General de la Romana, who had accompanied the retreat of the English, but had taken the route by Orense, in order to leave that of Vigo open to them, had remained on the frontiers of Portugal, along the Minho, between the Portuguese, elated by their recent deliverance, and the Spaniards of Galicia, the most obstinate of all the insurgents of the Peninsula. In this way he kept up a dangerous focus of excitement in the north. In fine, where the French armies were not, there the junta publicly levied soldiers; and where they were, bands of adventurers, hiding in the mountains and the defiles, awaited our convoys of sick and wounded, or of munitions, to slaughter the former and carry off the latter. In the Asturias, General Ballesteros ventured to show himself within a few leagues of General Bonnet. In Aragon the terrible example of Saragossa had impressed only the unfortunate town itself. In Catalonia the battles of Cardedeu and Molins del Rey had affected only the army of General Vives, and the Miquelets stopped our troops at all the passes, or harassed them at the sieges of Hostalrich, Girone, and Tarragone, which they had to execute one after the

other. Though but two months had elapsed since Napoleon's generals, led by himself, had recovered half Spain in half a score of battles, and conquered all before them from the Pyrenees to the Tagus, the news of the war in Austria, propagated and commented in a hundred ways, had rekindled all hopes, all passions, and converted a momentary terror into an excitement as great as that which had followed the battle of Baylen. It was thought that after having been obliged to quit Spain in person, Napoleon would soon be forced to withdraw his best troops from it, and that it would be easy to dispose of the remainder.

The English, who had been beaten in company with the Spaniards, had, like them too, recovered confidence, and flattered themselves that the withdrawal of our best troops to meet the exigencies of the war in Austria would allow them to recover the ground they had lost during the two months of Napoleon's presence in the Peninsula.

The army of General Moore, which ought to have perished in its retreat through Galicia, and which, though feebly pursued, had lost its horses, a part of its matériel, and a fourth of its effective, had been carried back to the shores of England. There it was recruited with volunteers from the famous militia which had been destined to resist the expedition from Boulogne, but which, since that had ceased to be thought of in England, furnished ample materials for recruiting the regular army. Thus by agitating the whole world Napoleon had everywhere called soldiers into existence. England, rightly thinking that the war in Austria was a last opportunity presented to it by fortune which should by no means be allowed to pass, had resolved to make the greatest efforts in this campaign to attack Napoleon at all points, and prepare obstacles and perils for him in all quarters. It was her design not only to send another expedition into the Peninsula, notwithstanding the ill success of that under General Moore, but also to organise a formidable one against the coasts of France, Holland, and Hanover. The unprotected state in which Napoleon had been forced to leave the continental coasts from Bayonne to Hamburg, offered many chances of destroying the great fleets constructed at Rochefort, Lorient, Brest, Cherbourg, and Antwerp. The idea of assailing the Scheldt, and giving to the flames the magnificent dockyards on its banks, particularly occupied the British cabinet, and singularly excited its zeal. The least, indeed, it could do for Austria and for itself was to sweep the European shores with fire and sword, in order to divert from Vienna and Madrid a part of the forces directed against those two capitals. But pending the deliberation on these vast projects of destruction, the most urgent object of attention was Spain, which should

be succoured promptly lest it should be prostrated before Austria had succeeded in effecting a diversion in its favour. Of the English troops which had taken Portugal from General Junot, and which, being afterwards recruited, had taken part in General Moore's expedition into Castille, a part had remained in the environs of Lisbon, between Alcobaza and Leiria, under the orders of General Cradock. They had been promptly reinforced by detachments from Gibraltar and England; and it was intended further to reinforce them, so as to make of them an army capable of contending with Marshal Soult for possession of Portugal. Sir Arthur Wellesley, who had been the real liberator of Portugal, having been subsequently cleared of all blame with reference to the convention of Cintra by the court appointed to try its authors, could now be employed without difficulty. His rising fame and his incontestable ability pointed him out as the natural leader of the new expedition. He undertook, he said, with 30,000 English, 30,000 Portuguese, and some 40,000 Portuguese militia, which would cost the British exchequer about 70 or 80 million francs a year, to find occupation for at least 100,000 enemies, preserve Portugal, and by that means render the situation of the French in Spain for ever precarious. Having weighed the events of the last two campaigns with singular good sense, he had clearly perceived how the English should proceed in the Peninsula; and in spite of the opinion of those whom the fate of Moore's expedition had deeply dismayed, he affirmed that it would always be possible to re-embark in time, with the sacrifice, at most, of the matériel of the army. He even went so far as to point out, almost prophetically, a position in which, protected by the sea and by entrenchments, he would be certain of holding out for several years against the victorious armies of France. The confidence inspired by the sagacious and decided character of this general overcame the repugnance of his government to risk fresh armies in the interior of the Peninsula, especially as his plan consisted in keeping as close to Portugal as possible, and rendering the situation of the French in Madrid precarious by reason of the mere presence of the English in Lisbon. It was therefore decided that he should be sent with forces which would raise the British army in Portugal to the number of 30,000 men, and with resources in munitions and money which should make it possible to levy a numerous Portuguese army. The insurrectional enthusiasm of the Portuguese, which had reached the highest pitch since the expulsion of General Junot, gave reason to hope for everything on their part. They hailed the advent of the English with delight, and submitted to their military lessons with a zeal which nothing but the liveliest passion could have inspired.

Such were the changes which had supervened in the Peninsula at the mere announcement of the war in Austria. Submissive as Spain had seemed to be when Napoleon left that country, it now rose up again; forsaken as it had been thought to be by its allies, it was about to be again succoured by the English, and occupied by them, not to be quitted again until the end of the war.

Napoleon's instructions had fixed the month of February as the fit time for Marshal Soult's entry into Portugal. He had calculated that the marshal, having arrived at Lisbon in March, would aid Marshal Victor to occupy Seville and Cadiz almost at the same time, and that the conquest of the south of the Peninsula would thus be completed before the heat of summer. But events were soon to show that it was easier for him to master Vienna than for his marshals to pass beyond the line of the Tagus and the Douro. Marshal Soult's corps, but just recovered from the fatigues of its march to Coruña, had been collected between St. Jago de Compostello, Vigo, and Tuy, to repair its damages and refit its artillery, to which had been added several pieces of large calibre, to be used if there should be any town wall to breach. In spite of the impatience at headquarters and Soult's own zeal, the army destined for Portugal could not be made ready to march before the middle of February. It was composed of the Merle, Mermet, Delaborde, and Heudelet divisions, taken from the old corps of Marshal Bessières and General Junot, Franceschi's light cavalry, and the Lorge and Lahoussaye dragoons. It amounted to not more than 26,000 men present under arms, though thirty and some odd thousands had been reckoned upon. Its nominal force had been upwards of 40,000, but fatigues, battles, and detachments had reduced it to its present numbers. Everything being ready, Marshal Soult marched from Vigo on the 15th of February. His purpose was to cross the Minho, which forms the frontier of Portugal, forcing a passage a little below Tuy, very near the mouth of the river, and to advance by the great coast road from Braga to Oporto. But insurmountable obstacles prevented this march, which the nature of the localities pointed out as the most obvious one.

The Portuguese, who shared the aversion of the Spaniards for the French, and were most highly encouraged by the expulsion of Junot, had all risen in arms, under the influence of their nobles and their priests. They had barricaded the villages and the towns, blocked up the passes, and appeared resolved to defend themselves to the last extremity. The tocsin was heard in all directions, and the roads were thronged with troops of the populace, led by priests bearing crucifixes in their hands, and nobles brandishing old swords that had long been hung up

on their manorial walls. Expecting the arrival of the French, the Portuguese had taken care to collect all the boats on the Minho, and bring them over to their own side of the river. Our light cavalry, scouring the country in all directions, did not find a single boat.

Seeing this, Marshal Soult resolved to march down the course of the Minho to the sea, and seize the numerous fishing-boats belonging to the village of Garda, near the mouth of the river. He found there a quantity of boats which the Portuguese had not had time to remove, and of these he took a number sufficient for the transport of about 2000 men at a time, whom he attempted to send across the river, hoping they would be strong enough to make good their footing against the Portuguese, and establish a communication between the two banks. But as the passage was to be effected over that part of the Minho which was near the sea, the spring gales allowed only three or four boats to cross. Some fifty men at most reached the other side, where they fought bravely, in hopes of being succoured; but they were soon obliged to lay down their arms and place themselves at the mercy of a ferocious populace.

After this unfortunate attempt, Soult saw no alternative but to ascend the course of the Minho to the mountains, and cross at Orense. He began his march in that direction on the 16th. But in going up the right bank of the Minho he was sure to find in his way La Romana's army, which, as we have seen, had established itself at Orense on separating from the English. That army was not very formidable in itself, but its presence had fired the minds of the whole population on both sides of the frontier, and the two nations so long at enmity with each other exchanged pledges of mutual support and joint resistance to the foreign invaders. The villages on the banks of the river and on the hills had all been barricaded, and were occupied by a fanatical populace. Marshal Soult was preceded in his advance by Lahoussaye's dragoons along the river, and by Heudelet's division of infantry on the hills. The dragoons were several times obliged to dismount, in order to clear a way for themselves and to force barricades. General Heudelet had many formidable positions to carry and terrible executions to make. Thus, marching in the midst of obstacles of all kinds, it was not until the 21st that Orense was reached, after having burned, destroyed, and slain a great deal, and also sustained such considerable losses as gave reason to fear that the army would arrive at Lisbon with but half its forces, if at all. In that case it might expect the same ill fate as Junot's in 1808, for the English could not fail in 1809, as in 1808, to appear soon in the waters of Lisbon.

Had Napoleon inspired his lieutenants with a less blind submission, it would now have been the marshal's duty to foresee the disaster to which he was about to expose himself, and ask for fresh orders before venturing into a wild country, where at every step he would have to fight with a bloodthirsty population, and so arrive, spent and enfeebled, before the English army, one of the finest regular armies in Europe. He would, no doubt, have much displeased Napoleon by thus contravening his projects, but much less assuredly than by bringing him back two months afterwards a beaten and disorganised army.

Be this as it may, after having driven La Romana's partisans before him beyond Orense, Soult resolved to turn to the right, cross the Minho, and enter Portugal by the province of Tras-os-Montes. His intention was to direct his march to Chaves, and thence to Braga, so as to arrive, after a long detour, upon the highroad from Tuy to Oporto, which he had before been unable to reach. As for the Spanish general de la Romana, driven back from Orense on Villafranca, he conceived the design of extricating himself by a stolen march worthy of a partisan leader. Upper Galicia, which is conterminous with the kingdom of Leon, was open at that moment, Marshal Soult having evacuated it to invade Portugal, and Marshal Ney having quitted it to sweep the coast. It might be reached by passing through the French chain of advanced posts, which connected the troops of the two marshals with those of Old Castille. La Romana resolved to do so, were it only for the sake of the great confusion to be thereby caused in our line of communication, purposing to take refuge afterwards in the Asturias if Marshal Ney came back to pursue him.

Whilst the Spanish general was about to cause the French this disagreeable surprise, Soult made his arrangements for crossing the province of Tras-os-Montes. He had already more than 800 sick and wounded in consequence of his first operations. A part of his artillery horses were in a very bad state from the severity of the roads and want of fodder. He resolved therefore to disencumber himself of whatever would too much impede his march, and he sent his sick and wounded and his heavy artillery to Tuy, of which he was master, purposing, when he should have reached Braga, to have them conveyed thither by the direct and very short road to that town from Tuy. He sent then to Tuy 36 pieces of artillery and about 2000 men, and took with him 22 guns, well horsed and provided with the necessary ammunition. On the 4th of March he crossed the frontier of Portugal, and intimated in his despatches to Madrid that he should soon be at Oporto.

The population of that part of Portugal was gathered round Chaves, with some militia and some detachments of regular

troops, under Generals Sylveira and Bernardin Frère. These generals, whose instructions had been dictated from the English headquarters, had orders not to give battle, but to harass the French incessantly, and kill as many as possible in every defile and at the passage of every village. In consequence of these instructions, after having disputed the road from Orense to Chaves, the two Portuguese generals would rather not have stopped in the latter town and uselessly endangered a part of their forces for its defence; but they were forced to obey the wishes of the insurgent populace, and to leave a detachment in Chaves to garrison it along with the latter. They then retired to Braga.

Arriving before Chaves after many conflicts, Marshal Soult beheld a furious multitude composed of peasants, priests, women, and soldiers, bellowing threats and curses from the top of the town walls. Such a fanatic mob might suffice to surprise a convoy or cut the throats of wounded men, but was incapable of stopping 24,000 French soldiers led by able officers. Marshal Soult having threatened to put to the sword all who resisted, the town of Chaves was given up to him half depopulated. He found in it artillery without carriages and a considerable quantity of ammunition. A small citadel, useful as a security against the populace, adjoined the town. He took advantage of it to leave, under the protection of a small garrison, the sick and wounded whom the march from Orense to Chaves had already disabled from proceeding further. Such is the sad condition of every offensive operation in the midst of insurgent populations when these are fierce and resolved to defend themselves. Every sick or wounded man requires an able-bodied soldier to guard him, and a war of posts being that which puts the most men hors de combat, it may easily be conceived what soon becomes of regular armies in an invasion of some extent and duration.

Marshal Soult proceeded from Chaves to Braga, descending towards the shore through as long a space as he had ascended towards the mountains, in his march from Tuy to Orense. During the march the Franceschi cavalry and the Mermet infantry, which formed the head of the army, had many impediments to overcome. In many narrow passes, where the columns were forced to lengthen themselves out in order to defile, and where the artillery had the greatest difficulty in making its way, they were assailed by swarms of insurgents from the adjacent mountains, and exposed to be cut off and destroyed before the rear of the columns could succour the van. The divisions were constantly separated from each other on their march by dense masses of enemies. At last, killing insurgents all the way, and burdened with more and more wounded, the

invading army arrived before Braga on the 17th of March. General Frère was in possession there with 17,000 or 18,000 men, partly regular troops, partly armed peasants. Wishing to fall back on Oporto, according to his instructions, without risking a battle, he was assailed by the populace, and murdered, with several of his officers, *to serve as an example to traitors*, as his soldiers said. A Hanoverian officer who succeeded him made some arrangements for battle for the next day, the 18th; but the populace that murders is not apt to defend itself against old soldiers. Marshal Soult attacked and carried the post of Braga without difficulty, and with a loss of not more than 40 killed and 160 wounded. We lost more men in storming the villages along the march. Our soldiers made few prisoners, thanks to the excellent legs of the Portuguese; but all who were caught before they could run away were killed on the spot. Some thousands of dead and dying strewed the environs of Braga. The war thus assumed an atrocious character; for, in order to disgust that ferocious population with cruelty, it was necessary to become almost as ferocious as themselves.

Master of Braga, Marshal Soult had won only a town; but he had acquired something better, viz., the direct road from Tuy, by which he might bring up the matériel left behind. The whole population around him was up in arms, and more furious than ever. Some Frenchmen, who had fallen into the hands of the insurgents, had been horribly mutilated by women, and their torn remains polluted the road from Braga. At the same time it was ascertained that the depôt left at Tuy was blockaded, and in danger of being taken if not promptly succoured. After availing himself of the resources of Braga, which the fugitive population had not been able to carry off or destroy, Soult pursued his march to Oporto, leaving General Heudelet's division to garrison Braga, guard the wounded, echelon the road, and succour the depôt at Tuy.

Some resistance was encountered at the passage of the river Ave, but it was overcome, and our men drove the Portuguese before them, who there again, by way of avenging themselves on a victorious enemy, murdered one of their generals, the Brigadier Vallongo. They then fell back on Oporto, with the intention of sustaining a general battle under its walls, where they assembled to the number of 60,000, including regular soldiers, peasants, and others of the populace. Their general-in-chief, well worthy of such an army, was the Bishop of Oporto, who commanded in his episcopal vestments. The insurgent populace, much more alarming to the peaceful inhabitants than to the enemy, had made themselves absolute masters of Oporto, which they oppressed, obeying none but the bishop, and him only when he commanded in accordance with the popular

passions. They had thrown into prison a number of French families, whose houses they had pillaged, and whom they threatened with death if Marshal Soult attempted to enter Oporto. General Foy, whose excessive temerity had caused him to be taken in a reconnaissance, was among the prisoners thus exposed to extreme peril. Much more occupied in committing cruelties than in erecting defensive works, the Portuguese had hastily thrown up some redoubts in the form of a semicircle, which embraced the town of Oporto, and abutted at each extremity upon the Douro. A bridge connected the town, situated on the right bank, by which we arrived, with the faubourgs on the left bank. The Portuguese works were badly devised, but mounted 200 guns of large calibre, and presented an obstacle not easily to be surmounted if defended even by middling troops. But though reckoning 60,000 men, including soldiers and volunteers, and though protected by entrenchments and 200 pieces of cannon, the Portuguese army, with its bishop-general, was not capable of withstanding the 20,000 Frenchmen that remained to Marshal Soult.

The latter, having arrived on the 27th of March before Braga, was struck, but not intimidated, by the difficulties he had to overcome. He had no doubt he should surmount them all with the soldiers and the officers he commanded; but he foresaw that the opulent town of Oporto, the most commercially important in the country, would be sacked, and he would fain have spared Portugal, humanity, and his own army that calamity. Accordingly he summoned the place by means of a letter, in which he appealed to the reason of its leaders, and he awaited a reply, regardless of the balls cast into his bivouacs by the heavy artillery of the town.

His overtures, as might have been expected, were of no avail, and he resolved to make the assault on the 29th of March. With such an enemy as he had before him, he had but to make one brisk and vigorous attack to carry the entrenchments of Oporto, formidable as they seemed. Having formed his troops out of range of the artillery, the marshal marched rapidly in three columns; the right under General Merle, the centre under Generals Mermet and Lahoussaye, the left under Generals Delaborde and Franceschi. The word being given, the cavalry galloped forward and swept away the enemy's advanced posts; then the infantry assailed the entrenchments, covered with a furious multitude that did not obey, and whom the cannon filled with rage but not with valour. The entrenchments were all rapidly carried, and our columns drove the fugitive multitude before them at the bayonet point into the streets of Oporto, which soon presented but a scene of frightful confusion. General Delaborde, traversing the streets at quick step, reached

the bridge of boats over the Douro which connected the main town with the faubourgs. The enemy's cavalry, mixed up with the fugitive population, crowded to the bridge, and encountered the fire of grape which the Portuguese discharged from the opposite side to stop the French. The bridge gave way under the pressure, and sank with all it carried. The French suspended their march for a while in presence of this horrible spectacle. then re-established the bridge, and galloped over it in pursuit of the fugitives. On the right a body of Portuguese, driven by General Merle to the Douro, plunged into it, hoping to escape by swimming, but perished almost to a man. Another body, having attempted to defend themselves in the bishop's mansion, were all destroyed there. Ere long, the hot blood of the French being stirred up by the fight, they gave way to those excesses which usually follow the taking of a place by storm, and spread themselves through the town to plunder. They behaved at Oporto as they had done at Cordova; but in the former place, as in the latter, our officers humanely exerted themselves to the utmost to restrain the fury of the soldiers, and strove to save the drowning wretches in the river. Marshal Soult did his best to restore order, and to give his conquest the character that becomes a civilised people. This important attack cost him but 300 or 400 men, whilst the killed, wounded, and drowned on the Portuguese side amounted to 9000 or 10,000. The marshal captured also 200 pieces of cannon.

The stores found in Oporto were considerable, and of great value to the army. They included abundance of provisions and ammunition, a vast matériel of war brought by the English, and innumerable boats laden with choice wines. Marshal Soult immediately took measures for the orderly disposal of this booty, so that the army might want for nothing, and that the population might gradually recover confidence, and become accustomed to their victors. But their rage against us was at its acme. The whole rural population beyond the Douro had joined the beaten people of Oporto and the English, who then occupied the road to Lisbon. Our army, reduced to a bare 20,000 men, had already detached one of its divisions to Braga; it was now obliged to detach another to Amarante, above Oporto, in order to guard the upper course of the Douro. Thus it was forced to divide itself, whilst it needed all its combined strength to resist the English. The position was becoming so critical as to require great ability on the part of the general-in-chief, whether to maintain his ground in Portugal, if that were possible, or to quit it without disaster, if he should have to retreat before greatly superior numbers. Marshal Soult declared himself governor-general of Portugal, did what he could to appease the people, gave orders on his rear to march from Braga and

raise the blockade of the depôt in Tuy, and sent several officers to Madrid by the route he had traversed to make known the critical position in which he was certain to find himself ere long. It was probable—and this was precisely one of the dangers of this situation—that none of the officers he despatched could reach his destination. General la Romana was the cause of this interruption of communications. Neglected by Marshal Soult, who had not thought of destroying him before entering Portugal, and favoured by the absence of Marshal Ney, who had been constrained to descend to the coast to hinder the communications of the English from Ferrol to Vigo, the Spanish general had invaded the mountain region which forms Upper Galicia and the frontier of the kingdom of Leon. By his personal influence, and by spreading news from Austria, he had roused the people of the north, whom the campaign of November and December had terrified for a while. The departure of the imperial guard, which had now begun its march to the Danube, was a further encouragement to the revival of the insurrectionary spirit. Thus Ney on the coast, and Soult in Oporto, were separated, as it were, from the rest of Spain by a vast insurrection, which did not grow into an army, but which sufficed to slaughter our sick and wounded and our couriers, and often to stop the best escorted convoys.

Since the 24th of February nothing was known at Madrid of what had become of Marshal Soult; but relying on the strength of his *corps d'armée* and on his military experience, they had no doubts at headquarters of his success, and they calculated in what places he was likely to be from the number of days that had elapsed. Having received word from him that he should arrive at Oporto in the beginning of March, whereas he had not been able to reach it before the 29th of that month, it had been supposed that he would soon be at Lisbon, that he would, of course, be surrounded there with many difficulties, and the necessity of at last sending off Marshal Victor to the south of the Peninsula was talked of, in order that he might draw off a portion of the enemy, who would otherwise fall en masse on the army in Portugal. Certainly nothing could be more reasonable under all contingencies, for the English and the Portuguese, as the event proved, could not be indifferent to the march of a French army on Merida and Badajoz.

Orders were therefore repeated from Joseph's headquarters to Marshal Victor to execute that part of the imperial instructions which concerned him. To this he offered some objections, founded upon the dispersed state of his corps. He had, in fact, at hand only the Villatte and Ruffin divisions. Lapisse's was still at Salamanca, and he saw that before it could cross all Estramadura to rejoin him it would perhaps be detained for

the service of Castille or Portugal; that he would then have, including even Leval's German division, at most 23,000 men, which would be too small a force to invade Andalusia, where General Dupont had been defeated with at least an equal number of soldiers. He was told in answer, that express orders had been sent to the Lapisse division to follow him, and that with the cavalry which had been given him, and with Leval's division, he would have 24,000 men—a force sufficient to begin his offensive movement, the more so as he was sure to have the Lapisse division soon with him, and to be seconded by a *corps d'armée* which was about to march from Madrid through La Mancha to the Sierra Morena. There were good grounds for being peremptory with Marshal Victor, for besides the necessity of effecting a movement to the south, parallel with that of Marshal Soult, there was another motive of not less urgency for acting in that direction, namely, to hinder the Spanish general Gregorio de la Cuesta from establishing himself on the left of the Tagus, opposite the bridge of Almaraz. Having been for a month past left too much at liberty in that quarter, Gregorio de la Cuesta had occupied the left of the Tagus, destroyed the main arch of the bridge of Almaraz, and posted himself strongly on the steep hills bordering the river, whence it would be impossible to dislodge him if steps to that end were not taken in time.

Pressed by these considerations, and by the reiterated orders he had received, Marshal Victor began his movement in the middle of March. The old fourth corps, placed the preceding year under the orders of Marshal Lefebvre, was partly reconstituted under General Sebastiani, and directed towards Ciudad Real, in order to effect a movement in La Mancha corresponding to that of Marshal Victor in Estramadura, and draw after it the army of Cartojal, whilst the marshal himself was to deal with that of Gregorio de la Cuesta. The fourth corps, previously composed of the Sebastiani divisions, Leval's Germans, and Valence's Poles, was formed of the same divisions, with the exception of the Germans, who had been transferred to Marshal Victor. Milhaud's dragoons made up its numbers to 12,000 or 13,000 men.

The first thing Marshal Victor had to consider was how to cross the Tagus. The Talavera and the Arzobispo bridges could not serve his purpose, since they did not abut on the main road of Estramadura, by Truxillo and Merida. The right point was Almaraz, and the old bridge, a vast and magnificent structure of ancient times, had had its main arch, of more than a hundred feet span, broken down. Materials being everywhere deficient in Spain for want of internal trade, Marshal Victor knew not how to set about constructing a bridge, and

he was no further advanced in that part of his task in the middle of March than in the beginning of February. Some help was sent him from Madrid, and also General Lery and Senarmont, who, after great efforts, succeeded in making a bridge of boats fit for the passage of heavy artillery. On the 15th of March, Marshal Victor marched from Talavera with his corps, which, previously to the arrival of the Lapisse division, comprised the French divisions of Villatte and Ruffin, Leval's German division, Lasalle's light cavalry, and Latour-Maubourg's dragoons, forming a total of 23,000 or 24,000 men, of whom 15,000 to 16,000 were infantry, 6000 cavalry, and 2000 artillery. To facilitate the operation, the marshal crossed the Tagus in three columns. Lasalle and Leval passed over the Talavera bridge, Villatte and Ruffin that of the Arzobispo, whilst Latour-Maubourg, with the heavy artillery, descended the left bank of the river to Almaraz, where the most cumbrous part of the matériel was to cross. The first two columns, composed of light cavalry and infantry, were to dislodge Gregorio de la Cuesta from his position on the cliffs, and having done so, rejoin the cavalry of the line and the siege artillery before Almaraz.

These arrangements were executed with as much judgment as they were conceived. Leval's Germans, behaving like allies worthy of the French, under whose eyes they fought, arrived on the other side of the Tagus before cliffs of difficult ascent, where the dexterity of the Spanish infantry, and their obstinate valour when fighting behind any cover, enjoyed the greatest advantages. They dislodged them, nevertheless, drove them from rock to rock, as far as the Mesa de Ibor, took from them seven pieces of cannon, and killed or wounded a thousand of them. During this time the brave Villatte division, debouching after the Germans by the bridge del Arzobispo, supported their movement, taking up a position at Fresnedoso and Deleytosa, after several sharp and successful conflicts. This combined march having cleared the main road of Estramadura, Latour-Maubourg's dragoons were enabled to present themselves before the bridge of Almaraz, the restoration of which was just on the point of being completed, and rendered practicable for the heaviest burdens. This was a necessary precaution, for by Napoleon's orders some 24-pounders and mortars had been annexed to Victor's corps, in order to batter the walls of Seville if they were defended.

General Gregorio de la Cuesta, who had counted on the natural impediments on the left bank of the Tagus for resisting the movement of the French, retreated to Truxillo on the 19th of March, and from Truxillo to Merida, intending to make another stand behind the Guadiana. Marshal Victor followed him with his light cavalry and his infantry, though his dragoons

and his heavy artillery had not yet entirely crossed the Almaraz bridge. The Duke del Parque brought up the enemy's rear-guard with cavalry. The brave and intelligent Lasalle,* vigorously pursuing the Spaniards, charged them wherever he had an opportunity, and took 200 horse from them in one encounter. Unfortunately the 10th chasseurs suffered themselves to be surprised next day, and lost sixty-two men, whom the Spaniards, after having killed them, mutilated in the most atrocious manner. Finding on their way these sad proofs of Spanish ferocity, our soldiers swore to revenge their companions in arms, and fearfully did they keep their words some days afterwards, as we shall see.

So long as the passage of the bridge of Almaraz was not completed Marshal Victor could not advance resolutely to the Guadiana. That operation having been terminated on the 25th of March, and Latour-Maubourg's dragoons having come up with the marshal, he moved to the banks of the Guadiana, and crossed it at Medellin. At that point he was obliged to detach some infantry and cavalry to guard his rear, and check the gatherings formed behind him in the wild mountains he had traversed. He left at Truxillo some Dutchmen detached from the Leval division, and deprived himself of two regiments of dragoons—the one to observe the Merida road, the other to watch the mountains of Guadalupe, which were infested with guerillas. These detachments being sent away, there remained to him not more than from 18,000 to 19,000 men; but these were such choice troops that there was no reason to be uneasy at the smallness of their numbers.

Don Gregorio de la Cuesta, who affected a superiority over the junta and his companions in arms, which the latter had not acknowledged at first, but which was now conceded to him in consequence of the disasters which had befallen the other generals, could not prolong his retreat without being put on a level with those he assumed a right to despise. Besides, one step more would have lost him the line of the Guadiana after that of the Tagus, and would have uncovered Seville, the capital of the insurrection, the last asylum of Spanish fidelity. Being informed that Marshal Victor had weakened himself on the march, being himself reinforced by the Albuquerque division, which had been detached from the army of the centre, and thus being at the head of 36,000 men, the best organised in Spain, he thought himself in a condition to give battle, for he had just double the force of his adversary. Accordingly he posted himself behind

* The same we have seen in the preceding book figuring with distinction, and meeting a glorious death on the banks of the Danube. He left Spain at the end of March, after the passage of the Tagus and the battle of Medellin.

the Guadiana, a little beyond the small torrent of the Ortigosa, in a tolerably advantageous position, to receive the French. He could not have done anything that was more favourable to them, or which better suited their tastes or their interests.

Master of Medellin, which he entered without impediment, Marshal Victor had assured possession of the Guadiana, and proceeded beyond it without inconvenience. Having crossed that river on the morning of the 28th, he soon discovered on his left the Spanish army, partly concealed by the form of the ground, and appearing rather disposed to advance than to retreat. He rejoiced greatly at this, and resolved to meet it forthwith. To do this it was necessary to cross the torrent of the Ortigosa, which falls into the Guadiana a little above Medellin, which he did with two-thirds of his army. He left the Ruffin division on the hither side of the torrent, at the bridge, to confront a strong detachment which appeared on that side, and advanced with Lasalle, the Germans, what remained of the Latour-Maubourg dragoons, the artillery, and the Villatte division; the whole amounting to about 12,000 men. Beyond the Ortigosa was discovered a very extensive plateau, somewhat elevated on our right, sinking down towards the left, and ending in a plain near Don Benito. Nothing was discerned but the very edge of the plateau and the part of the Spanish army stationed on it. The rest was hidden by the declivity of the ground. Marshal Victor promptly made his arrangements.

To the right he sent forward Latour-Maubourg, two German battalions, and ten pieces of cannon, supported by the 94th of the line of Villatte's division. These troops were to carry the plateau, and rout the portion of the Spanish army seen on it. Towards the left, where the ground sank down to Don Benito, and where also very dense masses of Spaniards were perceived, the marshal contented himself with despatching Lasalle with his light cavalry, and the two German battalions which remained with him. In the centre he placed the 63rd and 95th of the Villatte division in close columns, and the 27th light infantry a little to the right to connect them with Ruffin. He then gave Latour-Maubourg the word to advance, waiting the result of this first attack before making further arrangements.

The Germans steadily ascended the plateau, followed by their ten guns and Latour-Maubourg's five squadrons of dragoons. No sooner had these troops reached the top of the plateau, than they discovered the ground in its whole extent, and the Spanish army covering it in the distance. On our right was seen a certain portion of infantry and cavalry, but on the left was perceived the bulk of the Spanish army marching en masse against Lasalle's small force, with the evident intention of cutting us off from the Guadiana.

At this sight our troops on the right dashed forward to the attack. The Germans, after driving back the Spanish sharp-shooters, brought forward their ten pieces of cannon, which were calculated to produce much effect on the even slope of the plateau. As soon as the Spanish infantry saw our artillery they opened upon us a hasty but confused and ill-directed fire. Our brave artillerymen coolly advanced to within thirty or forty paces of the Spanish infantry, and swept it with grape—a sort of treatment it was not much accustomed to. Gregorio de la Cuesta then ordered his cavalry to charge our cannoniers and sabre them at their guns; but such things were not to be done by Spanish cavalry against French artillery. The Spaniards, already shaken by the grape, and intimidated by the sight of Latour-Maubourg's dragoons, advanced sluggishly, and with a foreboding of defeat. No sooner had they approached our pieces than a charge in flank by a squadron of dragoons sufficed to make them wheel round and ride down their own infantry in their headlong flight. Gregorio de la Cuesta, who had more pride than ability, but whose bravery equalled his pride, threw himself into the midst of his troops, and made ineffectual efforts to keep them on the field of battle. Latour-Maubourg's five squadrons, overthrowing all before them, put to flight the infantry as well as the cavalry, and followed up the left of the Spanish line along the declivity to Don Benito. The brave Latour-Maubourg, knowing that the only way of dealing effectually with the Spaniards was to make them feel the point of the sabre, pursued them relentlessly, being supported by the 94th of the line.

But whilst all was ended on the right, so that not a single enemy was left standing, it was not so in the centre and the left; things were even becoming critical there. Whilst the Spanish left was running as fast as their legs could carry them, their centre and their right, at least 27,000 or 28,000 strong, were advancing en masse against Lasalle's 3000 or 4000 men, consisting, as we have said, of some regiments of light cavalry and two battalions of German infantry. Lasalle, behaving with equal coolness and intelligence, checked with timely charges the detachments of Spanish infantry which showed more boldness than the rest, and thus retarded the movement of the mass. But with their customary audacity, when they believed themselves victorious, the Spaniards marched resolutely, shouting and threatening with certain annihilation the handful of French before them, and deeming the destruction of our army infallible if they succeeded in making themselves masters of the Guadiana. Though such a hope was very presumptuous, since we had the whole Ruffin division in our rear guarding the line of the Ortigosa and the town of Medellin, nevertheless the battle might

be lost if decisive measures were not promptly taken. It was certainly too much to have left the Ruffin division on the hither side of the Ortigosa to withstand some insignificant skirmishers; but with the three remaining regiments of Villatte's division, and the troops which Latour-Maubourg had not taken with him in his adventurous pursuit, there were still means at hand for inflicting a heavy blow upon the Spaniards. Marshal Victor, with great presence of mind, took all the measures likely to conduce to that end. He ordered two of Villatte's regiments, the 63rd and the 95th, to move to the right, and deploy there, in order to stop the mass of the Spaniards. He ordered the Germans to perform the same manœuvre, and Lasalle to charge the Spaniards after they had been stopped by the infantry. Two German battalions, and the ten cannons which had not accompanied Latour-Maubourg, remained on our right on the plateau. He ordered them to throw themselves, by a sudden conversion from right to left, against the flank of the Spaniards, and pour upon them a double fire of grape and musketry. Lastly, he ordered Latour-Maubourg and the 94th to suspend their pursuit, and avail themselves of the too precipitate movement which placed them on the rear of the enemy to attack them on that side and complete their destruction.

These measures, ordered àpropos and vigorously executed, were completely successful. The Spaniards, who were advancing with blind confidence, were surprised by the deployment of Villatte's two regiments. This movement, steadily executed, although in presence of troops very superior in numbers, and followed by a well-sustained fire, checked the Spaniards, who, not being able to discover whether they had before them the whole French army or two regiments only, began to march less rapidly, and to fire awkwardly, confusedly, and without effect. Taking advantage of their hesitation, Lasalle charged them, and flung several of their routed battalions in disorder one upon the other. At the opposite wing, at the same moment, the ten pieces of cannon of our right opened their fire, which, being pointed from above, downwards on a dense mass, did terrible havoc. Much less would have been sufficient to put to flight those raw troops, which had more impetuosity than steadiness under fire. They quickly gave way; and presently being surprised in their rear by Latour-Maubourg, whose error thus became a happy incident in the battle, they were seized with a panic impossible to describe. In an instant they broke their ranks, and fled in immense disorder. But Lasalle and Latour-Maubourg were so placed as to do such execution as could be done on Spaniards only by hindering them from flying. Charging the dense mass with 3000 horse in opposite directions, they sabred them without mercy; and full of the recollection of the sixty-two chasseurs butchered

a few days previously, they gave no quarter. The cavalry was not the only arm in a position to touch the Spaniards. The 94th, placed far in their rear, was able to reach a good number of them with their bayonets, and did not spare them. In less than an hour 9000 or 10,000 dead or wounded lay on the ground. Four thousand prisoners remained in our power, with sixteen pieces of cannon, forming the whole Spanish artillery, and a great quantity of flags.

This battle, subsequently designated that of Medellin, did equal honour to our soldiers and to their general. It was in reality fought by 12,000 men against 36,000, and it remained one of the most bloody souvenirs of that period, for never had more decisive results been obtained. The unfortunate Gregorio de la Cuesta could not have got together a single battalion in the evening. This fine exploit filled the commander of the first corps with confidence; and whereas a fortnight previously he hesitated to advance from the Tagus to the Guadiana, he immediately wrote to King Joseph that he was ready to advance from the Guadiana to the Guadalquivir, from Merida to Seville, provided the movement of the Lapisse division to join him was accelerated. He sent his prisoners to Madrid; but of the 4000 not more than half reached their destination. He encamped his infantry on the banks of the Guadiana, from Medellin to Merida, that it might live the more at ease, and sent his cavalry abroad to disperse the guerillas, and keep the region around him in awe. The season was then superb (March 28). The country was not yet exhausted, and our soldiers were able to enjoy the fruits of their victory quite at their ease.

Whilst Marshal Victor was gaining this important victory on the road to the south, General Sebastiani, performing a similar movement through La Mancha, obtained corresponding advantages proportioned to the strength of his corps. With his fine French division, General Valence's Poles, and Milhaud's dragoons, he had from 12,000 to 13,000 men against Cartojal's 16,000 or 17,000, representing the old army of the centre, beaten under Castaños at Tudela, and under the Duke del Infantado at Ucles. He had advanced beyond the Tagus by Ocaña and Consuegra to Ciudad Real, at the same time that Victor had marched from Almaraz to Truxillo and Medellin. Having arrived on the 20th at the Guadiana, he sent General Milhaud, who was considerably in advance of the infantry, across the river. Milhaud having made himself master of the bridge, drove the Spanish army some leagues beyond it up to the walls of Ciudad Real. Perceiving that Milhaud was not supported, and that he had only his dragoons with him, the Spaniards plucked up courage and retraced their steps. General Milhaud fell back ably and steadily on the Guadiana, vigorously

charging those that pressed too closely upon him. Having made his way back without loss to the bridge which he had rashly crossed, he blocked it up, and stationed on it some dismounted dragoons to defend it.

General Sebastiani having arrived on the following day, the 27th, at once resumed the offensive. He pushed forward the dragoons and the Polish lancers across the bridge to make the Spanish army evacuate the ground. He then defiled with his whole infantry, and forming it into an attacking column at the moment it passed the bridge, he assailed the Spaniards before they were well recovered from the charges of the French cavalry. In the twinkling of an eye they were routed by the magnificent regiments of the Sebastiani division, which had made the campaigns of Austria, Prussia, and Poland, and which no soldiery was capable of withstanding. The Spaniards fled in disorder to Ciudad Real, leaving behind them their artillery, 2000 killed and wounded, and nearly 4000 prisoners. General Milhaud passed beyond Ciudad Real, and pursued them to Almagro. Next day the French advanced to the Sierra Morena, to the mouths of those same defiles which had witnessed General Dupont's disaster, and took another thousand prisoners and 800 wounded. Thus on those days of the 27th and 28th of March, which were those of Marshal Soult's arrival before Oporto, we inflicted a loss of 7000 or 8000 men on the army of the centre, and 13,000 or 14,000 on the army of Estramadura; and we should have deprived them of all confidence, had not the Spaniards been possessed with that singular presumption which makes men lose battles, but hinders them also from feeling that they have lost them.

The two brilliant victories we have narrated filled the court of Madrid with joy, and somewhat brightened the sombre picture it drew of its situation. Joseph hoped soon to become master of the south of Spain by Marshal Victor's march on Seville, and by that of Marshal Suchet on Valencia, which he never ceased urgently demanding. He renewed the order to General Lapisse to move from Salamanca to Merida, for the junction of his division with Marshal Victor was indispensable to any further success on the part of the latter. Joseph even supposed that Marshal Victor's appearance in the southern provinces would be sufficient to bring them all under subjection. He had with him the famous M. de Morla, so arrogant towards the French at the period of Baylen, so humble at that of the taking of Madrid, unjustly accused of treachery by his countrymen, guilty only of interested versatility, and now seeking under the new royalty a refuge against the injustice of the partisans of the old. M. de Morla had numerous connections in Andalusia, who encouraged King Joseph to hope for the speedy submission

of that province, which they represented as disgusted with the government of the junta, and weary of the domination of the generals, the tyranny of the populace, and the overwhelming burdens imposed on it by the war. Filled for a while with such illusions, Joseph wrote to Napoleon that he hoped to be able soon to give him back 50,000 of his fine troops to be employed in Austria.

It is certain that in any other country two battles like those of Medellin and Ciudad Real would have decided a campaign, and perhaps a war. But the Spaniards were not so easily discouraged. The junta voted rewards to all those who had fought well or ill, did not disgrace Gregorio de la Cuesta—for the system of repairing defeats by disgracing generals was beginning to be discredited—sent him reinforcements, and again addressed a manifesto to Spain and all nations, denouncing what it called the criminal enterprise of the French against the legitimate royalty. The people, responding to its zeal, was not less prompt to rise wherever it was not immediately under the hand of the French; so that in reality the advanced movement of General Sebastiani and Marshal Victor on the Guadiana was rather an aggravation of difficulties than an advantage. Several posts were actually taken on the road to Ciudad Real. The town of Toledo, seeing Marshal Victor within twenty or thirty leagues of it, was near rising. The inhabitants of the mountains, from Salamanca to Talavera, flooded the banks of the Tietar and the Tagus with guerillas, so as even to menace the bridge of Almaraz. But a few days had elapsed since the two victories of Medellin and Ciudad Real, when it became necessary to send the adjutant-commandant Mocquery from Madrid with 500 men to keep down Toledo, and the adjutant-commandant Bagneris with 600 men to guard the bridge of Almaraz. Lastly, it was necessary to repair the little forts of Consuegra and Manzanares, in order to echelon General Sebastiani's line of communication with Madrid. Thus, in that strange country, victories, by multiplying the points to be guarded, and by producing only a moral effect soon forgotten, weakened rather than strengthened the victor.

It was in the north especially that the evil began to be seriously felt. Marshal Ney, always active and energetic, had conceived the desire and the hope of subduing Galicia, never imagining that his two fine divisions, which had vanquished the Russian armies, could be beaten by fanatic mountaineers, who could do nothing but run away, so long as they had not some defile or some house where they could fight under cover. He was soon undeceived. Having more than a hundred leagues of coast to guard, from Cape Ortegal to the mouth of the Minho —having to defend points like Ferrol and Coruña, to hinder

the English from communicating with the inhabitants, and to keep down centres of population, such as St. Jago de Compostello, Vigo, Tuy, and Orense—he had been obliged to descend with his whole corps to the coast—consequently to abandon his communication with Old Castille, and even to ask for aid, instead of being able, as had been hoped at first, to master the whole north of Spain by himself alone. Certainly this was not what might have been expected of a corps so inured to war and so well commanded as his; nor was it that he had been deficient in ability or energy; but difficulties had multiplied round him without end. Marshal Soult, having had a passing brush with La Romana's corps, and having given himself no more concern about it, that general had traversed the country between Galicia and Leon, surprised a French battalion left at Villafranca, and roused the people to arms wherever he appeared. At last he threw himself into the Asturias, which General Bonnet could not keep in order with only two regiments. It was to make head against these difficulties that Marshal Ney had been obliged to rush hither and thither, nowhere finding insurgents, however fanatic they were, who could resist his terrible impetuosity, but always seeing them reappear in his rear when he had beaten them in front. Thus, whilst he had detached General Maurice Mathieu to Mondonedo to make head against the Asturians, he had been compelled to send General Marchand to St. Jago de Compostello to destroy 1500 insurgents who had established themselves there. He had then been obliged to hurry to the ports of Villa Garcia and Carcil, and burn them, to keep off the English. Then, learning that the Portuguese insurgents were besieging the depôt of artillery left by Marshal Soult at Tuy, he had hastened thither, and had some severe fighting to raise the blockade, which was effected just when General Heudelet was preparing to march thither. In these various encounters Marshal Ney had killed more than 6000 Spaniards, and taken 22 pieces of cannon, and an immense quantity of matériel furnished by the English, without sensibly diminishing the hostile tendencies of the population. What will appear still more strange was, that Marshal Ney, though placed on Marshal Soult's line of march, had received no news of him, except through the column he had sent to Tuy, which had there met with that of General Heudelet, and thus learned that Soult's force had not been able to enter Oporto until the 29th, by torchlight. As for Marshal Ney himself, nothing was known of his proceedings at Madrid, except that he was fighting vigorously against the insurgents, and that although he beat them in all directions he was not able to secure his means of communication with Old Castille.

Thus, in spite of the victories of Medellin and Ciudad Real,

Madrid was soon saddened by the apparition of a multitude of guerilla bands in the north of Spain, by the capture of couriers on all the roads, by the absolute impossibility of having news of Marshals Soult and Ney, and by the certainty that all the means of communicating with them were broken. The movement of General Lapisse, who had quitted Salamanca, traversed Alcantara, crossed the Tagus, and rejoined Marshal Victor, fighting all the way, had but still more favoured the insurgents of Old Castille, who had now no force to keep them in awe. Accordingly General Kellermann, who commanded in Old Castille, hastened to send word to Madrid that all the north of Spain was on the point of escaping from the grasp of the French, if vigorous measures were not taken against the guerillas that swarmed there in all directions. Though Marshal Victor had been reinforced by General Lapisse, yet when so much uneasiness was felt for the whole north of Spain, when it was not known what had become of Marshal Soult, and whether or not he would be able to force his way to Lisbon, it was no time to push forward the armies of Estramadura and La Mancha to the south, and add to the difficulty of intercommunication by increasing the extent of territory occupied. It was resolved, therefore, before pursuing the execution of the plan laid down by Napoleon, to await the pacification of the northern provinces and news from Marshal Soult.

The idea occurred very àpropos to King Joseph and Marshal Soult to send Marshal Mortier from the environs of Logroño, where he had been stationed by Napoleon's orders, to Valladolid to reopen communications with Marshal Ney, and succour Marshal Soult if the latter's position was precarious, as began to be feared. Nothing could be better than such a measure, since it was one for which Napoleon himself sent orders from Germany on receiving despatches from Spain. But until his recent wishes, conceived and expressed on the Danube, were known in the Peninsula, Marshal Mortier, whose orders were to remain at Logroño, durst hardly venture to disobey, and he would not. Such is the inconvenience of operations directed from too great a distance. King Joseph having written to Marshal Mortier to repair to Valladolid, the latter was greatly embarrassed between the orders from Paris and those from Madrid. By way of compromise, however, he consented to proceed to Burgos. But it was not enough to repress the insurgents in the north and reopen communications with Soult and Ney. There were detached from the army of Aragon, by way of a temporary loan, two regiments, which it was thought might be spared since the taking of Saragossa, and they were sent to General Kellermann. A Polish and a German battalion were taken from Segovia and the surrounding posts, and their places were supplied by troops

from the garrison of Madrid. Some other detachments were taken from the garrison of Burgos, and with the whole there was formed for General Kellermann a corps of 7000 or 8000 men, with which he was to proceed to Galicia, to re-establish the communications interrupted in the northern provinces.

These several musters were not completed until the 27th of April, and it was not until the 2nd of May that Kellermann reached Lugo, after skirmishing all the way with the peasants of the district. He found General Maurice Mathieu at Lugo, whither he had been sent by Marshal Ney to reopen his communications with Old Castille. It was agreed between these two generals that the main cause of the evil was the descent on the one side into Portugal, on the other to the coast of Galicia, without having previously destroyed the Marquis de la Romana; they resolved therefore to pursue him in the Asturias, and endeavour to destroy him there, which would have the twofold effect of pacifying those regions and of extinguishing the author of all the agitation in the north of Spain. It was further settled that Marshal Ney should march into the Asturias by the route from Lugo to Oviedo, and General Kellermann by that from Leon, so that coming upon La Romana from two opposite directions they might hem him in between them. The two corps then separated with a sincere determination to contribute to the best of their ability to each other's success.

The whole month of April was passed in wretched tentative efforts, in consequence of the uncertainty at Madrid as to Marshal Soult's fate, and also of the inability at headquarters to direct at will, and according to the requirements of the moment, the movements of the French generals operating in Spain. Not knowing what had become of Marshal Soult, the central authorities durst not send Marshal Victor's corps against Badajoz and Seville. Not having the complete disposal of the generals, they could not send Marshal Mortier in the track of Soult and Ney. Thus was lost the most important month in the year, the month in which the most decisive advantages might have been obtained over the Spaniards and the English. The only operation executed during that precious time in Estramadura was to recall Marshal Victor's corps from Medellin to Alcantara to drive the Spanish and Portuguese insurgents out of the latter town, of which they had taken possession. King Joseph and Marshal Jourdan were at first opposed to this retrograde movement on the part of Marshal Victor, fearing the bad effect it would produce in Andalusia. But they decided on letting it be executed on the report of a spy from Oporto, who announced that Marshal Soult's position was in the highest degree critical, and that the English had again landed at Lisbon. The possibility of unpleasant events in that quarter rendered the possession of

Alcantara indispensable, for it was by the Tagus and Alcantara that succour could be sent most directly to the army in Portugal. Alcantara was therefore retaken, the insurgents put to the sword, and immediately afterwards Marshal Victor returned by Almaraz to Truxillo, in order to hinder Gregorio de la Cuesta from reoccupying the positions from which he had expelled him when marching to Medellin.

The news which had been received indirectly from Oporto was unfortunately but too true. Soult's position in Oporto had really become most difficult during the month of April; and for this both men and events were in fault. As soon as he had entered the town the marshal proceeded to establish himself there firmly, thinking he had done enough in arriving on the Douro, and leaving it to circumstances to determine whether he should retreat, or, on the contrary, should push his conquests further. Of all the courses he could have adopted this was the most dangerous, for remaining in Oporto without any settled purpose could evidently lead only to disasters. It was of itself a great danger to be with twenty and odd thousand men in the midst of an insurgent country, in which the popular frenzy against the French had reached the last degree of violence; still, with such a brave army and with such excellent officers, it was possible to maintain one's ground in the north of Portugal. But there were about 17,000 or 18,000 English in Lisbon, and there was every likelihood that double that number would soon arrive in the fleets which had sailed from England. Under such circumstances, to defend oneself behind the line of the Douro against a regular army placed beyond it, and an army of insurgents within it, would be almost impracticable. The probability of this might be inferred from two recent events. The little garrison left at Chaves to guard our wounded had been captured by the Portuguese. The depôt left at Tuy would also have been taken if the Heudelet division and Marshal Ney had not come from Braga and Galicia and raised the blockade. And after all, a part of that depôt, which had been sent to Vigo, was captured. It must be added that they were no weak posts to which such accidents had happened; for the Tuy depôt, reinforced successively by troops on the march, had been raised to 4500 men, and that which had been taken at Vigo amounted to 1300. Marshal Soult had therefore to apprehend at one and the same time both the English army, which could not fail to repair soon from the Tagus to the Douro, and the thousands of fanatical insurgents he had left behind him from the Douro to the Minho. Succours of any kind he could scarcely expect, for Ney's corps was wholly occupied in Galicia; and as for the armies which might have come from the centre (that is to say, from Madrid, by Alcantara

or Badajoz), Napoleon's instructions provided for the case, in which Marshal Soult, after making himself master of Lisbon, might be required to second Marshal Victor at Seville, but did not advert to the possibility that Marshal Victor, when master of Seville, might be called on to succour Lisbon. There was therefore the greatest danger in remaining at Oporto, in the midst of thousands of insurgents swarming in all directions, in presence of an English army ready to assume the offensive, and without any hope of aid against so many enemies; and Soult ought at once either to have retrograded to the Minho, or to have gone up by Braganza towards Old Castille, so as to be backed by the principal mass of the French army operating in the centre of Spain, thus putting spaces not easily to be traversed between him and the English, and reserving to himself the alternative of being useful in Spain, or of reappearing in Portugal with sufficient forces to maintain his ground. With the English especially he ought to have conducted himself in a way to incur no defeat, nor even to sustain an engagement with doubtful success.* But to retrograde àpropos needs as much resolution as to advance boldly; and in war, as in other affairs, this is only the privilege of steadfast and sagacious minds.

Once in Oporto, Marshal Soult, who durst neither march to Lisbon, which the English guarded with 18,000 men, nor disobey Napoleon, who had prescribed the conquest of Portugal, contented himself with remaining where he was, leaving to fortune the determination of his future conduct. Unfortunate illusions, which arose in his mind out of purely local circumstances, contributed also to mislead him, and make him lose valuable time. He had, as we have seen, sent General Heudelet to Tuy to raise the blockade of his depôt, left a detachment at Braga to guard that important town, and distributed important posts on his left, at Penafiel and at Amarante, to secure the roads to Chaves and Braganza, and thus effect the double purpose of keeping the country quiet and occupying the roads. At Amarante on the Tamega he had placed a few thousand men under General Loison. These measures were well conceived, though insufficient, and by seizing the country on all sides at once, they put it for a short interval into a state, not of submission, but of inaction.

When the French were established in Oporto, there was manifested in a part of the population a disposition which had more than once exhibited itself before, and which an interval of quiet rendered still more evident. The violent populace, who had been let loose from all restraint, and who rendered

* This opinion is not mine, but that of Marshal Jourdan and of Napoleon at Schönbrunn, expressed in a very detailed correspondence.

existence insupportable to everybody who had some humanity and civilisation, was regarded with horror, we will not say by the enlightened classes, but by those in easy circumstances, who loved peace and quiet. These classes were not duped by the zeal which the English affected in behalf of Portugal. They saw clearly that ruling the commerce of that country in peace, and desiring in war to make it their field of battle, they thought only of using it for their own ends, as they proved, indeed, very clearly, by letting loose for their service a ferocious multitude which had become the terror of all well-disposed people. So without liking the French, who in their eyes were still foreigners, they were ready, if compelled to choose between them and the English, to prefer them as a lesser evil, as a means of ending the war, and as holding out the hope of a more liberal rule than that under which Portugal had lived for ages. As for the house of Braganza, the classes in question were inclined, since the regent's flight to Brazil, to consider it as an empty name which the English made use of to upset the land from top to bottom.

The presence of Marshal Soult and his encouraging declarations did but confirm the more discreet inhabitants in their pacific inclinations. It was particularly in Oporto, a rich trading town, less exposed than Lisbon to the old court influences, and very intent on its own interests, that the disposition we have described was most obviously manifested, in spite of the patriotic and fanatical bishop who swayed the rabble. The middle classes responded with no little satisfaction to Marshal Soult's assurances, and seemed resolved to remain quiet if he kept his word, maintained good discipline amongst his soldiers, restrained the populace, and procured for every man liberty to attend to his business. This feeling was particularly manifested by the Jews —men who are everywhere very numerous, active, and rich, but especially so in countries of backward civilisation, where trade is left in their hands, the rest of the inhabitants not understanding it. They were more than two hundred thousand in Portugal, living under harsh oppression, and delighted at the prospect of enjoying under the French a civil equality, which seemed to them the most desirable form of government. After having entered into relations with the French administration for the sustenance of the army and the collection of revenues, they soon came to make political overtures as to the manner of establishing a regular government in Portugal. Many merchants of the country joined them; and it appeared that the idea of erecting Northern Lusitania into a separate kingdom, as a treaty made by Napoleon in October 1807 had arranged, would be very acceptable to the province of Oporto. It was declared that such a resolution, publicly announced, and accompanied by an

equitable and mild administration, would cause the French to be looked upon not in the light of invaders who devour the countries through which they pass, but of friends who deal carefully by a country in which they intend to establish themselves permanently. It was for Napoleon to nominate as soon as possible the French prince who should wear the new crown of Oporto, perhaps ere long of Oporto and Lisbon. But as circumstances were pressing, were it not well to move as fast as circumstances; and since it was a time when kings were made out of generals, was it not quite natural to make a king of Northern Lusitania of Napoleon's lieutenant? Whether this thought was suggested by the little military court of the marshal to officious intermediaries, or by the latter to the former, is a fact which remains unknown, and as to which assertions varied much when all the details of this singular adventure were afterwards laid before Napoleon. Be this as it may, the idea of making Marshal Soult a king of Portugal soon spread through Oporto and the towns of the province of Entre Douro e Minho. It was thought rather absurd by the more rational, received with insulting jests by the army, but accepted by the trading classes, who wanted a protector; by the Jews, who wanted a representative of civil equality; and by those military intriguers who always flatter generals-in-chief, and are their most dangerous enemies. The latter affected to consider this arrangement as profoundly politic, for it would serve, they said, to attach the Portuguese to the French, and detach them from the English and the house of Braganza. What chiefly encouraged them to the audacity of making, or at least preparing, a king without the express consent of the emperor, was his absence in a distant part of the continent, where he was engaged in events of uncertain issue. All the ambitions excited by his example, being thus emancipated by distance, allowed themselves free course; and there were not wanting those who said to themselves, that since they were condemned to waste their blood in a corner of the world for the grandeur of an insatiable family, it was time they should think of themselves, and take advantage of the opportunity to settle well where they were. Napoleon perhaps would take it amiss, but every day's experience showed how much his power was diminishing from the Rhine to the Pyrenees, from the Pyrenees to the Tagus; besides, he had so much need of those he sent so far to conquer kingdoms that they might well retain some part of what they conquered for him, to say nothing of the very probable chance that his death or defeat on the Danube would leave them free to keep whatever they should have taken on the Douro or the Tagus.

It was not every one, indeed, who went so far in this line of

speculation; but there were some exceedingly rash spirits about the marshal, and they so beguiled his judgment as to induce him to put forth a strange circular, addressed to the generals commanding divisions, which, after recounting the offer made to the marshal to accept a king from the emperor's family, or from among the persons of his choice, proceeded to say that the population of Oporto, Braga, and several neighbouring towns had requested Marshal Soult to invest himself with the attributes of sovereignty, and to exercise royal authority until the arrival of Napoleon's answer; and that meanwhile they swore to be faithful to him, and defend him against all enemies —English, insurgents, and others—who should seek to resist the spontaneous act they solicited on his part. The circular concluded with a request that the generals would call forth the expression of a similar desire on the part of the several populations under their command.

Though this circular was in some degree confidential, it could not remain secret. It afforded matter for laughter to some, offended others, and alarmed the best men. Much ridicule was cast upon the marshal, who had so far forgotten his extreme reserve at the fallacious prospect of a crown as to manifest the most imprudent desires. A part of the army was highly incensed, especially the old officers, who retained at the bottom of their hearts the feelings of independence peculiar to the army of the Rhine, and who fought from a generous devotion to duty, but in secret were indignant at seeing their blood lavished in every corner of the world, in order to make kings who were weak, or incapable, or dissolute, and in general, not very faithful to France. There were many officers in the army of Portugal who entertained these sentiments, and one who did so in a pre-eminent degree, namely, General Delaborde, who had so well discovered the art of beating the English, and had done this in so brilliant a manner at the battle of Rolica. He was a man of high spirit, intelligent, and brave, and he held a language which was soon repeated by everybody round him. Men of more reserved temper, who were interested only in the maintenance of discipline, were deeply distressed at the moral effect which they foresaw would be produced by the commander-in-chief's example among officers and soldiers already too much inclined to emancipate themselves from all rule, and to indemnify themselves by license for the sufferings they endured in distant lands. Such proceedings were equivalent to a direct invitation to disorder, and what was worse, they tended inevitably to divide the army, which, in its perilous position, had more need than ever of union, force, and good conduct. These sensible men were also curious to know what the emperor would think of all those who lent themselves more

or less to acts so strange, involving so striking though involuntary a censure of the imperial policy.

General Quesnel, commandant of Oporto, addressed some observations to Marshal Soult, who received them very ill, and replied haughtily, that the approbation to be obtained from the emperor was his own affair, and did not at all concern the officers under his orders. "The fate that has befallen General Dupont's lieutenants," replied General Quesnel, "proves that the emperor can, on occasion, make the responsibility of the general-in-chief extend to those who have participated in his faults."

Three parties were immediately formed in the army—that of the officers who, actuated by no other motive than their sense of duty and fidelity to the emperor, would not lend themselves to an assumption of royal power which he had not sanctioned; that of the officers who had formerly been republicans, and whom the excesses of the imperial policy were bringing back to their primitive opinions; lastly, that of some more audacious malcontents, who cared little about disobeying the emperor, and felt no regret for the republic, but who were simply royalists—though perhaps they did not admit the fact even to themselves—and who regarded the republic, the consulate, the empire, and all that had happened in France for the last twenty years, as a series of frightful convulsions, all destined to end ill. The language of the old royalists was already heard from the lips of some officers, and notoriously from those of the colonel of the 47th regiment of the line, subsequently well known as General Donnadieu. What is most singular is, that this small party, which was beginning to make itself heard in the army (especially in Spain, where the sufferings were horrible, and the end for which they were endured too apparent), was not composed of old royalists (scarcely any of those men were of an age to come under that designation), but of ex-republicans, of the army of the Rhine, disgusted at toils that no longer had for object the greatness of France, but that of a family. Glory had for a while concealed the emptiness or the selfishness of this policy. The first reverses induced reflection, and reflection induced disgust.

No sooner had these divisions broken out than the language of the army became incredibly audacious, and equalled in imprudence the acts that had provoked it. Nothing less was talked of than arresting the commander-in-chief if he acted upon his circular, deposing him, and putting the oldest of the lieutenant-generals in his place. It may easily be conceived how dangerous was such a disturbance of discipline in the midst of an enemy's country, and in presence of an English army led by an able commander. The effects were soon felt.

The service was performed with a laxity and negligence that had deplorable consequences. Our soldiers, obliged to enter every inhabited place by force, and authorised to exercise there the right possessed over every place taken by storm, had contracted a taste for pillage; and unfortunately many of them were loaded with gold since the sack of Oporto. To wean them from such habits was urgently needful; yet this could hardly be done in the state of indiscipline into which the whole army had fallen. If attempts were made to bring them into order, they complained that they were sacrificed to a population whose suffrages were to be won at that price. The officers who had been the first to set the example of this sort of language were unable to put it down among the soldiery, and in a short while the mischief made rapid progress. A sad proof of this was seen in a strange incident which, some months afterwards, conducted an officer to a disgraceful death.

Assiduous attention to duty no longer prevailing, the officers often quitted their posts without any inquiry being made about them. A captain of the 18th dragoons, very intelligent, brave, and enterprising, having obtained the favour of his superiors by good means and bad, by bravery and complaisance, was among those who said openly that the consulate, at first so glorious, afterwards converted into the empire, was but the sacrifice of all the interests of France to a boundless ambition. Born in the south, a royalist region, he had been brought prematurely to the sentiments which flashed up in 1815, when France, wearied by thirty years of revolution, threw herself into the arms of the Bourbons. This officer had frequented the colonels and generals who complained the most openly of the commander-in-chief, and forming an exaggerated estimate of their thoughts from their language, he fancied he discerned in their discontent evidences of a conspiracy which might be forthwith made use of to bring about the overthrow of Napoleon and his empire in 1809! Like all those restless spirits who rush headlong into conspiracies, he had wants fully as much as opinions; and a craving for money, no less than an inordinate activity, prompted him to go and treat with Sir Arthur Wellesley, who was then at Coïmbra.

That celebrated general, the victor of Vimeira, recalled to the command of the British army after the death of Moore, had been sent from England with a reinforcement of 12,000 men, which raised the English forces in that country to a total of about 30,000. His temporary predecessor, General Cradock, had not ventured to oppose Marshal Soult's movement against Oporto, in consequence of Marshal Victor's appearance towards Merida, and General Lapisse's towards Alcantara, and he had remained at the environs of Leiria, on the road to Lisbon. Sir

Arthur Wellesley was not a man to remain inactive, and he was resolved, without exceeding his instructions, which enjoined him to confine himself to the defence of Portugal, to shake the power of the French in the Peninsula as much as possible. He proposed, in the first place, to make Marshal Soult evacuate Oporto, and after delivering the north of Portugal, to proceed to the south, and see what he could do to baffle King Joseph's designs against the south of Spain. He had established his headquarters at Coïmbra, where he was at the head of twenty and odd thousand men, and he had pushed forward an English and a Portuguese division to Abrantes to observe the movements of the French in that quarter.

Captain Argenton, the officer whose criminal intrigues we are recounting, in consequence of the incredible irregularity which had crept into the army, could withdraw from his duty, repair in disguise from Oporto to Coïmbra, and present himself clandestinely to Sir Arthur Wellesley. The complaisance of the French authorities towards the inhabitants of Oporto who had business in Lisbon, and who were allowed to come and go notwithstanding the state of war, contributed not a little to facilitate communications of this kind. Argenton saw the English general, talked to him of the divisions in the French army, of the parties that had grown up in it, exaggerated, as usual with men of his kind, the too sad reality, made out of mere malcontent conspirators, out of people who murmured, people who wished to act, out of men who yielded to different impulses because they were sincere, men who had all one common desire, namely, to overthrow a power ruinous to France, and to revolt against the authority of the emperor. True in all points to the usages of the too sanguine spirits that play such parts as his, Argenton ascribed to himself a mission he had not received, and calumniously naming a host of generals and colonels, he pretended that he was deputed by them to present himself to the British commander and to treat with him. It was a falsehood, of a kind unfortunately too common in similar circumstances, and too often believed, though often unmasked. The plan this intriguer proposed was as follows. Marshal Soult, he said, would not fail, if the people of Oporto lent themselves to his design, to proclaim himself king, or at least, as the circular announced, to assume provisionally all the attributes of sovereignty. Such a step would be sufficient to produce a revolt in the army. The marshal would then be deposed, and after that first explosion the generals would go still further. They would proclaim the dethronement of Napoleon himself, and then, if the English army would treat with them and not pursue them, they would retreat by appointed marches to the Pyrenees. Their example would be immediately imitated by the 300,000 men who

were serving in Spain; and the old army of the republic and the empire, remembering what it had been, and incensed at being sacrificed to the projects of one ambitious man, would quit the Peninsula, retire to the Pyrenees, and there proclaim the deliverance of France and Europe, provided always the English accepted the proposals made to them, namely, that they should follow without molesting those who were going by this spontaneous movement to re-establish the peace of the world.

These were wild exaggerations. What was true in them was that the army, which can judge as well as the nation what passes under its own eyes, whilst remaining faithful to its duties, had rightly appreciated the policy of Napoleon, and secretly blamed it though serving it heroically; that such were its sentiments, especially in Spain, and that a few days' disruption of discipline would have been enough to produce in the seven or eight *corps d'armée* serving in the Peninsula the same chaos of sentiments as prevailed in Oporto. But this state of things was as remote from the project talked of by Argenton as the inventions of conspirators commonly are from the reality.

The English general exhibited on this occasion the good sense which was his most distinguishing quality, and estimated the possible truth involved in Argenton's assertions. He saw clearly that Napoleon's conquering policy was condemned even in the French army, that that army was divided, that the bonds of discipline were much relaxed in it, that, great as was the valour in its ranks, its military duties could not but be ill performed; and without believing in a revolt which, beginning with the deposition of Marshal Soult, was to terminate in that of Napoleon himself, he hoped for something more probable, and unhappily more practicable, namely, that he might surprise the French in the very town of Oporto, and make them suffer a humiliating disaster.

Though he put no more faith in Argenton's overtures than they deserved, he did not repulse him, but invited him to return, and supplied him with the means of doing so. But he refused to treat with the French army, or to induce the inhabitants of Oporto to proclaim Marshal Soult King of Portugal, which, according to Argenton's showing, would have precipitated the crisis. On all these weighty matters he said he must refer to his government. But seeing what facilities the French army offered him for a surprise, he resolved to march upon Oporto, taking care previously to fill that town with his spies, who, in the character of inhabitants of Oporto or Lisbon, and under pretext of commercial business, obtained from the complaisance of the French authorities free leave to come and go.

Having returned to the camp without notice taken of his

absence, which was attributed to amorous motives, Argenton frequently repeated his criminal excursions, again saw the English general, and tried to convert him to the idea of favouring Marshal Soult's advancement to royal station, in order to precipitate a movement in the army, and of treating subsequently with its authors; but with all his efforts he only succeeded in more fully enlightening him as to the moral condition of the French troops, and confirming him in his design of surprising Oporto.

On his return from his last excursion, Argenton passed through General Lefebvre's brigade, which furnished the French advanced posts on the left bank of the Douro, and finding that brigade exposed to the assault of the English army which he had left on its march, he was seized with a desire to preserve General Lefebvre, whom he liked because he had served under him, and also to affiliate him to the pretended conspiracy of which he himself was the sole artificer. He told General Lefebvre that his position exposed him to the greatest dangers. The latter wishing to know what these were, Argenton ended by revealing them to him. He told him that the English army was approaching; and to confirm the statement, he confessed that he had just come from it, adding untruly that he had gone to it by deputation from the majority of the generals, who were indignant at being sacrificed to the ambition of the Bonaparte family, and he besought him to join his comrades, and contribute to the salvation of the army and of France.

General Lefebvre was deeply agitated by these revelations, and though it pained him to denounce Argenton, he disclosed what he had just learned to Marshal Soult, begging him not to destroy a wretched man, who, criminal as he was, had yet a claim on his gratitude, inasmuch as he had sought to warn and save him. Marshal Soult had Argenton arrested instantly, and thus became aware of all that was passing in the army. The discontents excited in it had not escaped his notice, but refusing to attribute them to their real cause, he was weak enough to believe in a conspiracy, about which, however, he made little noise, knowing that the situation was one of difficulty for everybody, for there was no one whose conscience was quite whole. The news of this arrest spread as that of the projected royalty had done; and then began a storm of mutual accusations, one party being charged with conspiring against the safety of the army, the other with meditating a usurpation. The disorder and confusion were but the more augmented.

Marshal Soult had been more than a month in Oporto, occupied in cultivating a good understanding with the inhabitants, but coming to no decision as to military operations whether to advance or retreat. To advance was almost impossible; for besides the Portuguese population, he would have had to beat the

English army, and although with 20,000 veteran French troops and an able general this was within the limits of possibility, it would have been supremely imprudent to attempt it. To remain was quite as impracticable; for in this case, too, it would have been necessary to beat the English army, whilst there was the insurgent population to be kept down on our right, our left, and our rear. To retreat by the roads leading to Old Castille —that is to say, by Amarante, Chaves, and Braganza—or better still, by the roads which led back to Galicia, by Braga and Tuy —so as to return to our point of departure, was, though not very brilliant, yet the only feasible course. Not to adopt it was to prefer a disaster to an unpleasant alternative.

Unfortunately Marshal Soult did not think of this. Intent on pacifying the new kingdom of Northern Lusitania, he had abolished certain taxes, founded perpetual lamps for certain Madonnas, and received addresses from the several towns which had been induced to call for the establishment of a French dynasty. Deputations from Braga, Oporto, Barcellos, Viana, Villa do Conde, Feira, and Ovar came in state and entreated him to give a king to Portugal. All these ceremonies had the aspect and the form of the Spanish besamanos. The army laughed and jeered at them without end, held language capable of shaking all military authority, and was but the more disposed to neglect its duties. In the midst of these idle occupations, Marshal Soult learned that Sir Arthur Wellesley had landed, on the 22nd of April, with a reinforcement of 12,000 men; that 30,000 English, followed by the whole Portuguese insurrection, were about to march on Oporto; and at last he owned that his only course was to abandon the capital of his projected kingdom. It would have been far better to have admitted this unpleasant necessity much sooner; but having done so at last, the marshal should have acted with the promptest decision, in order to leave nothing behind him—neither his matériel, nor his sick and wounded, whom it was impossible to leave at the mercy of a ferocious people. He had to choose for his line of retreat either that by Amarante to Zamora, or by Braga to Tuy. To retreat by Amarante would have the appearance of a manœuvre, which would spare the vanity of the general-in-chief, for he would seem to be making a move to the left of the English without entirely quitting Portugal, whereas to retire by Braga was simply to return to the spot whence he had come, and by the very same road. But the retreat by Amarante was difficult, and required much time; it was to be effected upon a road not one point of which was in our possession, in a long column, which the sick and wounded would make still longer, the head and middle of which would have to be protected against the insurgents,

and the tail against the English. The road by Braga to Tuy was short; every point of it was in the hands of the French, and by concentrating the best troops in the rearguard to make head against the English, their mass would serve to cover all that was sent forward before them. This, then, was the only sure, facile, and admissible line of retreat, though it was the least capable of veiling the fact of the forced abandonment of Portugal.

Be this as it may, whatever line was preferred, no time was to be lost. It was imperative that a considerable force should be sent to Amarante, if that direction was adopted, to hinder the English from crossing the Douro on our left, and cutting off our retreat. It was, above all, requisite that the sick, the wounded, and the heavy matériel should be sent away. Marshal Soult, though made aware on the 8th of May of Sir Arthur Wellesley's movements, did no more than concentrate his posts at Braga, Viana, and Guimaraens on Amarante, and order General Loison to make an excursion beyond the Tamega, in order to secure the passage of that small river. But in Oporto he made no preparation for departure, which was unfortunate, for it was evident that the longer the retreat was delayed the more difficult it would be. He had proposed at first to march on the 10th of May, after having occupied Oporto forty days; then he delayed until the 11th, and finally chose to wait until the 12th. But that day was destined by Providence for one of the strangest events of this disastrous war.

Having sent, as we have said, an English brigade and a Portuguese division to Abrantes to observe the movements of the French on the Tagus, Sir Arthur Wellesley resolved to march in person to the Douro, and present himself before Oporto, being thoroughly informed of what was passing there, and of the incredible disorder into which everything had fallen. General Beresford, who specially commanded the Portuguese, was ordered by him from Coïmbra to Lamego by Visen. The English general's intention was to intercept the Braganza road, and at the same time to withdraw attention from Oporto, which was to be his main object. At the same time he sent forward his two principal columns—the one to the left by the coast road from Aveiro to Ovar, the other to the right by the interior road from Agueda to Bemposta. The left column, having arrived at Aveiro, had to cross long lagunes parallel to the coast, and which were navigable. Sir Arthur Wellesley embarked upon them a strong detachment, which on landing at Ovar would be placed in the rear of the French advanced guard, commanded by General Franceschi. Sir Arthur Wellesley ordered the right column to attack Franceschi in front as soon as the troops landed at Ovar should be ready to fall upon his rear.

It was on the 10th of May this movement was effected. The brave General Franceschi, surprised and assailed in all directions, behaved with singular coolness, charged now the English infantry, now their cavalry under a fire of grape, killed as many men as he lost, and extricated himself from his awkward position with extreme good fortune. This surprise was the sad result of a state of things in which we let the English know everything, without ourselves knowing anything about them. On the 11th our detachments, recalled to the faubourgs of Oporto on the left bank of the river, recrossed the river and brought over all the boats to the right side.

It seems that being warned on the 10th and 11th by the presence of the English army, Marshal Soult ought to have had all his sick and wounded not in the hospitals of Oporto, but on the road to Amarante, and should have assured himself positively of the possession of that town. But on the 11th none of the wounded had been removed, and the possession of Amarante was taken for granted without certain proof. Marshal Soult again postponed till the 12th his departure from Oporto, from which he was loth to tear himself. The only precaution taken was to throw into the water the powder that could not be carried away, to separate from the heavy artillery, which could not be dragged with the army, the field artillery, which there were means of conveying, so as to have of the latter a movable park of twenty-two pieces. The departure was to take place on the 12th. The bulk of the army was echeloned on the road leading to Amarante by Balthar, and the Mermet division was distributed in the interior of Oporto to cover the retreat.

But on the night of the 11th Sir Arthur Wellesley had conceived a project which would have been one of extravagant daring had he not been so well informed of the real state of things: this was to cross the Douro in presence of the French army, and seize Oporto before their eyes. On that night he sent two battalions to Avintas, two or three leagues above Oporto, with orders to cross the Douro unknown to the French, collect all the boats they could find, and float them down before daybreak to Oporto. He himself took post with the bulk of his troops in the faubourgs of the left bank, completely concealed by the houses, and waiting the proper moment to execute his plan, the secret of which he had imparted only to the two lieutenant-generals who led the attacking columns.

On the 12th, very early in the morning, the two battalions sent under Sir John Murray to Avintas, having collected a sufficient number of boats and sent them to Oporto, they were used before daybreak to land some battalions under Lieutenant-General Paget, suddenly and with the utmost secrecy, at the

upper extremity of Oporto. He hid his troops in a building belonging to the bishop, which commanded the right bank of the river. This point being well occupied, the rest of Hill's brigade was carried over, detachment by detachment, and it was already broad day ere anything was known at the French headquarters of what was going on, and they refused to believe the warnings given them by several eye-witnesses. The general-in-chief, instead of going and ascertaining the truth with his own eyes, trusted at first to the negative report of his lieutenants, whom he afterwards accused of having deceived him, and who were culpable, no doubt; but less so than himself, for in such cases the responsibility increases with the rank. This incredulity having allowed the English to throw some thousands of their men on the right bank of the Douro, they had time to establish themselves in the town of Oporto, and soon they even took no pains to conceal themselves. But General Foy, having at last gone in person to the spot, and convinced himself of the danger, ran to the barracks, put the troops under arms, and directed the 17th light infantry against the building occupied by the English. The latter, unfortunately, being once in possession, were not easily to be dislodged, and musketry was used against them without effect. General Mermet, who formed the rearguard with his division, brought his troops to bear upon the point seized by the English, with the intention of driving them into the river. But in moving to the upper part of Oporto he left the centre uncovered; and Lieutenant-General Sherbrooke, taking advantage of the unguarded state of that part of the town, rapidly landed his brigade there, so that in an instant Oporto was filled with English. The brave General Delaborde, at the head of the 4th light infantry and the 15th of the line, charged and drove them to the edge of the river, but could never wrest from them the buildings which served them as a support. He was wounded, as was also General Foy, without succeeding in avenging the honour of the army for this unparalleled surprise.

In the existing state of things, resigned as we were to quit Oporto, it was almost useless to contest, at the cost of an immense effusion of blood, a town which we should have had to reconquer, street by street, from troops who were not to be driven, like the Portuguese, from the possessions they had seized. It is true that there remained a thousand sick and wounded in Oporto, a sacred deposit it behoved us to save. But to effect their removal it would have been necessary to possess the town for several days longer, and this was quite impossible. It was this consideration that decided the retreat of the French, after a strenuous struggle on the part of General Delaborde, and a loss of some hundreds, subsequently estimated

at an exaggerated figure by Marshal Soult and Sir Arthur Wellesley. The most vexatious thing was to leave our sick and wounded in the power of the enemy, and with them the honour of the army, for such a surprise was without a precedent in the annals of war. Fortunately we were succeeded in Oporto by the general of a civilised nation, and our sick, who would have been in danger of being murdered had they remained in the power of the insurgents, were exposed only to the risk of being neglected.*

The French then retreated on the evening of the 12th to Balthar, greatly incensed against each other, the generals accusing the commander-in-chief of having suffered everything to fall into a state of neglect and disorder, which had rendered the surprise of Oporto possible, the commander-in-chief accusing his lieutenants of having left him in ignorance of the fact that the English had begun to cross the Douro. Argenton, the culpable author of the communications with the English, whom the marshal had put in arrest in order to bring him to trial, was brought away with the army. The marshal wished to commit him to General Delaborde's custody, but things were come to such a pass that the general refused to take charge of him, saying that there was no other intention than to favour the escape of that intriguer, in order to cast a veil over what had happened, and that for his own part, as he desired light. he had no notion of being responsible for such an evasion. Argenton, who was full of dexterity, did in fact succeed in escaping, and fled to the English, without its being possible reasonably to accuse any one of conniving at his escape, though there was no end of such accusations in the army.†

Having arrived at Balthar in the evening, Marshal Soult had tidings of another accident, still worse than that which had befallen in the morning at Oporto. General Loison, not having sufficient troops to force his passage across the Tamega, and fearing he should be cut off from Oporto by the great number of enemies that presented themselves, had evacuated Amarante, and thus surrendered the road to Braganza to the English. This was disastrous, for in order to come upon the direct road from Oporto to Tuy by Braga, which it would have been far better to have adopted from the first, it was necessary to go back very near to Oporto; and it was natural to expect that the English army would be found barring our way. In that case, how were we to break through them and reach the road to Braga? There were many reasons for regarding this as

* The Duke of Wellington behaved generously on this occasion. He applied to the French army for its own surgeons to attend their invalid countrymen, and granted those surgeons safe conducts to come and return.

† He was retaken some months afterwards, tried, and shot.

hopeless in the existing state of the army, and Marshal Soult hardly knew what to do. But with a little more presence of mind he might have made the somewhat obvious reflection, that notwithstanding the surprise of the morning it was not to be supposed that the English general had already transported his army from one bank of the Douro to the other. Such operations are but slowly effected when the means have not been prepared a long time in advance. Even if he had done so, it was not probable that he had already concentrated all his troops in the rear of the French, so as to bar their way from the Amarante to the Braga road. At the most, there could only be an advanced guard at the intersection of those two roads, and then there would be a probability that we might force a passage. It is true that in such situations one is more apt to surmise the worst than the best, and that, after having relied too much on fortune, one ends by trusting to it too little. In the present instance Marshal Soult would have succeeded better had he been more confident; for it was not until the morning of the 13th that Sir Arthur Wellesley sent a mere advanced guard to occupy Valongo, the first point beyond Oporto, and it was only on the 14th that he appeared there himself at the head of his army. But as Marshal Soult could not foresee this circumstance, he adopted a desperate course.

He had before him a chain of steep hills, beyond which lay the road to Braga, and what was more to the purpose, the road from Braga to Chaves, into which he might strike directly without descending to Braga, and so reach Chaves before General Beresford's troops. Not having ordered preparations beforehand at Tuy for crossing the Minho, he was obliged, as on the former occasion, to go up to Chaves, in order to cross the river in the mountains towards Orense.

But to cross the mountain chain called the Sierra da Santa Cathalina, the army had to march along goat tracks, where the horsemen had to dismount, and the artillerymen to abandon their cannons. The marshal had therefore to resign himself to the loss of all his artillery, the most humiliating of all sacrifices for an army, next to laying down its arms, for there is none more pernicious. But this resolution once adopted, Marshal Soult had the merit of executing it without loss of time. He had his artillery and his ammunition-chests immediately collected to be blown up. Care had been previously taken to load the soldiers' backs with as many cartridges as they could carry; and even a portion of the army treasure was offered to their cupidity, but this was useless, for most of them had their bags filled already. The greater part of the contents of the army-chest was abandoned to the explosion that destroyed the artillery.

Having accomplished this painful sacrifice, the French marched to the escarped flanks of the Sierra da Santa Cathalina, towards which a *tête de colonne* had preceded them, and the whole day of the 13th was employed in crossing it. The soldiers suffered much on the march, for they were very heavily laden, and had to climb very difficult paths. At last they arrived in the evening at Guimaraens, where they found the corps of General Loison, which had fallen back on that town on quitting Amarante, and also the several detachments under General Lorge, which had evacuated the coast. The whole army was thus reunited, and capable of passing anywhere in consequence of the sacrifice of its artillery.

This was an advantage too dearly purchased not to be made good use of. Expecting to evade the pursuit of General Beresford, who after occupying Amarante might push forward directly to Chaves and again intercept our line of communication, the march was continued without halting to Salamanca and Ruivaens. For the greater safety the marshal even avoided passing by Chaves, where he was sure of encountering the Portuguese who had forced the garrison left in that town, and he proceeded towards Monte Alegre, whence a shorter road led to Orense.

But it soon became known that in order to give General Beresford time to overtake the French, the insurgents were breaking down the bridges and shutting up the passes. In particular, it was known that the bridge called Puente Novo had been broken down by the peasants, and that they were in ambush near it to defend the passage. This obstruction was to be overcome at all hazards, or else we should have been taken in flank by General Beresford in twenty-four hours, and in the rear by Sir Arthur Wellesley in forty-eight. Major Dulong, of the 31st light infantry, undertook the task. With 100 picked men he marched in the dark to the bridge, which he found cut down and guarded by the peasants. Fortunately the latter had left two planks for their own use, and moreover, to shelter themselves from the weather, which was frightful, had shut themselves up in a hut, where they thought of nothing but warming themselves. Taking advantage of their negligence, Major Dulong passed over the planks with his brave men, attacked the hut, killed all the Portuguese in it, and having got rid of them, made haste to restore the bridge with the timber he found at hand. At daybreak on the 16th the army found the bridge repaired, and defiled over it, being thus saved from the consequence of the faults of its leaders by the bravery of an officer and by a favour of chance. It soon met with another obstacle at the Misarella bridge near Villa da Pontè. In the heart of a narrow gorge, where two men could hardly march abreast, and from the heights overhanging which numbers

of peasantry fired upon our soldiers, there was a bridge guarded by a breastwork of timber, and which the Portuguese had begun to destroy. At the same time was heard in the distance the firing which was begun to be exchanged between our rearguard and the advanced guard of General Beresford. There was no need of so many circumstances to excite the temerity of our soldiers. They dashed boldly into the gorge, carried the breastwork, killed the Portuguese who defended it, and crossed the bridge. But in the rearguard there was some disorder, and some remaining baggage which was carried on the backs of mules was lost. This loss was very lightly borne, and our men joyfully reached the road to Orense, where they arrived on the 19th of May, spent with fatigue, shoeless, and almost without clothes, having marched, often without food, under the spring rains, which in that region are horrible. The greatest subject of sorrow, besides the loss of the matériel, was to have left in Oporto many sick, who, indeed, would be protected by English honour, and to have left besides on the route many wounded and crippled men, whom Portuguese honour did not protect at all, for the insurgents killed them as they followed us. Whatever may have been said afterwards, the capitulation of Cintra after the battle of Vimeira, bravely fought though lost, did less damage to the renown and the effective strength of the army than the surprise of Oporto, the destruction of our artillery at Penafiel, and the precipitate march through the gorges of the province of Tras-os-Montes. The moral condition of our troops corresponded to their physical condition. The soldiers, though their bags were full, were dissatisfied with their leaders and with themselves, and while persisting in their indiscipline, they were severe, as they always are, in their judgment of those who had suffered them to fall into that state. Their jeers at the vanished royalty of Oporto deepened the sadness of the spectacle.

No sooner was Soult arrived at Orense than he had to repair to Lugo to rescue that town, which the absence of Marshal Ney exposed to the enterprises of the Galician insurgents. Ney, as we have said, feeling it necessary to rid the Asturias of La Romana, had resolved to make with General Kellermann a joint expedition into that province, the one moving by Lugo on Oviedo, the other by Leon. The first was consequently to march along the coast, the second was to traverse the mountains separating Old Castille from the Asturias. They had kept word with each other like gallant men. Ney, starting from Lugo with 10,000 fighting men on the 13th of May, the day after the surprise of Oporto, had reached the sources of the Navia, and leaving the Spaniards posted along the shore, had outflanked them by making his way over tremendous

mountains which had separated them from Oviedo, entered that town in the midst of their dispersed bands, and had been unable to save it from a sort of sack, the result of a street fight between the Spaniards and the French. The Marquis de la Romana, after having brought down all sorts of calamities on that unfortunate region, had taken refuge with some officers on board the English vessels, to go and recommence elsewhere his wretched system of war. Considerable stores of wealth had been found at Gijon. General Kellermann, on his side, had set out from Leon, crossed the mountains of the Asturias, and descending on Oviedo, had formed a junction there with the troops under Marshal Ney.

It was during these combined operations that the Galician insurgents, availing themselves of Marshal Ney's absence, had assailed Lugo and St. Jago de Compostello. Marshal Soult marched thither and dispersed them, and was joined by Marshal Ney, who, after delivering the Asturias, had returned in all haste to relieve the threatened towns. When the two corps met, the details of the Oporto expedition were related by the one to the other, and were severely criticised by that of Marshal Ney. His old soldiers, poor, orderly, and disciplined, ridiculed the younger, richer, and very indocile soldiers of Marshal Soult, who had no victories to allege in excuse for their behaviour. The latter exculpated themselves by throwing the blame on their leaders, whom they accused of causing all the misfortunes of the army. It was evident that peace might be disturbed if the two corps remained long together. Marshal Ney, however, impetuous, but full of good faith, behaved to his colleague with the courtesy of a generous companion-in-arms. He opened his magazines to furnish Marshal Soult's troops with part of what they had lost, and did what he could to replace the artillery they had been obliged to abandon.

Satisfied with each other, the two marshals conferred together as to the conduct they should pursue for the best interests of the emperor's arms, as the phrase ran in those days, and with reason, for Napoleon's greatness was much more considered than that of France, which was much compromised by these remote wars. After campaigning for several months in Galicia and the Asturias, Marshal Ney had about 12,000 men present under arms, and Marshal Soult about 17,000, though their respective nominal forces were twice as great. Their strength would soon be increased by the return of men discharged from the hospitals; and with such a force, frankly employed, without any feeling of rivalry, they might complete the subjection of Galicia and the Asturias, exterminate the insurgents, and if the English persisted in remaining on the banks of the Minho, or even dared to cross it, they might rout them too, and drive

them back to the sea. If, on the contrary, as was probable, Sir Arthur Wellesley returned from the north of Portugal to the south, to make head against the French on the Tagus, one of the two marshals, or both of them, might quit Galicia, skirt along the confines of Portugal by Old Castille, move from Lugo to Zamora and Ciudad Rodrigo, fall in conjunction with Marshal Victor on the British army, and cure it for ever of any desire to reappear in the Peninsula.

This was certainly what Napoleon would have ordered had he been on the spot (his instructions testify it), and this was what the people at headquarters in Madrid would have prescribed if they had possessed the art of making themselves obeyed. For the present the two marshals could spontaneously execute the first part of this plan by clearing the coast of Galicia in a few days of the insurgents who had established themselves there, and cutting off those communications with the English fleet which furnished the chief aliment of the war. General Noruña had created a formidable establishment at Vigo with about 12,000 men and the crews of some English vessels. The Marquis de la Romana, who had been carried from the Asturias to Galicia, with his officers and some select troops, had established himself at Orense since Marshal Soult's movement on Lugo, and was making himself formidable there. It was indispensable, if the two marshals were not to remain together, to expel the insurgent chiefs from their positions, after which they might proceed wherever they should think it more useful or more conformable to their instructions. Those given to Marshal Soult allowed him great latitude, for they amounted only to this, that he was to conquer Portugal, and then go to the support of Marshal Victor in Andalusia. Now, instead of being at Lisbon or Badajoz, he was at Lugo, the point from which he had started. This case had not been foreseen or provided for by Napoleon, and therefore he was wholly free to act for the best. But he had a visible inclination to move into Old Castille, towards Zamora and Ciudad Rodrigo, along the eastern frontier of Portugal; whether it was that in thus skirting along the country he was to have conquered he felt himself a little less remote from his aim, or that remaining confined in Galicia to accomplish a task which was properly that of Marshal Ney was not very flattering to his ambition, or that the very acrimonious and sometimes scandalous language elicited by the contact between the two corps was disagreeable to him. He therefore intimated to Marshal Ney his intention of proceeding to Zamora, to effect, as he said, in Castille, a movement corresponding to that which the English seemed to be meditating towards the south of Portugal, by passing from the Minho to the Douro, and thence to the Tagus. There was some reason in this, though

nothing was yet positively known of the supposed movement of the English towards the south of Portugal, and what was most immediately requisite was to beat the enemy who were at hand, for otherwise they would secure for themselves an exceedingly strong position on the coast of Galicia. At the rate the English were marching they could not be on the Tagus before a month or two, as the event afterwards proved. There would be time enough in that interval to destroy their establishment in Galicia, and then to proceed all together to the Tagus by Zamora and Alcantara. There would also be time to rest for a few days, and refit.

In order, however, to respond to the wishes of his comrade, Marshal Soult agreed with him, by a written stipulation, that they should make an expedition into Galicia, and destroy the two musters of insurgents; after which Soult was to separate from Ney, and proceed to Old Castille by Puebla de Sanabria and Zamora. They agreed that Soult, who was at Lugo, should descend by the valley of the Minho to Montforte de Lemos, Orense, and Ribadavia, until he had overtaken and destroyed the Marquis de la Romana; that Marshal Ney, protected on his flank by this movement, should compel the enemy to evacuate St. Jago de Compostello, and should then go down to the coast and attack the formidable works erected at Vigo by the English and the Spaniards. Marshal Soult having, by the destruction of the Marquis de la Romana, rendered practicable the very difficult operation which they had to attempt upon Vigo, might then go up by the valley of Ores to Puebla de Sanabria and Zamora. After having signed these arrangements at Lugo, on the 29th of May, the two marshals separated, to begin, as soon as possible, the operations they had resolved on.

Marshal Soult quitted Lugo on the 2nd of June, after having made all his preparations for a march to Zamora, and advanced to Montforte, whence the Marquis de la Romana fled to Orense. Having arrived on the 5th at Montforte, Soult halted, and instead of continuing to descend the valley of the Minho to Orense, as he had agreed with Ney, he directed his reconnaissances to the upper course of the Sil, one of the confluents of the Minho, towards Puebla de Sanabria and Zamora. That was not the way to Orense. However, he stopped at Montforte in a sort of immobility.

Ney, on his part, marched from the environs of Coruña, with 18 battalions, to St. Jago de Compostello, which the insurgents evacuated at his approach. On the 7th of June he repaired to Pontevedra, on the seaboard. To arrive at Vigo he had to pass along a series of small gulfs, covered with English gunboats, and to defile under their fire. The intrepid marshal was not a man to stop for this; but on arriving near Vigo he encountered

a position which nature and art had rendered formidable. He had to cross a small river without bridge, and within cannon-shot of the sea, and then to scale entrenchments mounting 60 guns of large calibre, and behind which were several thousand English seamen, with 12,000 Spaniards. Such a position might have been carried by the impetuosity of the marshal and his soldiers, but his loss would be great. Besides, he ran the risk of failure; and moreover, it was necessary to be assured that during the daring attempt he should not be subjected to a sudden attack on his flank or his rear by La Romana, who, though not to be feared in an ordinary situation, might do much mischief when the marshal was engaged in carrying the English redoubts. Knowing, therefore, that Soult was at Montforte, and La Romana at Orense, Ney awaited a movement of the former against the latter before beginning his perilous enterprise. In this position he continued until the 10th, expecting Soult to fulfil his engagement, rightly desiring that La Romana's force should be dispersed before he attacked Vigo.

But at last he received from General Fournier, whom he had left at Lugo for certain details, a despatch which filled him with distrust of his colleague, and circumspection as to the enemy—two feelings not familiar to his confident and daring nature. General Fournier had seen in the hands of General Rouyer, who had remained at Lugo in charge of the sick and wounded of the army of Portugal, very secret orders from Marshal Soult, enjoining him, as soon as the invalids were in a condition to march, to send them straightway to Zamora, and to keep those orders concealed from everybody, above all from Marshal Ney. On being made aware of this order, which would have been quite natural if it had been avowed, since Zamora was Soult's definitive destination, Ney thought he was betrayed. Seeing, moreover, that instead of descending upon Orense to drive out La Romana, Soult remained at Montforte, he felt assured that his colleague wilfully broke his word to him. Before coming to an open rupture with him, he wrote him a letter on the 10th, informing him of his very perilous situation, telling him he still counted on the execution of the plan agreed on; but adding, that if, contrary to all probability, that plan was abandoned, he begged to have notice of the fact, because a longer stay in face of Vigo, with the road from Orense open on his flank, would be infinitely dangerous.

Marshal Ney waited some days for a reply to this letter, but received none. Struck by this silence, seeing the position of the English at Vigo becoming every day stronger, fearing, if he weakened himself in taking it, that the insurgents would all fall on him together, and that his return to Coruña would become difficult, he retreated to St. Jago de Compostello, scarcely

able to contain his anger. There he learned that Marshal Soult, far from descending the Minho, had, on the contrary, gone up its confluents, and proceeded by Puebla de Sanabria to Zamora. The fact was that Soult, impatient to quit Galicia for Old Castille, after having remained until the 11th at Montforte, had set out to cross the mountains that separate those two provinces. La Romana having attempted to oppose his march, he repulsed him, and thought that in so doing he had fulfilled his engagements, which was not at all the case, for by beating the Spanish general on the upper confluents of the Minho he only drove him toward the lower part of the river, towards Orense, the very place where it had been agreed that he should not be allowed to remain. Believing he had discharged his obligation to his colleague, he went on to Zamora without replying to Ney's letter. The latter, considering this silence, the march to Zamora, and the injunction of secrecy laid on General Rouyer as proofs of bad faith towards himself, gave way to the most violent anger. He was in a most difficult position, for no sooner had Marshal Soult re-entered Castille than La Romana returned to Orense, and as he might join Noruña, it became very dangerous for Marshal Ney to remain before Vigo. His communications with Leon and Old Castille having been frequently interrupted whilst he was occupied on the coast, Ney might expect that the case would be much worse, now that the insurgents, excited by the approach of the English and the retreat of Marshal Soult, would overrun the whole country, and probably go up from Orense to Lugo in great strength, and occupy that decisive position which completely bars the way from Coruña to Benavente. If, when there were only some scattered insurgents, it had required Maurice Mathieu's whole division, co-operating with General Kellermann, to reopen the communications with Leon and Old Castille, what would happen when Noruña and La Romana together were established in strength at Lugo? Another danger might arise, one that might lead to another Baylen. The English, on arriving at the Minho, had two courses open to them: they might recommence Sir John Moore's campaign and enter Old Castille, or they might return to the south of Portugal to the Tagus. If they entered Castille, Marshal Ney, with 10,000 or 12,000 French against 20,000 English and 40,000 or 50,000 Spaniards, was lost. Now the idea of capitulating like General Dupont, or of saving himself by the sacrifice of his artillery like Marshal Soult, was equally insupportable to him, and he resolved to evacuate Galicia. This was a very serious step, and would have momentous consequences; but there were good reasons for it, and moreover, it accorded with instructions frequently repeated to him; for Joseph and Napoleon had written to him,

blaming him for his haste in descending to the coast when his rear was not sufficiently secure, and telling him that before he devoted himself exclusively to the subjection of the seaboard, he ought to make sure of his communications with Old Castille. When Marshal Soult was in Portugal, it was a comrade's duty to guard Orense and Tuy; but now that Soult had evacuated Portugal there was no longer any reason for remaining in Galicia, exposed to all sorts of danger, especially to that of being surrounded by the English and the Spaniards together.

Ney's only regret on evacuating Galicia was on account of Coruña and Ferrol. But the Spaniards were too jealous of their maritime establishments to give them up to the English, and moreover, for the more security, he left a French garrison well provisioned in the forts of Ferrol. Then sending his whole matériel on before him, not leaving behind one sick or wounded man, he returned slowly to Lugo, cutting off to the last man all the insurgent posts that ventured to approach him. At Lugo he picked up Marshal Soult's invalids, and took them with his own to Astorga, where he arrived in the beginning of July, without having lost one man or one cannon. Then he applied himself to reorganising and refitting his corps. At the moment he reached Astorga, Marshal Soult was entering Zamora.

Marshal Ney's soldiers participated in the indignation of their commander to such a degree that the aides-de-camp of the minister of war who were sent to the spot reported that there would be danger in leaving the two corps near each other. The most insulting language was current in Astorga about Marshal Soult and his army, who were accused of all the misfortunes of the campaign; for on departing, said they, he had passed on to Orense without destroying La Romana, whom he had thus thrown on the rear of Marshal Ney; and when he came back, whilst a hand was lent him to destroy La Romana if he would, he retired clandestinely into Castille, leaving Marshal Ney in Galicia exposed to every danger. Ney wrote both to King Joseph and to Marshal Soult letters most damnatory to the latter. "Had I chosen," he said, "to make up my mind to quit Galicia without my artillery, I might have remained there longer at the risk of being shut in there; but I did not choose to expose myself to quit it in that fashion, and I effected my retreat, carrying off my sick and wounded, and even those of Marshal Soult who had been left to my care." As for that marshal, he declared that whatever might be the emperor's orders, he was resolved never again to serve with him.

These painful details are indispensable to a right conception of the manner in which the war in Spain was conducted, and to show how Napoleon, by extending his operations beyond the limits to which his own superintendence would reach, surrendered

them to the hazard of events and of men's passions, and exposed to useless destruction heroic soldiers, who would ere long be missed for the defence of our unfortunate country. Whilst Marshal Ney was at Astorga, expressing the anger he felt with all the vehemence of his nature—an example that was but too well followed by his soldiers—Marshal Soult, at a short distance thence, at Zamora, appeared devoured with grief, deeply cast down, and constantly immersed in thought. It was thus at least that the officers commissioned to report to the minister of war depicted the state of mind of the two marshals.

King Joseph, who always learned news late, and did not know of the evacuation of Portugal and of Galicia, and the quarrel between the two marshals until a month after the event, was deeply grieved, for he could easily foresee the consequences of that threefold misfortune. He at once gave up all thoughts of pushing Marshal Victor forward into Andalusia, and detained him on the Tagus between Almaraz and Alcantara, to act against Gregorio de la Cuesta, if the latter attempted to recross the Tagus, or against the English, should they be inclined to go up from Lisbon to Estramadura. The brilliant dreams of the month of April, inspired by the victories of Medellin and Ciudad Real, had vanished; the most that could be hoped for now was a victorious resistance to the assaults of the enemy. The news of the battle of Essling, which arrived just then, was not of a nature to enliven the sombre state of feeling at Madrid. However, as the three corps of Marshals Ney, Mortier, and Soult could muster more than 50,000 men, after they rested from their fatigues, they were enough, if well led, to drive all the English in the Peninsula into the sea. But to this end it was necessary that they should be well led, above all, by a single hand, and under existing circumstances this was not to be expected.

Such was the state of things when there arrived most unexpectedly from Schönbrunn a despatch issued by Napoleon himself, which afforded another illustration of the consequences of directing military operations from such a distance. Whilst the last intelligence in Spain comprised the evacuation of Portugal and Galicia, at Schönbrunn Napoleon knew nothing subsequent to Soult's entry into Portugal, and Ney's descent to the coast of Galicia. Napoleon, a better judge than Joseph, had, like him, disapproved of what was passing, and the best remedy he knew was to combine the three corps of Marshals Soult, Ney, and Mortier under one command. Accordingly he wrote the following despatch to the minister of war: "You will send a staff officer to Spain with orders that the corps of the Duke d'Elchingen, the Duke de Trevise, and the Duke de Dalmatie shall form but one army under the command of the Duke de Dalmatie. These three corps are to manœuvre only together,

march against the English, pursue them without remission, beat them, and sweep them into the sea. Putting aside every consideration, I give the command to the Duke de Dalmatie as senior to the others. These three corps ought to amount to from 55,000 to 60,000 men, and if their junction takes place promptly, the English will be destroyed and the affairs of Spain terminated. But they must combine and not march in small parcels; this is a general principle for every country, but especially for a country in which communications cannot be had. I cannot nominate the place of junction, because I do not know the events that have happened. Send this order to the king, to the Duke de Dalmatie, and to the two other marshals by four different ways." When this despatch arrived in Spain at the end of June it caused extreme surprise; not because the junction of the three corps under one commander was disapproved of, but because it seemed impossible that Marshals Ney, Mortier, and Soult should serve together, and above all, that the two former should serve under the latter. Had Napoleon been on the spot he would certainly have made a different arrangement. He would—as Joseph suggested to him with much good sense—have left Soult to guard the north of Spain, and sent Mortier and Ney to the Tagus to reinforce Marshal Victor, who was about to require considerable aid against the combined forces of Spain and England. And if Marshal Ney, whose high standing and impetuous character unfitted him for serving under any other leader than the emperor himself, could not have been employed under Marshal Victor, he would have placed him in La Mancha, to act against the Spanish army of the centre, and he would have put General Sebastiani and Marshal Mortier under Marshal Victor to fight the English. Marshal Mortier's modesty allowed of his being employed anywhere, no matter in what post, provided there were services he could render. The three corps of Mortier, Sebastiani, and Victor would, beyond a doubt, have been enough to beat the English. But Napoleon was far off, and Joseph durst not give orders for fear of not being obeyed. Thanks, however, to a certain military good sense with which he was endowed, and to the advice of his chief of the staff, Marshal Jourdan, he conceived the happy idea of relieving Ney from the false position in which he was placed, and calling him to Madrid to take command of General Sebastiani's corps, which was operating in the province of La Mancha. Ney, however, chose to remain at Benavente, for he could not bring himself to quit his soldiers, whom he loved, and who loved him; and such was his deportment there towards Soult, that it was much to be doubted whether he would render obedience to that marshal when he came to be under his orders.

Ney, however, knew his duty too well to refuse to obey Soult until such time as Napoleon should be better informed; and some satisfactory results might still be expected from the combination of the three corps. But whereas their separation had damaged the first part of the campaign of 1809, their junction, effected at a fatal moment, was destined to spoil the second part, so that torrents of blood should have flowed uselessly in Spain from February to August. Sad proof of this will be found in the sequel.

The following was the situation of the belligerent forces in consequence of the late events. The evacuation of Galicia by Soult and Ney had left the whole north of Spain to the insurgents, excepting the Asturias, where the brave General Bonnet, with a few thousand men, was making head against the mountaineers of that province. All Galicia, the Portuguese provinces of Tras-os-Montes, Entre Douro e Minho, the verge of Old Castille, as far as Ciudad Rodrigo, and part of Estramadura, from Ciudad Rodrigo to Alcantara, were in the hands of the Spaniards, the Portuguese, and the English, without counting the south of the Peninsula, which belonged to them exclusively. The Spaniards were making great efforts to arm the fortress of Ciudad Rodrigo.

The detachment of Portuguese sent against Abrantes by Sir Arthur Wellesley had marched to Alcantara, been repulsed thence by Marshal Victor, and re-entered it again, the marshal not having chosen to leave a garrison there for fear of weakening himself. Victor having fallen back on the Tagus on receiving intelligence of Soult's discomfiture and the arrival of a strong English army in Portugal, the Spanish general Gregorio de la Cuesta had moved back from the Guadiana to the Tagus, to the pass of Mirabete, opposite Almaraz. In La Mancha, General Venegas, who had succeeded Cartojal in the command of the army of the centre, had advanced against Sebastiani's corps, and seemed disposed to attack it. King Joseph had then quitted Madrid with his guard and a portion of the Dessoles division to attack Venegas; but the latter immediately retreated to the Sierra Morena, after which Joseph returned to the capital, leaving Sebastiani's corps between Consuegra and Madridejos, and Victor's corps on the Tagus, from Toledo to Talavera. These troops had not been engaged since the battles of Medellin and Ciudad Real; they had done nothing in April, May, and June but perform some marches from the Guadiana to the Tagus, and they were well rested, well fed, and in superb condition. As for the provinces of Aragon and Catalonia, which we have not had occasion to mention since the siege of Saragossa and the battles of Cardedeu and Molins del Rey, General Suchet was fighting in the former against the insurgents of the

Ebro, whom the siege of Saragossa had not discouraged; and in the latter General St. Cyr had begun the sieges he had orders to effect, and was obliged to fight fresh battles every day to cover them.

Such was the spectacle which the war in Spain then exhibited. Everything was to depend on what the English would do. Would Sir Arthur Wellesley march into Old Castille, as General Moore had done, to threaten the line of communication of the French, and oblige them to evacuate the south of the Peninsula, in order to succour the north? Or would he, after having cleared Portugal and driven Marshal Soult beyond the Minho, move to the Tagus, to stop the enterprises which were to be apprehended on Marshal Victor's part since the battle of Medellin? Such was the question which could hardly be solved in Madrid, the English general's instructions not being known, though Marshal Victor at Talavera, and Marshal Jourdan at Madrid, rightly surmised from certain indications that Sir Arthur Wellesley would return to the Tagus. They supposed, with good reason, that he would not march into Galicia, and thereby inordinately elongate his line of operation, and open the road to Lisbon by Alcantara to the French, but prefer marching on the Tagus, and advancing thence with all the forces of Spain against Madrid. Under such considerations Joseph did not think proper to accumulate forces in Old Castille, which were useless in that province; and acting on his own royal authority until Soult should be in a condition to take the general command of the three corps, he moved Mortier from Valladolid to Villacastra, on the summit of the Guadarrama, so that he might be upon the Tagus in one or two marches, either at Toledo or at Talavera.

These measures adopted at headquarters were happily adjusted to the intentions of the English general. His instructions, dictated under the impression made by Sir John Moore's disasters, imported that he was not to venture into Spain. He was to attach himself exclusively to the defence of Portugal, and limit to that defence the aid promised to the Spaniards. He was to abstain as much as possible from crossing the Portuguese frontier, and to take such a step only in case of urgent necessity, or upon the surest prospect of success. So rigid were his instructions in this respect that he had been obliged to procure a modification of them, in order to be less crippled in his movements. For this reason he had halted on the banks of the Minho, and learning that the French were assuming a very menacing aspect about Alcantara, he had moved by forced marches from the Minho to the Douro, and from the Douro to the Tagus, setting off against the earnest remonstrances of La Romana, who wanted him at Orense, those of Gregorio de la

Cuesta, who summoned him to Merida. By the middle of June he was at Abrantes, preparing to reascend the valley of the Tagus, when he should have revictualled and recruited his army, which had great need of this after its recent campaign on the Douro. He complained loudly of wanting money, matériel, and clothes; for, notwithstanding its wealth and its immense means of transport, the English government did sometimes make its soldiers wait for necessaries. Sir Arthur complained especially of his army, which he accused in very strong terms of being no more able to support good fortune than bad, and of shamefully pillaging the country it had come to defend. It pillaged, he said, not for want of subsistence, but to make money by selling to the inhabitants the cattle of which it had robbed them.* He remained at Abrantes awaiting two regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, and Crawford's whole brigade from Gibraltar. With these reinforcements, which would make

* I quote the Duke of Wellington's own words in their original language. This is the only way to tell the truth without offending a noble nation, which has often accused us of having devastated Spain, and which will permit us to remark that we were not the only ravagers of that country.

To the Right Honourable J. VILLIERS.

"COÏMBRA, 31*st May* 1809.

"MY DEAR VILLIERS,—I have long been of opinion that a British army could bear neither success nor failure, and I have had manifest proofs of the truth of this opinion in the first of its branches in the recent conduct of the soldiers of this army. They have plundered the country most terribly, which has given me the greatest concern. . . .

"They have plundered the people of bullocks, among other property; for what reason I am sure I do not know except it be, as I understand is their practice, to sell them to the people again. I shall be very much obliged to you if you will mention this practice to the ministers of the Regency, and beg them to issue a proclamation forbidding the people, in the most positive terms, to purchase anything from the soldiers of the British army.

"We are terribly distressed for money. I am convinced that £300,000 would not pay our debts, and two months' pay is due to the army. I suspect the ministers in England are very indifferent to our operations in this country. —Believe me, &c., ARTHUR WELLESLEY."

To Viscount CASTLEREAGH, Secretary of State.

"COÏMBRA, 31*st May* 1809.

"MY DEAR LORD,—The army behave terribly ill. They are a rabble who cannot bear success any more than Sir John Moore's army could bear failure. I am endeavouring to tame them; but if I should not succeed, I must make an official complaint of them, and send one or two corps home in disgrace. They plunder in all directions. . . .—Believe me, &c.,

"ARTHUR WELLESLEY."

To Viscount CASTLEREAGH, Secretary of State.

"ABRANTES, 17*th June* 1809.

"MY DEAR LORD,—I cannot with propriety omit to draw your attention again to the state of discipline of the army, which is a subject of serious concern to me, and well deserves the consideration of his majesty's ministers.

"It is impossible to describe to you the irregularities and outrages committed

his force amount to from 26,000 to 28,000 men present under arms, he intended to go up the Tagus to Alcantara, where he expected to arrive in the beginning of June, and form a junction with Gregorio de la Cuesta, whilst General Beresford, who was engaged in organising the Portuguese army, would guard the north of Portugal with the new levies and the English detachment under his orders.

The concentration of the French forces in the middle of the valley of the Tagus, on the suspicion of the approach of the English in that direction, was therefore a very wise resolution of those at headquarters in Madrid. Unfortunately the combination of the three corps under Marshal Soult was about to become a fatal obstacle to that measure; and whilst there had been reason to regret that they had not been combined three months before, the time was at hand when it would be bitterly regretted that they were combined at the present moment. Though the supreme command had been bestowed on Marshal Soult before the events at Oporto were known, and although he had still to fear the effect which the information sent to Schönbrunn might produce on the mind of Napoleon, he was yet very well pleased at having his rivals under his orders; and elated with pride at the part assigned to him, he devised a vast plan, ill adapted to existing circumstances, which he communicated to King Joseph, begging him to give orders for its immediate execution. As this plan was not carried into effect, it would not deserve mention here, had it not been the cause of subsequently hindering the junction of the French forces on the field of battle on which the issue of the campaign was decided. The plan was briefly this.

Marshal Soult supposed that the English, fatigued by their expedition to the Douro and the Minho, would halt and remain inactive until the completion of the harvest should enable the Spaniards and Portuguese to join them, so that they might

by the troops. They are never out of the sight of their officers—I may almost say never out of sight of the commanding officers of their regiments—and the general officers of the army, that outrages are not committed; and notwithstanding the pains which I take, of which there will be ample evidence in my orderly books, not a post or a courier comes in, not an officer arrives from the rear of the army, that does not bring me accounts of outrages committed by the soldiers who have been left behind on the march, having been sick, or having straggled from their regiments, or who have been left in hospitals.

"We have a provost-marshal, and no less than four assistants. I never allow a man to march with the baggage; I never leave an hospital without a number of officers and non-commanding officers proportionable to the number of soldiers; and never allow a detachment to march unless under the command of an officer; and yet there is not an outrage of any description which has not been committed on a people who have uniformly received us as friends, by soldiers who never yet for one moment suffered the slightest want or the smallest privation. . . .—Believe me, &c.,

"ARTHUR WELLESLEY."

resume military operations in September. There was therefore time enough, as he thought, to prepare for that event; and as he was more specially commissioned, by the union of the three *corps d'armée* of the north under his command, to expel the English from the Peninsula, he intended to operate by the line from Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida on Coïmbra, which was, in his opinion, the true route for penetrating into Portugal. To this end it was requisite forthwith to begin the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, then that of Almeida, and to employ in operations against those two places the interval of leisure on which he had reason to count. He undertook to make himself master of them with the 50,000 or 60,000 men who were about to be under his orders, and after they had fallen he proposed to enter Portugal. But in order to be able to operate surely, three new concentrations of forces, he said, were necessary — one formed with the troops of Aragon and Catalonia (where we know that Generals Suchet and St. Cyr maintained their ground with difficulty), in order to furnish him with a corps of observation in the north; another formed with a part of the troops assembled in the valley of the Tagus (where they were quite indispensable), to cover his flank towards Alcantara; the third, formed with the reserve at Madrid (where there remained but a very weak garrison when Joseph quitted the capital), to serve him as a rearguard when he should have advanced into the heart of Portugal. Soult, moreover, required a park of siege artillery, and a considerable sum of money to prepare his matériel. So then, in order to take a place which might some time or other be of use in the operations against Portugal, and to make head against the English in September, in a province where there was no certainty of meeting them, we were forthwith to abandon to them the Tagus, on which they were marching, and leave Madrid, Aragon, and Catalonia without troops. King Joseph and Marshal Jourdan, regarding such a plan as inadmissible, replied that not a man could be withdrawn, either from Aragon or Catalonia, without immediately losing those provinces; that the forces remaining in Madrid were barely sufficient to reinforce the corps of General Sebastiani and Marshal Victor from time to time; that the presence of those two corps on the Tagus sufficiently protected Marshal Soult's flank towards Alcantara; that, moreover, the English, instead of postponing their operations until September, would march without delay to the Tagus, and there it was the marshal should think of acting, not on the line of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida; that money there was none; the king was living on his plate, which had been melted down at the mint; and lastly, since the marshal wished to begin with the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo,

the état-major would do its best to procure him a park of heavy artillery.

The most vexatious part of these projects was the order given to Marshal Mortier to quit Villacastin for Salamanca. Joseph remonstrated against this order, rightly thinking that by a move to Salamanca Mortier would be drawn into the sphere of action of an army which, according to its leader's plan, was to remain useless for a long while; whereas at Villacastin he might render decisive services on the Tagus whilst waiting until Soult's forces were ready to act. But Soult insisted, and Mortier was removed from the place where his presence might have been of immense advantage, as we shall soon see.

Contrary, in fact, to Soult's surmise, it was not in September that the English and Spaniards were to reappear on the theatre of war, but immediately, in the beginning of July, as soon as the resources of all kinds which they expected should have arrived. Sir Arthur Wellesley, as was to be anticipated, was at issue with the Spaniards as to the manner of operating on the Tagus. Gregorio de la Cuesta, always haunted by the fear of finding himself alone in presence of the French, insisted that the English army should come and join him on the Guadiana, and thus make a very long detour, which would oblige it to descend as far as Badajoz in order to go up thence to Merida. Sir Arthur Wellesley, believing that Marshal Victor was still between the Tagus and the Guadiana, wished to follow the better and much more natural plan of going up the valley of the Tagus, by Abrantes, Castello Branco, and Alcantara, so as to turn the marshal's position by occupying that valley in his rear, and arrive perhaps at Madrid before him. For the success of this plan it was enough that Gregorio de la Cuesta should detain Marshal Victor on the Guadiana by some feint, and should not be afraid of exposing himself alone for some days to the encounter of the French. But the return of Marshal Victor from the Guadiana to the Tagus cut short all these disputes. It was agreed that the English general, proceeding from Abrantes to Alcantara by the old route which Junot had taken, and the Spanish general moving from the Guadiana to the Tagus by Truxillo and Almaraz, should effect their junction on the banks of the Tagus, between Alcantara and Talavera, and should then take measures for turning their junction to the best account.

In consequence of this arrangement, Sir Arthur Wellesley, having received the troops he expected from Gibraltar, and the money and matériel of which he had urgent need, set out on the 27th of June from Abrantes, and advanced by Castello Branco, Rosmaniñal, and Zarza Major, into Estramadura. He was at Zarza Major on the 3rd of July, on the 6th at Coria, on the 8th at Plasencia. On arriving at the latter place he wished

to concert measures with Gregorio de la Cuesta, and repaired to his headquarters at Puerto de Mirabete on the Tagus. He had orders to have as little communication as possible with the Spanish generals on account of their extremely braggart dispositions, and to communicate with the ministers of the junta only through the English ambassador at Seville; in a word, to abstain, except in case of imperious necessity, from an intercourse which was always disagreeable and generally led to disunion. His interview with the proud and intractable Gregorio de la Cuesta afforded him proof of the wisdom of the instructions given him by his government. Don Gregorio being just then in favour with the fickle Spanish revolutionists, assumed the airs of a master, and behaved with singular arrogance to the insurrectional junta, which everybody wished to see give place to the Cortes. He even declared his intention of anticipating the public wishes by dismissing the junta and creating a government of his own fashion. His haughtiness towards his allies was proportional to these pretensions. Many a debate was necessary before a tolerably rational plan could be arranged with such a person. That which presented itself at the first glance, and on which it was impossible not to agree, was that the three generals, Wellesley, La Cuesta, and Venegas, should unite their forces between Almaraz and Talavera, or between Talavera and Toledo, and march together on Madrid. The forces of Venegas in La Mancha were estimated at 18,000 men, those of Cuesta at 36,000 men, those of Sir Arthur Wellesley at 26,000, setting aside all exaggeration. It was an imposing force, and one which would have been overwhelming for the French if more than two-thirds of it had not consisted of Spanish troops. The junction being agreed on, the manner in which it was to be executed was next to be considered. In accordance with the judicious advice of Sir Arthur Wellesley, it was agreed that towards the 20th or 22nd of July Venegas should make a strong demonstration against Madrid by attempting to cross the Tagus in the neighbourhood of Aranjuez; that whilst the French were thus drawn to the upper course of the Tagus the English army should seize the opportunity to join the principal Spanish army, that of Gregorio de la Cuesta; and that the two armies should march up both banks of the Tagus and join Venegas in the environs of Toledo. Great difficulties arose on one point. The capture of the brave General Franceschi by the famous guerilla leader El Capuchino, who horribly maltreated his prisoner, had furnished the English general with certain proof of the arrival of Marshal Soult at Zamora. But Sir Arthur believed that Soult had occupation for a long time in repairing his damage, and was not aware of the general command conferred upon him. He thought, therefore, that

by guarding the two passes from Old Castille into Estramadura, those, namely, of Perales and Baños, full security would be obtained against any danger from that quarter. He undertook to have the pass of Perales, which was the nearest of the two to Portugal, kept by detachments of Beresford's force; but that of Baños, which lay nearest to La Cuesta, ought, he thought, to be kept by Spanish troops. He had an excellent motive for acting thus, namely, to avoid dispersing the English troops, which could alone be depended upon when the day of battle came, and to employ in accessory services the Spaniards, whose numbers mattered little in a decisive engagement, where they were rather an encumbrance than otherwise. After much contention it was settled that General Wilson should be sent with a few thousand Spaniards, a few thousand Portuguese, and a thousand English, along the mountains which separate Estramadura from Castille, to cover the flank of the combined armies. Next, there was a dispute respecting the victuals and transports, which the Spaniards had promised to furnish to the English for payment, and which they did not supply even when the money was tendered. Things had reached such a pass that Sir Arthur Wellesley, seeing the Spaniards well provided, and his own soldiers condemned to all sorts of privations, threatened to withdraw if his wants were not more regularly supplied. To this the Spaniards replied that the English never had enough, they could do nothing but grumble, and where they complained of starvation, they, the Spaniards, would consider themselves living in plenty. The contradiction was easily accounted for by the difference in the habits and way of living of the two nations.

Having concluded these arrangements in the best way he could, Sir Arthur Wellesley returned to Plasencia on the 13th of July. After allowing time for some detachments which were still behind to arrive, he marched to the Tietar, which he crossed without difficulty on the 18th of July. Advancing to Oropesa, he joined Gregorio de la Cuesta by the Almaraz and Arzobespo bridges, and drove back the rearguards of Victor's corps on Talavera, which he entered on the 22nd. Sir Arthur was for attacking the French at once, knowing that they were not concentrated, and expecting that with the combined army, which was more than 60,000 strong (26,000 English and 36,000 Spaniards), he should beat the 22,000 French under Marshal Victor. But Gregorio de la Cuesta declared that he was not ready, and Victor's corps was allowed to retire unmolested behind the Alberche, a small stream which descends from the mountains and falls into the Tagus a little beyond Talavera.

It was at this moment that the French at last had accurate intelligence of the march of the coalesced generals, and the

junction of the English and Spanish armies. They had been aware for a fortnight of Sir Arthur Wellesley's movement towards Abrantes and Alcantara, but they were still in doubt as to his ulterior direction, his intended junction with the Spaniards, and his plan for the campaign. That plan was now evident, and on the 20th and 21st of July Marshal Victor made it known at Madrid. Not knowing whether or not he should be supported, he had recrossed the Alberche, and was resolved to retreat further still to the Guadarrama, another small confluent of the Tagus, which issues from the hills of the same name.

By the advice of Marshal Jourdan, King Joseph immediately decided on moving forward all his forces to meet the combined army. He certainly could not have done better. He had at his disposal the 4th corps, General Sebastiani's, which still mustered 17,000 or 18,000 excellent soldiers, after detaching 3000 to guard Toledo. He had that of Marshal Victor, which, after all deductions, numbered 22,000 quite as good. He could take from Madrid a brigade of the Dessoles division, his guard, and a small body of light cavalry, forming a reserve of 5000 men and fourteen pieces of cannon—altogether, 45,000 first-rate troops. In the hands of an able general such a force would have been more than sufficient to beat the combined army, which amounted to from 66,000 to 68,000 men, including General Wilson's detachment in the mountains, but of which only 26,000 were real soldiers. Nor would there even have been any doubt as to the result, whoever was the general commanding our troops, if Marshal Mortier had remained at Villacastro, so as to be able to reach Toledo in two days' marches. A reinforcement of 18,000 or 20,000 veteran soldiers would have given the French army such a superiority as the Anglo-Spanish army could not have withstood. This precious advantage had unfortunately been sacrificed to the idea of fusing together the three corps of the north—an idea conceived by Napoleon at the distance of six hundred leagues from the theatre of war, and three months previously to the events which were to be accomplished. Nevertheless it was still possible to repair the disadvantages of this unseasonable junction by ordering Marshal Soult to march from Salamanca to Avila, in order to descend between Madrid and Talavera; and if it was not possible to combine his three corps, immediately to push forward that one of the three which was ready first, leaving the others to follow in succession. If only that of Marshal Mortier arrived—and it had long been ready—it would have sufficed to secure King Joseph a decided superiority. Joseph and Marshal Jourdan did conceive this idea; but being of opinion that to bring Marshal Soult's forces to Madrid would occasion a con-

siderable loss of time, and that by making him debouch directly from Salamanca on Plasencia, he might on the 30th or 31st of July come upon the rear of the English, they preferred giving him this latter order rather than have him debouch by Avila, between Talavera and Madrid. This course lay under the disadvantage of presenting our forces to the enemy in two masses; the one descending the valley of the Tagus from Toledo to Talavera, the other ascending it from Almaraz to Talavera, and of affording Sir Arthur Wellesley, who would be placed between them, an opportunity of beating them one after the other, as General Bonaparte had so often done round Verona. But Sir Arthur Wellesley, though an excellent commander, was not General Bonaparte, and his soldiers did not march as did the French soldiers. He had but 26,000 Englishmen under him, and with these could not beat in succession Joseph's 45,000, and Soult's 50,000. If the latter, receiving on the 24th the order despatched on the 22nd, marched on the 26th, which was possible, he might be at Plasencia on the 30th, and the English army, attacked in front and rear, must have been defeated. If Soult could not bring up Ney's corps from its position near Benavente, his own corps, which should then be about 20,000 strong, with Mortier's 18,000, would be enough to give the *coup de grace* to Sir Arthur Wellesley, who had but 26,000 men, who by that time would probably have been already beaten, or at least separated from the Spaniards, and forced to retreat. King Joseph sent General Foy to Marshal Soult with the instructions we have mentioned, and with most pressing entreaties to put himself en route forthwith. On his return from Soult's camp, General Foy repeatedly averred that the marshal could be where he was wanted at the appointed time. Joseph then ordered General Sebastiani to march by Toledo to Talavera to the aid of Marshal Victor; and he himself set out for the same rallying-point, on the night of the 22nd, with his reserve of 5000 men. He left General Belliard in Madrid with Dessoles' second brigade, and a number of invalids and convalescents, who could all, in case of emergency, throw themselves into the Retiro, and defend themselves there for several weeks. A regiment of dragoons was to sweep the banks of the Tagus above and below Aranjuez, to give notice of the first appearance of Venegas. The 3000 men detached from Soult's corps were to guard Toledo, so that from the sources of the Tagus to Talavera the necessary measures were taken on the left of the French to check the march of Venegas, whilst a stand was made against Gregorio de la Cuesta and Sir Arthur Wellesley. These arrangements, which marked the advice of an experienced soldier (Marshal Jourdan), and did honour to the judgment of King Joseph, who had adopted them, promised, if well executed,

to bring about the total destruction of the English, who, upon the least favourable supposition, would be assailed by 45,000 men in front, and 38,000 in their rear. What could 66,000 men, but one-third of whom were real soldiers, do against such a mass of forces?

Joseph marched out of Madrid to Illescas on the night of the 22nd of July, and arrived on the 25th at Vargas, a little behind the small stream of the Guadarrama, on which Marshal Victor had fallen back, in order to effect his junction with General Sebastiani. That same day the three corps (Victor's 22,542, Sebastiani's 17,690, Joseph's 5077) were in conjunction at Vargas, a little beyond Toledo. Had they relied less on the prompt arrival of Marshal Soult, it would have been more prudent not to advance too far, but keep within reach of Madrid, to cover it from any attempt on the part of Venegas, and at the same time to choose a good defensive position, so as to lead the English into that kind of warfare they least understood—offensive war. This course would have given Soult time to prepare and to appear on the theatre of war. But trusting too easily to his speedy arrival at Plasencia, and not taking sufficiently into account the unexpected delays which often baffle the best calculations in war, the French leaders did not hesitate to urge the Anglo-Spanish armies away from Madrid by marching straight against them, and pushing them upon Oropesa and Plasencia, where their destruction was expected. It was resolved, therefore, to advance on the following day, and vigorously resume the offensive. The news from Marshal Soult was excellent. Undeceived at last as to the time when the English were to enter into action, and abandoning his first plans, he wrote word on the 24th that Mortier's corps and his own could quit Salamanca on the 26th; so that even leaving Ney's corps behind, there would be a sufficient force in the rear of the English on the 30th or 31st.

Don Gregorio de la Cuesta, who on the 23rd was not ready to attack Marshal Victor, whose force was then isolated, became full of spirit on seeing the French retreat, crossed the Alberche after them, hotly pursued them, and wrote to his ally, Wellesley, that there was no overtaking those despicable French, so fast did they run. Having marched on the 24th and 25th to Alcabon and Cebolla, he found them on the 26th at Torrijos, resolved to let him have his wish and come up with them. He had been warned by Sir Arthur Wellesley that if he marched in that way he would get himself beaten. The event showed the good sense of the English general.

Merlin's light cavalry, belonging to General Sebastiani's corps, marched with Latour-Mabourg's dragoons in the advanced guard. Don Gregorio de la Cuesta, who so much regretted the headlong flight of the French, stopped short on seeing them

prepared to resist, and hastily retreated to seek support from the English. Between Torrijos and Alcabon he had to pass a defile, and to cover himself during the passage, he presented 4000 infantry and 2000 cavalry under General Zayas in order of battle. General Latour-Maubourg, who commanded the advanced guard, after having debouched in a field of olives, deployed his squadrons in a line parallel to the enemy. The Spaniards kept their ground at first when they saw only cavalry before them; but as soon as they perceived the head of the column of infantry they began to fall back in all haste, and threw themselves into Alcabon. General Beaumont then dashed after them with the 2nd hussars and a squadron of the 5th chasseurs. General Zayas tried to oppose him with Villaviciosa's dragoons; but our hussars and chasseurs charged them in every direction, hemmed them in, and put them to the sword. Very few of them escaped. Our cavalry then charged the advanced guard, which fled in disorder with the main body. If the 1st corps (Marshal Victor's) had then been in a condition to act, the whole Spanish army would have been routed. But the troops were fatigued with the heat, the ground was very broken, and Marshal Victor did not choose to risk a fresh action, though strongly pressed to do so by Joseph's staff.

The French halted for the night at Santa Olalla. On the following day, the 27th, they set out at two in the morning to take advantage of the cool hours, and marched towards the Alberche, in order to arrive the same day at Talavera, with the intention of driving the Anglo-Spanish army on Plasencia. The 1st corps, preceded by Latour-Maubourg's cavalry, still formed the head of the column. On approaching the Alberche they saw on the left the Spaniards passing that confluent of the Tagus in disorder in their retreat to Talavera, and on the right a column of English, who had come to Cazalegas to aid Don Gregorio de la Cuesta. From the summit of a plateau which commands the course of the Alberche, they perceived on the other bank a vast wood of oaks and olives, and further on a series of prominent hills, very strongly occupied, connected on one side with a high chain of mountains, on the other with Talavera and the Tagus, which flows through that town. The greatest part of the English army was in position on the series of hills, having before them a large quantity of artillery, fascines, and solid redoubts. The dust that rose above the forest of oaks and olives showed that the Spanish troops we had beaten the day before were retreating through it, and we might hope to come up with them before they had reached the entrenched position of the English. Marshal Victor, who had great confidence in his old soldiers, and who thought he might take much upon himself in consideration of his high rank, hastily forded the

Alberche with his three divisions. He advanced with the Ruffin division on his right, Villatte's in the centre, Lapisse's on the left, and flanked by Latour-Maubourg, and he sent word to King Joseph to support him with Sebastiani's corps and the reserve. Being well acquainted with the ground, which he had often gone over, he flattered himself that if circumstances proved favourable, and he was well seconded, he should be able to carry the position by a mere *coup de main*.

The troops crossed the Alberche in close column, with the water up to their middles, and dashed into the forest. Lapisse's division, on Marshal Victor's left, became engaged near Casa de las Gallinas with Mackenzie's brigade, which formed the English rearguard. The 16th light infantry pressed close upon the English, and attacked them wherever the ground permitted it. On coming to a glade that allowed of the deployment of the troops, General Chaudron Rousseau ordered a charge with the bayonet. The brave soldiers of the 16th, eager to prove that they no more feared a solid and regular army than the unwarlike troops of the Spaniards, rushed upon the two English regiments opposed to them (the 31st and the 87th), broke them, and caused them a considerable loss. The English retreated hurriedly upon their main body, which was in position, as we have said, near Talavera, between the Tagus and the mountains. Marshal Victor wished to follow them, but he had to wait for the Villatte division, which had not quite crossed the Alberche, and the cavalry and artillery, which were still on the other side; especially it was necessary that Sebastiani's corps, which was still in the rear, should have come up. If, instead of a king personally brave, but without experience, and obliged to consult an old marshal, the army had been led by a real general, who personally inspected the ground at the head of his advanced guard, and formed his resolutions in good time, we should have hastened to cross the Alberche en masse; and by taking advantage of the check dealt to the English, and the confusion in which the Spaniards were retreating, we might perhaps have carried the enemy's position. But every one took his own course, or waited for the word of command, which did not come until the occasion was gone by.

It must be owned that it was rather late to crown the day by so decisive an act, for Marshal Victor himself did not arrive in front of the English position until towards the close of the day. On emerging from the forest beyond the Alberche, our troops advanced along a sort of plateau, whence they distinctly perceived the position of the English. It was, as we have said, a series of hills, the highest of which was seen on our right, covered with English troops and artillery; and the others on our left, gradually declining towards Talavera, were likewise

covered with troops and artillery belonging to the Spanish army. In the centre of this position was a large redoubt bristling with cannon, and jointly defended by the troops of both nations. Further on our left clumps of oaks and olive-trees, felled timber, and enclosures extended to Talavera and the Tagus, and served to support the courage of the Spaniards, which never showed in much lustre, as we have often had occasion to remark, except when it was sustained by the nature of the ground. There might have been in position 25,000 or 26,000 English, thirty and some odd thousand Spaniards, besides Wilson's division, which was distinguished on the mountains on our right, making haste to rejoin the main body: there were then 65,000 or 66,000 enemies, whom we had to fight with 45,000; but the excellence of the latter made amends for their inferiority in number.

Besides that the position of the English and the Spaniards was strong, it accorded with their principal military quality, which consisted in making good use of a defensive post. To reach them it was necessary to cross a rather deep ravine which separated them from the plateau on which we had debouched on issuing from the forest, and then to ascend a series of steep hills under their fire. It was possible, however, to turn these hills on our right, in consequence of a feature of the ground which we might have used with advantage. The hill which formed the extreme point of the position of the English was divided by a wide valley from the lofty chain of mountains which borders the valley of the Tagus. By descending into the ravine above mentioned, marching straight towards the enemy, and ascending again to the right, we might have entered the valley and turned the hill in question, on which Hill's division was encamped. A considerable portion of the French forces should have been brought round in this way unperceived by the English, and then by a vigorous attack in front and rear their position would very probably have been carried.

Marshal Victor, who had remarked a great confusion in the retreat of the enemy, imagined that by a brisk attack at the close of the day he should carry the hill on our right, after which the position would no longer be tenable for the English, and he would have the sole honour of gaining the battle. Extreme zeal and brilliant valour dictated this resolution; but it was one that would not have been taken under a general-in-chief who commanded with authority and vigour. A great battle would not have been begun unknown to him, by a wing, at so advanced an hour of the day, without his having appointed the time and the manner of entering into action, and above all, without his having decided whether or not a battle was to be fought at all.

Carried away by his courage, and not knowing what troops he

had to do with, Marshal Victor launched the Ruffin division against the hill between nine and ten at night. This division, one of the best in the grand army, consisted of three accomplished regiments—the 9th light, and the 24th and 96th of the line. It was led by two officers of great merit—Divisional-General Ruffin and Brigade-General Barrois. Marshal Victor ordered the 9th to attack the hill in front, the 24th to turn it by the valley, and the 96th to advance to the left, to the direct support of the 9th. The marshal kept the Villatte and Lapisse divisions in reserve to hold the enemy in check on the left. The artillery on the plateau might have fired over the ravine upon the English, but it was not used for fear of firing upon our own men in the dark.

Our troops advanced bravely. The 9th, which led the way, descended from the plateau into the ravine, and marched straight towards the hill. The English, having perceived the movement, opened a murderous fire, though aimed in the dark, upon our men, but did not succeed in checking them. The latter climbed the slopes of the position, drove in the enemy's first line with the bayonet, and still under fire made their way to the summit. Some companies of the 9th reached the top of the hill, and had even beaten back some of the English, when General Hill, seeing that these bold assailants were not supported either on the right or the left, directed a part of his troops against their flank. The 9th, attacked in front and on its left, was compelled to retreat, leaving many of its men dead or wounded on the summit of the plateau. The cause of this discomfiture was the delay of the 96th, which, encountering unexpected obstacles in the ravine, had spent more time in crossing it than had been calculated, and the delay also of the 24th, which had lost its way in the valley on the right. These two regiments, arriving on the scene of action, found the 9th retreating, but not routed, and maintaining an unshakable steadiness under the fire of the English. It had lost 300 men in that abortive attempt. Its colonel, Meunier, had received three musket-shots. Marshal Victor did not think proper to continue this nocturnal engagement, but bethought him of allowing some rest to troops which, having left Santa Olalla at two o'clock in the morning, were fighting at Talavera at ten o'clock at night. Our men bivouacked where they were, on the plateau facing the English. On the left the cavalry connected Marshal Victor's troops with those of General Sebastiani and of the reserve, which had at last crossed the Alberche, and deployed opposite the enemy's centre. Milhaud's dragoons, on the extreme left, watched the highroad to Talavera. On that side the Spaniards, whom our cavalry had thrown into extraordinary confusion, were taking up their position as they could. In their bewilderment they believed themselves

attacked when they heard the musketry of Ruffin's division, and they began to fire without knowing against whom or wherefore. So the next day they alleged that they had had to repulse a violent night attack. What was less pardonable, the English stationed in the same quarter repeated this falsehood.

On the next day, the 28th, a memorable day in our Spanish wars, eager to repair the very accidental discomfiture of the preceding night, Marshal Victor was ready to begin the action at daybreak, confident of succeeding this time, if the attack on the hill was made with suitable ensemble. Seeing, as he rode over the ground, the English army posted on the series of hills, the chief of which he had assailed, and the Spanish army behind walls, felled timber, and woods, he was confirmed in his opinion that the hill opposite our right was the key to the position, and if it was taken the combined army would be driven back on Talavera, and probably into the Tagus. He therefore determined to attack it at once with all his might, and sent word to King Joseph immediately to direct Sebastiani's troops and the reserve against the enemy's centre, that the English might not fall upon him en masse whilst he was occupied against the extremity of their line.

To give the Ruffin division an opportunity of revenging its defeat of the preceding night, he ordered it to attack the hill with its three regiments together. He placed the Villatte division in reserve in the rear, and ordered the Lapisse division and Latour-Maubourg's dragoons to make a feint to the left of attacking the enemy's centre. But something more than a feint was requisite if they were to be hindered from falling in a mass on Ruffin's division.

At daybreak that brave division put itself in motion with only one change in its order of march. The 9th, which had already been decimated in its first attempt, was to make its attack on the right by the valley; the 24th, which had not fought, was to attack in the centre and in front; the 96th on the left, as on the preceding night. The three regiments descended into the ravine, and traversed it under the fire of Hill's whole division with a steadiness that excited the admiration of the English army. They mounted the first slopes and arrived on a ground that formed, as it were, the first stage of the hill, sustaining with incomparable coolness the enemy's grape and bullets. But Sir Arthur Wellesley, placed in the midst of his army, discerned, with the glance of a real general, that the Lapisse division on the left of Ruffin's was not near enough to act, and that the rest of the French army was still less so. With the utmost celerity he then directed a part of his centre, composed of General Sherbrooke's troops, against Ruffin's division. The latter, taken in flank, whilst it sustained

a tremendous fire in front, just as the 9th had been in the night, was compelled to give way. It retreated slowly, leaving the English without the courage to pursue it; but it paid for its daring attack and its fine retreat by an enormous loss. About 500 men of each regiment, making a total of 1500 men for the division, strewed the terraces of that fatal hill, against which two successive attacks made with rare heroism had been unsuccessful.

Marshal Victor, who had not spared himself, was forced to own that against such troops a position was not to be carried by a *coup de main*. Still confident, however, of victory, he postponed the decisive attack until such time as the whole French army should be able to act together. It was ten o'clock in the morning. Joseph, who had galloped up to the first corps to take upon him his functions as commander-in-chief, held a council of war with Marshal Jourdan, Marshal Victor, and General Sebastiani. The first question to be discussed was whether or not they should give battle. Opinions were divided on this essential question. Marshal Jourdan threw the weight of his great experience into the negative scale. He supported his opinions with excellent reasons. According to him, the opportunity had been lost for carrying the enemy's position, which he had just reconnoitred, and of which he now knew the strong and the weak points. The proper course would have been, whilst the English were as yet ignorant of the real point of attack, to move a considerable part of the French army into the valley, keeping the rest of the line to mask that movement, then suddenly to make a vigorous and well-combined attack on the principal hill before the enemy should have had time to bring up sufficient forces for its defence; and when the hill was carried, to drive back the Anglo-Spanish army on Talavera and the Tagus, where it might have been beaten with great havoc. But it was no longer time to operate thus, because Sir Arthur Wellesley was made aware by two successive attempts of the real point of attack, because it was daylight, and so the least movement would be perceived, and the English general would not fail to move up to his left as many troops as we moved to our right. Moreover, in executing this change of front we should have no other way of retreat in case of failure than the impracticable roads leading to Avila, and the retreat, if it became necessary, could only be effected by sacrificing the artillery and the heavy baggage of the army. In this state of things, the attack in front being a doubtful proceeding, and the attack in flank too late, and moreover, perilous for the retreat, it was advisable to temporise, fall back behind the Alberche, take up a defensive position, and wait until Marshal Soult with his three corps

should have debouched on the rear of the Anglo-Spanish army.

Marshal Victor, eager to indemnify himself for his two fruitless attempts, and confident in the energy of his troops, maintained that it was for want of support towards the centre that his attack had not succeeded; and if Sebastiani's corps and the reserve were directed against the English centre, he undertook with his own corps alone to take the hill which was the key to the position. Again and again he declared that he ought to give up the trade of war, if with troops like his he did not take the enemy's position. Perplexed between Marshal Jourdan's cool prudence and Marshal Victor's impetuosity, Joseph knew not which course to take, when a despatch arrived from Marshal Soult, announcing that notwithstanding his promise, he could not be in the rear of the English before the 3rd of August. Yet Marshal Mortier's corps was at Salamanca on the 26th; Marshal Soult's corps was on the same day half at Salamanca, half at Toro, and there seems no reason why he should not have been on the 29th or 30th at Plasencia with 38,000 or 40,000 men. Be this as it may, it was now the 28th, and Soult was not to be expected before six days. Now, would it be possible during those six days to make head against Sir Arthur Wellesley and Don Gregorio de la Cuesta on one side, and Venegas on the other, the latter already menacing Toledo and Aranjuez? These considerations and Marshal Victor's eagerness to fight prevailed, and it was resolved that the attack should be made forthwith. It was further agreed that this time it should be made simultaneously by our whole line from right to left, so that the enemy, being obliged to defend himself at all points, should not be able to carry reinforcements to any. Marshal Victor was to proceed otherwise than as he had done at night and in the morning. Instead of ascending the hill directly, he was to make the Ruffin division file off into the valley which divided the enemy's position from the mountains, pass along that valley where Wilson's force was beginning to show itself, and not climb the hill until it had completely turned it. During this time the Villatte division was to have one of its two brigades at the foot of the hill to threaten it and keep the English there, the other in the valley to support Ruffin's division against a mass of cavalry which was seen in the distance. The Lapisse division, forming Victor's left, was with Sebastiani's corps to make a vigorous attack on the centre, so as to draw thither the enemy's greatest forces. When that attack on the centre had produced its effect, and Ruffin had gained sufficient ground in the valley on the left of the English, General Villatte was to assail the hill in front with his two brigades. It was reasonable to expect that the attack thus made would be suc-

cessful. Latour-Maubourg's dragoons and Merlin's light cavalry were to follow the Ruffin division in the valley, where, as we have said, there was a good deal of English and Spanish cavalry. Milhaud's dragoons were to act on the extreme left, and occupy the Spaniards in the direction of Talavera. Joseph's reserve was posted in the rear of the centre to afford aid wherever needed. Lastly, Marshal Victor's artillery, ranged on the plateau opposite the English position, was to fire upon it across the ravine.

The small extent of the field of battle allowed of these orders being rapidly conveyed, yet it was not until two in the afternoon they began to be executed, in consequence of the many movements of troops to be effected. Ruffin's division, entering the valley by a lateral opening, marched up it in close column along the flank of the English, whilst Villatte's two brigades took up a position in the ravine which divided us from the enemy, one of them facing the valley, the other the hill, ready to join Ruffin's division, or to return and assail in front the position so obstinately disputed since the preceding evening. During this time the artillery, under Colonel d'Aboville, threw its fire upon the English across the ravine. Lastly, the Lapisse division made ready to charge the enemy's centre, and Sebastiani's corps was marching upon the redoubt at the point of junction of the two combined armies. But whilst these movements were taking place in good order, an accident occurred to disturb them. Leval's German division, which had recently been transferred from Marshal Victor's corps to General Sebastiani's, had been placed on the left of the latter, to flank it with Milhaud's dragoons in case the Spaniards should debouch from Talavera. Being ordered to keep abreast with General Sebastiani, and not clearly discerning his post through the oaks and olives that covered the ground, it found itself suddenly under the fire of the central redoubt, and assailed on the right by the English, on the left by the Spanish cavalry. The Germans formed square, received the cavalry with a fire at point blank distance, defeated it, and marched forward. In their offensive movement they turned an English regiment that attacked them in flank, surrounded it, and were about to make prisoners of it, when General de Porbeck, who commanded the Baden troops, was shot dead. This accident having left the Badenese without a leader, the English had time to retrieve themselves and escape. Joseph's staff, seeing the premature action, wished to stop the Germans, lest being engaged too soon they should be missed at a later moment when their services were required on General Sebastiani's flank, and so orders were sent to General Leval to fall back. It would have been better to follow up the attack with vigour, and to use the reserve in case of a sudden appear-

ance of the Spaniards on Sebastiani's flank, than to retreat in face of the enemy. Be this as it may, the Leval division fell back, but its artillery horses having been killed by the fire of the redoubt, eight pieces which it could not drag back through the wood were left behind, and fell into the enemy's hands.

After having repaired this accident as well as they could, Generals Sebastiani and Lapisse both advanced. With the 16th light and the 45th of the line, both deployed, followed by the 8th and 54th of the line in close columns, Lapisse assailed the heights which flanked the principal hill and connected it with the plain of Talavera. In spite of the fire of the English he gained ground. Sebastiani, with his fine French division of four regiments, advanced on Lapisse's left. The English fell furiously upon him. His right brigade, commanded by General Rey, and composed of the 28th and 32nd, repulsed them. The left brigade, commanded by General Belair, was assailed by the Spaniards and the English together, but stood its ground not less firmly than General Rey's. The 75th and 58th stopped the charges of the Spanish cavalry, whilst Leval's Germans again advanced in several squares. Here, too, as well as in the direction of Lapisse's division, we were slowly gaining ground. Whilst these events were taking place on the left and the centre, to the right, in face of the famous hill, the artillery, continuing to fire across the ravine, produced a murderous effect on Hill's division; General Villatte was still in the ravine, awaiting the signal to attack, and Ruffin's division was advancing in the valley against the English left. At that moment Albuquerque's Portuguese cavalry, joined with the English cavalry, attempted to bar the way against Ruffin's division, and galloped down upon it. The division, seeing the charge approach, drew aside to let it pass, and the Anglo-Portuguese horse, dashing on at full speed, received the fire both of Ruffin and Villatte. A part wheeled round, but the English 13th dragoons were unable to pull up. General Strolz's brigade of light horse, skilfully manœuvring, waited till they had passed, then charged them in flank and rear, whilst the Polish lancers and the Westphalian light horse assailed them in front. The unfortunate regiment, surrounded on all sides, was cut down or taken to a man.

Such was the state of things towards our right, when in the centre, General Lapisse, who led his division in person, and had already climbed the heights occupied by the enemy, was killed by a shot. His death caused some confusion in the division, which, being immediately charged by Sherbrooke's troops, was driven back. Informed of this occurrence, Marshal Victor galloped up to rally the troops, and bring them back into line; but the enemy, following up his success, fell en masse on the

Lapisse division. At the same moment General Sebastiani's corps, uncovered by the retrograde movement of the Lapisse division, was briskly attacked on its right. The 28th and 32nd behaved with their usual bravery, stood firm under General Rey, and yielded no more ground than was necessary to put them in line again with the troops which had retreated.

This was the moment to act with redoubled energy, to bring up the reserve to the aid of the Lapisse and Sebastiani divisions, and to set on Villatte's two brigades against the hill which Ruffin had succeeded in turning. Everything, in fact, gave reason to hope for victory. The English, cut up by the grape from our batteries on the plateau, seemed to be wavering; their artillery was dismounted, and their fire nearly extinct. Their usual tenacity must have given way to a vigorous simultaneous movement at that moment. But Joseph, who, while he yielded to Marshal Victor's ardour, had also been much impressed by Marshal Jourdan's reasoning, now seeing the day far advanced, and the victory still doubtful, thought proper to suspend the action, with the intention of renewing it next day. Certainly there was no reason for discouragement, for the battle was on the point of being won. Nevertheless he countermanded the attack. It was about five o'clock, and at that hour of the day in the month of June he had still several hours' daylight before him. Marshal Victor immediately galloped up to him, urged the certainty of success if Ruffin, who had advanced to the necessary extent in the valley, attacked the rear of the English, whilst Villatte assailed them in front; pointed out that the English were visibly wavering, and set forth all the reasons that existed for persevering and pressing upon Sir Arthur Wellesley with a steadfastness equal to his own. Moved by the marshal's arguments, Joseph was about to adopt his advice, when several officers came up with information that some Spanish detachments, going up the banks of the Tagus, seemed to be approaching the Alberche; and other officers, coming in all haste from Toledo, brought the alarming news of the appearance of Venegas before Aranjuez and Madrid. Joseph's irresolute nature could not withstand the effect of these reports; he was afraid of being turned; and being confirmed in his apprehensions by Marshal Jourdan, who disapproved of the battle, he sent orders to Marshal Victor to retreat, and to acquaint General Sebastiani with the exact moment when he would begin his backward movement, in order that the latter might effect his at the same time.

Not daring to disobey this time, Marshal Victor sent word to General Sebastiani that he would begin to retreat at midnight; but he reiterated his entreaties to Joseph to be allowed to continue the battle the next day. Joseph passed part of the night

in sore perplexity, surrounded by officers—some of whom said that we were outflanked—others, on the contrary, that the English appeared to be motionless in their position, and not in a condition to make a step in advance. Whilst thus distracted between the fear of being turned if he persevered in fighting, and that of being accused to the emperor of weakness if he ordered a retreat, he suddenly learned that the army was quitting its position, and was thus relieved from the state of irresolution by the events themselves, which he no longer controlled. The fact was, that General Sebastiani, having received the intimation which Marshal Victor had sent him in obedience to orders, had concluded he was to fall back, and had done so accordingly. Thereupon Victor, who would fain have retained his position in order to begin again next day, seeing General Sebastiani retreat, followed his example, and at daybreak on the 29th the whole army was in motion to recross the Alberche. Thus did chance put an end to the battle which chance had begun. Our army recrossed the Alberche without being pursued, carrying off all its wounded, its baggage, and its artillery, except the eight pieces left by the Leval division in a grove of olives. The English, glad enough to be rid of us, had not the least desire to pursue us. They had had several generals killed or wounded, and 7000 or 8000 men put hors de combat—5000 of whom were from their own ranks, the rest from those of the Spaniards. It was our artillery especially that had committed this havoc among them. Our losses were scarcely less; we had 1000 killed and about 6000 wounded. General Lapisse, an officer greatly to be regretted, had been killed. Several other generals and colonels had been killed or wounded. This battle, which was left undecided, would have been won if Marshal Victor had not attacked too soon, and at a single point, both on the eve and in the morning; if, when the action had become general, time had been given to the right to second the left; if our forces had not been withdrawn too soon; if the action had not been ended, as it had been begun, by chance; and lastly, if everything had not been given up to confusion, for want of concert and decision of purpose. The battle of Talavera is one of the most important in the history of the war in Spain, and one of the most instructive; for it presents a complete picture of what took place in that country, where heroic soldiers lost the fruits of their heroism for want of good leading. Assuredly King Joseph and Marshal Jourdan, if they had acted solely upon the dictates, the one of his natural good sense, the other of his experience, would have done much better than it was possible for them to do when placed between insubordinate generals on the one hand, and the too remote authority of Napoleon on the other—between a disobedience which disconcerted all their

plans, and a will which, at such a distance, paralysed without guiding them. Talavera presented a complete epitome of this sad state of things.

Joseph, whose return towards Madrid was, above all, prompted by his fear of the dangers that threatened that capital, fell back upon Santa Olalla; by no means, it must be allowed, with the precipitation of a beaten general, for he was not so, but, on the contrary, with the slowness of a formidable enemy who retreats deliberately with a view to ulterior objects. The spirits of his brave soldiers were as undaunted as ever, and they desired nothing better than to be again confronted with the English. But the attitude of the latter showed that there would be no pursuit; and besides, it was expected that they would soon be in a very bad plight in consequence of Soult's arrival on their rear. Nevertheless Joseph left Victor on the Alberche to watch them, and act as circumstances should require on Soult's arrival. Then, in order to intercept Venegas and cover Madrid, he marched to Toledo and Aranjuez with Sebastiani's corps and the reserve, which were more than sufficient, notwithstanding their losses, to match the army of La Mancha, which General Sebastiani alone had already beaten.

Though Sir Arthur Wellesley was reinforced on the day after the battle of Talavera by the Crawford brigade, amounting to 3000 or 4000 men, he had been so very roughly handled that it was impossible for him to fight another battle. Most of his guns had been dismounted, and his ammunition had been exceedingly diminished. It was absolutely necessary, too, that his soldiers should have time to recover from the effect of the violent efforts they had made. There was no fear, therefore, that he would imitate a manœuvre of Napoleon's, which he has since been blamed for not having practised, viz., that after his encounter with King Joseph he should go and fall upon Marshal Soult, and thus beat them one after the other. In every age, when certain modes of procedure have been successful, they are erected into standard types, to which all things must conform, and by which the acts of all the men of the time are to be judged. Napoleon subsequently blamed Marshal Jourdan for having brought Marshal Soult to Plasencia instead of to Madrid by Villacastin, and thus placed Sir Arthur Wellesley between the two French armies, thereby affording the latter a fine opportunity; and Sir Arthur Wellesley's critics have blamed him for letting that opportunity escape him. But in neither instance were these censures well grounded. To bring Marshal Soult to Madrid by Villacastin, and from Madrid to Talavera, would have required eight or ten days more; and such a delay could not have been admitted without peril, so beset were the French by the three armies of Sir Arthur Wellesley, Don Gregorio de

la Cuesta, and Venegas. Moreover, in debouching with 50,000 men on Plasencia, Marshal Soult was strong enough not to fear singly encountering the English army. The more natural course certainly would have been to send Marshal Mortier's corps to Talavera by Avila, and afterwards let Marshal Soult march by Plasencia and fall on the rear of the English after they had been beaten. But it was the orders from Schönbrunn that hindered this natural manner of acting, by placing Mortier under Soult's orders. Marshal Jourdan, therefore, was not at all in fault. As for Sir Arthur Wellesley, his soldiers did not march like those of General Bonaparte in Italy; and with the 18,000 English remaining to him after the battle of Talavera, augmented perhaps to the number of 22,000 by the arrival of Crawford's brigade, what could he have done against Marshal Soult's 50,000? Evidently nothing, except to expose himself to be cut to pieces. There are no grounds, therefore, for accusing him on this occasion of having missed the opportunity of a great victory.

Sir Arthur Wellesley had barely had twenty-four hours to recover from the effects of this severe engagement, when he was informed by the people of the country that provisions were being collected at both extremities of the pass of Baños, on the road from Castille to Estramadura. The reports spoke only of some 12,000 men, which was not very alarming. Leaving Don Gregorio de la Cuesta in his rear to watch Marshal Victor, he immediately marched to Oropesa, on the road to Plasencia, to meet the French, who were advancing from that direction, and who he conjectured could only be Marshal Soult's corps, already beaten in Portugal.

At last that marshal was arriving, but three or four days after the moment when his presence might have produced immense results. On the 26th he had Marshal Mortier's corps under his hand at Salamanca, and his own at one day's march in the rear. Had he marched on the 26th or 27th, he might in three or four days have debouched on Plasencia, and have been upon the rear of the English on the 30th or 31st. Coming upon them with 38,000 men, whilst they were exhausted by a great battle, he must have driven them in disorder upon the Tagus, and have made them pay dear for their half victory at Talavera. But not venturing to advance without all his forces, Marshal Soult waited for Marshal Ney, who promptly obeyed his call, but came from too great a distance to join him at the appointed time. He also wished to supply some parts of the artillery he wanted, and he was not able to arrive with his advanced guard until the 3rd of August at Plasencia, a fact which justifies our assertion that the combination of the three corps of Marshals Ney, Mortier, and Soult did as much mischief at the end of the campaign as

their separation had done at its commencement. But for this junction, as we have frequently remarked, Marshal Mortier, being free in his movements, and left at Villacastin at Joseph's disposal, would have accompanied him to Talavera and decided the battle. Had the British army been beaten that day, there is no knowing how it could have passed the Tagus, or got back to Alcantara, pursued by French soldiers marching twice as fast as the English.

Be this as it may, Sir Arthur Wellesley having learned at Oropesa that the intelligence forwarded to him from the pass of Baños was incomplete, for instead of 12,000, 40,000 or 50,000 were arriving by that pass, he thought he could not do better than shelter himself behind the line of the Tagus—a step which, from the condition of a victor, which he boasted to be, would bring him into that of the vanquished, with all the consequences of the most complete defeat. He could not afford to lose a moment, placed as he was between Victor, who might return upon him, and Mortier, who was coming on in all haste in advance of Soult. He resolved to cross the Tagus by the Arzobispo bridge, which was the nearest to him, although that would oblige him to go down the left bank as far as Almaraz by almost impracticable roads, in order to get upon the highroad to Estramadura. Fortunately for him, Marshal Victor, whom Joseph had left on the Alberche to watch the English, having taken alarm at Wilson's skirmishers on the mountains, and seeing them advance on his right towards Madrid, had fallen back in the direction of that capital. Had he been on the Alberche, the Anglo-Spanish army, assailed when passing the river, might have suffered enormously. Sir Arthur Wellesley then recrossed the Arzobispo bridge, leaving at Talavera 4000 or 5000 wounded, whom he commended to the humanity of the French generals, and a great quantity of matériel which he could not carry away. The wounded were so many prisoners he surrendered to us, and who procured us all the trophies of victory, as though we had gained the battle of Talavera. Sir Arthur took up a position opposite Almaraz, on the heights commanding the Tagus, where he waited until his artillery should have traversed the horrible roads on the left bank of that river from the Arzobispo bridge to that of Almaraz. La Cuesta's Spaniards were to defend the Arzobispo bridge, and oppose the march of the French.

Marshal Mortier, who headed the march, having debouched from the mountains, was opposite the Arzobispo bridge on the 6th and 7th of August, and was soon followed by Marshal Soult with the main body. The army which arrived so late naturally desired to signalise its presence, and could not let the enemy escape without trying to do him some great damage. It was

consequently resolved to carry the bridge. This was a demonstration of force much rather than an operation of serious consequence. It was executed by Mortier on the 8th of August. The Spaniards had barricaded the bridge, stationed infantry in two towers situated on the middle of it, erected strong batteries right and left on the opposite bank, and drawn up the bulk of their army on the hills in the rear. Thus covered, they believed themselves invincible. Marshal Mortier looked for a ford, and found one a few hundred fathoms higher up by which cavalry and infantry could pass. Whilst the French artillery played upon the bridge and the batteries beyond it, General Caulaincourt's dragoons crossed the ford, protected by parties of voltigeurs, and followed by the 34th and 40th regiments. Don Gregorio de la Cuesta opposed them with his infantry, formed in several squares. These were successfully charged by the dragoons; but the latter were soon assailed by the whole Spanish cavalry, three or four times more numerous than themselves, and would have been in serious danger if they had not manœuvred with much ability and coolness, supported by the infantry which had followed them. Fortunately, whilst this sharp conflict was waging, the 40th, marching along the bridge in spite of the fire of the Spaniards, forced the barricades, and opened a passage for Mortier's infantry, which took the Spanish batteries in flank and carried them. From that moment the Spaniards could hold out no longer, and fled, leaving us thirty pieces of cannon, a great number of horses, and 800 wounded as prisoners. This gallant exploit showed what were the corps of the old army and the officers who commanded them.

The question was now whether the French, having made themselves masters of the bridges over the Tagus, would pursue the now fugitive Anglo-Spanish army which called itself victorious a few days before. They had at their disposal the bridges of El Arzobispo and Talavera. But to reach the highroad to Estramadura, the only one practicable for heavy artillery, it would be necessary for them to go down to the bridge of Almaraz, the principal arch of which had been broken down, and which had been replaced for a while by a bridge of boats, now destroyed. The English had lost five days in conveying their artillery by the left bank as far as the highroad to Estramadura, opposite Almaraz, though they had the arms of all the people of the country to help them. It would be necessary, then, to follow them almost without artillery, and to fight them in almost inexpugnable positions, or to erect a bridge at Almaraz, no materials for which were at hand. Hence it was scarcely advisable to pursue them, unless the whole country was to be occupied from the Tagus to the Guadiana, from Almaraz to Merida, or unless the march into Andalusia was to be im-

mediately commenced. But the former of these operations was of little utility, the country between the Tagus and Guadiana having been ruined by the presence of the belligerent armies in it for many months. As for the latter, the season was manifestly too hot and provisions too scarce to undertake it just then. It was better to await the harvest, the termination of the hot season, and the arrival of Napoleon's instructions, which were becoming indispensable after the entire derangement of that year's plan of campaign. The army halted, therefore, at the Arzobispo bridge after the brilliant exploit which had put it in our hands. For the present the king's staff distributed Marshal Soult's troops along the Tagus, and moved a portion of them back into Old Castille. The fifth corps (Marshal Mortier's) was stationed at Oropesa to watch the Tagus from Almaraz to Toledo. The second (Marshal Soult's) was established at Plasencia to watch the passes from Portugal. Lastly, Marshal Ney, whom it was very desirable to keep aloof from Marshal Soult, was moved back to Salamanca to destroy the bands of the Duke del Parque which infested Old Castille. The intrepid marshal, setting out on the 12th, traversed the pass of Baños, fighting and dispersing Wilson's bands, and proved by the execution of this difficult march in less than four days that more speed might have been made to arrive in the rear of the English.

During this time Sir Arthur Wellesley had arrived at Truxillo, whence he proposed to march to Badajoz. Reduced to 20,000 men, obliged to leave his sick and wounded to the French, at variance with the Spanish generals about provisions, about the operations to be executed, about everything, in short, he had not succeeded better than Sir John Moore in his expedition into the interior of Spain. He returned, therefore, more than ever convinced that he should confine himself to the defence of Portugal, and only enter Spain in case of urgent emergency and with almost certain prospects of success. Nothing could be gloomier than his despatches to his government.

On parting from the Spanish generals, he strongly advised them not to risk a battle, but to content themselves with defending the mountainous country of Estramadura, between the Tagus and the Guadiana, behind which barrier they might reorganise their forces, and even receive the co-operation of the British army, if they deserved that it should be continued to them. But they were incapable of appreciating and following such good advice.

The first among them who ought to have acted upon it was Venegas, who had moved upon Madrid, whilst Sir Arthur Wellesley and de la Cuesta were combining at Talavera, and against whom Joseph and Sebastiani were marching at that moment by

way of Toledo. After having detached some skirmishing parties across the Tagus, he had promptly fallen back behind it on learning the return of the French army, and had halted at Almonacid, opposite Toledo, in a strong position, where he believed himself able, with 30,000 men, to brave the forces which Joseph could send against him. He would certainly have done better to follow Sir Arthur Wellesley's advice; but he paid no heed to it, and resolved to await the French on the heights of Almonacid.

He had his left stationed on a lofty hill, his centre on a plateau, his right on the escarped heights of Almonacid, themselves commanded by a more escarped position, above which rose an old Moorish castle. General Sebastiani, marching in advance of King Joseph, arrived in front of Venegas by the Toledo bridge, on the evening of the 10th of August. His force amounted to not more than 15,000 men since its losses at Talavera. The king was bringing him 5000. On the morning of the 11th he made the Leval division assail Venegas' left. The Poles were the first to ascend the hill on which the Spaniards were posted. Venegas threw a part of his reserve upon them. But the Germans, coming to the aid of the Poles, withstood the shock, and carried the left of the Spaniards, whilst the four French regiments of Sebastiani's division, the 28th, the 32nd, 58th, and 75th, attacked their centre and their right, followed by the Godinot brigade, which belonged to the Dessoles division. Every point was carried, and the Spaniards were forced to fall back on the castle of Almonacid. That position might have been turned, but Sebastiani and Dessoles' old regiments did not want to have difficulties smoothed down for them. Up they went, under the fire of an almost inaccessible position, and completed the rout of all the remaining enemies. The Spaniards had 3000 or 4000 men killed or wounded, a nearly equal number taken prisoners, and lost sixteen pieces of cannon. The French lost more men than usual, in consequence of the nature of the positions attacked. They had more than 300 killed, and about 3000 wounded.

The English army being in retreat on Badajoz, La Cuesta's army obliged to follow it, and that of Venegas quite dispersed, Joseph had nothing to do but to return to Madrid, which he re-entered, after having sent Marshal Victor into La Mancha, and left General Sebastiani at Aranjuez. He appeared there triumphant in the eyes of the Spaniards, for Gregorio de la Cuesta, Venegas, and Sir Arthur Wellesley (the latter with more reserve, as became his great merit) had announced their approaching entry into Madrid and the deliverance of Spain. Far from being able to fulfil these pompous promises, they were all retreating upon the Guadiana, the English disheartened, the Spaniards not disheartened but dispersed. Joseph could therefore present himself in his capital under all the appearances of

victory. It was only for good judges, for those who knew the means accumulated in Spain, and the hopes conceived for this campaign, that it was possible, by comparing the results expected with those obtained, to appreciate the operations of this year. With 300,000 old soldiers, the best France ever possessed, giving 200,000 present under fire, King Joseph's military counsellors had promised themselves to be in July at Lisbon, Seville, Cadiz, and Valencia; and yet they were not at Lisbon, not even at Oporto, but at Astorga; not at Cadiz, not at Seville, but at Madrid; not at Valencia, but at Saragossa! The obstinacy of the Spaniards, their patriotic and savage fury, their presumption which saved them from discouragement, the efficacious co-operation of the English, the disunion of our generals, the remoteness of Napoleon, and his instructions, which, given from too great a distance, hindered the plain good sense of Joseph and Jourdan from seizing the opportunities which fortune offered them, were the general causes of the profound differences between what had been expected and what had been accomplished. Passing from general causes to particular, we must add that if instead of despatching Marshal Soult with his own corps only into Portugal, he had been sent along with Marshal Mortier; if Marshal Soult, when he consented to attempt that expedition with insufficient means, had not left La Romana in his rear without destroying him; if, on arriving at Oporto, he had not wasted his time there, had not suffered himself to be surprised, or had made a better retreat; if, on his return to Galicia, he had better seconded Marshal Ney; if, having obtained a combination of troops desirable in March, to be regretted in June, he had not detained them uselessly at Salamanca; if Joseph, then having it in his power to bring up Mortier's corps, had presented himself at Talavera with irresistible forces; if, not having those forces, he had temporised and waited for Marshal Soult, or, not waiting for him, had made the attack at Talavera with more ensemble and steadiness; and if, even though none of these things had been realised, Marshal Soult had marched with more speed to Plasencia, the English would have been victoriously repulsed from Spain, and severely punished for their intervention in the Peninsula. One or two of these errors the less, and the fortune of the war had been changed!

When Napoleon, who was at Schönbrunn, engaged in negotiating and in preparing his armies of Germany in case of a resumption of hostilities, was informed of the events in the Peninsula, he was deeply affected by them, for, in order to negotiate advantageously and not be obliged to fight again, it was necessary for him that everything should go on well in all quarters, and that Austria should not find any encouragement in the events which were occurring elsewhere. Not acknow-

ledging to himself his own share in the faults committed, and great as he was, retaining so much human weakness as to wish to see only the faults of others without admitting his own, he severely blamed everybody. He keenly regretted having so soon settled the question between Marshals Ney, Mortier, and Soult by uniting the three corps under the command of the latter; he blamed Marshal Soult for having marched into Portugal without having destroyed La Romana, for not having taken any definite course at Oporto, for not having reopened his communications with Zamora, and for having made a wretched retreat. He conceived strange suspicions as to what had taken place in Oporto, and for a while his anger was so great that he thought of having the marshal brought to trial. But he had already on his hands the prosecution of General Dupont, which was becoming a serious difficulty; he had been obliged to reprimand the Prince of Ponte Corvo, and too many acts of severity at one time had the double inconvenience of making him appear harsh to companions-in-arms, whom he daily called upon to shed their blood in his behalf, and of revealing the necessity for such harshness. How many cankers in his State would be revealed if he publicly gave vent to his displeasure! Some of his lieutenants breaking down at last before the immensity of the dangers; others trying their hands at insubordination; others again becoming ambitious in their turn, and dreaming of such fortunes as those of his brothers! Napoleon, however, came to no final determination: he sent for the principal officers who had figured in Oporto, and ordered that evidence should be collected with the greatest strictness against Captain Argenton and his accomplices, if any he had. He authorised Marshal Ney to return to France, to relieve him from the false position in which he had been placed; and he kept silence towards Marshal Soult, leaving him for several months in the greatest perplexity. Nor did he spare Joseph; still less the chief of his staff, Jourdan, towards whom he was habitually unjust. He bitterly blamed them both for having made Soult debouch by Plasencia and not by Avila, a reproach which was not deserved, as we have elsewhere shown. He blamed them, with more reason, for having given battle without waiting for the arrival of Marshal Soult, then for not having given battle with ensemble, and not having persisted more energetically in the attack on the enemy's positions; in a word, when they had with Victor, Sebastiani, Soult, Mortier, and Ney nearly 100,000 men, for having gone into action with 45,000 against 66,000! all reprehensible faults, of which the arrangements ordered at Schönbrunn, without knowledge of the facts, were partly the cause. His criticisms after all, though characterised by that precision and that superior penetration which

belonged only to him, repaired nothing, and had only the poor advantage of easing his own dissatisfaction, whilst they deeply distressed his brother. He expressed, in particular, great anger at having been left ignorant of the loss of the artillery of the Leval division, and said, with reason, that as soon as he could go and pass some time in Spain, he would soon bring matters there to a conclusion. He gave orders to wait for the end of the hot season to resume operations, and above all, to wait until the negotiations at Altenburg were closed, because he proposed, when peace was signed, to send back to the Peninsula the forces he was at that moment drawing to Austria. Now, whilst he wrote to Joseph that Talavera was a battle lost, he said at Altenburg that it was a battle won (both which assertions were false), and he made those about him relate in detail the pitiable state in which the English army was retiring into Portugal, for events now interested him only in so far as they might influence the negotiations pending with Austria.

But he was not at the end of the difficulties the English had in store for him—whether to help Austria, which they had again left in jeopardy, or to gratify their maritime ambition. They had never ceased, since the opening of the campaign, to promise the court of Austria some great expedition against the coasts of the continent, meaning thereby the northern coasts; for an expedition to Spain, however highly serviceable to the maritime policy of Great Britain, was at that moment almost a matter of indifference to Austria. An English army, more or less in Spain, could not make one French regiment enter or quit the Peninsula. It was otherwise with a descent upon the coasts of France, Holland, or Germany. A descent on the coasts of France or Holland would draw off thither the reinforcements destined for Austria; on the coasts of Germany it might occasion a national explosion. Hence Austria had never ceased, since the opening of the negotiations, to press the English for a fulfilment of their promise. Moreover, as the work to be done was to destroy ports, burn dockyards, and commit all kinds of maritime ravages, their zeal might be relied upon; and if there was delay, it was only to be imputed to the nature of things, or to the incapacity of their government, which, rancorous and powerful as it was, was not conducted with the genius which then presided over the operations of the French government. They had lost Nelson and Pitt: they had still, indeed, Sir Arthur Wellesley, superior to both; but he was restricted to a narrow stage, and the existing administration was far from able.

The English scheme, in addition to their efforts to rid Spain of the French, consisted in destroying Napoleon's immense

maritime preparations along the whole coast of the empire. We have already seen that Napoleon, though unable to keep the sea against the British navy, had not renounced the intention of fighting England on her own element, but had devised grand measures to that end. Wherever he had sway or influence, he had prepared countless naval constructions, and crews proportioned to them, as far as that was possible, intending, as soon as his armies should be disengaged, to form camps within reach of his vessels, in order to despatch on a sudden, now from one point, now from another, great expeditions for the East and West Indies, Egypt, and perhaps Ireland. At Venice, Spezzia, Toulon, Rochefort, Lorient, Brest, Cherbourg, Boulogne (where the idle flotilla was beginning to rot), and Antwerp, above all—Napoleon's favourite creation—armaments of all kinds existed, and were regarded with extraordinary anxiety by the English (thereby justifying the views of Napoleon), and with an ardent desire to ward off from themselves dangers which were the more alarming because their scope was unknown.

Two points had engrossed their whole attention during the year whose history we are relating: these were Rochefort and Antwerp. At the former had been effected by Napoleon's orders a combination of squadrons, which moored in the roads of the Isle d'Aix. At Antwerp was prepared an immense establishment, which, by its position opposite the Thames, kept the Londoners in a state of actual insomnia. The aid which the English, with a keen eye to their own interests, intended to afford Austria, was to destroy Rochefort and Antwerp, whatever efforts it might cost them. Seeing the greater facility of acting against Rochefort, where there was only a fleet to be burned, they had been early in a condition for this exploit. The longer, vaster, and more costly preparations against Antwerp were as yet but an unexecuted threat whilst the belligerents were contending at Wagram and Talavera.

The expedition against Rochefort was ready for sea in April. At that time there were in that port two fine naval divisions, under Vice-Admiral Allemand. They were stationed there in pursuance of a very ingenious plan of Napoleon's, but a very perilous one, like all those he was obliged to have recourse to at sea. By his orders Rear-Admiral Willaumez was to have quitted Brest with a fleet of six ships and several frigates, picked up on his way the divisions at Lorient and at Rochefort, sailed for the West Indies with supplies of victuals, ammunition, and men, returned thence to Europe, passing through the Straits of Gibraltar, and cast anchor at Toulon, where a grand naval force was gradually preparing, either to join Sicily to Naples, provision Barcelona, or menace Egypt, which Napoleon

had not renounced the hope of some day recovering. Willaumez sailed in February, missed the Lorient division, being afraid to stop there too long, and not finding the Rochefort division ready for sea, had been obliged to stop in that port, thereby raising to the number of eleven ships and four frigates the naval force there. The brave Vice-Admiral Allemand, who had so successfully passed the Straits of Gibraltar to meet Ganteaume in 1808, and had accomplished the expedition to Corfu with him, had been appointed to the command of the Rochefort squadron. His instructions were to take the sea at the first opportunity. His fleet was a fine one, though far from being well manned—as always happens when a fleet has to be formed in roads. The English had conceived the design of destroying the Rochefort fleet by the most terrible means imaginable, though they should exceed in barbarous cruelty all that war allows.

They had no thought of going up the Charente and presenting themselves abreast of Rochefort. It was elsewhere they intended to make an attempt of that kind, for it required an army, and they had not two at their disposal. But at Rochefort they proposed to destroy the fleet in its moorings. Admiral Gambier was therefore sent with thirteen ships, a great number of frigates, corvettes, brigs, and gunboats, to the Isle d'Aix, and boldly moored in Basque roads, those important waters not yet being sufficiently defended at that period. Fort Boyard was not yet in existence. The English had resolved to convert a great number of vessels into fire-ships, and to sacrifice them, regardless of the cost, for the chance of burning the French squadron. The lawfulness of employing this measure in war is questionable, because it is atrocious, like the bombardment of fortified towns without absolute necessity. Usually when recourse is had to it, old vessels are used, which are loaded with combustibles, sometimes with explosive machines. After being thus converted into floating volcanoes, they are brought before a fleet, and the moment being chosen when the wind and current are favourable, they are set on fire and sent adrift, the crews only leaving them at the last moment, when the flames compel them to take to their boats. A single fire-ship is often enough to cause immense destruction. This practice is particularly dangerous when the fleet attacked consists of many vessels lying close to each other, and when the fire-ships are sure of doing mischief wherever they fall. The danger, of course, increases with the number of the fire-ships. The English determined to have thirty, such a number as never before had been seen together, and as could only be furnished by an immensely powerful marine which had abundance of old hulls to throw away. To devote thirty vessels to the destruction of

perhaps three or four, was to act with a fury which takes no account of the mischief it sustains, provided it inflicts some on the enemy. So far did the English indulge the passion to destroy, as to place among these fire-ships frigates, and even ships of the line, so that the impulsive force might be the greater against the obstacles which the French might oppose to them. The English remained twenty days at anchor, preparing this unexampled flotilla, and loading it with its terrible freight.

Seeing them moored so long in the Basque roads, Vice-Admiral Allemand could not doubt the existence of an incendiary design against the port and the fleet. He placed his eleven ships and four frigates in two lines, very close to each other, backed on the right by the guns on the Isle d'Aix, and on the left by those on the river-bank. They lay in a direction not opposed, but parallel to the current, so that the floating bodies launched against them should not come athwart them, but pass before them. He also protected them with a double range of booms, the one at 400, the other at 800 fathoms' distance, formed of floating beams strongly bound together, and fixed by means of heavy anchors dropped at certain intervals. As the critical moment approached, he formed the ships' boats into several divisions, armed them with cannons, and manned them with intrepid seamen, who were to lay hold on the fire-ships with hooks and turn them aside. The boats mounted guard every night alongside the booms. He had all the useless sails taken down and stowed away with all other inflammable matters in the holds, and had everything removed that could increase the danger of the fire-ships, by forming projections upon which they might be caught, and so become fixed to the vessels they encountered. There were many things he wanted which the port of Rochefort could not supply him with, because there is almost always a lack of them after a long and unsuccessful war; but with such materials as he had he did everything in his power to guard against the catastrophe, which he believed to be formidable, but which he was far from imagining so terrible as it actually proved to be.

On the night of the 11th of April, the wind blowing freshly from the N.N.E. upon our line, and at an hour when the tide ran in the same direction, the English appeared in several divisions of large and small vessels, with the manifest intention of surrounding our squadron. A division of frigates and corvettes then advanced towards the boom, escorting the fire-ships. Vice-Admiral Allemand, judging from all known precedents, expected to see some four, five, or six fire-ships, and had ordered the boats to be constantly at their stations along the booms, when suddenly was beheld a blazing line of thirty fire-ships, borne along

by wind and tide against the French squadron. Never had such a spectacle been witnessed. Three of these horrible machines blew up near the booms and broke them. The others, darting forth fireworks of all kinds like volcanoes, swept away the remains of the booms before them, and were floated along round our ships. The attempts to hook them were fruitless; they were too bulky to be held against wind and tide by boats, and dragged these along with them whenever the crews were rash enough to grapple them. Beholding these thirty blazing machines, there were few hearts but quailed, not at the danger to which seamen are inured, but at the thought of seeing all our vessels destroyed without a fight. In the horrible confusion, amidst frightful explosions and hideous glares that showed the danger without serving to throw light on the defence, it was impossible to give or receive orders. Every captain had to act for himself, think only of his own ship, and how he could save it. The first impulse with them all was to get rid of the fire-ships that had fastened on their hulls. The admiral's ship *L'Océan* alone had three of them. The surest means of escaping was to cut their cables and run where they could. Another was to fire upon the fire-ships and sink them; and in doing this they fired upon each other as well in the confusion into which they had fallen, after losing their positions in line. By singular good fortune, however, our ships escaped, without excessive damage, to various parts of the coast; such of them as had taken fire succeeded in extinguishing the flames. The fire-ships ran ashore here and there on the neighbouring islands, and at daybreak we had the satisfaction of seeing all the thirty blown up, or burning to the water's edge, without having consumed any of our ships. So far English rage had only been destructive to English wealth.

But the scene was not ended. Our ships, as we have said, had cut their cables, and run aground at the embouchure of the Charente, from Fort Fouras to the Isle d'Enett. Unluckily four of them, caught by the ebb-tide, had stuck fast on the points of a chain of rocks called Les Palles, which forms one of the two sides of the mouth of the Charente. These ships were *Le Calcutta*, *Le Tonnerre*, *L'Aquilon*, and *Le Varsovie*. Almost all the captains had thrown their powder into the sea, for fear of blowing up if they took fire. Others had lost their boats and boats' crews in the confusion. They were therefore scarcely in a condition to defend themselves. Exasperated by the ill success of their atrocious scheme, the English resolved to indemnify themselves by taking or destroying the four ships on Les Palles. *Le Calcutta*, attacked by several ships and frigates, cannonaded in all directions, and hardly able to use her guns, was defended for some hours, and then abandoned by Captain Lafon, who, having but 230 men, believed that as it was impossible to save

his ship, it was his duty to save his crew. The unfortunate man knew not to what severities he was exposing himself! *Le Calcutta* blew up some minutes after it was abandoned. *L'Aquilon* and *Le Varsovie*, unable to defend themselves, were obliged to strike their colours, and were burned by the English. Two fresh explosions told the squadron what was the fate of these ships. *Le Tonnerre* having sprung a leak, made its way with difficulty to near Isle Madame. Captain Clément Laroncière threw overboard his guns, ballast, and everything he could to lighten her, but without avail. After enormous efforts, continued under the fire of the English, foreseeing that he must sink at high water, he landed his men on a point of rock, whence they might reach Isle Madame when the tide was out. Being the last to quit the ship, he set fire to it with his own hand, and so it went down under French colours.

Thus, out of eleven ships, four perished, not from encountering the fire-ships, but from the wish to avoid them. The brave Admiral Allemand was in despair, though he had saved seven, without counting the frigates, which, with only one exception, were all preserved. His despair became converted into so great an irascibility that it was impossible to leave him the command of Rochefort. The minister Decrès sent him to Toulon with his crews, who went by land, to man the vessels in the Mediterranean. New works were requisite at Rochefort before another fleet could be formed there. Admiral Gambier returned to the shores of England with the dubious glory of an atrocious expedition which had cost England much more than France. Its most solid advantage for the former was the deep dread impressed on all our fleets moored in roads, and a sort of hallucination that possessed most of our commanders of squadrons, who were continually haunted with visions of fire-ships, and made the strangest contrivances to guard against them. The minister Decrès, in spite of his rare discernment, was not himself quite free from this perturbation, and proposed to the emperor to send back to Flushing the fine fleet constructed in the dockyards of Antwerp, and then moored at the mouths of the Scheldt. But Admiral Missiessy, a cool, clear-headed, determined man, refused to do this, alleging that at Flushing it would be exposed to perish by the bombs, or the fever of Walcheren, in dishonourable inactivity. He pledged himself to manœuvre in the Scheldt, so as not to lose either his honour or his fleet, and obtained a freedom of action of which he soon made glorious use. The only measure commanded by the emperor was the trial of the unfortunate captains who had lost their ships in the Rochefort roads.

The Rochefort expedition was not the one the English had most at heart. They ought, no doubt, to have been very well

satisfied with destroying one of our principal fleets at its moorings; but they longed, above all things, to free themselves from the inordinate uneasiness caused them by Antwerp. They were always possessed with the idea that in process of time there might issue from that port, not the ten ships then moored at Flushing, but twenty or thirty, which Napoleon had the means of building there, and a flotilla far more dangerous than that of Boulogne, for in one tide it might convey an army from the mouth of the Scheldt to that of the Thames. That grand expedition which they had promised Austria they would send out before the end of the hostilities, and which since the armistice of Znaïm they promised to send out before the negotiations were ended, they were at that moment completing, not for the purpose of raising up Germany in revolt, but for the purpose of destroying the naval establishments in the Netherlands.

They had two reasons for selecting Antwerp as the point to attack—the importance of that port, and the hope of finding it without any preparation for defence. Spies had reported to them that there were but 7000 or 8000 men on both banks of the Scheldt to Bergen-op-Zoom. With a little boldness they might even go further, commit immense destruction, and shed woeful light on the policy which carried all our forces to Lisbon, Madrid, and Vienna, and left none to guard our own coasts. Their eagerness for an expedition to the banks of the Scheldt was therefore extreme, and they were resolved to devote to it 40,000 men at least, and from 1200 to 1500 sail. Nothing so considerable would have been seen in any age if they were able to carry out their intentions to their full extent. But the time employed in preparing such an armament was, of course, proportioned to its vastness. Proposed in March, resolved on in April, just when Napoleon was setting out for Austria, it had not sailed on the day of the battle of Wagram, nor arrived on that of the battle of Talavera. Sir John Moore's army, which had been proved in service, was to be employed in the expedition; but it had need to be largely recruited to reach the total of 40,000 men; and as, moreover, there was a great siege apparatus to be shipped, the means of transport required amounted to the enormous sum of 100,000 tons. Of these the royal navy could furnish 25,000, the remaining 75,000 were to be procured either from the government arsenals or from the merchant service. But many vessels had already been sent to the coast of Spain on Sir Arthur Wellesley's account, and it was not advisable to deprive him of that indispensable means of retreat, a reverse of fortune being always to be provided against in the Peninsula. The whole 75,000 tons were then to be procured from other than government sources, and so passionately was the British cabinet bent on this object, that for a moment it

thought of pressing all the neutrals in the Thames into its service, and paying them afterwards. But this project was abandoned on account of the disturbance it would have caused to trade, and instead of it, the government offered enormously high rates for freight. The matériel was prepared, the army was recruited with volunteers from the militia, and so the time wore away from May to June, from June to July. It was not until the end of the latter month that all was ready. No time was to be lost, for if nothing was done before the treaty of peace had been extorted from Austria, the French armies would have returned from the banks of the Danube, and then any expedition of the kind would be a folly, not to mention that England would again have left her surest allies in the lurch.

By the 24th or 25th of July the expedition was ready for sea, consisting of 38,000 infantry, 3000 artillerymen, 2500 cavalry (in all, about 44,000 men), 9000 horses, 150 twenty-four pounders and large mortars, the whole embarked on board 40 ships of the line, 30 frigates, 84 corvettes, brigs, and bombards, 400 or 500 transports, and countless gunboats. Nothing like it had ever been seen. It was to sail from Portsmouth, Harwich, Chatham, Dover, and the Downs. Having command of the sea, the English could choose any points of departure that suited their own convenience. Sir John Strachan commanded the fleet, the Earl of Chatham the army. Their orders were to take Flushing if they could, to destroy the Scheldt fleet at the same time, then to burn the dockyards of Antwerp, and close the channels of the Scheldt by sinking large masses in them, which should render them unfit for navigation. The end and the means were commensurate in their vastness.

Dutch emigrants, and English officers who had made the campaigns of Flanders in 1792 and 1793, had long been consulted as to the best course to be pursued. Two principal plans had been proposed: to land at Ostend, and march to Antwerp by Bruges and the Sas of Ghent, or to sail up the Scheldt. To march five-and-twenty or thirty leagues through the French territory, in presence of a nation so warlike as ours, appeared too perilous; and yet it was the only plan that offered some chance of success, for the invaders would barely have found on their way 3000 or 4000 men dispersed all over Flanders. By beginning their march before succours could be sent (a process requiring from fifteen to twenty days at least), they would have arrived at Antwerp without firing a shot, burned the dockyards and the fleet, and have re-embarked in their transports at Antwerp when the French troops were beginning to show themselves. But the idea of traversing such an extent of the territory of the empire was a bugbear that caused the plan to be abandoned. The next to be considered, and it was one that

gave rise to much debate, was the plan of sailing up the Scheldt to Batz and Santvliet, the point where the estuary of the Scheldt changes into a river.

Ten leagues below Antwerp the Scheldt divides into two branches. One of these, called from its direction the Western Scheldt, continues to flow due west, and falls into the sea between the guns of Flushing and Breskens; the other turns northward at Santvliet, passes between the fort of Batz and the fortified town of Bergen-op-Zoom, empties itself to the north-west, and is called the Eastern Scheldt, only because it flows less directly to the west than the other branch. Both of them are wider and shallower than the river above its bifurcation; they flow over a series of shoals which present many obstacles to navigation, and wash a province called Zeeland. This is the lowest province of Holland, the greater part of it being below the level of the sea, from the irruption of which it is only preserved by lofty dykes. In summer it presents to the eye only verdant meadows, beautiful willows, and tall poplars; but hideous death lurks beneath this smiling aspect, for pestilential miasmata are exhaled from the mud, which the tide leaves uncovered twice a day. Among all known fevers, there is none more deadly than that which bears the inauspicious name of Walcheren.

Of the two branches of the Scheldt, the western alone is navigable for ships of the line. It was the one chosen by Napoleon for the passage of his fleet from Antwerp to the sea, and was protected by the fortifications of Flushing in the island of Walcheren, and by those of Breskens in the island of Cadzand.

Supposing that Antwerp was to be reached by water, whether was the Eastern or the Western Scheldt to be preferred? Here again the bolder plan was the better, for when a surprise is to be effected, the quickest route affords the greatest likelihood, not only of success, but also of safety. The best course would have been boldly to enter the West Scheldt in defiance of the fires of Flushing and Breskens, at the risk of often running aground, for the buoys that marked the channel would of course have been removed, to have then advanced, with small vessels going before to take soundings, destroyed the French fleet if met with, landed the army at Santvliet, and marched straight to Antwerp. This would have cost more time and trouble than the land route, but the invaders would certainly have arrived in ten days, and in that space of time Antwerp would not have received the succours necessary for its defence, as we shall presently see. This time again the decision was in favour of the more timorous way of executing a daring expedition, and as commonly happens, a plan was adopted

which, containing something from each of the plans proposed, ran the chance of combining the defects of them all.

It was settled that a naval division, under Rear-Admiral Ottway, should land 12,000 men on the island of Walcheren, with whom the second in command, Sir Eyre Coote, should take Flushing; that a second division under Commodore Owen should put a few thousand men on shore on the island of Cadzand, with whom the Marquis of Huntly should take the fort of Breskens and the batteries on that island; that the enemy's fire being thus extinguished right and left by the capture of the two islands which form the entrance to the Western Scheldt, the bulk of the expedition should sail up it under the orders of Rear-Admiral Keats, Lieutenant-Generals Hope, Rosslyn, Grosvenor, and the two commanders-in-chief, Strachan and Chatham. They were to land near Santvliet with 25,000 men, and then march to Antwerp.

Such was the plan ultimately decided upon at the departure of the expedition, the greater part of which was under sail on the 25th of July at Portsmouth, Harwich, Dover, and the Downs. The rest was to follow as it could. On the 29th the low lands of the Scheldt were in sight. But the troops could not be disembarked at once in consequence of the state of the wind, which made it dangerous to attempt landing in boats. The two divisions which were to proceed respectively to the island of Walcheren, north, and to the island of Cadzand, south of the embouchure of the Western Scheldt, stationed themselves off those islands, and kept the sea as well as they could in rather rough weather. The main body, which was to go up the Scheldt, under Rear-Admiral Keats and Sir John Hope, waited also under sail for more favourable weather.

But as the wind did not change, and as unexpected intelligence arrived that the French fleet, instead of having gone up to Antwerp, was still at Flushing, the plan agreed on at the departure of the expedition was changed. In the first place, to avoid the bad weather, it was resolved to pass round the island of Walcheren northwards, to the entrance of the Eastern Scheldt, to get into the inner branch of the Weere Gat by the Roompot channel, and there land the troops under shelter from the surf that threatened to destroy the boats on the outer side. Considering also the news that had been received of the fleet, it was thought dangerous to attack it amidst the batteries that protected it, in channels well known to it; and it appeared better to turn it by the isle of Walcheren, instead of coming upon it in front. A large portion of the expedition was therefore to proceed as far as possible up the Eastern Scheldt, whilst the other attacked the islands of Walcheren and Cadzand. The troops were to be landed on the islands of North and South

Beveland, and were to be led by land to the forts of Batz and Santvliet, to the junction of the two Scheldts, which would afford means of intercepting the French fleet and hindering its return to Antwerp. It would then be soon captured; and even if the expedition should not be able to reach Antwerp, it would have done very well indeed when it had taken the islands of Walcheren and Cadzand, the fortress of Flushing and the French fleet. Orders were immediately given in conformity with this plan, which was the third. The last division, under Rosslyn and Grosvenor, was to be disposed of according to circumstances when it arrived. Admiral Gardner was placed at the entrance of the Western Scheldt to oppose the French fleet, should it choose to offer battle, succour Flushing, or act against the division detached to Cadzand.

Accordingly, whilst Admiral Gardner kept the sea with his ships of the line, and Commodore Owen was preparing with his frigates and light craft to land the Marquis of Huntly's troops on the island of Cadzand, Rear-Admiral Ottway's strong division, which was to put 12,000 men ashore at Walcheren, went up the north side of the island on the 29th and 30th, and entering the Eastern Scheldt, moored at the opening of the Weere Gat. Once out of the open sea, and within the inner channels of Zeeland, the weather was no longer an impediment. Immediate preparations were made for landing. The English had such a quantity of boats that the simultaneous landing of a great number of troops was for them the easiest of operations.

A more favourable moment could not have been chosen for insulting the French territory with impunity. No preparation for defence had been made, either in the island of Walcheren or in the adjacent region; not that there had been no warning, but that the intelligence received was not treated with the attention it deserved. It was certainly impossible that so vast a muster of forces should have taken place on the English coasts without something of it having been known on those of France, in spite of the interruptions of communications. In fact, some French prisoners who had made their escape, and some well-paid spies, had warned the coast authorities, who in their turn had informed the ministers of marine and of war. But the minister of marine, too full of the recollection of Rochefort, had thought only of an expedition of fire-ships to burn the Scheldt fleet, and had wanted, as we have said, to shut that fleet up in Flushing, which Admiral Missiessy had refused to do, for reasons which were justified by the event. As for the minister of war, having nothing to send to Antwerp against an army of 40,000 men, and not venturing to take upon himself to divert from the Danube to the Scheldt the torrent of men and matériel which continued, even since the armistice, to flow

towards Austria, he did nothing, and chose rather to believe, with the minister of marine, that the threatened expedition would prove an affair of fire-ships, which were to be guarded against by obstructing the several channels of the Scheldt. There was nothing then within reach of Antwerp but the camp at Boulogne, some companies of national guards employed under the Senator Rampon in watching the coasts, and some provisional demi-brigades; but all dispersed, without organisation, without artillery, cavalry, &c. In the island of Walcheren especially no preparation had been made for sustaining a siege. The island had been for several years divided between France and Holland. The French occupied the fortified town of Flushing on account of its port and its command of the Western Scheldt, and the Dutch retained the territory of the island with its capital, Middleburg, and the small forts commanding the Eastern Scheldt. General Monnet, a brave man, who had distinguished himself in the wars of the Revolution, reposed from his past campaigns as commandant of Flushing. He had for the defence of the island neither flying artillery, nor cavalry, nor any one constituent of a corps adapted for keeping the field; his sole means of defence was a handful of odds and ends of troops, made up of an Irish battalion, a colonial battalion, two battalions of Prussian deserters, and some hundreds of French, making together about 3000 men. The Dutch commandant had some hundreds of veterans in Middleburg, and the forts on the shores. The fortifications of Flushing consisted merely of a bastioned wall surrounded by a ditch which was everywhere fordable. It had no strong batteries, except on the side next the sea. Nothing then was easier than to take the island of Walcheren and the town of Flushing when the invaders came upon them with 45,000 men and 500 or 600 sail.

As soon as the English were seen obstinately stationing themselves at the mouths of the Scheldt, it was easy to guess the object of their expedition. General Monnet, not wishing to absent himself from Flushing, immediately sent General Osten with 1200 or 1500 men, that is to say, with half the garrison, to the northern shore of the island, to oppose the landing as well as he could; and with the remainder he himself set about preparing to defend Flushing. Some field artillery was procured for General Osten by taking from the fortifications two three-pounders and two six-pounders, and harnessing to them untrained horses of the country, mounted by peasants. General Osten, who was very brave, advanced with his small force, and stationed it from right to left, from the fort of Den Haak to Domburg, along the dykes, to fire on the English as soon as they should touch the shore.

The latter landed, to the number of some thousands, pro-

tected by the guns of more than sixty vessels. General Osten's soldiers, without discipline or national spirit, did not stand a moment against the fire from the ships, although they were covered by the dykes, but retreated in disorder, in spite of the heroic efforts of their officers to rally them. General Osten's four pieces, if well served, might have stopped the advance of the English, or at least retarded it. But the untrained horses reared and plunged, the peasants cut the traces, and fled. Two of the four guns were thus left on the ground. After ineffectual efforts to maintain his position, General Osten led his troops back to Serooskerke, in the interior of the island, and sent word of what had happened to General Monnet.

Whilst General Osten was deprived by the bad spirit of his soldiers of the honour of disputing the dykes with the English, Bruce, a Dutch general, surrendered to them the forts of Den Haak and Terweere, and the town of Middleburg, not having the least desire to be killed for the sake of the French—in which respect he shared the feelings of all his countrymen. He might, moreover, allege in his own justification that he had not sufficient means to resist the enemy.

On the 31st of July the English spread 15,000 men over the island of Walcheren, and surrounded it with several hundred sail, for they placed themselves with the greater part of their naval forces in the Weere Gat and Sloe branches, which part the island of Walcheren from those of North and South Beveland. They marched to Middleburg, and thence to Flushing. General Osten made the best retreat he could, disputing the ground foot by foot, when the courage of his troops corresponded to his own; and though he did not obtain from his soldiers all he could have wished, he honourably covered his retreat with the loss of 200 or 300 men, and the destruction of a greater number of the enemy.

General Monnet received him on the glacis of Flushing, and they effected their junction under the guns of the place, and resolved to defend its approaches before they shut themselves up within its narrow limits. General Monnet occupied several posts on the exterior, and particularly one to the right towards Rameskens, in order to be able to break the dykes and inundate the whole island, when all other means of resistance had failed. He hastened to organise his garrison somewhat better, to supply his want of artillerymen from the ranks of the infantry, to form the population into legions of firemen to counteract the effects of a bombardment, and to write to the island of Cadzand for French troops whilst the Western Scheldt was still open. The distance thence was but three or four cannon-shots, the passage was easy and still possible, if the necessary forces were to be found in Cadzand.

That island was commanded by General Rousseau, an active

and gallant officer belonging to the department of the Scheldt, which was included in the twenty-fourth military division. The moment he was aware of the presence of the English, he had sent notice to General Chambarlhac, who commanded the twenty-fourth military division, and had called in the troops stationed in the vicinity. He began by distributing among the coast batteries the few hundred men he could immediately dispose of, and getting ready some pieces of field artillery. Two fourth battalions, one of the 65th, the other of the 48th, having then been sent to him, he put himself at their head along the shore, ready to fall upon the first troops of the enemy that should land.

These prompt and determined measures were perfectly visible from sea, for the land was a low plain, as level as the sea itself, and they might give reason to suppose that there was a considerable body of troops in the rear. Commodore Owen and the Marquis of Huntly, who commanded the forces acting against Cadzand, perceiving General Rousseau's troops from the Vielengen channel, where they were struggling against the bad weather, did not dare to land. They saw 1200 or 1500 men, whom they took for 3000 or 4000; and having only boats enough to land 700 men at a time, they were afraid they should be thrown into the sea if they attempted to touch the shore. Had Admiral Strachan and Lord Chatham carried to the island of Cadzand all the forces, and all the means of disembarkation uselessly employed in the Eastern Scheldt, they would infallibly have got possession of the island, with all the batteries on the left of the Scheldt, and have arrived at La Tête de Flandre, a suburb of Antwerp, before any succours. Fortunately it was not so. Commodore Owen and the Marquis of Huntly, intimidated by General Rousseau's attitude, sent to Rear-Admiral Gardner, who commanded the ships in the great Deurloo channel, for the boats he could spare, in order to land more men at a time; but he wanted them for his own operations, besides which, the stormy weather prevented their arrival, and the attack on the island of Cadzand, which ought to have succeeded, was not made on the 29th, nor on the 30th, nor on the 31st. The leaders of the expedition, content with having had it in their power to land at Walcheren, finding themselves quite safe from the bad weather within the Eastern Scheldt, and always full of the idea of taking the islands of North and South Beveland, which divide the two Scheldts, and the possession of which would allow of their turning the fleet, recalled Owen and Huntly. The whole expedition, including the last portion, which had just arrived under Lieutenant-Generals Grosvenor and Rosslyn, thus filled the Weere Gat and Sloe arms. All the troops that had not landed on Walcheren were then put on shore in North and South Beveland, to march to the fort of Batz, the point of junction of

the two Scheldts, and thus turn the French fleet, whilst the rest of the army was besieging Flushing.

Fortunately at that moment there were two energetic men on the spot—General Rousseau and Admiral Missiessy. The former, seeing the departure of the naval division that threatened the island of Cadzand, ceased to have much fear for the left bank of the Scheldt, and without hesitation sent away the two battalions of the 65th and 48th by water from Breskens to Flushing. They had to cross the Western Scheldt, which was some hundred fathoms wide at that part, and he sent over all the detachments that came to him, one after the other, thinking more of his neighbour, whose danger he perceived, than of himself.

Admiral Missiessy, who had asked not to be shut up in Flushing, where he would have perished by the enemy's shells and the fever, crowned the wisdom of his counsels by the firmness and ability of his conduct. His steadiness in remaining before Flushing, without shutting himself up in the port, had already sufficed to give the English expedition a different course—the most dangerous for it, the most advantageous for us, as we shall soon see—that, namely, into the Eastern Scheldt. He had now to keep himself from being taken at the junction of the two Scheldts, towards Batz and Santvliet. So, like a man of sense and determination, who knew what he had to do, he weighed anchor on the 31st, and took advantage of the favourable wind to run up the Scheldt. By the evening of that day he had passed the fort of Batz, and entered the Upper Scheldt, above where the river divides. At that place two of the vessels ran aground on a soft mud-bank, but were soon got off. Next day he was again under sail, and at high water all his ships passed between the forts of Lillo and Liefkenshoek, which close the passage of the river by their formidable cross-fires. All these forts (Batz and Santvliet, Lillo and Liefkenshoek) were as neglected as they might have been in a time of profound peace amongst a heedless nation. Admiral Missiessy, who saw in them the means of his own safety, occupied himself about their defence. He placed a frigate athwart the channel of Bergen-op-Zoom, which joins the Western Scheldt with the Eastern, and is commanded by the forts of Batz and Santvliet. He landed 100 Dutch gunners in Batz, and put French garrisons into Lillo and Liefkenshoek, taking care to supply them with the necessary stores. He then had several booms constructed as a defence against fire-ships, and instead of shutting himself in Antwerp, he remained free to move about the river, and bring the thousand guns of his fleet to bear upon the defence of the surrounding points. He had under him a flotilla formerly detached from that of Boulogne, and stationed in the Scheldt.

It was well for him he had so opportunely made his retreat

into the Upper Scheldt, for two days later the English would have turned him by placing themselves between Batz and Santvliet, and thus have struck a grand first blow by the capture or destruction of a whole new fleet. The troops of Hope's division, which had been put on shore on the islands of Beveland, had marched with all speed, and arrived on the 2nd of August before Batz, which was occupied by a Dutch garrison and by General Bruce, who had already surrendered the entrenched posts of the island of Walcheren. The fort mounted thirty guns, level with the water, and very dangerous for ships attacking it, but it had no great means of defending itself on the land side. With a garrison, however, and a brave commandant, it might have held out for some days. The one it had, but not the other. General Bruce was no more disposed at Batz than at Middleburg to resist to the uttermost, in a small fortress without casemates or blindage, exposed to an overwhelming force, and that for the sake of the French; so he evacuated the fort, into which the English entered without firing a shot. From that moment they were masters of the passage from the one to the other branch of the Scheldt, and had they forthwith brought up their whole army, as they had brought Hope's division, by the way of North and South Beveland, they might in a few days have arrived before Antwerp, which was, indeed, a closed fortress, but closed by old works, half destroyed, where there were at most 2000 men, without a cannon on the ramparts, and where there prevailed as much confusion among the authorities, surprised by the appearance of the enemy, as disaffection among the Flemish population. Fortunately the two leaders of the expedition (Sir John Strachan and Lord Chatham) thought it necessary, in the first place, to finish the siege of Flushing, which would give them the means of introducing the whole of the fleet into the Western Scheldt, and arriving by sea at Batz and Santvliet, whence the land forces could march to Antwerp. This decision of theirs gave the French government some days to organise the first means of defence.

The telegraph had announced on the 31st of July, at Paris, the landing of the English in the island of Walcheren, and on the 1st of August the whole government was informed of the serious nature of the danger. In Napoleon's absence the government consisted of the ministers under the presidency of the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès. Three only of the ministers could take part in the proceedings on this occasion: the ministers of war and marine, Clarke and Decrès, because the safety of the territory and the fleet were their special concern, and Fouché, the minister of police, because he was the only one who had preserved a sort of political importance since the retirement

of M. de Talleyrand. He had seen his existence threatened at the time of the latter's disgrace, and had become, in consequence, more busy than ever, whether to regain favour if he succeeded in signalising his zeal in a moment of difficulty, or in order to become a principal personage if the affairs of the empire fell into perplexity, as many people began either to fear or to hope. Signs of the decline of Napoleon's power were, in fact, beheld by many in the Spanish war, which seemed as though it would never end; in the Austrian war, the issue of which had for a while seemed doubtful; in the gradual spread of uneasiness among the populations of the empire; and in the dissatisfaction excited by the affairs of the Church, the sequel of which we shall soon set forth. For a restless person, therefore, not very trustworthy, and wishing to be at the head of all changes of fortune, the present was an opportunity to bestir himself.

Though he flattered the emperor greatly, M. Fouché was the secret ally of all the disaffected, groaning *sotto voce* with them over their grievances, or over the maladies of the empire, the glory of which he extolled in public. Thus Admiral Decrès, a minister of great talent, but so unlucky in his administration, was dissatisfied because the emperor, unjustly visiting upon him the defeats of the navy, and offended at his caustic and bold language, had not been forward to make him a duke. M. Fouché had forthwith become the confidant and friend of M. Decrès. Marshal Bernadotte having been sent away from the army on account of his order of the day to the Saxons, had carried his pride and his resentment to Paris. M. Fouché hastened to press his hand, condoled with him on the ingratitude he had met with, and in public assumed the part of a mentor, who strove to moderate the prince-marshal's anger, and hinder him from committing fresh faults. The Walcheren expedition was an occasion for bringing these latent dispositions into prominence; and if anything, indeed, could already disclose the failing strength of the throne, it was that under such a master as Napoleon any one should aspire to a political rôle of any kind whatever.

No sooner had the news of the landing arrived than M. Decrès hastened to the minister and the arch-chancellor and called for extreme measures. He displayed extreme ardour in his proceedings, because ever since the Rochefort business he had known no rest. He wanted that all the workmen that could be procured should be marched from Paris, that the national guards should be levied en masse, that a marshal of France, Bernadotte for example, should be placed at their head, and that the enemy should be awed by a great display of force, apparent, if not real. M. Decrès spoke with the sincerity of a minister alarmed for the safety of his department. M. Fouché,

who, by a singular concourse of circumstances, occupied provisionally the place of M. Cretet, minister of the interior, who was on his death-bed, found in the functions which had casually devolved upon him a very sufficient reason for busying himself a great deal about the Walcheren expedition. To call out the national guards, almost in his own name and on his own account, to write proclamations, put a great number of men in motion, and appoint a military leader of his own choice, all this suited his twofold purpose of appearing at Schönbrunn very zealous, and at Paris very influential. He fully approved of M. Decrès' ideas, which he strongly supported in a council held on the morning of the 1st of August. Possessed by the dangers that threatened Antwerp, the minister of marine vehemently urged the convocation of 100,000 national guards and the nomination of Marshal Bernadotte to command them. These propositions, which might have appeared excessive under the most urgent circumstances, startled Clarke, the minister of war, whose character was not more trustworthy than Fouché's, but who had much sense and shrewdness, and very much doubted Napoleon's approval either of the national guards or of the Prince of Ponte Corvo. He laid his doubts before the council, and then enumerated the means he had at his disposal without having recourse to the national guards, means which consisted in the provisional demi-brigades instituted by Napoleon, the gendarmerie, the national guards *d'élite*, under the Senator Rampon, and the troops of the camp at Boulogne. The whole might form some 30,000 men under the Senator Sainte Suzanne, an ex-officer of the army of the Rhine, whom Napoleon had appointed to the command of the coasts from Picardy to Holland, in case of an English expedition. Sainte Suzanne, though ill, had declared himself ready to take his command. Lastly, there was the King of Holland, who was marching with some men to Antwerp, and who as constable had already been invested by Napoleon in 1806 with the command of the coasts. Here was enough to supersede the necessity for levies en masse, and a leader in disgrace, like the Prince of Ponte Corvo.

The arch-chancellor, who on the one hand distrusted Fouché's zeal, and on the other feared lest enough should not be done under the circumstances, did not declare himself very openly, but calmed the vehemence of M. Decrès, and seemed to incline to the opinion of the minister of war. Thereupon M. Fouché, abating the warmth of his advocacy of his new friend's views, contented himself with whispering in the ear of M. Decrès that he was of his opinion, and that after all he would do upon his own responsibility what the council would not resolve. The council adjourned without adopting the propositions of MM. Decrès and Fouché, the measures devised by M. Clarke being

considered sufficient for the moment, until orders should have arrived from the emperor, to whom despatches had been sent by extraordinary couriers.

The minister of war immediately issued orders in conformity with the ideas he had promulgated in the council. There were in Paris two demi-brigades composed of fourth battalions, the 3rd and 4th; he sent them off with all speed. There was in the north a battalion of the Vistula, some squadrons of Polish lancers, and several batteries of artillery, destined for the Danube; there were the 6th, 7th, and 8th demi-brigades stationed between Boulogne and Brussels, and four battalions of various regiments cantoned at Louvain; all these he sent to Cadzand and Antwerp. General Rampon had, as on other occasions, been appointed to command about 6000 national guards *d'élite*, the organisation of whom had already begun. The minister Clarke ordered them to Antwerp. He directed Marshal Moncey to collect all the mounted gendarmerie of the departments of the north, amounting to about 2000; and he desired that as soon as Boulogne was considered out of danger, all the troops that could be spared should be sent thence to Antwerp. The three demi-brigades of the north, the two of Paris, the four battalions of Louvain, and the battalion of the Vistula made up about 10,000 foot, and the national guards *d'élite* 5000. With the gendarmerie, the artillery, and the depôts from the vicinity, a force of 20,000 men might be reckoned upon, to which was to be added the camp at Boulogne, and a division of Dutchmen advancing under King Louis. This was a total of 30,000 men, sufficient to protect Antwerp from a *coup de main*. The only difficulty was to bring them up in time, for the chief danger of the moment lay in the promptitude with which the English should conduct their operations. At least fifteen days were requisite to enable these forces to assemble at Antwerp with the horses, the officers, and the necessary matériel, and in fifteen days the English might easily have taken Flushing and laid siege to Antwerp. Quantity of forces was therefore of less moment than celerity, seeing that behind the walls and inundations of Antwerp the number and valour of the troops would be of secondary importance. General Clarke gave the necessary orders that all these movements should be executed as quickly as possible. He sent to Antwerp an officer of engineers of the highest merit, M. Decaux, subsequently minister, and he wrote to the King of Holland, hinting that if he desired the command it rested only with himself to assume it in the capacity of constable.

Meanwhile M. Fouché, on his part, began the grand movement which had not found favour with the council, and wrote to all the departments on the northern frontier, requiring them in the emperor's name to levy the national guards. The letter

addressed to the prefects, and intended for publication, appealed to the honour and patriotism of the population, told them Napoleon relied on them when he quitted his own frontiers for Austria, and that doubtless they would not suffer a handful of English to insult the territory of the empire. This letter, which was a sort of proclamation, savoured of the declamatory style of 1792, and was evidently intended to rouse public feeling. Administrative circulars subjoined to the minister's letter indicated the means by which the men were to be called out, clothed, and mustered. The zeal of the prefects was challenged to act with the utmost celerity.

Whilst these showy measures were being announced, the quieter and more effectual measures of the minister of war were receiving their execution, but unfortunately not so fast as they ought. Extreme confusion prevailed in Antwerp, where there were barely a few hundred soldiers and some workmen to man the ramparts. The King of Holland, with laudable zeal, repaired thither in all haste at the head of 5000 Dutchmen, the only troops at his disposal, whom he had stationed between Bergen-op-Zoom and Antwerp. Having turned thrifty to please the Dutch, he had on foot only these 5000 men, besides four regiments in Germany and one or two battalions in Spain. He had allowed his army and his fleet to dwindle away, in order to conform to the spirit of his new subjects; and in leading all the forces he had to the succour of Antwerp, he exposed Holland to the attempts of the English. That country, formerly friendly to France and hostile to England, had completely changed in that respect since the French alliance had closed the seas against its commerce. It hailed the arrival of the English almost as liberators. All Belgium shared the same feeling for the same reason, and still more from motives of religion. Any success of the English might easily have called forth a popular insurrection in that country. The clergy, whose influence there was so great, had been eager against the French rule since the rupture with the Pope, and all its members, except the Archbishop of Malines, who owed his appointment to Napoleon, directed all their efforts in favour of the English.

On arriving at Bergen-op-Zoom, King Louis stationed his troops between Santvliet and Antwerp, so as to be able to succour the latter. Upon the mere hint in Clarke's letter, he assumed the general command, and giving way to his very lively imagination, he proposed measures which would have prematurely thrown the country into confusion, and done much hurt to the establishment of Antwerp. He wanted to have the whole country flooded from Antwerp to the Lower Scheldt, to have hulls of vessels sunk in the channels, and that, in short, in order to keep off the English, the country should do itself as much mischief as the invaders

themselves could have inflicted upon it. The commandant Decaux, a very sensible man, and a skilful engineer, succeeded in cooling down the King of Holland's effervescing spirits, put the forts of Lillo and Liefkenshoek in a better state, spread the inundation round them so as to render them inaccessible, postponed it round Antwerp, arranged with Admiral Missiessy for the establishment of several booms on the Scheldt, repaired the walls of Antwerp, and brought the measures for defence into some degree of order. Some thousand men of the 3rd, 4th, and 6th demi-brigades having already arrived, and being followed by the customs-men, the gendarmerie, and the national guards, there were about the 10th or 12th of August in Antwerp 8000 or 10,000 men, ill organised, but sufficient to garrison the place. Fortunately, too, the English persisted in the siege of Flushing. General Monnet had received about 2000 men before the closing of the Western Scheldt; and if it was not to be expected that he should hold out to the end, still he would secure time for organising the defence of Antwerp. General Rousseau, on his part, having received the 8th demi-brigade and some national guards *d'élite*, continued to occupy the left bank of the Scheldt, in the island of Cadzand. The progress of the enemy was thus delayed, and that was enough to cause their failure. The fleet had escaped the English; Antwerp was hourly becoming more difficult of access for them; Flushing alone was in danger of falling into their hands; and in any case it might be hoped that it would be their sole trophy.

When Napoleon learned, by extraordinary courier, the news of the Walcheren expedition, he was not surprised at it, for he had expected some descent upon the coasts, and for that reason had left in France the two provisional demi-brigades of Paris, the three of the north, and a certain number of artillery companies, of which he was not in absolute need. If the news did not surprise, still less did it trouble him, for from the first moment he judged the import of the expedition, and was convinced that except some expense entailed on himself, all the evils of it would fall upon the English, who would perish uselessly by the fever, without taking Antwerp or the fleet, unless the latter was ill managed. Had he, however, more impartially considered his own position, he would have seen that this expedition did his government a very serious kind of mischief—that of strikingly revealing the dangers of a policy which, having 300,000 men in Spain, 100,000 in Italy, and 300,000 in Germany, had not a soldier to guard Antwerp, Lille, and Paris.

At first, strange to say, he was not of the opinion of those who had thought themselves of his, namely, General Clarke and Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès. Both had supposed he would not approve either of the mustering of the national guards, or of the

nomination of Marshal Bernadotte. They had guessed wrong. Though Napoleon did not like to have recourse to reasoning populations who put conditions upon their services, and though he surmised how much rancour the Prince of Ponte Corvo cherished against him, still he could waive all such considerations when his interest required it. In the first place, he was not exactly informed as to the importance of the Walcheren expedition, and though with his transcendent sagacity he foresaw its ultimate result, he was yet not free from all uneasiness when he heard of 40,000 or 50,000 English soldiers—soldiers whose valour Spain had showed him. He did not think that such a force was to be despised, and by no means wished that the French should remain indifferent to its appearance. He could then have wished that at the first signal the nation had risen up in eager indignation to fall upon the audacious foe that dared to violate the soil of the empire. This would have been to unite the enthusiasm of 1792 with the profound order of 1809; but things so contrary are not to be allied at will. Nevertheless, as it gathers years, authority becomes singularly self-complacent, however great it may be intellectually. This is a weakness of time. Though he began to weary the nation, though the evidence of his ambition gave his wars a meaning unfavourable to him, Napoleon thought that everything was due to him; that at the first danger occasioned by his fault, every Frenchman ought to start to his feet; and he had, moreover, contracted the false notion of a man of genius, that a government, when it will, may make a nation do whatever it pleases. He was therefore dissatisfied that on the first appearance of the English on the soil of the empire his ministers had not appealed to France, roused her enthusiasm, and demanded her devoted efforts. He believed they ought to have done this, that they could have done it, and he blamed their coldness. He thought it especially desirable (and in this he showed no weakness, but the highest good sense) to disgust the English with similar expeditions, by setting the mass of the people upon them. He regarded it as a great advantage for the moment, to prove to Austria, with which he was in negotiation, that France was ready to unite with him; and if the reader would know his last motive, frankly expressed in his letters, he desired, as matter for recruiting was beginning to fail him, to procure fresh, by deriving from a strong commotion from 60,000 to 80,000 young national guards, whom, once raised, he would retain in arms, and convert into the best of conscripts, for they would all be from twenty to thirty years old. He therefore bitterly blamed General Clarke and Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès for their excessive prudence, and MM. Fouché and Decrès for not having persisted in the opinions they had put forth, still more than MM. Clarke and Cambacérès for not having

acquiesced in them. He wrote to both parties that he could not understand their hesitations; that at the first signal they ought to have raised 60,000 national guards, convoked the Senate, employed it to speak to France, and proved that behind the armies engaged at a distance there remained the nation itself, ready to support them, and supply their place at every point. If these ideas be compared with those which have been attributed to him in all contemporary narratives, it will be seen how rarely history is well informed.

Far from being displeased with Fouché for having agitated the nation, Napoleon blamed him for not having sufficiently stirred it up. As for the choice of the commander-in-chief, he here showed how much his judgment was superior to his passions when a great interest required it. He entertained a deep aversion for the vanity, the ambition, and the whole character of Marshal Bernadotte, and he perfectly divined what treachery, present and future, was latent in his heart; and yet, deeming him of all men within reach of the British expedition the only one capable of taking the command, he deeply regretted that he had not been nominated general-in-chief of the troops assembled in the north. He therefore reproached his ministers for not having chosen him, and ordered them to confer the command upon him if there was yet time. He no less strongly condemned them for conferring the command on King Louis. He was beginning to conceive an extreme impatience at seeing his brother govern Holland in a narrow interest, tolerating smuggling, favouring clandestine relations with England, feebly seconding and often abandoning the cause of the continental blockade, and abounding in a system of economy pleasing to the Dutch, but destructive to their army and their marine. Exaggerating even his brother's sins regarding the imperial policy, he went so far as to entertain distrust of him, and he reproached his ministers for not having seen that on this occasion King Louis would prefer the interests of Holland to those of France, and to preserve Amsterdam, would let Flushing be taken and Antwerp burned. Nothing was more unjust than such a supposition, for King Louis was at that moment hastening to the defence of the French territory, and was uncovering Amsterdam to cover Antwerp. But irritated by a correspondence with his brother, which was daily becoming more acrimonious, Napoleon blamed the confidence that had been placed in him, and in his letters he sarcastically asked his ministers, "Is it because he bears the title of constable that you have chosen Louis? But Murat bears that of grand-admiral: what would you say if I gave him a fleet to command?"

These points settled, the convocation of the national guard being adopted, and Bernadotte being designated for the chief

command, he gave admirably prudent, able, and provident instructions as to the conduct to be pursued. Make no attempt, he said in his letters to his ministers, to come to action with the English. *A man is not a soldier.** Your national guards, your conscripts of the provisional demi-brigades, led pell-mell to Antwerp, almost without officers, with an artillery scarcely formed, opposed to Moore's soldiers, who have had to do with the troops of the grand army, would get themselves beaten, and would supply the English expedition with an object which they will soon lack, if they have not taken the fleet, as I hope, and if they do not take Antwerp, as I am sure they will not. The English must be opposed only with the fever, which will soon have devoured them all; and with soldiers shut in behind entrenchments and inundations, to be organised and instructed. In a month the English will depart covered with confusion, decimated by the fever, and I shall have gained from this expedition an army of 80,000 men, which will render me many services if the war with Austria is to continue.

In accordance with these views, Napoleon ordered General Monnet to defend Flushing to the last extremity, so as to keep the English as long as possible in the fever district, and give Antwerp time to complete its defences. He formally enjoined him not to lose a minute in breaking the dykes, and laying the whole island of Walcheren under water. He then gave orders to have the fleet taken up to Antwerp, or even higher, if that had not yet been done; to let in the water only where inundations were necessary; by no means to sink hulls of vessels in the channels, for he did not wish to have the Scheldt destroyed by way of defending it; to muster at Antwerp, under Marshal Bernadotte, the provisional demi-brigades, General Rampon's national guards *d'élite*, the disposable depôt battalions, Marshal Moncey's gendarmerie, and King Louis's Dutchmen, the whole forming possibly an army of 25,000 men, to be stationed round Antwerp behind the dykes and inundations, so as to render the place inaccessible, without, however, giving battle, but leaving the fever alone to work for him upon the English; to form after that first army a second, composed exclusively of national guards, distributed into five legions, commanded by as many veteran officers of the Senate, and to be spread from the Tête de Flandre (a suburb of Antwerp) to the island of Cadzand, to guard the left bank of the Scheldt, in case the English should attempt a descent upon it; to organise that new army as well as possible, and summon to it, not retired officers, old servants of the republic, but officers from the infantry depôts, particularly the majors, who were almost all excellent; to get together the

* Napoleon's own words. What follows is a faithful abridgment of a hundred admirable letters on the Walcheren expedition.

matériel and personnel of eighty pieces of artillery, the means for which he afforded by leaving in France ten companies of artillery out of those he had demanded; lastly, to place that second army under the command of Marshal Bessières, who was cured of the wound he had received at Wagram, on whose devoted zeal he relied, and whom he was not sorry to place by the side of Prince Bernadotte to second and watch the latter. To these two armies Napoleon (knowing that one never obtains more than half what one orders and pays for) desired to add a third on the Meuse, which was to come from the Rhine, and be composed of some demi-brigades at first destined for the Danube. He had already received from the hospitals, the depôts of Italy, and the demi-brigades which had come by Strasburg and down the Danube, a considerable mass of soldiers, who had been incorporated with the army of Germany, and raised its effective amount to a most satisfactory point. He could therefore dispense with part of the resources he had called for, and consequently he gave orders to stop at Strasburg every corps that was organised—such, for example, as the demi-brigades—and send them down by the Rhine to the Meuse; to continue to send to Vienna mere detachments, suitable for recruiting the battalions; to commence at Maestricht, under Marshal Kellermann, a muster of 10,000 men, complete in all arms, in order to flank Marshal Bernadotte at Antwerp. Estimating Bernadotte's corps at 30,000 men, that of Bessières at 40,000, and that of Kellermann at 10,000, Napoleon hoped to have in Flanders an army of 80,000 men, including 50,000 at least passably organised, who, moreover, would become trained in a little while, and of whom, perhaps, at some future time he himself would suddenly come and take the command, if there was any good snare to be laid for the English. Detaining the latter in a labyrinth of islands, marshes, and arms of the sea, he did not despair of seconding the effects of the fever by some sudden piece of strategy which would make them pay dear for their immense expedition; so that instead of being distressed by an attempt which, in reality, as we have said, revealed one of the bad sides of his policy, he was delighted at it, because he discerned the probability of a signal retaliation, and the creation of an army the more added to those he already possessed.

When these instructions arrived in Paris they filled Fouché with pride, and Clarke and Cambacérès with embarrassment. But each went to work to fulfil Napoleon's intentions to the best of his ability. Fouché had already rung a veritable tocsin for the levy of the national guards. He had, in the first instance, addressed a call to ten departments; he had recourse to twenty after the letters from Schönbrunn, and prepared even to address a still greater number. L'Escaut, La Lys, La Meuse

Inférieure, Jemmapes, Les Ardennes, La Marne, L'Aisne, Le Nord, Le Pas de Calais, La Somme, La Seine Inférieure, L'Oise, Seine et Oise, La Seine, Seine et Marne, L'Aube, L'Yonne, Le Loiret, Eure et Loire, and L'Eure were put under contribution to furnish contingents of national guards. The prefects called together the mayors, and organised a sort of conscription, which was to be voluntary in appearance, but forced in reality, and from which escape was to be effected by paying so much a day to the unemployed workmen, or the vagabonds whom the authorities did not know what to do with. There were, in fact, very few zealous citizens who offered to serve in person, for this muster of national guards was looked upon as a new form of conscription. People did not believe much in the danger of the British expedition, and such as it was, they imputed it to the policy which left our own frontiers uncovered to invade those of others. In the Belgian departments, which were ill-disposed, and in those of the centre and the south, where distance caused the danger to be more coolly regarded, the inhabitants did not lend themselves freely to the new levies. But in the old departments near the northern frontiers and the coast, where the hatred of the English has always been very strong, people came forward with some alacrity. These latter departments had already furnished General Rampon with picked companies, consisting of old soldiers; they again supplied men for the new corps of which Napoleon had ordered the formation. M. Fouché, acting in a revolutionary manner, did not hesitate to charge the budget of the minister of the interior with considerable expenses for clothing the national guards. Partly from zeal, partly from ostentation, he displayed an activity which was soon to end by exciting suspicion, for it exceeded the bounds of what was natural and useful. In Paris especially he displayed an ardour that appeared strange. In that great capital, accustomed to pass so rapidly from enthusiasm to sarcasm, there had been a change of feeling towards Napoleon since the war in Spain. To have the English so close upon one at home, whilst one was at Madrid and Vienna; to keep the Pope prisoner in Rome, when he had been so caressed at Nôtre Dame—all this displayed an inconsistency which no one took the trouble to disguise. Paris, according to the bulletins of the police, was not like itself for a year past, and—sad result of the abuse of war!—Napoleon had so wearied out patriotism, that the mendacious bulletins of the Archduke Charles, denying the success of the French army, were secretly circulated; not that the Parisians were already so culpable as not to desire that success, but because without doubting Napoleon's genius they began to doubt his fortune, and thus he had revived the dangerous propensity

to be critical. For these reasons Fouché had with difficulty succeeded in moving the young who loved horses and uniforms, and organising some battalions of national guards in Paris. He had been obliged to talk of a guard of honour which should escort the emperor's person without going very far abroad; and to fill up its vacant ranks he had even been obliged to pay men without work. He had then indulged in the pleasure of reviewing them—a dangerous pleasure, which was afterwards to cost him dear. As for the minister of war, M. Clarke, his occupations were more serious. On receipt of letters from Napoleon, he had summoned the Prince of Ponte Córvo, and sent him to Antwerp. The disposable demi-brigades were on their way to the Scheldt; the gendarmerie collected by Marshal Moncey had furnished 2000 horses; the artillery withdrawn from the roads to Alsace were on those to Flanders, and though with much confusion, the means of defence were beginning to accumulate on the previously unguarded points of Antwerp, La Tête de Flandre, Le Sas de Gand, Breskens, and the island of Cadzand.

Fortunately the English had profited little by the time elapsed. They had finished by collecting all their land and sea forces in the Eastern Scheldt. Their fleet was spread over the various channels that divide Walcheren from North and South Beveland; their troops were stationed in the island of Walcheren, round Flushing, and in South Bèveland, round the fort of Batz. They did not think they could march safely until they had opened to their fleet the passage of the Western Scheldt by the capture of Flushing, which would allow them to bring up their whole army by sea before Batz and Santvliet. In consequence of this determination, they had spent the first days of August in making works of approach before Flushing, and had employed their best troops upon them. General Monnet, who, as we have seen, had received 2000 men from various regiments, particularly two French battalions—the one from the 48th, the other from the 65th—had used them to dispute the ground more vigorously than had been done in the beginning. The new troops sent to him, though young, were full of honour, and did their duty better than the medley of foreigners of whom the Flushing garrison had at first consisted.

After having lost 1200 or 1500 men, he was by the 10th of August entirely pent up within the town, and communicated only by his right with the post of Rameskens, where he had endeavoured to break down the dykes, in compliance with Napoleon's urgent orders. But whether it was that the tide was too low, or the ground not formed to receive the inundation, but little water had entered the island, and the English, lodged on the causeways, had been able to remain before

Flushing, where they were at work to establish batteries to reduce the town. This was the critical moment for the besieged; for General Monnet had no casemates to shelter his troops. He had in the town a population (like all maritime populations) ill-disposed towards the French; he had in the garrison one-third French, unused to war, but trustworthy, and two-thirds foreigners, downright bandits, who took advantage of the disorder of a siege to plunder and exasperate the inhabitants. The condition was therefore one of the very worst for resisting the frightful extremities which were in preparation.

In conformity with the true principles of siege operations, the English had resolved to employ all their artillery simultaneously, and not otherwise. On the one hand, they laboured at the erection of their incendiary batteries; on the other, to introduce into the Deurloo channel a portion of the Gardner division, which consisted of ships of the line and frigates, so as to cannonade the town by land and sea. Already even they had succeeded in turning it on the inner side by passing through the Weere Gat into the Sloe.

On the 11th of August, after some difficulty, for want of pilots, and in consequence of the removal of the buoys, the frigates began to pass along the Deurloo channel before Flushing, discharging upon its walls a cannonade which was vigorously returned. They effected their junction with the smaller craft, which had come down by the Sloe to before Rameskens. On the 12th the ships followed the frigates into the channel, and the English general, having summoned Flushing to surrender, began to cannonade it simultaneously by land and sea. Never had so many guns sent forth their thunders in so small a space. The land batteries numbered more than sixty pieces of large calibre —twenty-four pounders and mortars. The guns of the naval division were from 1000 to 1100, and poured out incessant broadsides of shot and shells. After twenty-four hours of this horrible cannonade, the town was found to be on fire; all the houses were shot through, all the roofs demolished. The inhabitants howled in despair. The batteries on the side next the sea replied with vigour, and caused the British squadron some serious damage. But the latter was numerous enough to bring fresh vessels into line in the place of those that were injured; and in consequence of the freedom of its movements, it was able to throw its fire athwart our batteries. The contest could not long be continued without ending in all our gunners being put hors de combat. By the 14th most of them were killed or wounded. Endeavours were made to fill their places with soldiers of the line, but the latter, having no experience, were very bad substitutes; and besides, the cannons were almost all dismounted. On the 14th, the English general, finding the

guns of the town almost silenced, granted it a respite while he summoned it again to surrender. Not receiving an immediate reply, he reopened his fire. This fresh cannonade put Flushing in such a state that it was no longer possible to resist. No return was made to the besiegers' fire, for our batteries were every one destroyed. The troops, with the exception of the French minority, refused to serve, and employed themselves only in pillaging. The despairing inhabitants insisted on surrendering, for several breaches in the walls exposed them to the horrors of storming. Under these circumstances General Monnet consented to capitulate, and signed articles of surrender on the 16th of August. Though capitulations are never to be excused, it must be owned that in this case a longer defence was impossible, and would have retarded the surrender only one day, whilst it exposed the garrison and the inhabitants to all the consequences of a storming. After all, General Monnet, by detaining the enemy seventeen days before Flushing, and General Rousseau, by preventing their landing on Cadzand, had ruined the English expedition.

Flushing taken, an immediate advance ought to have been made upon Antwerp; but here the operation was becoming more delicate and more perilous, since the invaders had to march over French territory, through vast inundations, to lay siege to a considerable fortress already filled with reinforcements, which had been sent to it from all parts. The simplest course—if there had been as much resolution at that time as when the expedition started—would have been to have landed all the troops with their matériel on the islands of North and South Beveland, to have crossed those islands on foot, as the Hope division had previously done, and gone straightway to Santvliet, without losing time in bringing all the way up the two Scheldts such an enormous quantity of ships, frigates, and transports. A keen dispute arose on this subject between the naval and the military commander, as always happens in expeditions of this kind in which such dissimilar forces co-operate. The admiral, who was for landing the troops at once, and marching them to Batz, urged the difficulty of working through the two Scheldts, under the fire of the batteries still remaining to the Dutch and the French, and through channels, the soundings of which were unknown, a multitude of ships of war and transports, amounting, with the gunboats, to 1200 or 1500, and towing these against the stream, which would require an indefinite number of days; whilst, if the troops were landed where they were, they would reach Batz in forty-eight hours. The commander of the land forces, on the contrary, wished to have all his matériel deposited at Batz or at Santvliet, alleging the impossibility of traversing with such encumbrances ground intersected by so

many arms of the sea, canals, and dykes, to reach the upper extremity of the two Scheldts. He urged, above all, the necessity of having means to cross the channel of Bergen-op-Zoom, and from the island of South Beveland to the mainland, on which Antwerp stands. It is probable that the general, on whom rested the responsibility of the land operations, was not displeased to protract an expedition which frightened him, now that he had to march over the soil of the empire.

After a keen altercation, the Earl of Chatham, with whom it rested to decide how he would employ his army, having insisted that his troops and his matériel should be conveyed by water to Batz and Santvliet, the admiral had only to submit, and undertake the introduction of that immense armament into the two Scheldts. This he tried to do, introducing the smaller craft into the eastern branch, and the larger, such as frigates and ships, into the western. But the fleet had to wait every day for the tide, and when the wind was not favourable, the vessels had to haul upon their cables or be towed from the shore. From the 16th of August all the seamen in the fleet were employed in this severe labour.

During this time the Prince of Ponte Corvo had repaired to Antwerp, which he entered on the 15th, bringing thither very opportunely the authority of his rank. King Louis, who, amidst the confusion of dismayed civilians and scarcely organised troops, knew not which way to turn for advice, gladly resigned the command to the prince-marshal, and retired to Bergen-op-Zoom, and thence to Amsterdam, to take care of his own dominions. He left, however, his 5000 Dutchmen between Santvliet and Bergen-op-Zoom at the disposal of Marshal Bernadotte, who had power to combine them with his own forces.

The marshal found on his arrival three demi-brigades already mustered, several fourth battalions taken from the 24th military division, a Polish battalion, 3000 or 4000 national guards *d'élite*, about 2000 mounted gendarmes, 1000 horse from the depôts, and several companies of artillery, making altogether twenty and odd thousand men present under arms, 12,000 or 15,000 of whom were capable of appearing in line, with nearly 24 pieces of cannon, badly horsed. This medley of troops would have made a bad figure before the English army, especially if it was commanded like its countrymen in Spain; but behind the inundations of the Scheldt and the walls of Antwerp, under the command of a marshal practised in war and inspiring confidence, it was enough to frustrate the impending attack. It is true that the confusion in Antwerp was great, and that the moment would still have been favourable enough for a daring enemy, who, after taking Flushing, should have marched on Antwerp, which he might have reached on the 17th, when the marshal,

but just arrived, knowing neither the place nor his army, had not yet been able to grasp the command. Success would have been easy on the 1st of August, if the English had not waited to take Flushing; but on the 16th, after Flushing had fallen, it became difficult, there being already in Antwerp a considerable though ill-organised muster of men, supplies, and a commander; and day by day the difficulty was about to rise into impossibility, for besides that the forces in the town were to be incessantly augmented, they were about to be organised, which was still better than being augmented.

Marshal Bernadotte, in concert with two able men, Admiral Missiessy and the engineer-commandant Decaux, completed the measures devised in anticipation of the march of the English upon Antwerp. The forts of Lillo and Liefkenshoek were put completely in a state of defence and surrounded by vast inundations. Behind these forts two sets of booms protected the fleet. Within the booms a numerous flotilla, ranging along the banks of the Scheldt, was to sweep them with raking fires; and the ten ships of the fleet, free in their movements, and having nothing to fear from fire-ships, could second the defence of Antwerp with 800 or 900 large guns. Antwerp itself was covered with entrenchments, palisades, and cannons; it was filled with troops, and its defenders were ready to encompass it with inundations. Marshal Bernadotte reviewed the troops, organised them, prepared them to look the enemy in the face, inspired them with an incipient confidence in themselves, and completed the mounting of their artillery; whilst in the rear, from the Tête de Flandre to Bruges, national guards were mustering in large numbers to form the army of Marshal Bessières. The brave General Rousseau, with one of the demi-brigades sent him, guarded all the approaches to the island of Cadzand and the left bank of the Scheldt.

After having spent seventeen days in taking Flushing, the English employed ten more in working their 1200 or 1500 sail up the two branches of the Scheldt. On the 25th, they had between Batz and Santvliet 200 or 300 frigates, corvettes, brigs, and gunboats, and were in a condition to cross the channel of Bergen-op-Zoom, which forms the junction of the Western with the Eastern Scheldt. They could do so either in their countless boats, or by fording it at low tide with the water up to their shoulders. But beyond it they had to brave the territory of the empire, an experienced general, and an army magnified by the exaggerations of the French and the fears of the English, and reputed to be 40,000 strong. This was not all: the epidemic which had spared the corps engaged before Flushing, because activity generally protects armies from fever, had not only attacked the troops landed in South Beveland, but also the

division which, after having completed the siege of Flushing, was resting in Walcheren. The effects of their want of occupation, and the bad marsh water they drank, had been the more violent from the numbers assembled. From the 16th of August, the date of the surrender of Flushing, to the 26th, when the naval forces arrived off Batz, 12,000 or 15,000 men had been attacked by the fever, and in many of them it had assumed a malignant character. They were dying by thousands, and there was scarcely a place to lay them; for there were few buildings on the always half-inundated islands of Zeeland, and Flushing had not a roof left standing. After having left some thousand men in Flushing, there remained, exclusive of the sick and wounded, but 24,000 or 25,000 out of 44,000 to march to Antwerp.

Lord Chatham seeing this state of things, and further intimidated by what was reported of Bernadotte's strength, held a council of war on the 26th of August, at Batz, to determine what was to be done. All the lieutenant-generals were present. It was evidently impossible to cross the channel of Bergen-op-Zoom, either by fording it or on shipboard, and then march on Antwerp, without incurring a disaster. In fact, there would be found invincible difficulties on the way, if the French had the prudence not to give battle, but trust to the obstruction caused by the waters, which could not fail to stop the English army, whilst the fever would reduce their numbers from 24,000 to 20,000, or perhaps 15,000. And if they failed before Antwerp, as everything foreboded, how should they effect their retreat before the French, who would immediately sally out from their entrenchments and pursue them. It would be the utmost if they could get back safe and sound across the channel of Bergen-op-Zoom.

These arguments were quite valid; for whereas on the 1st of August there was every chance of success, and on the 16th some still remained, on the 26th there was none whatever, and it would have been madness to pursue the object of the expedition further. Its leaders, then, had to content themselves with the conquest of Flushing; a conquest, it is true, that would not be retained, though costing enormous expenses, 15,000 or 20,000 invalids, and the shame of seeing the greatest maritime experiment of the age made ridiculous. But there was no help for it. The decision of the council of war was immediately transmitted to England, whence a reply could arrive in forty-eight hours. The interval was spent in retrograding and embarking the sick for England.

On the 2nd of September the British cabinet approved of the decision of the council of war, and ratified the abandonment of an expedition which had cost so many efforts and promised such vast results. The English began again the difficult operation

of hauling along the Scheldt 1200 or 1500 vessels of all forms and sizes, and embarking their men, horses, and cannon. A great number of vessels sailed for the Downs. But the army could not be left where it was. Already there were 15,000 or 18,000 soldiers on the sick-list. These were embarked as well as could be done, and vessels to convey them home were continually passing to and fro between the island of Walcheren and the Downs. To avoid acknowledging the complete failure of the expedition by immediately evacuating Flushing, it was resolved to leave there a garrison of 12,000 men, and the water drunk being the principal cause of the fever, 800 tons a day were to be sent from the Downs to Flushing. The transports, therefore, were constantly coming and going, bringing water, and taking away the sick. Four thousand had already perished in Walcheren. Twelve thousand had been carried to England, where many died on their arrival; and as the garrison of Flushing diminished daily, it was resolved that only the number of troops strictly necessary for its defence should remain there. It was even intended to evacuate it altogether after blowing up the works, if the peace which was soon to be signed brought back the French armies from the Danube to the Scheldt.

When the French perceived the retrograde movement of the English (and they were not slow to perceive it), they were in a tumult of delight at their easy victory. The happy result was due exclusively to the firm attitude of General Rousseau, who had preserved the island of Cadzand, to General Monnet's resistance, which had made the English lose valuable time, and to the coolness of Admiral Missiessy, whose skilful manœuvring had saved the fleet. Nevertheless Marshal Bernadotte, always prompt to sound his own praises, addressed a new order of the day to his troops applauding himself for the victory they had obtained over the English. This order of the day did not find more favour at Schönbrunn than that which he had addressed to the Saxons after the battle of Wagram.

It was now time to stop the levy of the national guards, who filled the country with agitation from Lille to Ghent, from Ghent to Antwerp, deserted for the most part on the march, or arrived in undisciplined tumult. This was the opinion of General Clarke; but Fouché, who had received the emperor's approbation for the first levy, and found means of exalting his own consequence through the reviews in Paris and the general movement of the population, continued the levies, and extended them to the whole coast of the empire, even to Toulon and Genoa, under the pretext that the English, being forced to quit Zeeland, might very possibly go and revenge themselves in Guyenne, Provence, or Piedmont, for their disaster in Flanders.

All these events were made known to Napoleon in the

beginning of September. Great was his joy and his pride, for he attributed this success to his lucky star. Having seen that star near waning two or three times since the affairs of Spain began, he thought he now beheld it shining with fresh lustre. "It is," he said in his letters, "a piece of the good fortune attached to present circumstances, this same expedition, which reduces to nothing the greatest effort of England, and procures us an army of 80,000 men, which we could not have procured otherwise." He gave orders to continue organising the army of the north, to muster five legions of national guards under five senators, selecting for them only young and vigorous men disposed to serve; and to complete the horsing of the artillery, in order that it might drive the English out of Flushing if they attempted to remain there, or return to Germany if hostilities with Austria were resumed. Lastly, being again displeased with Marshal Bernadotte for his propensity to vaunt after the simplest operations, and seeing him with distrust at the head of an army composed of old republican officers and national guards, he had him thanked by the minister Clarke for his services, and ordered Marshal Bessières to take the command of the army of the north.

Such had been this year the efforts of the English to dispute the Peninsula with Napoleon, and destroy his vast maritime armaments on the coasts. In Spain, with a few soldiers and a good general, they had stood their ground against admirable troops feebly commanded; and in Flanders, with excellent troops lacking a general, they had failed ignominiously before the recruits that filled Antwerp. But on the one theatre and the other Napoleon's fortune still prevailed. Sir Arthur Wellesley, pursued by the mass of the French armies, retreated into Andalusia, dissatisfied with his Spanish allies, and scarcely having any more hopes of that war. Lord Chatham returned to England, covered with confusion. Napoleon might then extort from forsaken Austria a brilliant peace, and save his own greatness and ours if he profited by the lessons of fortune, which once again seemed to have used him roughly for a moment to warn rather than destroy him.

END OF VOL. VI.

PRINTED BY BALLANTYNE, HANSON AND CO.
EDINBURGH AND LONDON.

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